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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the importance of conflict in the 
Third World. It stresses ethnic conflict; conflict within 
classes, particularly within the bourgeosie; and the role of 
the 'professional' component in this middle-class struggle. 
It looks at these in respect of Pakistan and Nigeria, both of 
which have suffered major civil wars. Conflict is an inseparable 
part of the process of 'development'. It is argued in this thesis 
that the nature of conflict changes as societies develop. Third 
World societies tend to be riven by communal, especially ethnic 
divisions, while the class structure is ill-defined. Conflict 
is therefore often ethnic in nature. As the importance of these 
divisions recedes and the class structure begins to develop, the 
nature of conflict changes. However, classes are still little 
more than clusters of 'class fragments', not fully fledged classes 
in the Western sense. 
Each class fragment finds itself in competition, not with 
'distant'- class fragments but with similar class fragments; 
resources are so scarce that fragments even within a single class 
'group' fight over access to them. Conflict is, therefore, 
'intra-class' (i. e. within broad clusters). This competition 
occurs all the way through the social hierarchy but reaches its 
climax at the top. Because of the scarcity of resources one of 
the main means of access to them is through power. The struggle 
for power between the various 'elite' (but basically bourgeois) 
fragments is, therefore, intense. 
Business, bureaucracy, the army and politics all form bases 
for different class fragments in their struggle against each other 
to control resources. Central to intra-class conflict is the 
'professional' component of the bourgeoisie. In its struggle 
for supremacy over the military, the bureaucracy, and businessmen, 
it seeks an expansion of democracy, politics being its only source 
of power against these other, stronger, elites. This struggle 
is carried over into the mass media, which are manned largely by 
this professional component of the middle class. The press in 
particular reflects both ethnic and intra-class struggle. This 
thesis describes in detail the connection between the press and 
conflict. Only as Third World societies develop more fully is 
class struggle likely to become 'inter-class', i. e. between classes. 
Then the various middle-class fragments might combine against the 
rising proletariat, and unite in their control and use of the mass 
media. The research incorporated into this thesis did not concern 
itself with this long-term possibility. 
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PART ONE: THE SOCIOLOGICAL NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Despite early attempts to prove otherwise, it appears that it 
is not possible to understand development on the basis of any single 
sociological formula. Such simplification, however congenial, cannot 
account for the enormous variety of developing societies. Nevertheless, 
it does help to try to establish some sort of basic framework from 
which to operate. For instance, assumptions have to be made on the 
meaning of development. In fact, it seems preferable to use such 
assumptions rather than some theoretical formula as a basis for 
empirical study. Assuming that the minimum economic and political 
conditions needed to define what developing countries are can be 
ascertained without too much difficulty 
- most of them are very poor 
relative to the West, with a small industrial base, and only recently 
(or fairly recently) free of colonial rule 
- 
it is much harder to say 
with any certainty what the sociological condition of these societies 
might be. Fairly clearly it must derive from the minimum economic 
and political conditions just described, for these determine whether 
a country is a 'developing country' or not. I consider the following 
to be the fundamental sociological condition of developing countries: 
that they are governed by a struggle between various social groups 
for access to scarce resources. All societies, of course, contain 
struggles between different groups for a greater share of economic 
welfare, but the scarcity of resources in developing countries 
intensifies and also alters the character of this struggle in very 
particular ways. I shall be describing these conflicts throughout 
this thesis. 
My own approach to the understanding of development is informed 
by the general sociological condition just described, rather than by 
a comprehensive theoretical framework. However, I consider theorising 
rather than mere empirical comparison - if development is to be 
understood at all 
- 
to be absolutely necessary. Two general 
theoretical frameworks that have been very important in the sociology 
of development are functionalism and Marxism. Both of these theories 
-2- 
are the type that propose a formula for the understanding of 
developing societies that can be applied across the board 
(however much variation these formulae are subjected to in 
practice). Apart from their particular weaknesses, both 
theories leave too much out. They are simply too general. 
It seems to me that theories more varied and flexible than 
functionalism and Marxism are needed if a genuinely coherent 
and comprehensive basis for the understanding of development 
is to be achieved. Though both theories have serious deficiencies 
in their application to development 
- 
far more marked in the case 
of functionalism, which is becoming an increasingly redundant 
school of thought 
- 
it is possible, through comparison of these 
two totally antithetical theories, to see the way to a more flexible 
framework of ideas. 
The major deficiency in functionalism is its inability to 
give emphasis to the idea of conflict. Even a casual look at 
events in many Third World countries is enough to show the absurdity 
of this fault (one quite fundamental to the theory). In discussing 
theories of development I shall start with functionalism and add 
greater and greater slices of conflict until the Marxist position 
is reached.. The analysis will, thereby, also become more concerned 
with class. But this reduction of a vast array of social forces 
to those solely defined by class reveals the major deficiency of 
Marxism in its application to development. Traditional class 
analysis is not particularly relevant to the study of Third World 
society, which usually lacks a developed class structure in the 
Western sense (whether one looks at the West now or in the past). 
Concomitantly, Marxism tends to ignore other bases of conflict 
than that provided by class - in particular, differences of community 
(whether these divisions are defined by race, religion, language 
or territory). 
In my own theoretical discussion, then, I shall be emphasising 
the role of conflict in development, and the role of both community 
and class in the generation of conflict. Because of the importance 
of communal conflict I have incorporated a good deal of discussion 
on nationalism. My analysis, therefore, goes wider than the 
-3- 
development process itself. However, I also decided to analyse 
one sector of society in greater depth, thereby narrowing the 
discussion as well. Another reason for doing this was to 
, 
incorporate some more purely sociological analysis. Much of my 
discussion is taken up with the political-economies of the 
countries I have studied. In order to get closer to society 
itself I could have chosen to look at education, or the family, 
and observed how they related to the broader political and economic 
nature of these societies. I decided, in fact, to study the mass 
media, as these have a more obvious and natural link with questions 
of political-economy. 
As I have said, my argument is informed by the notion of 
struggle over scarce resources. This thesis is essentially a 
study of the communal and class bases of conflict in developing 
countries. I shall'be looking at these questions with reference 
to nationalism, development itself, and the mass media. The 
struggle over scarce resources starts before independence. It 
does not, therefore, seem sensible to view the nationalist period 
as a totally separate affair from the post-independence period. 
I shall analyse the struggle over scarce resources in both these 
phases, and then go on to see how this struggle is reflected in 
the mass media. How the media reflect society varies according 
to the theory you hold. Both functionalism and Marxism - my 
theoretical parameters - have particular views on the role of the 
media in society. Media images are either a direct reflection 
of society (functionalism), or a distortion of it (Marxism). In 
looking at the nature of this relationship I too shall view the 
media as a part of society influenced by its political and economic 
structure in particular ways, but different ones from-those proposed 
by either of the above theories. 
The nub of my overall argument is that competition for access 
to scarce resources sparks off a mixture of communal and class 
conflict. This starts before independence; in this sense, then, 
there is little difference between the nationalist and post-independence 
periods. In fact, I shall be arguing that nationalism is a 
continuous process. 'Before independence there is anti-colonial 
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nationalism, but after independence (sometimes even before this) 
ethnic divisions occur within the new state, resulting in smaller 
nationalisms and sometimes pronounced secession attempts, which 
are naturally opposed by the groups in control. The new states 
thus become the seeding-beds of new imperialist and nationalist 
forces. This does not mean that this conflict is purely cultural 
in nature. It is, in fact, a part of the continuing struggle 
over access to scarce resources. Economic factors are clearly 
of importance: natural differences in the distribution of resources, 
discrimination or plain exploitation play an overwhelming part in 
creating ethnic tensions. However, not all socio-economic groups 
within an ethnic community will be equally affected by these factors. 
Assessment has to be made, therefore, of the relationship between 
the society's ethnic structure and its class structure, however 
weak and fragmented the latter might be. 
Functionalism is totally incapable of explaining these complex 
relationships, while Marxism offers only partial explanations. 
Conflict is primarily communal. Nevertheless, there is class 
conflict too. However different the class structure of developing 
countries might be from that in the West, it exists: there are 
traditional classes, and there are incipient 'modern' classes in 
the Western sense. - what I, in fact, call "class fragments". I 
argue that, in developing countries the means for economic advance 
are so limited that they are insufficient for even a single class. 
Conflict tends to be between class fragments. Moreover, as 
resources are so limited, class fragments with broadly similar 
socio-economic backgrounds find themselves in competition for the 
same resources (whether these are petty trading opportunities, 
industrial assets, or power). Instead of classes it seems more 
appropriate to talk in terms of clusters of class fragments. 
Different fragments within each cluster compete against each other 
over the same set of resources. Class conflict is, therefore, 
within classes, i. e. "intra-class" rather than "inter-class". 
Conflict is horizontal rather than vertical. 
Most developing countries have severe communal divisions of 
one sort or another, but usually ethnic. For convenience, I shall 
-5- 
generally speak of ethnic conflict, though it should not be forgotten 
that other communal divisions also exist. However, it is not 
possible for entire ethnic groups to oppose each other. They each 
have their own social hierarchies. Conflict tends to be between 
equivalent socio-economic groups from different ethnic communities 
over (for the same reasons as discussed just above) the same set of 
resources. Thus traders from one ethnic group compete against 
traders from another group. The same goes for workers, industrialists, 
and the political elite. In other words, ethnic conflict occurs 
all the way down the social hierarchy. Or, to put it another way, 
it is between equivalent class fragments from different ethnic groups. 
As the class structure develops, the cultural aspects of this conflict 
recede and it becomes more purely intra-class in nature. (This is 
also the case in those societies that do not contain severe communal 
divisions). As the class structure develops further class conflict 
becomes increasingly similar to that which occurs in the West, i. e. 
it becomes increasingly inter-class. In sum ,I propose a broad 
scheme of development, going from ethnic (or other communal) conflict, 
to intra-class and then, finally, inter-class conflict. Thus it is 
only the last phase which is of relevance to traditional Marxist 
class analysis. Finally, it should be said that none of these 
phases are mutually exclusive. Elements of each are bound to exist 
at all times in all societies. They are, in fact, "ideal types". 
At a particular time one type will be the predominant one, but it 
will always overlap with the other types of conflict. 
If ethnic and intra-class conflict - the types that characterise 
developing countries - occurs all the way up the social hierarchy, 
it reaches its climax at the uppermost level, that of the political 
elite. I say political elite because the scarcity of economic 
resources, the important influence of which has already been made 
clear, means that power is of primary value. The state, as the 
major accumulator of wealth, a function it receives through its 
control of the economy, becomes the main economic resource, the 
primary avenue to individual wealth. Control rather than ownership 
is the source of economic well-being. Power is the source of 
-6- 
wealth, not vice versa. For this reason, those groups which 
have an advantage in the power struggle - the military and the 
bureaucracy(which I call "functionary groups") - often find 
themselves as much an economic as a political elite. It seems 
useful to consider such groups to be class fragments in their 
own right (or at least their leaderships). Intra-class conflict 
at the level of the elite is, therefore, determined in large 
measure by differences of function. Finally, as peasants are 
in general quiescent, and as different ethnic groups and class 
fragments tend to come across each other only in cities, conflict 
tends to be an urban phenomenon. For this reason, but also 
because conflict tends to be intra rather than inter-class, and, 
at the uppermost level, over power rather than over economic 
resources, it results not in revolution but simply in changes 
of regime. 
It is because conflict is generally limited to urban areas 
and because the supreme struggle is between different elites 
that the mass media can assume some importance. The media in 
developing countries are not powerful but, insofar as they can 
influence events, it is in just such circumstances. They might 
at times have the power to influence urban conflicts sufficiently 
to unbalance the current regime. So the media (though more 
usually just the press) can become a part of the power-game, and 
because of this potential they are usually heavily controlled. 
Though. it is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the influence 
of the press in conflict situations, there is no doubt that the 
press is itself very dependent on conflict for its own development. 
It has an intimate relationship with conflict. Nevertheless, 
the press has in general limited influence. I shall, in fact, 
argue that the media as a whole have very limited influence. 
They do not reflect society, or necessarily even a distortion 
of it. They simply reflect a very small part of it. They are 
elite rather than mass media. Nevertheless, in these two very 
important respects 
- 
the intimate connection with conflict and 
their largely elitist nature - the media, in a general sense, 
accurately reflect the sort of society they derive from. It is 
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often assumed that the mass media play an important part both 
in nationalism and in development. The functionalists in 
particular lay great stress on this. But, far from promoting 
integration or development, the media reflect only a narrow 
part of society and, insofar as they do stretch down towards 
the masses, they tend, if anything, to promote conflict. They 
reflect rather than heal social divisions. These divisions 
are usually communal. For this reason, and because the media 
are largely an elitist affair, they are able to become an 
instrument of class control only to a small extent. The media 
are simply not mass media. Marxism, therefore, is not very 
relevant either. 
I shall be looking at the above questions with particular 
reference to two case-studies: Nigeria and Pakistan (including 
Bangladesh). I went to Pakistan and Bangladesh for research 
purposes in 1978. I did not go to Nigeria as there is a far 
more extensive literature on this country - on both the political- 
economy and mass media - than there is on Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Moreover, in this area of analysis these latter countries offered 
a far more complex field of study, one which really required close 
first-hand examination. Overall, my research has been wide-ranging 
in technique, incorporating economic and political analysis of 
both areas (i. e. Nigeria and Pakistan/Bangladesh), a study of 
politicians' backgrounds and of parliamentary debates (in order 
that greater sociological insight could be cast on the nature of 
politics in these areas), a content-analysis of the press and 
interviews with or questionnaire returns from a number of journalists 
(and also a few politicians) in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
I chose Nigeria and Pakistan for study because both countries 
have, since independence, suffered severe internal conflicts. It 
could be said that this thesis is in large part a sociological 
examination of the causes of these intense conflicts. Though 
both countries are extreme cases, such conflict in varying degrees 
of intensity is or has been prevalent in a large number of Third 
World areas (the Congo, the Horn of Africa, Uganda, Turkey, Iran, 
Cambodia and Malaysia 
- 
to name but a few). From an academic point 
of view it is not the intensity of the conflict that is important, 
but rather its nature and its causes. 
-8- 
CHAPTER ONE: CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter I will try to show that development, 
sociologically speaking, should be understood primarily in 
terms of conflict and that, though this conflict is essentially 
economic in nature, it depends on the opposition of cultural 
identities for its expression. As cultural identities are 
usually permanent this conflict is a never-ending principle, 
with ethnic groups struggling to dominate and to avoid being 
dominated. Developing countries are often characterised by 
a continuous flow of internal imperialism and nationalism. 
Moreover, this conflict, at its climax, as economic resources 
are scarce and as government is the main accumulator of wealth, 
becomes a struggle for power. What we have, then, is conflict 
over access to scarce resources, which is eventually expressed 
by a struggle between different cultural groups for control of 
government. 
1.1. Nationalism: The First Phase of Internal Conflict 
A study of nationalism is crucial to this thesis as I wish 
to show that internal conflict is not an accident of development. 
It has its seeds in the so-called 'nationalist period' - so much 
so that it can be said there is no essential difference between 
the nationalist and development periods. The conflicts present 
in incipient form in the former phase flower in the latter. In 
this section I hope to show that the current theoretical understanding 
of nationalism is far too limited, and to a certain extent illogical 
insofar as it misses the following basic point: that nationalism 
is a continuous process. There will always be communal groups 
which seek to be free from other communal groups, whether these 
are colonialists from thousands of miles away or neighbouring tribes. 
1.1.1. The Economic Basis of Nationalist Conflict 
There are, broadly speaking, two very distinct sets of theories 
about nationalism. One sees it as an ideological movement. The 
other, the Marxist approach, sees it as a reaction to economic 
exploitation. Neither cultural nor purely political factors 
-9- 
can be the cause. 
"The rise of a new phenomenon like nationalism 
can clearly not be explained by the existence of 
relatively permanent factors like geography, race, 
religion, or a common culture or tradition, which 
had existed for centuries without producing 
nationalism. "1 
The desire for political autonomy is an obvious motive, but 
foreign economic control has a greater effect on the population, 
in Kautsky's view, than mere political control, which affects 
only a minority (the indigenous leaders). "Anti-colonialism, 
then, must here be understood as opposition not merely to 
colonialism narrowly defined but also to a colonial economic 
status". 
2 As the colonial masters are capitalist countries, 
this economic status reflects a relationship between capitalism 
and colonialism. 
This colonialism has a profound effect on the subjected 
countries. All socio-economic groups - peasants, workers, 
artisans, traders, indigenous capitalists, the aristocracy, and 
the intelligentsia 
- 
are in different ways, which Kautsky is 
careful to delineate, adversely affected by outside economic 
exploitation and political control. The upshot is that all 
classes are, in varying degrees, motivated to root out foreign 
capitalism from their society. 
"The social tensions which modernisation and industrialisation 
produce everywhere and which in Europe were necessarily 
turned inward, resulting in conflicts dividing societies, 
are, in underdeveloped countries, largely turned outward..., 
the result being, not internal conflict, but that internal 
unity of anti-colonialism which is the basis of nationalism 
"3 in underdeveloped countries. 
Thus colonialism produces a sort of classlessness (at least of 
feeling),, through uniting the opposition. This is led by the 
intelligentsia, which Kautsky sees as being the most classless, 
1 Kautsky (1962), p. 30 
2 Ibid, p. 39 
3 Ibid, p. 39 
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and therefore free to lead. However, the intelligentsia is 
itself the product of the modernisation brought by colonial 
rule. Kautsky borrows from Marx when he concludes that 
colonialism has its own internal contradictions. It produces 
its own 'grave-diggers', the seeds of its own destruction. 
Another left-wing writer, Worsley, also rejects the idea 
that nationalists are united by culture. They are united by 
economic oppression. 
"Reduced to infantile dependence, reduced to uniformity, 
a sense of common fate united peoples divided by older 
social barriers of ethnicity, class, rank, culture, 
religion. People drew together, and were forced together. "1 
If nationalism is to unite such disparate groups it must have 
a very broad appeal. The result of this need is a style of 
politics which Worsley calls 'populism'. This becomes especially 
important after independence. I will discuss populism later on, 
but the essence of the ideology is the assertion "that there are 
no divisions in the community, or that if they are discernible, 
they are 'non-antagonistic'. "2 This populism Worsley sees as 
a flexible sort of socialism seeking to bring people together 
and to encourage them to accept themselves as a community. The 
overall argument is similar to Kautsky's, differing mostly in 
Worsley's direct linking of nationalism to socialism and in his 
vision of nationalist movements led by 'populist' leaders rather 
than by the intelligentsia (not that the two are mutually exclusive). 
The crux of the argument is that nationalism is more than a 
revolt against colonial political rule. It is also a revolt against 
capitalist exploitation. The main trouble with this presentation 
is, in fact, the crucial burden placed upon the role of capitalism. 
It seems the reason for emphasising the role of capitalism is its 
apparently widespread effect on the colonial economy and, therefore, 
on the general population. But there are many reasons for 
opposing foreign rule. Earlier forms of economic exploitation - 
sheer plunder, trading monopolies, slavery, could be more devastating 
in the short and long-term than slowly developing capitalism. 
1 Worsley (1964), p. 84 
2 Ibid, p. 165 
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It seems the reason for emphasising the role of capitalism is its 
apparently widespread effect on the colonial economy and, therefore, 
on the general population. But there are many reasons for opposing 
foreign rule. Eatlier forms of economic exploitation - sheer 
plunder, trading monopolies, slavery, could be more devastating in 
the short and long-term than slowly developing capitalism. (The 
Spanish devastationsof Central and South American Indian societies 
are a clear example). Religious resentment is important when the 
newcomers are seen to ride over what is considered by the indigenous 
people to be sacred. Loss of political power may not affect the 
majority, but it does affect the previous elite, as well as those 
dependent on them for patronage, and those followers who remain loyal. 
Conscription into an occupying army is another possible cause of 
resentment, even where the soldiers are volunteers, joining to make 
a living. (The Indian 'Mutiny' of 1857 shows all these features). 
It seems, then, that capitalism is not a primary cause of nationalism. 
Colonial rule in any form is likely to bring a nationalist reaction. 
This does not mean capitalism has no effect, merely that any effect 
it does have is secondary. 
Kautsky and Worsley are very keen to see nationalism as a united 
force, which leads them to underestimate ethnic divisions, or sub- 
nationalisms, within the community. Worsley does make some allowance 
for this, but defers ethnic strife until after independence. Yet 
ethnic (or other cultural) differences have had a crucial effect on 
nationalist movements themselves, i. e. before independence - for 
example, in India, Nigeria, and Ireland. In these and many other 
cases the nationalist movement contained different cultural groups 
which opposed each other as much as they opposed colonial rule. 
Fears of domination by neighbouring ethnic groups have been a powerful 
factor within nationalist movements. 
Kautsky and Worsley, then, over-simplify nationalism first by 
making it a reaction to foreign capitalism and then by vastly under- 
estimating the importance of internal ethnic divisions. Paradoxically, 
in their eagerness to make of nationalism a united front against 
foreign capitalist rule, they also underestimate the importance of 
class divisions. There is a difference between forgetting class 
- 
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divisions during the nationalist struggle, and merely not letting 
them get in the way of the struggle. Different classes have 
different uses for nationalism. This, in fact, comes out of 
their own analysis. They analyse the reasons for each class 
overlooking its class interests in the cause of nationalism; but, 
by the same token, these different interests do exist. In fact, 
the very point of their analysis is to show why each class joins 
the nationalist movement (for instance, traders want better trading 
opportunities). Thus each class, or fragment of a class, uses 
nationalism for its own ends. Class if often not a major 
differentiating factor, given the overwhelming proportion of 
peasants in most developing countries; but vested interests 
certainly exist - landowners, traders, some industrialists, certain 
professional groups; they each have a different vision of nationalism 
and the future nation-state, and different uses for them. This 
becomes especially important after independence, when these interests 
come to the fore. The stress that these writers lay on the different 
reasons various socio-economic groups might have for joining the 
nationalist movement is very useful, even if they fail to take their 
ideas to the logical conclusion. They are right to emphasise the 
economic factors, but are wrong in their simplification of nationalism, 
its reduction to a simple, united stand against foreign capitalism. 
1.1.2. The Cultural Basis of Nationalist Conflict 
The other two theories I shall discuss see nationalism as an 
ideological force rather than as a reaction to economic exploitation. 
As Kautsky and Worsley emphasise the latter cause, they view nationalism 
favourably. They see it as unifying and progressive. Kedourie's 
view is the opposite. To him nationalism is destructive. Moreover, 
he entirely discounts economic exploitation not only for nationalism 
but for colonialism too. Sometimes, for instance, worthless 
territories were taken over (at great expense), for strategic reasons, 
prestige, or simply to prevent other countries from getting them. 
1 
For Kedourie nationalism is not a general ideology but a specific 
ideology developed in a particular time and place - Western Europe 
in the late 18th century. It concerns the individuality of different 
cultures and their expression as 'national will' in independent 
1 Kedourie (1970) 
- 
13 
- 
nation-states. Herder, one of the thinkers Kedourie takes to 
be the founders of the nationalist ideology, took this notion 
to extremes and argued that individuals were defined, morally 
and otherwise, by their nationality. Furthermore, he laid 
great stress on nationality itself being defined by culture, in 
particular by language. 
And you German alone, returning from abroad 
Wouldst greet your mother in French? 
0 spew it out, before your door 
Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine 
Speak German, 0 you German. 
I 
Perhaps the poem sounds better in German too. For Herder, and 
later nationalists, those who speak a common language form a 
nation. This language is not simply a convenience. It expresses 
the thoughts, beliefs, customs, even the 'soul' of the nation. 
However, Kedourie argues that the ideological basis of 
nationalism in culture and language is false. Nationalism, as 
ideology, masks fact. People are not in reality neatly divided 
into national categories either by language or culture. People 
are grouped into various collectivities largely through historical 
accident. 
"In certain localities in Hungary, for instance, the 
landed gentry were Magyars, the urban middle class 
German-speaking, the peasants Croat or Slovak natives... 
If this Central and East European society were 
refashioned into national territorial sovereignties, 
n2 
great conflicts were bound to arise...... 
Thus, rather than being a cohesive force, nationalism can be 
divisive and destructive. This is even more the case in developing 
countries fragmented by language, tribe and religion. 
Those who import the nationalist ideology - into situations 
where it is hopelessly out of context - are intellectuals influenced 
by Western ideas but confused and dislocated by the modernisation 
process. Their nationalism is then supported by the mythological 
1 Herder (To the Germans), quoted in Kedourie (1960), p. 59 
2 Ibid, p. 119 
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and religious symbols of their own culture. The result is a 
frightening mixture of political activism and millenial prophesy. 
The individual is now totally lost in the whole. This combination 
of national purity, religious fervour and political manipulation 
can be highly destructive. 
Here, then, is a radically different approach to nationalism. 
Kedourie's theory is-intellectual, conservative, and pessimistic. 
Its intellectualism comes from the theory's foundations in the 
study of the writings of nationalist writers. Kedourie says very 
little about the objective conditions - social, economic or political - 
surrounding nationalism. We are given nothing more than crude 
psychological assumptions - and they are nothing more than assumptions - 
on the spiritual dislocation of the intellectuals and their ability 
to control their followers, who become "plastic" and "malleable" 
in their hands. Despite these major defects, Kedourie does a 
service in-his realistic assessment of the negative side of nationalism. 
This is a worthwhile approach (and the reason for the inclusion of 
Kedourie in this discussion). More important than this perhaps 
is the applicability of his argument to all types of freedom 
movement. He correctly sees nationalism as a continuous process. 
There will always be ethnic groups seeking autonomy from other ethnic 
groups, whatever the logical weakness of their cultural underpinnings. 
Though nationalism is not a specific reaction to capitalist 
exploitation, and can be a highly divisive force, it is not necessarily 
as irrational as Kedourie claims. Smith also holds that nationalism 
is an ideology, but is similar to Kautsky and Worsley in endowing it 
with positive functions. He complains that Kedourie has concentrated 
on a sort of German 'organic' nationalism, ignoring the liberal form 
espoused during the French Revolution. The latter is concerned with 
economic and social well-being, and can accept cultural diversity. 
Its vision is one of freedom, equality, progress, and the sovereignity 
of the people, rather than of some mystical 'union'. 
"The key to my analysis is the concept of the 'scientific 
state'... What matters is the new 'interventionist' role 
of the State 
- 
on the grounds that it alone can raise the 
living standards of the population, educate them, unify 
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them, give them a sense of pride and well-being, 
and administer public affairs in a 'rational' and 
calculative manner. "1 
This idea is similar to Kautsky's and Worsley's in its 
optimism, and the belief that colonialism modernises. However, 
Smith refuses to narrow down the reaction to this modernisation 
to a reaction to capitalism. The reaction is to Western rational 
administration and the West's vastly superior technology. The 
critical reaction occurs amongst the intelligentsia, because they 
see the 'superiority' of the Western system, admire it, want to 
adopt it, but have also been socialised by their own traditional 
system. Many writers, including Kautsky and Kedourie, lay great 
emphasis on the strains that the intelligentsia undergoes during 
modernisation, but Smith differs in his description of this 
ambivalence (which he calls 'dual legitimation'). The difference 
lies in the addition of a spiritual conflict, a crisis of religious 
faith. Some of the intelligentsia look back to traditional ways 
as a reaction to these contradictions, some seek membership in a 
brotherhood of modern states ('assimilationists'), while some 
transfer their religious impulses from God to the new nation, thus 
spiritualising it (seeking an extreme national purity). These 
'revivalists' and the 'assim'ilationists' form the backbone of 
nationalism. 
"What I think the model helps to explain is the Janus- 
faced posture of so many ethnic nationalisms. Nationalism 
is both integrative and divisive, because the 'assimilationist' 
stresses the vision of fraternity among equals, but the 
elitist-minded 'revivalist' underlines the cultural 
differentiae. so necessary to the renovation of the community 
and the restoration of dignity through secession. "2 
This analysis is clearly Weberian in style - in the general 
emphasis on culture, in the use of certain terms such as 'status', 
'authority', and religious 'value', and also in particular parallels 
with the 'Protestant ethic' thesis. However, I doubt that religion 
is as important as Smith claims. It is hard to believe most 
1 Smith (1971), p. 231/2 
2 Ibid, p. 256 
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nationalist leaders are anything other than hard-headed 
nationalists who, if they use religious symbols, do so to gain 
mass support. In fact, a further problem with Smith's theory 
is his concentration on nationalist leadership. He shares 
this weakness with Kedourie, though Smith deliberately limits 
his theory this way for the sake of clarity in a complex area. 
Nevertheless, it has been left largely to Marxist writers to 
consider society as a whole when examining nationalism 
- surely 
a necessity. 
The major asset of the theory is the important argument 
that nationalism is both divisive and integrative. This is a 
significant improvement over the other theories, which see it 
simply as one or the other. Nationalism contains continuously 
opposed centrifugal and centripetal forces. There are those 
who have a wide vision (Smith's assimilationists) and those who 
have a restricted vision (the revivalists). This must surely 
always be the case. Equally, it is possible to say there will 
always be those who will use their cultural groups to dominate 
others, and those that will seek to avoid this domination. 
However, reactions to the 'scientific state' cannot adequately 
account for such conflicts. Deeper economic factors 
- 
the 
struggle over scarce resourses 
- are present. 
Implicit in the above analysis of four writers is that 
nationalism. is a mixture of both economic and cultural factors. 
I have also tried to indicate that these factors are to a large 
extent internal. All four of the above writers place the main 
source of reference externally (capitalism, European ideology, 
or the idea of the modern 'scientific state'), while one 'pair' 
of writers (Kautsky and Worsley) stress economic factors and the 
other 'pair' (Kedourie and Smith) cultural factors. In the case 
of both 'pairs' I shall now give the 'internal' versions of both 
the economic and cultural arguments. The 'internal economic' 
element concerns the struggle for control over scarce economic 
resources (through the gaining of power). The 'internal cultural' 
element concerns sub-nationalism, which I will discuss second. 
- 
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1.1.3. The Struggle for Power 
Nationalism, whatever else it may be, must also be a struggle 
between rival groups for power after independence. However 
fervent the nationalist ideology, however fervent the hatred of 
colonial rule and exploitation, each nationalist group (or sub- 
group) wants to be the ruling group. Each nationalist leader 
says to himself: "I want freedom for my country. But I want to 
rule it when it is free, because I know what is best for it". 
(Or, "I will gain enormous power and wealth". ) This does not 
explain nationalism, but it makes of it a completely different 
animal. It is, of course, also possible to see the ideology of 
nationalism as an ideology in the original Marxist sense of 
deception, i. e. a cover for gain. 
"the benefits from the gratification of nationalist 
sentiment are of two sorts, particular and general, 
or tangible and intangible. The particular benefits 
are the incomes and prestige that accrue to those 
nationals who acquire the property rights or the 
offices and employment opportunities in which nationalism 
invests. The general benefits consist of the psychic 
satisfaction derived by the community at large from 
gratification of the taste for nationalism"". 
Power and wealth do not simply accrue to the nation. They accrue 
to particular members of it. Even the most socialist of Third 
World states suffer severely from 'elitism'. It is interesting 
that Marxists are willing to see nationalism in the West as a 
false ideology 
- 
helping to create an unreal unity between classes 
whose interests are really opposed - but have been unwilling to 
apply this idea elsewhere. 
I would not claim that nationalism is such a 'false' ideology. 
But I do think there must eventually be a trade-off between nationalism 
and the struggle for power such that when the latter becomes critical, 
nationalism (its symbols, its following and its ideology) will be 
caught up in the struggle for power. It will be used and manipulated, 
however sincerely nationalist the rivals for power are. 
1 Johnson, H. G. (1965), p. 177 
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Ultimately, power and access to resources are at stake. It seems 
obvious to me that different groups will have an eye on these good 
things. Thus, the struggle for them during the nationalist 
movement can be intense. The rivalry between the various parties 
contending for power in Rhodesia when it was, finally, to become 
Zimbabwe, is an example of this. The speed with which independence 
(from white. rather than colonial rule) was to come, and the nature 
it would take, depended largely on the relationships between the 
main contenders for power. Some groups (for example, the emirs 
of Northern Nigeria and the Moslems of India) even went as far as 
to try and slow down the race to independence in order to put 
themselves in a better position, either to take over the reins at 
independence, or to protect themselves against others who might 
take over the reins. Nationalism, i. e. the ideology of the nation, 
is not at the basis of all national movements. It is only one 
factor. Greed and lust for power are others. 
Very often, then, vested interests have their own uses for 
nationalism. An example of such a group were the 'Bhadralok' 
('gentlemen' or 'respectable people'), a Hindu elite of Bengal 
comprising the top three castes of that area. In the early part 
of the 20th century they began to see their control over Bengal 
threatened both by Muslim nationalism and by Gandhi's attempts at 
mass agitation. They quickly indulged in their own form of 
nationalism in order to try and retain control. Paradoxically, 
this led many young Bhadralok to adopt a Marxist ideology (thus 
rejecting "electoral political systems in which an elite was likely 
to be outnumbered"') and to get involved in terrorism, which they 
preferred to mass agitation. 
"They were apprehensive that mass agitation would 
lead to violence, and that violence against the 
foreigner might quickly change to violence against 
the socially privileged., 
2 
To assume that nationalism is cultural or ideological (Kedourie 
and Smith) means ignoring the economic side of nationalism. To 
assume that the economic side of nationalism consists entirely of 
1 Franda (1970), p. 592 
2 Broomfield (1968), p. 154 
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a (united) stand against capitalist colonialism means ignoring 
the role of indigenous vested interests in the nationalist movements. 
1.1.4. Sub-nationalism 
None of the above theories can cope adequately with secession 
movements that come after national independence. The theories 
of Kautsky and Worsley are particularly inapposite. If nationalism 
describes the struggle of colonies to break free from capitalist 
exploitation, then what are the struggles for secession that occur 
in many countries after independence? Are we to maintain the 
notion of 'anti-capitalist' nationalism simply by defining nationalism 
so that it cannot include secession bids? And how on earth could 
the conflict between Muslims and Hindus as India gained independence 
be described as a movement against Western capitalism? Smith, in a 
brief theoretical paper, suggests that sub-nationalism arises out of 
economic frustration felt by regional groupings after independence, 
while 
"the inability of the new states to distribute resources 
efficiently and equitably, in the judgement of peripheral 
ethnic groups, hastens their politicisation. "1 
The vehicle of protest is, again, a "thwarted and mobile"2 intelligentsia. 
As in the nationalist phase, the intelligentsia is facing a "crisis 
of legitimacy", of ambivalence between modernity and tradition. As 
before, they seek a return of the ethnic past. Regional economic 
inequalities, neglectful bureaucratic centralisation, and lack of 
economic growth, push the intelligentsia into ethnic separatism. 
Suggestive though this analysis is, it is too sketchy to provide 
a thorough basis for understanding sub-nationalism. Anyway, surely 
we cannot lay all nationalist (and sub-nationalist) movements at the 
feet of the (apparently ubiquitously) disgruntled intelligentsia? 
Elsewhere Smith does have something further to say on this. 
3 He 
distinguishes between two basic types of nationalism, an 'ethnic' 
variety and a 'territorial' variety. The main form of ethnic 
nationalism is the secessionist movement seeking autonomy for an 
ethnic group. Territorial nationalisms try to unite heterogeneous 
groups within a particular territory - the case in many developing 
1 Smith (1979), pp. 34/5 
2 Ibid, p. 34 
3 Smith (1976), pp-4/5 
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countries incorporating different tribes. This is an important 
distinction as it describes two very real, and conflicting, 
nationalisms: one, positive and constructive (the latter); the 
other divisive. (This, to me, also parallels his description of 
two different types of nationalist - the revivalist and the 
assimilationist). I would argue, however, that these types of 
nationalism are all part of the same process. They do not 
describe movements in different eras or countries as Smith suggests, 
or even necessarily phases of the same movement. Both types of 
nationalism are present in most societies. Most societies contain 
both imperialists and nationalists. 
The lack of difference between nationalism and sub-nationalism 
can be made clearer if nationalism is not seen solely in relation 
to colonialism, at least not in the normal sense. Some have 
applied the term colonialism to describe political and economic 
relationships between different cultural groups within the same 
society. This 'internal colonialism' has been described as follows: 
"The uneven wave of industrialisation over territorial 
space creates relatively advanced and less advanced 
groups, and therefore acute cleavages of interest arise 
between these groups.... The superordinate group, now 
esconced as the core, seeks to stabilise and monopolise 
its advantages through policies aiming at the 
institutionalisation and perpetuation of the existing 
stratification system.... Let this stratification 
system be termed the cultural division of labour: it 
assigns individuals to specific roles in the social 
structure on the basis of objective cultural distinctions. "1 
The uncertainty of boundary definition and the difficulty of 
distinguishing between nationalism and sub-nationalism is brought 
out well in Nigeria's early history. When the British established 
themselves in Lagos they showed little interest in taking over the 
Yoruba hinterlands. When the Ijebu closed the main trade route 
from Ibadan. to Lagos the British came under a lot a pressure from 
indigenous interests to take over the area. When they did go in, 
1 Hechter (1975), p. 39 
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the British had the support of Yoruba businessmen in Lagos, 
the Ibadans, and other Africans. The Ijebus, who saw Ijebu-land 
as their country, were as much opposed to Ibadans and African 
Lagosians as to the Europeans. 
"Though the great majority of West African peoples 
cherished their independence, they were invariably 
faced with a series of potential threats to their 
independence..... at times the European seemed less 
of an immediate threat to that independence, and was, 
as we have seen, called in as an ally, or was joined 
in his support of a mutual enemy. "1 
After independence these tribal loyalties severely weakenQdYoruba 
unity, and political alliances were made by some Yoruba groups 
with Ibo or Hausa interests outside Yoruba-land. What were the 
boundaries of nationalist forces in that area over the whole period 
of Nigerian history? Egba-land, Ibadan-land, etc.? Or Yoruba-land? 
Western Nigeria? Or Nigeria? All these boundaries were of 
importance in a confused, conflicting medley of nationalisms. 
The problem of boundary definition is especially acute in the 
Middle East where there is a conflict between Islamic nationalism, 
Arab nationalism, and State nationalism. The boundaries of 
nationalism are fluid. Which boundaries will be chosen depends 
on the degree and type of foreign penetration. Thus Arabs have 
stressed their 'Arabness' when struggling against Turkish domination, 
but their Islamic identity when opposing the power of the West. 
They only become 'nation-state' nationalists when the Arab States 
themselves come into mutual opposition. 
Theories of nationalism tend to treat sub-nationalism as a 
peripheral thing. It is 'parochialism', 'localism', 'tribalism', 
or 'regionalism'. This conception is artificial. Every 'parochial' 
group sees itself as a nation. It fixes some limit beyond which 
it considers people to be foreigners. My own view, then, of 
tribalism and such movements, is that they are essentially 
nationalistic. A group becomes nationalistic when it feels itself 
under threat or when it wishes to expand. I will concentrate on 
1 Crowder (1971), p. 13. 
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the former case. If a colonialist country invades (for example) 
an African country, as it penetrates it it sparks off a number of 
independent nationalisms by various tribal groups, each seeing 
their particular nation under threat. Nationalism is all a 
question of boundaries. These only become concretely defined 
when a group is under attack. If the subsequent occupation is 
sufficiently long it can meld various neighbouring groups together. 
Thus group boundaries are extended and the nationalist struggle 
widened. This process continues until nationalism fills up the 
whole area which the colonising country has designated as the new 
(but colonial) nation-state. 'Nationalism', as most theories see 
it, suddenly erupts. But all that has really happened is that 
smaller nationalism have grown and coalesced until they have reached 
accepted state boundaries. If there are periods of quiescence 
before this, it is because of the danger of protest. As the 
tribal or regional groups are brought together by colonial rule, 
the more people there are to throw into the struggle, and the 
greater the justification for demanding a free nation-state. 
Of course, not all people who see their 'national boundaries' 
thus changing identify with this ever-increasing national image. 
Cultural boundaries expand more slowly than economic or political 
boundaries. Here the above discussion of the struggle for power 
and resources again becomes relevant. The bigger the nation that 
the colonial rulers have defined, the greater the power and resources 
that the new incumbents in government after independence will have 
access to. The larger the country, the more there is at stake, 
and the more intense the struggle within the nationalist movement. 
This helps explain the ethnic or regional conflicts that occur after 
independence. Many groups will be ambivalent between different 
national boundaries - that of their own tribe or region, and those 
of the new nation-state. They fluctuate between acceptance of the 
new boundary and affirmation of the old - or hover round some 
intermediate boundary. Whether or not they accept the new one 
depends in large measure on what they (or their leaders) stand to 
gain in the struggle for power and access to resources. A group's 
nationalism is likely to contract to within its own boundaries 
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when it sees it is doing badly in the competition for power and 
resources. Thus, tribal (or other ethnic) groups support state- 
nationalism in order to be rid of colonial rule, but often then 
become 'smaller' nationalists when independence has been achieved, 
in order to win yet greater autonomy. Nationalism can be a 
uniting force, but it also acts as the reverse. 
"A great number of successor-states to the empires 
are polyethnic societies and here the dogma of 
nationality, successful in uniting the various 
communities against the imperial power, soon acts 
as a dissolvent. For these communities begin to 
become conscious of themselves as nations, and to 
demand self-determination. Why not? Where is the 
principle of self-determination to end? 
" 1 
1.1.5. Conclusion 
Nationalism is both cultural and economic. Economic 
advantage and disadvantage, real or perceived, are defined 
culturally. When resources are scarce there has to be a way 
of defining others as ineligible for access to these resources. 
The way to do that is to show that they are not the same as you, 
i. e. 'foreign'. In my view there is no essential difference 
between 'nation-state nationalism', 'tribal nationalism', 
'regional nationalism', or any other group nationalism. What 
is of importance is the group boundary. What boundary a group 
wishes to defend depends on the nature and extent of outside 
influence or control within that boundary. Nationalism consists 
in large measure of a struggle by a community for power and access 
to scarce resources. What sort of power and which resources are 
sought by the community will determine which boundaries will be 
chosen as the vehicle for this nationalism. Developing societies 
often contain a number of ethnic groups undecided and in competition 
over which boundaries to accept as their national boundaries 
- 
some seeking control over others, others seeking to avoid this 
control. These societies, then, become the setting for a 
fluctuating contest between internal imperialist and nationalist 
forces. 
I Finer (1962), p. 225 
- 
24 
- 
The power of ethnic identity means it often becomes the 
primary basis for the competition over access to scarce resources. 
This affects all levels of the social hierarchy: traders and 
workers from one ethnic group try to restrict the economic 
opportunities of traders and workers from other ethnic groups. 
But this competition becomes most crucial at the uppermost level, 
that of the elite. As the major gateway to wealth is through 
power, and as ethnicity is the basis of competition over access 
to scarce resources, nationalism, i. e. ethnic competition for 
political control, can often be seen as a means of competing for 
such economic opportunities. To summarise: nationalism is a 
struggle for power and wealth waged against 'foreigners', whether 
these foreigners are overseas colonialists or next-door neighbours. 
These theme's 
- 
ethnic conflict, competition for access to scarce 
resources, and the culmination of these in the struggle for power - 
will be continued in the next section. 
1.2. The Importance and Nature of Conflict in Development 
In the introduction I argued that conflict should be a central 
issue in the study of developing countries, and that intense conflict 
is not an accident of development. It starts in the nationalist 
phase. In the above section I argued that it makes little sense 
to view nationalism without regard to internally generated conflict, 
and, further, that nationalism is a continuous process. The 
'development phase' is not necessarily essentially different from 
the pre-independence 'nationalist phase'. The internal conflicts 
always present, once the colonial power has gone simply come more 
into the open. These, as I have just described, are economic in 
nature but are based on cultural differentiation. What I tried 
to show above is that in most, if not all, developing societies 
there are tendencies towards fragmentation. Within most developing 
and even in many developed countries there are groups with nationalist 
urges. These are supported by strong economic imperatives. What 
I wish to argue in this section on development is that, in a situation 
of scarce resources, the main means of achieving economic advancement 
is the gaining of power (something that has so far only been hinted 
at), and that community (especially ethnic community), despite the 
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economic element, provides a far more important basis for this 
than class. However, classes (or at least class fragments) do 
exist, and it is the particular relationship between these and 
various communal identities that is of most interest. 
1.2.1. The Centrality of Conflict 
I argued above that conflict (i. e. internal conflict) is an 
important part of nationalism. It is, too, in the 'development 
phase'. The seeds of this conflict, i. e. of the struggle for 
access over scarce resources, are generally sown in the nationalist 
period. However, idealistic views of nationalism are often carried 
over into the study of development. Conflict is treated as a 
peripheral matter, as a mere accident of development. Functionalism 
has got closest to arguing this. In fact, this (or, more correctly, 
structural-functionalism) has been until recently one of the most 
influential theoretical bases for the study of development. The 
theory builds on the idea of the progressive unification and 
development of society, processes which are seen as concomitants 
of modernisation. As economic modernisation proceeds, new social 
and political needs arise; new institutions and processes develop 
to meet them. Unity -the increasing mutual interaction of the 
various components of an increasingly complex society - is a necessary 
part of this development. Modernisation compels 'nation-building'. 
It hardly needs pointing out that the abundance of coups, riots, 
and civil wars in developing countries since the decline of 
colonialism have made mincemeat of the theory of nation-building 
and the general theory of functionalism as it is applied to the 
Third World. (Unless it is considered that civil wars, etc. are 
in some way functional). It is equally clear that social and 
economic development. has in general been very limited, in some cases 
non-existent. 
Criticisms of functionalism, e. g. that it is ahistorical (refusing 
to see Western-type development as being possibly a specific, historical 
unrepeatable phenomenon); ethnocentric (viewing the countries of the 
Third World as struggling in a chrysalis of traditionalism, preparing 
to burst out as shining new Americas); and, as just indicated, 
incapable of taking adequate account of conflict - these are so 
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well known that there is little point in going into them. However, 
functionalism has undergone considerable change and it is worthwhile 
reviewing the attempts it has made to come to grips with the real 
world. I shall do this mainly by comparing two works by the same 
writer, Gabriel Almond (in conjunction with other writers), 
separated by a number of years. 
In The Politics of-the Developing Areas 
l, Almond categorises 
a number of functions a system must perform if it is to be called 
a polity - regardless of its specific structure. The categories 
together form an input-output model. The input functions include 
such things as 'interest articulation', the output functions such 
things as 'rule-making'. These minimum conditions are used in a 
number of case-studies as guide-lines for cross-national comparisons. 
The emphasis on interest articulation (and aggregation) allows some 
room for the analysis of conflicts of interest, and is in that 
respect an improvement over standard systems theory. Nevertheless, 
Almond does not venture far from the well chewed postures of 
functionalism.. The input-output model is a clear example of this. 
Though Almond is flexible in his definition (on the input side) of 
what includes interest articulation - it includes for instance, 
"anomic interest groups" such as riots and demonstrations - there is 
something Parsonian and unreal about the analysis of such interest 
articulations: for instance, 
"a high incidence of anomic interest articulation 
will mean poor boundary maintenance between the 
society and the polity, frequent eruptions of 
unprocessed claims without controlled direction 
into the political system. It will affect boundary 
maintenance within the political system by performing 
aggregative, rule-making, rule application, and rule 
adjudication functions outside of appropriate channels 
and without benefit of appropriate process"2 
When diametrically opposed interest groups are struggling over 
scarce resources, what is "appropriate process", what are 
"appropriate channels"? One interest group will invariably find 
that the "appropriate channels" have been appropriated by an 
1 Almond and Coleman (1960) 
2 Ibid, p. 35 
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opposed group. The whole framework of analysis breaks down 
when faced with reality, for which the concepts were not designed. 
The notion that politics builds on society as a whole rather than 
on its divisions is functionalism at its worst. 
Almond's later book, "Crisis, Choice, and Change"', reflects 
a considerable decline in the role of structural-functionalism. 
Almond starts with an apologia for earlier development theory. 
Specifically including his earlier book amongst earlier theories, 
he says 
"we were quite sure that these models and classification 
schemes.... were not developmental or causal theories. 
We were also aware of the fact that we were comparing 
non-Western political systems according to Western 
categories and from a Western perspective. After all, 
we were Westerners, begining with the knowledge and 
"2 concerns of the West.... 
Despite this academically rather feeble excuse, the unwillingness 
to tackle the analysis of developing countries wholeheartedly 
continues in the second book, only two of whose seven case-studies 
are on currently developing countries. 
Almond accepts the main criticisms of functionalism 
- 
that it 
is not explanatory, and that it puts excessive emphasis on equilibrium 
and, therefore, tends to be "ideologically conservative"3. The 
task now, in Almond's view, is to pay more attention to change and 
conflict. Almond et al combine a number of theories in combination 
with a much reduced functionalist framework in an attempt to supply 
these deficiencies. The starting point of the new format is to 
say that at a particular (selected) time a society can be found to 
be 'in equilibrium'. Then a disturbance to this functioning 
system occurs (a "systemic crisis") from an external or internal 
source, which alters power relationships and patterns of access to 
resources. The various contenders for power then try and. form new 
coalitions to redress the balance or make the best of a new balance. 
The result is a new equilibrium containing a different balance, of 
power and resources (even if the contenders are the same as before). 
1 Almond, Flanagan and Mundt (1973) 
2 Ibid, p. 2 
3 Ibid, p. 7 
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This new theory shows a greater emphasis on change and 
conflict, yet we still have a process of transition separating 
two equilibrium states. Thus, though there is a greater 
concentration on the transition period, the basic functionalist 
paradigm has not changed. Almond confirms as much when, while 
admitting that "our fingers had been burned by earlier theoretical 
experimentation", he goes on to repeat the old functionalist 
adage "of the obvious point that any theory which seeks to explain 
change or development must be the same theory that explains 
stability"'. I disagree. All societies, but especially those 
in the Third World, are in a state of continuous flux. It is 
the nature and intensity of this flux that requires examination. 
What one calls 'stability' and 'conflict' is to some extent a 
matter of definition. But conflict is a process, while stability 
is not. Short of social processes stopping (e. g. after a massive 
nuclear war) it would be difficult to say what 'stability' is. 
There is always process and flux. There is always conflict at 
some level. That is what needs study. Conflict cannot simply 
be shunted to one side of an equation as an unfortunate but 
calculable side-effect of other processes (and when Almond et al 
try to analyse political change literally in terms of mathematical 
formulae they seem to be living in another world). 
Almond's later theory, clearly a rearguard action, is possibly 
the functionalists' equivalent of Custer's Last Stand. Rajni 
Kothari, who reviewed a UNESCO conference on "nation-building" 
, 
during which a full-scale attack was made on functionalism, 
believed that 
"the systemic methodological-empirical critique of it, 
plus the fact that no rebuttal of this critique was 
forthcoming, appeared to put to rest the oft-attacked 
theory of structural functionalism". 
2 
Functionalism has made some attempt to take account of change and 
conflict, however inadequately. It continues to be a very 
influential theory, however. indirectly, and however much theories 
influenced by functionalism have progressed beyond it. Samuel 
Huntington's important theory3 seems to have been influenced by 
1 Ibid, p. 27 
2 Kothari in Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), p. 100 
3 See Huntington (1968) 
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functionalism though he makes conflict a central part of his 
argument. Huntington takes as his starting-point not political 
development but political decay. He distinguishes two concepts 
which functionalism assumes to be inseparable - political 
development and economic modernisation. The latter, in fact, 
tends to bring political decay, not development. It has brought 
(in the Third World) neither democracy nor a process of "nation- 
building", but military rule, coups and civil wars. 
Huntington's model is in a broad sense another input-output 
model but, in this case, an unbalanced one: in developing societies 
the inputs tend to exceed the outputs. Economic modernisation 
impels emergent groups to demand power commensurate with their 
economic standing. As developing countries are unable to 
institutionalise. such participation, conflict is invariably the 
result. Huntington's description is not dissimilar from Almond's 
"unprocessed claims". Huntington calls societies characterised 
by such systems "praetorian societies". In praetorian systems 
socio-economic forces are directly involved in politics, i. e. 
various social forces are highly politicised. The main such 
group tends to be the army. However, this is only 
"one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon 
in underdeveloped societies..... Countries which have 
political armies also have political clergies, political 
universities, political bureaucracies, political labour 
unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole 
is out-of-joint..... ' l 
The central characteristic, then, of such societies is that in 
them "social forces confront each other nakedly". 
2 
There are only two groups, in Huntington's view, which can 
promote development - the military and the politicians. The 
former have the greatest opportunity early on in modernisation, 
before society becomes too complex, before the compromise, 
wheedling and bargaining only politicians can manage is needed. 
However, it is wrong to see the military merely as guardians of 
power during a temporary emergency. The conditions of a praetorian 
society are such that an emergency is unlikely to be temporary. 
1 Ibid, p. 194 
2 Ibid, p. 196 
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Praetorianism can only end when politics is restricted to the 
political party. The party, in Huntington's view, is the vital 
modernising institution. Only parties, because of their need 
to obtain support, reach out to the people (in particular, the 
rural masses). It is important to note that Huntington does 
not believe political development (as he defines it) is inevitable. 
He merely outlines the only way he believes it can occur. 
Huntington's analysis, when looked at from the political 
angle only, makes a great deal of sense, but his faith in politics 
is misplaced. In fact, his notion of the party is rather abstract. 
This is because he is influenced by systems theory, despite his 
great stress on conflict and political decay. An institutionalised 
organisation or procedure, for instance, is one that is "adaptable, 
complex, autonomous,. and coherent". These categories are clearly 
related to Parsongpattern variables (and therefore to Almond's 
categories). A political party made up of lawyers and teachers 
might be adaptable, complex and coherent, but if power lies with 
other interests such as landlords or mine-owners, this makes little 
difference. Huntington's functionalism is at times quite clear. 
"The questions "What is the interest of the Presidency? 
What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest 
of the House of Representatives? What is the interest 
of the Supreme Court? are difficult but not completely 
impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a 
fairly close approximation of the 'public interest' of 
the United States"1 
The crucial functionalist weakness of emphasising society as a whole 
rather than its divisions, survives intact. Fundamental economic 
differences are apparently of little importance, political represent- 
ation is everything. Huntington is a functionalist but one with a 
pronounced sense of the 'dysfunctions' allowed by later versions of 
the theory. 
It seems it is very difficult to get away from the idea of 
transition between two equilibrium states, from the concept of 
tradition and modernity (with an 'unfortunate'period of change 
and flux between the two), from the belief in cohesion and integration. 
1 Ibid, p. 25 
- 
31 
- 
In Heeger's view it gets us nowhere to assert that societies are 
underdeveloped because they lack some 'modern' quality such as 
institutionalisation. "Underdeveloped states, to restate this 
argument, are underdeveloped"1. Huntington is as guilty as 
systems theorists of this fault. We must analyse developing 
countries for what they are. "Defining underdeveloped states in 
terms of what they are not reveals very little about politics as 
it actually occurs in such states". 
2 The simple dichotomy of 
tradition and modernity, the latter inevitably replacing the 
former, is equally unilluminating. "In some ways, the argument 
is unchallengeable. Just as some day we shall all be dead, so 
some day most things will be different". 
3 
Heeger starts off from a position of conflict and stymied 
progress. That is what must be explained as that is what exists. 
The fundamental reason, it would appear, is the scarcity of resources 
in developing societies. Governments. themselves should not be 
analysed with reference to their willingness to develop their 
societies, but to their capacity to survive. 
"Their resources are few. The economic pie is small 
and limits partronage; coercive means are costly and 
scarce. The result is chronically weak institutions 
which hinge on fragile bargaining relationships between 
. 
elites in the centre and periphery., 
4 
Politics in developing countries depends less on institutionalisation 
than on the building-up of precarious chains of patron-client 
linkages. The process is almost feudal. 
Heeger is skeptical of all the social forces usually thought 
of as being vehicles of modernisation and nation-building, such as 
nationalism, party politics, and the military. Certain groups 
might well be nationalistic, but modernisation has a differential 
impact on various social and economic groups, and it is their 
different grievances which form the basis of nationalist movements. 
"The nationalist movement may not mark the beginnings 
of a national social system and a surge of national 
consciousness so. much as an orchestration of protests - 
1 Heeger (1974), p. 2 
2 Ibid, p. 2 
3 Ibid, p. 3 
4 Ibid, p. 9 
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urban, rural, messianic, tribal and nationalist.... 
In constructing a nationalist movement, nationalist 
elites have, in a sense, constructed a 
. 
fiction.... "' 
This is one of the things I argued in the previous section. 
Parties are 'shoe-string' affairs, often no more than agglomerations 
of already existing organisations such as tribal or caste 
associations, labour unions, etc. In many developing countries 
too, the military tend tobe small, poorly trained and perhaps riven 
by communal rivalries (as in Nigeria). Military rulers have the 
same problems as civilian ones in a fragmented society and often 
have to use patronage to try to hold it together to gain support. 
Heeger seems, in some respects, much influenced by Huntington, 
but he takes the latter's arguments further. The problem is 
deeper than one of economic modernisation causing problems in 
political development. "Rather than being the consequence of 
breakdowns or political decay, the politics of instability is 
inherent in the segmentary political process itself"2. Huntington 
complains that there is not enough political power in the system 
to promote economic modernisation; Heeger that there are not 
enough economic resources in the system to promote political 
development. Heeger makes the scarcity of economic resources, 
and the conflicts that arise from this, central to his thesis. 
This idea is also central to my own thesis. However, like Huntington, 
Heeger is a political determinist. Both writers tend to dwell on 
the form of politics rather than its content. Heeger, while 
recognising the general importance of scarcity of resources, pays 
little regard to the specific economic and social bases of politics. 
We need to know something of the role of land-owners, of unions, 
of ethnic groups, etc., and also how all these inter-connect. 
1.2.2. The Economic Basis of Conflict 
The progress of this theoretical account so far has increasingly 
emphasised the need to understand conflict, but I have also indicated 
that it is necessary to understand the economic determinate of this 
conflict. The above writers see everything through political eyes. 
Huntington, for instance, is perceptive in his analysis of the roles 
the various socio-economic classes play in development, but nevertheless 
1 Ibid, pp. 22/3 
2 Ibid, p. 99 
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plays down purely economic demands as relatively unimportant. 
What people want is to participate in politics. Huntington 
rejects Marx but applauds Lenin. 
"Lenin was not a disciple of Marx, rather Marx 
was a precursor of Lenin. Lenin made Marxism 
into a political theory and in the process stood 
Marx on his head.... (Lenin recognised) the 
transcendence of political goals over economic 
ones. "' 
Huntington's admiration for Lenin stems from a great concern 
for political stability, almost Hobbesian in nature. But are 
political goals really transcendent over economic ones? The 
assumption behind this must be either (i) that political power 
or participation is an end in itself, which cannot be more than 
partially true as it would be meaningless unless it enabled 
people to order their lives better, and that is largely an 
economic question, or (ii) that political power is necessary to 
effect economic change, in which case the economic backgrounds 
and needs of the various contenders, and the differential effect 
of economic change on these, are clearly crucial. It is the 
fact that developing countries lack economic progress, not that 
they lack political participation, that makes them so unstable. 
Heeger takes more note of underlying economic factors, ones, 
indeed, that I have laid great stress on (the scarcity of resources 
and, therefore, of access to them), but treats them only in very 
general terms. However, the notion of patron-clientism is a 
useful one. Gamer is another 'patron-clientist', with an approach 
similar to Heeger's, but he goes further than Heeger on the economic 
side by adopting a broadly Marxist outlook. Gamer specifically 
eschews the political approach. For instance, referring to 
Almond's theory, he approves its emphasis on the articulation of 
interests and on bargaining between elites, but declares the need 
to go further. 
"His is the politician's bias: he is interested in 
an issue only up to the point where it quiets down. 
1 Huntington (1968), pp. 336/7 
- 
34 
- 
At that point there is a balance between inputs and 
outputs, because the elites who made the demands are 
satisfied and the rest of the populace (who have 
little subsystem autonomy or free articulation) can 
do little about what has been agreed upon. "1 
We must know "who gets what, when and how". 
Like Marx, Gamer puts at the centre of the picture the 
destructiveness of economic exploitation and the way the state 
becomes a vehicle for this. Due to commercialism men are 
alienated, in Gamer's view, from what were once "stable personal 
environments". For instance, they increasingly work to grow 
cash crops instead of their own food. The growth of trade 
destroys the power of traditional authorities. Real power lies 
with the merchants.. Traditional authority is gradually overtaken 
by patron-client networks. Such networks occur when resources 
are scarce. 
"In an atmosphere of scarce resources, an individual 
who is not a client must devise some service he can 
perform which will be needed by the major network if 
he expects the total network to extend out to benefit 
him. ,2 
The "major networks" contain the bureaucratic, political, military 
and business elites. The "minor networks" feed these. Patron- 
clientism appears to fill the gap between integrated, self-sufficient 
village life and full-scale commercialism, coming before the farmer 
has completely disappeared but also before economic modernisation 
has got very far. "In short, patron-clientism thrives in a situation 
of scarce resources"; 
3 
though the system is not a feudal one, it is 
redolent of feudalism. Of course, the system is very unequal. 
Those on the lowest rungs, as in feudalism, gain little but some 
security, the minimum they can manage on. Nor does it make any 
difference which particular elite is in power, as the basic patron- 
client relationships remain the same. "What counts is the informal 
relationships that emerge. "4 
1 Gamer (1976), p. 251 
2 Ibid, p. 102 
3 Ibid, p. 107 
4 Ibid, p. 164 
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Gamer, then, goes some way to incorporating a fuller account 
of the economic nature of conflict, of patterns of exploitation. 
However, it is not going far enough merely to say there are patron- 
client networks. These are still rather surface patterns. A 
deeper, more incisive picture of the economic sub-structure is needed, 
and one that will differentiate between different types of society, 
which patron-clientism fails to do. It is, in fact, a very vague 
concept, and not a particularly explanatory one. It describes 
the cell structure of the animal but not the animal's physical 
articulation. Though we now have sufficient acceptance of conflict, 
and some account of its economic nature, it is necessary to go 
further in the latter direction. Marxism is an obvious avenue. 
1.2.3. The Role of Class 
Marxism is an obvious avenue, yet it possibly presents more 
problems than solutions when applied to the Third World. One 
reason for this is Marx's pre-occupation with industrialised 
society. It cannot be said he ignored pre-industrial, or partially 
industrialised society. His 'Eighteenth Brumaire', for instance, 
is a detailed analysis of the problems different classes have 
establishing political rule in a society where they are not fully 
developed, or are in economic decline. 
1 Nevertheless, in societies 
where industry has not made much headway the peasants are by far 
the largest class, and Marx had little time for peasants (or for 
'traditional' society). While regretting the misery caused by the 
destruction of craft industries in traditional India, Marx warns 
that 
"we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, 
inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the 
solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained 
the human mind within the smallest possible compass...... 
We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and 
vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked 
on the other part, in contradistinction, wild aimless, 
unbounded forces of destruction, and rendered murder itself 
a religious rite in Hindustan., 
2 
1 Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1869) 
in Fernbach (1973), pp. 143-249 
2 Marx: The British Rule in India (1853), in Fernbach (1973), p. 306 
- 
36 
- 
As the peasantry is the most numerous class in the Third World, 
as Communist revolutions have so far occurred in peasant societies, 
and the urban class structure is usually not well developed, Marx's 
concept of the peasantry is hardly helpful. 
"It seems imperative in our day to purge Marxism's 
traditional contempt for the 'idiocy of rural life'... 
Even if peasant society is due to perish ultimately 
under socialism, a political practice based on 
expediting this process is bound to be elitist, 
terroristic, and self-defeating. "1 
While idealising certain aspects of Indian society, and the 
Indian's "calm nobility"2, and acknowledging the destructiveness 
of colonialism, Marx believes the destruction of traditionalism 
to be necessary. Colonialism destroyed, but it also modernised. 
Marx quotes Goethe: 
"Should this torture then torment us 
Since it brings us greater Pleasure? "3 
It was, however, left to later writers, including Lenin, to incorporate 
modern imperialism into the formal Marxist analysis of capitalism, 
as necessary not to traditional, developing societies but to capitalism 
itself. Imperialism becomes the means whereby the capitalist order 
can stave off the inevitable collapse predicted by Marx. 
One of the major writers responsible for incorporating the Third 
World into the international capitalist order is Paul Baran. His 
basic thesis is that the imperial powers prevented the development 
of indigenous industry in the colonies. The result was that the 
lower classes in these societies were exploited by their own upper 
class as well as by the ruling class of the invading power. 
"Thus the peoples who came into the orbit of Western 
capitalist expansion found themselves in the twilight 
of feudalism and capitalism enduring the worst features 
of both worlds, and the entire impact of imperialist 
subjugation to boot. To oppression by their feudal 
lords, ruthless but tempered by tradition, was added 
domination by foreign and domestic capitalists, callous 
and limited only by what the traffic would bear. "4 
I Aidan Foster-Carter, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p. 93 
2 Marx: The Future Results of the British Rule in India (1853), 
in Fernbach (1973), p. 324 
3 Marx: The British Rule in India (1853), in Fernbach (1973), p. 307 
4 Baran (1973), pp. 276/7 
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The development of a class structure in the way predicted by Marx 
was stunted by the imposition of a foreign bourgeois order. The 
result is, as just indicated, a double misallocation and misuse 
of the economic surplus -a concept central to Baran's theory. 
In his view underdeveloped countries are not necessarily short of 
capital; an economic surplus is squeezed from the peasant wherever 
he is, but in these countries this surplus is absorbed by the wrong 
people (and wasted) - the landlord class, merchants, money-lenders 
and other middle-men, indigenous capitalists, and foreign enterprise. 
Despite the dominance of foreign commerce, none of the above indigenous 
groups, not even business interests, desire to change things. The 
merchants gain easy profits from merchandising goods produced abroad; 
the indigenous capitalists depend on restrictive government-aided 
monopolies, and do not want their own positions to be undermined by 
a large expansion of native industry; the landlords simply want 
their land rights left intact. 
"What results is a political and social coalition of 
wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, and large 
landowners dedicated to the defence of the existing 
feudal-mercantile order.... this coalition has nothing 
to hope for from the rise of industrial capitalism 
which would dislodge it from its positions of privilege 
-and power. "' 
The final consumer (and waster) of the economic surplus is the state, 
which the above interests control. 
"Waste, corruption, squandering of vast sums on the 
maintenance of sprawling bureaucracies and military 
establishments the sole function of which is to keep 
the comprador regimes in power, characterise all of 
the countries in question., 
2 
It is clear from the above that Baran sees the underdeveloped 
countries as distorted images of the developed world's past: but 
for colonialism they would have developed along the same lines as 
the West, Japan, or Russia. In my view this is very doubtful, 
and certainly beyond proof. The one major difference between the 
1 Ibid, p. 338 
2 Ibid, p. 362 
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developing countries now and the developed countries before 
industrialisation is the very existence of the developed countries. 
Regardless of colonialism the now-developed countries face a 
very different situation from that faced by the West at the start 
of its industrialisation. Similarly, Baran makes naive assumptions 
about the effect of colonialism on the nature of exploitation in 
the Third World. If it pays the bourgeoisie of the Third World 
to take on a comprador rather than a productive role in their own 
societies, why should it be any different without the past or 
present existence of colonialism or neo-colonialism? It would 
still be easier, and profitable, for the bourgeoisie to merchandise 
the products of outside capitalism than to create this capitalism 
itself. The bourgeoisie, the feudal class, and the state, would 
still prefer to import foreign goods, expertise, and capital, 
than to disturb the status quo by rapid industrialisation. 
Though Baran gives some useful insights into the nature of the 
political-economies of the developing states, this is secondary 
to his overall placement of these within the world structure of 
Western capitalism. It is a constant Marxist tendency to treat 
the developing countries solely in the context of an international 
class structure. Yet the developing countries have their own 
class structures, their own political mechanisms, their own internal 
systems of exploitation - and these should be examined for what 
they are. The developing countries are not simply stunted versions 
of the developed countries. It should not be forgotten that at 
the start of the West's major colonial expansion the European 
powers were economically far ahead of the rest of the world. How 
else could imperialism occur? Their relationship with their colonies 
was fundamentally exploitative, and the West did little for its 
colonies; but it did not cause the latter's backwardness. Even 
Europe's poor were more advanced than the poor of the colonies-to-be. 
Surely no-one would compare the wretchedness of the British working 
class in the 19th century with the primitiveness of the African 
tribes. Even now literacy rates in India are much lower than they 
were in Britain 100 years ago. 
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Barrington Moore argues convincingly that, in terms of 
exploitation, little changed in India between pre-British times 
and independence (possibly even thereafter). Both'Zamindar' 
and emperor gained their profit from taxing the peasant, so 
there was little incentive for commercial farming. As the 
taxes were proportional to output, there was a particularly 
strong disincentive. The British merely allowed this destructive 
system to continue. 
"The point deserves stressing since Marxists and 
Indian nationalists generally argue that Indian 
society was on the point of bursting through the 
fetters of an agrarian system when the advent of 
British imperialism crushed and distorted potential 
developments in this direction. This conclusion 
seems quite unwarranted on the basis of the evidence, 
which gives strong support to the opposite thesis: 
that neither capitalism nor parliamentary democracy 
could have emerged unaided from seventeenth-century 
Indian society. "1 
Whatever the relations of the developing countries with the West, 
they are politically independent. Who holds power and how it 
is used is, except in rare instances, entirely an internal matter. 
Their structures of domination and exploitation might be affected 
by outside forces but, with or without these forces, they would 
still be there. Developing countries are not, as some Marxists 
appear to think, mere appendages in the Western-dominated capitalist 
order. "After fifteen years, the 'frozen left' is at long last 
prepared to admit that India. is actually, meaningfully 'independent' 
2 
Worsley is more sensitive to internal structures, but even his 
'populist' politics is defined by foreign domination, it being a 
reaction to the latter. As nationalist movements need mass support 
(or so Worsley believes) there was a natural inclination to some 
sort of socialism. This combination of nationalism and socialism 
had to have mass appeal. 
1 Barrington Moore (1973), p. 321 
2 Worsley (1967), p. 265 
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"the populist asserts that there are no divisions 
in the community, or that if they are discernible, 
they are 'non-antagonistic'. Thus class-divisions 
can then be dismissed as external ('imperialist') 
intrusions, alien to the society. Ethnic differences 
can equally be dismissed as consequences of 'divide 
and rule' or as vestigial, disappearing legacies of 
the past.... Since the society is undifferentiated, 
organic, undivided, it needs only one single political 
organisation to express its common interest, only one 
party.... Finally, a mystical top dressing of quasi- 
religious appeal to the unity of people, land, and 
society is not unusual. "' 
How does this creed, which Worsley calls a "rural idiom in a 
modern world"2, arise? It exists because, despite the fairytale 
sound of populist ideology, the conditions it describes are, 
according to Worsley, broadly true. Class divisions in particular 
are relatively unimportant (as a consequence of the low level of 
development). As I suggested in the section on nationalism, 
Worsley vastly overplays the populist image. Nkrumah, when he 
fell, fell with a crash. Developing countries are riven with 
social divisions, over which populist ideologies provide little 
more than a superficial veil. Even in the case of class, as I 
have already indicated, Worsley plays down the extent of social 
division. (He entirely discounts the traditional class structure, 
for instance). 
Marxism, if it is to be relevant to the study of development, 
must not only begin to look at developing countries in their own 
right but must also look at their internal class structures, if 
not to the exclusion of the international economic order. There 
seems to be no reason why Marxism should not be able to incorporate 
such features. It is possible to draw a much more varied picture 
than that which rigorous Marxism allows, whilst still using ideas 
related to Marxism. There are numerous means and outcomes of 
development. Barrington-Moorei, with his analysis of the relationship 
between types of rural economy (and the economic relations based 
1 Ibid, pp. 165-7 
2 Ibid, p. 164 
3 Barrington Moore (1973) 
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on these) and different combinations of industrial and political 
revolution, seems to me to offer the right sort of flexibility 
needed to take account of the enormous variety of societies in 
the Third World. 
1.2.4. Power as an Economic Resource 
Class is not as important in developing countries as in the 
West. This is so because of the relative scarcity of economic 
resources and their consequent inability to support fully developed 
classes.. In such circumstances power becomes the main economic 
resource. The creation of a new state (at independence) and the 
centralisation of power and control wer economic resources this 
brings, creates with it a new political elite. Where there is 
no economic sub-structure on which significant class divisions 
or class-based political system can form, the state itself becomes 
the sub-structure of a new type of exploitation. Worsley is one 
left-wing writer who seems to recognise this, if relunctantly. 
"As it penetrates into every area of social life, the 
Party becomes the principal avenue of advancement for 
the ambitious, who climb on to the bandwagon. Everything 
depends on securing its favour. Party membership, 
party office, party influence, and patronage, are the 
high-road to power, wealth and prestige.... Wealth 
derives from political power, it does not create it. 
Other means of acquiring wealth, prestige, and power, 
both for individuals and as groups, are strictly limited. "1 
It is in the following passage that Worsley comes closest to 
asserting the possibility of a power-based class structure. 
"Although the leading politicians normally do not 
privately own really major economic assets, their 
de facto control over the whole society, including 
powerful controls over the foreign-controlled sector 
of the economy, does place them in a special 
'relationship to the means of production'..... the 
class struggle here will not be the classic Marxist 
one between socio-economic classes whose antagonisms 
1 Worsley (1967), pp. 192/3 
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stem from the contradiction between private ownership 
and social production, but from the antagonisms between 
a political elite controlling the society as a whole, 
and the rest of the population. This is the 'new 
class' situation. "' 
These are very important arguments. Nevertheless, Worsley treats 
the power-based wealth of the new elite as an unfortunate side- 
effect of the one-party state, merely "dangers inherent in this 
kind of political system"2. For me the state is the central 
component in the structure of exploitation in the Third World. 
It is the main source of economic accumulation. Power is the 
source of wealth, and of a "new class situation". Its basis is 
economic control rather than ownership, and this is dependent on 
power. The emphasis on the state, in my view, is Worsley's 
central contribution. 
1.2.5. The Communal Basis of Conflict 
The major deficiency of Marxism as applied to the Third World 
is its failure, indeed inability, to take proper account of communal 
bases of conflict. These are, in fact, of primary significance. 
Where resources are scarce competition for access to these becomes 
crucial. I have suggested that the state, through its ability 
to concentrate resources, is often the major avenue for personal 
economic advancement. The main economic resource is power. 
Different groups therefore find themselves, in seeking access to 
resources, in competition against each other for power. But 
community, rather than class (the class structure being relatively 
undeveloped), is the main basis for this conflict. 
One writer who has managed to place this conflict in a central 
position is Cynthia Enloe. Why, she asks, has ethnicity been 
treated merely as a vestige of traditionalism?. It was the result 
of an inherent bias in American systems theory, which equates 
'system' with the nation-state and, therefore, 'system maintenance' 
with political stability. 
"Most political scientists are sensitive to the pitfalls 
of American and democratic assumptions and try to guard 
1 Ibid, p. 222 
2 Ibid, p. 199 
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against them in comparative studies. However, a 
basic nation-state bias persists. It relegates 
ethnic groups to the status of dependent variables 
or policy problems. "1 
As I argued in the previous section, nationalism does not 
have to mean loyalty to the nation-state. There are other forms 
of nation than the nation-state. To a member of a tribe, the 
tribe is his nation. Ethnic groups provide 
"a basis of social relationship more enduring and 
less instrumental than occupation, status and legal 
right.... thus ethnicity survives long after its 
traditional functions have been taken over by more 
impersonal, secular groups., 
2 
The idea that patriotism to a tribe or some other ethnic group 
is somehow 'parochial', while patriotism to a nation-state, 
however jingoistic, is 'broad-minded', is itself an ethnocentric 
and narrow idea. It is certainly not based on impartial analysis. 
Even in some Western countries there are powerful communal 
antagonisms. The Irish conflict, the protests of Blacks and 
Indians in the U. S. A., Basque separatism, Flemish/Walloon antagonism 
in Belgium 
- all these conflicts evince this fact. 
In developing countries such conflicts are far more intense. 
Modernisation, far from reducing these, as both functionalists and 
Marxists believe, brings them more into the open. Contact with 
outside groups, and the increased competition this engenders, 
increases ethnic awareness and ethnic conflict. Moreover, rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation disorientate people and induce 
them to cling to what they know will give them support 
- 
their 
various ethnic groups. Ethnic competition has a highly rational 
basis. If, for instance, one ethnic group is sitting on certain 
scarce resources (oil, perhaps, or highly arable land), or has an 
initial advantage in 
-education and therefore job opportunities, 
ethnic awareness of such economic differentials is likely to be 
intense. At the same time the economically advanced ethnic group 
will probably provide the bulk of the ruling elite and will demand 
1 Enloe (1973), p. 7 
2 Ibid, p. 268 
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manifestations of nationalism from other ethnic groups. The 
latter will feel they are being exploited under a false ideology 
(populist or not), and conflict is very likely. 
In sum, ethnicity is a powerful and ever-present factor in 
developing societies. It is a cultural matter but becomes crucial 
when fired by economic competition. Where class is not highly 
developed it cannot act as the major basis for conflict over 
access to scarce resources. Ethnic conflict occurs even in 
developed countries but it is far more powerful in ethnically 
fragmented developing countries, which are also politically far 
less capable (having a much weaker and less stable political 
structure) of containing the social conflict that ensues. In 
developing countries ethnicity is the major form of identity, and 
is, therefore, the major source of social division. It becomes 
for this reason the prime basis of economic competition. 
1.2.6. Intra-Class Conflict 
I have just indicated that class in developing countries is 
far from being irrelevant. But it consists of a number of 
disparate "class fragments" rather than a clear and well developed 
class structure. Those class fragments that bear some broad 
relation to each other form a loose "class cluster". As resources 
are scarce and the means for achieving access to them (usually 
through power) limited, different class fragments in the same 
cluster find themselves competing against each other for such 
access. They compete against each other (i) because class clusters 
do not as yet form a consistent class hierarchy, (ii) because 
roughly equivalent class fragments find that they are interested 
in the same type of resources (be it power, industrial assets, 
petty trading outlets, or job opportunities) which, being limited, 
are insufficient to go round every segment of the cluster. They 
are not really in competition with those lower down or those higher 
up. In other words, conflict is within rather than between 
classes. It is "intra-class". It is horizontal rather than 
vertical. 
Though ethnic conflict has primacy it is not unconnected with 
intra-class conflict. If ethnic rather than class identity is the 
main criterion of social differentiation but different class 
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fragments compete against each other for access to the same 
type of resources, then they are likely to do so on the basis 
of their ethnic identity, i. e. a class fragment in one ethnic 
group competes against its equivalent class fragment in other 
ethnic groups. This occurs all the way down the social hierarchy. 
Thus politicians use ethnicity as a weapon in political competition 
while, at the other end of the scale, petty traders from one ethnic 
group try to exclude traders from another from economic opportunity. 
It is rare that one ethnic group as a whole is in a superior class 
position to another. In other words, ethnic conflict tends to 
follow intra-class lines. But when ethnic conflict recedes (if 
it does), or where it is not very intense in the first place, 
conflict becomes more directly intra-class, i. e. between class 
fragments not ethnically differentiated. Only much later, as 
society develops, is conflict likely to be inter-class, i. e. the 
sort described by Marx. 
Though intra-class occurs all the way down the social 
hierarchy it reaches it climax at the level of the elite. The 
concept of the elite does not fit in well with the Marxist framework - 
an elite is not a class - but it does fit well with the patron-client 
framework of analysis. Both theories are concerned with the nature 
of exploitation but, while patron-clientism describes the general 
mechanism without saying how this exploitation is articulated in 
precise socio-economic terms, Marxism has a precise conception of 
such articulation, that of class conflict, which is at best only 
partially relevant to the Third World. More particularly, power 
is not a direct reflection of class position; government is not 
"a committee for managing the common affairs"' of any particular 
class. All sorts of groups - ethnic, commercial, military, feudal, 
etc. - might gain out of government. There is, on this account, 
a tendency to talk of an elite, even amongst Marxists. It is here 
that an understanding of the patron-client system helps, as it is 
through this that the elite has contact - political and economic - 
with those below. In my view, then, class analysis and patron- 
clientism supplement each other. 
1 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed. Taylor, A. (1967), p. 82 
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The theory of patronage is bound up with the concept of 
the elite, which is a useful concept in application to the Third 
World. It is, however, about as vague as the concept of patron- 
clientism itself. To say that a few people rule at the top for 
their own benefit is saying little. Elite theory (deriving from 
Pareto) says nothing about the basis of this power or how it fits 
in with the socio-economic structure. 
"Thus, when we ask, who has power in a particular 
society, the reply is, those who have power, i. e. 
those who occupy the specified positions. This 
is scarcely illuminating. "1 
It is scarcely illuminating when applied to the West, where there 
is a pronounced class structure. This is not so much the case 
in the developing countries; there, as Bottomore points out, 
there is a significant elite/mass divide, with a small ruling 
group on one side, and the masses, largely peasant, more or less 
passive, and totally powerless, on the other. While 'class' is 
a socio-economic concept 'elite' is political, and it is politics 
which has primacy in the Third World. Wealth is acquired through 
power more than power is through wealth. 
A number of writers, including, above, Heeger and Baran, 
have tended to dismiss differences between different types of 
regime as secondary to the structure of domination. It does not 
greatly matter whether the government is military or civilian, 
feudal or bourgeois. For Heeger it is just a matter of an elite 
at the top of the patron-client system. For Baran there is a 
broad alliance of such interests, so it does not matter which 
rules. Certainly, if one looks at political and economic control 
in terms of an elite, the nature of the elite is not of primary 
significance. But, even if it is accepted that the class basis 
of such elites in the Third World is not so important, bureaucratic, 
military or political regimes cannot simply be dismissed as elites. 
They function in different ways, even if the fundamental nature 
of elite rule does not change. More specifically, if class 
cannot be used to differentiate different types of regime, then 
1 Bottomore (1966), p. 32 
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some other basis has to be sought. If one of the above groups 
can become the elite, then it does so by virtue of its function. 
The bureaucracy and the military are the major examples. If 
either, or both, gain control, they do so specifically on account 
of the function they hold in society. These functions, legitimately 
or not, enable them to acquire control. To make this clear I 
shall call these 'functionary groups'. 
It has to be recognised that power is a value in its own right. 
The military, for instance, might have many reasons for intervention 
(the need to 'save the country', or whatever) but it also has many 
things to gain as a group. As Finer points out, the army might 
represent a class but this is not often the case. It is just one 
possibility. It might also represent an ethnic or regional group 
(for instance, the Pakistani army is largely Punjabi). But on 
top of these motives there is the-"corporate self-interest" of 
the forces to consider, and, on top of these, the individual 
interests of its membership. 
"It is also noticeable that in many if not most of 
the countries which have undergone a military coup, 
the military budget and the rewards and conditions 
of the military are sharply increased. "1 
This exemplifies the nature of the 'functionary group'. Though 
segments of it usually gain more than others, often it benefits 
as a group. In the case of the military rank-and-file, it at 
least finds guaranteed employment when its leaders are in power. 
In the case of the bureaucracy, control over the flow of scarce 
resources between public and state (in both directions) presents 
it with enormous opportunities for corruption. There is no 
shortage of evidence that all ranks take these opportunities, 
from Permanent Secretaries to the lowest clerks. Where everything 
is in short supply this is inevitable. 
Functionary groups are, of course, only one of the contenders 
for power. When they meet opposition it is usually from the 
political elite, which has a vested interest in purely political 
processes. The opposition between politicians and bureaucratic 
or military control is very common. It is possible, then, to see 
1 Finer (1962), p. 56 
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this struggle between different types of elite as an aspect of 
intra-class conflict. This is broadly true, but it must be 
said that the political elite sometimes itself approximates to 
a functionary group. Insofar as it attempts to eliminate 
conflict, to establish a one-party state, to spread the influence 
of the party throughout society (including the bureaucracy), and 
to make political control a routine affair, then it itself takes 
on the characteristics of a functionary group; but, doing so, it 
often loses a lot of political support. 
This description of intra-class division is very broad in 
nature. It is possible to go into more detail. Though both 
the military and bureaucratic leaderships have traditionally been 
upper-class in origin, they are, as a result of the steady decline 
of the aristocracy, in combination with a great increase in the 
size of the army and of the civil service, becoming increasingly 
bourgeois in origin. As segments of the bourgeoisie these 
functionary groups find themselves in competition for power and 
access to resources with other bourgeois elements, in particular 
the business element and the substantial 'professional' element 
(lawyers, teachers, doctors, journalists, etc. ). The business 
elite has little power but its economic influence is resented by 
the functionary groups once they achieve power. The latter 
oppose their economic control to the ownership of the businessmen. 
The 'professional' element has no direct access either to power 
or to economic resources. It has education, professional 
experience and urban influence. The only way it can gain power 
or economic access is through politics. The professional class 
(or class fragment) is often the core of the political party. 
There is, thus, a strong professional-political link. Business 
men will also seek political connections but often, though they 
have to take a secondary place to the functionary groups (and to 
their economic control) they prefer to ally with these, as they 
can provide the stability and strength that business interests 
usually need for their own promotion. 
We thus have a bourgeoisie split into two: a business side 
and a professional side. The former support the functionary 
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groups, the latter support the politicians. The professional, 
'liberal' side wants democracy, the business side wants strong 
rule. It is clear enough from this that the professional/political 
element has a strong weakness. It has no inherent class strength. 
The businessmen have their control over economic assets, the 
bureaucratic elite its control over the administration, while the 
military elite has the most powerful force. All the politician, 
and the professional man seeking influence through politics, has 
is his public. But this, though a loose and not easily controllable 
force, can also be potent. The politician's weapon is discontent 
(and nearly always discontent in the cities, where it is easier 
to inflame), in particular. the urban riot - often led by students 
(from whose ranks the professional class is drawn), supported by 
the professional bourgeoisie, and making use of the discontents 
of the urban poor. 
In sum, intra-class conflict occurs all the way down the social 
hierarchy, but reaches its culmination in the struggle between 
various largely bourgeois elites. These are differentiated mainly 
in terms of either function or occupation, the main groups being 
the military elite, the bureaucratic elite, and the business and 
'professional' elements of the bourgeoisie. In general loose 
alliances are formed: the businessmen support the functionary 
groups, the professional element the politicians. As these are 
all broadly urban groups, as the countryside is generally quiescent 
while urban discontent is relatively easy to provoke, conflict 
between these groups is usually an urban phenomenon. In fact, 
the only way that the politicians can hope to oust the much stronger 
functionary groups is usually through inciting intense urban 
violence. The outcome is never revolution, merely a change in 
regime. 
1.3. Conclusion 
Development is about scarce resources and the struggle for 
control of these. As ethnicity is a more important source of 
group identification in underdeveloped countries than is class, 
this struggle frequently follows ethnic lines. This leads to 
various forms of nationalism. As resources are scarce, it is 
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difficult to make headway through direct involvement in the 
economy. Indirect control, through involvement in the apparatus 
of state, offers by far the best prospects. The state is the 
main accumulator of wealth. Power, then, is the basis of 
wealth, not wealth of power. The struggle for power frequently 
follows ethnic lines. 
However, ethnic conflict is not only between the elites. 
Where ethnic differentiation is strong conflict occurs between 
equivalent class segments of different ethnic groups all the 
way down the social hierarchy. The conflict over resources in 
developing countries primarily takes this form. The class 
structure, unlike the ethnic structure, tends to be undeveloped. 
There are a variety of class fragments some of which, at best, 
together form loose class clusters, but not established classes 
in the Western sense. The conflict over economic resources 
is not, therefore, between economic classes. In fact, resources 
are so scarce, and the means of their enjoyment 
- 
the attainment 
and retention of power (in the case of the elite) 
- so limited, 
that different class fractions within the same class cluster 
compete against each other for access to these resources. Thus, 
where ethnic differentiation is not especially important, or 
where it has declined in importance, conflict still tends to be 
within particular classes. It is "intra-class" in nature. Only 
later, as the society develops, is it "inter-class", i. e. between 
classes. A very rough outline of conflict can thus be drawn, 
as follows: 
Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict) 
y 
Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict) 
4. 
Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict) 
This schedule is not a necessary sequence, nor, as the above indicates, 
are the various stages mutually exclusive. Ethnic competition, 
because equivalent class segments from different ethnic groups compete 
against each other, also has an intra-class element. Certain 
societies might have very little ethnic (or other communal)conflict. 
All three stages are no more than "ideal types". Each contains 
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elements of the others. The basic idea is clear though. 
In the least developed societies conflict tends to be communal, 
and, though I have said this might be limited, every society 
has some communal conflict, whether this is based on ethnicity, 
language, religion, or merely cultural tradition. Eventually 
class fragments develop and these inevitably find themselves 
competing against each other for power. Finally, class conflict 
in the Marxist sense is only likely to occur in developed 
societies. Thus, as societies develop, conflict is not between 
a succession of changing classes but between a succession of 
changing types of group - first ethnic groups, then class 
fragments, and only finally developed classes. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT & COMMUNICATION 
So far the discussion has been entirely in terms of political- 
economy. I said at the start that I would also try to engage in 
a more sociological analysis. I chose to do this by studying one 
of the main ways the political-economy is considered to be linked 
to society 
- 
the mass media. It is the media's connection between 
these two things, society and its political-economy, that makes 
the media interesting. It is the nature of this bridge with 
which I am concerned. Too much is taken for granted. We talk of 
charismatic leadership, of mass appeal (or of class appeal), of 
ideology, of populism, of political movements; yet we make little 
assessment of one essential element in all these, namely communication. 
It could be that the mass media promote development, or impede it; 
that they facilitate integration, or fuel conflict; that they help 
link the elite to the masses, or that they act to keep them further 
apart. 
2.1. The Marxist and Functionalist Approaches 
Both Marxism and functionalism 
- 
the two main theoretical 
parameters of this thesis 
- 
have their answers to the above problems. 
For Marxists the media are a part of the super-structure of society, 
determined by the economic sub-structure and the class relations 
this engenders. The media are an element of class domination. 
"The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the 
ruling ideas: i. e. the class which is the dominant 
material force in society is at the same time its 
dominant intellectual force. The class which has the 
means of material production at its disposal, has control 
at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that in consequence the ideas of those who lack the means 
of mental production are, in general, subject to it. "' 
Some later Marxists have rejected the crudity of this assumption 
while retaining its core meaning. It has been subjected to a great 
deal of refinement, 2 and though one of the most fruitful avenues of 
approach to the subject, it is still beset by problems of proof and 
1 Marx, The German Ideology, in Selected Writings, ed. Bottomore (1963), p. ' 
2. See Hall, in Curran et al (1977), pp. 315-48. 
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explanatory power, the central problem being the theory's 
excessive determinism. These problems have themselves generated 
an ever greater sophistication of analysis, which, in the study 
of language etc., seems to be getting further and further away 
from orthodox Marxism. However, this sophistication is aimed 
at the Western media. It is not appropriate to the Third World's 
often highly unsophisticated media. 
Whilst I believe the relationship between the class structure 
of a society and that society's mass media to be a very relevant 
concern in the West, in the case of most developing countries it 
is either too limiting, or simply irrelevant. In the West the 
'super-structure' is highly developed. The cultural or 'ideological' 
elements of the superstructure, such as education and the mass media, 
play a powerful role in social processes, and much Marxist analysis 
has been concerned with this area. In Third World countries the 
relative lack of development means that these components of the 
superstructure are also underdeveloped, while the sub-structure, 
lacking a coherent class system such as exists in the West, is a 
much more fragmented affair. As a consequence the media in the 
Third World are less fully integrated with society than in the West. 
This does not mean the relationship between society and the mass 
media is arbitrary, but it is a far less determinate one than in 
the West. The main determining factor in the developing countries 
is, quite simply, the government. The media are usually strongly 
government-controlled. The interesting question is less this 
relationship than that of both the government and the media to the 
rest of society, treating the media as a bridge between society 
and political-economy. 
Functionalism has a completely different idea of the nature of 
this bridge from that provided by Marxism. The media reflect 
society as a whole rather than its divisions. They act as a full 
and natural link, not a distorting one, between society and polity. 
More specifically, they have a wholesome value, and promote both 
development and integration. The various functionalist-related 
theories which have this view of the media's role in the Third 
World have at their centre cultural and psychological variables. 
- 
54 
- 
By integrating men psychologically into a new, modernising society, 
the media help to promote this modernisation. These theories, all 
broadly similar, purport to show how 'traditional' man becomes 
'modern'. 
The pioneer in this field is Daniel Lerner. His main thesis 
is that 
"the Western model of modernisation exhibits certain 
components and sequences whose relevance is global. 
Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanisation has 
tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended 
to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure 
has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per 
capita income) and political participation (voting). "' 
The crucial mechanism for the transition from tradition to 'modernity' 
is a psychological variable Lerner calls 'empathy', which he defines 
as "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellows situation'. 
This quality is critical for social and 'psychic' mobility, the 
latter consisting, as it turns out, of the desire to emulate the 
living patterns of modern people. The mass media enable this to 
occur by inspiring or reinforcing empathy in 'traditional' people, 
who then become 'vehicles of change'. 
The major fault (one of the many) of this theory is its 
unwarranted determinism. A peasant surely does not need to be 
inspired to consume. He simply needs the money. At the root of 
this determinism. is the excessive burden the theory puts on the 
potency of psychological variables. This comes out even in two 
writers, disciples of Lerner, who are aware of this problem. Writing 
about 20 years after Lerner, Inkeles and Smith aim to validate 
Lerner's centre tenets, but with some qualification. 
"We are not unaware that a modern psychology cannot alone 
make a nation modern 
... 
nevertheless, we believe a change 
in attitudes and values to be one of the most essential 
pre-conditions for substantial and effective functioning 
of those modern institutions which most of the more 
'practical' programs of development hope to establish., 
3 
1 Lerner (1958), p. 46 
2 Ibid, p. 50 
3 Inkeles and Smith (1975), p. 313 
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In fact, their model of modernisation requires a significant 
degree of overt modernisation, i. e. the acquisition of certain 
structural elements like factories and schools, before the 
crucial element, psychic modernisation, can develop. In such 
an environment the media teach people to be ready for new 
experiences, to plan, to aspire, etc. 
Despite the recognition by these writers that a growing 
'modern' environment might alter people's attitudes (who would 
wish to quibble with that? ) it cannot be proved that this 
psychological change then causes further structural change. 
It merely shows that the former is a concomitant of the latter. 
The jump cannot be made from changes in individual psychological 
attributes to changes in social structure. 
This does not mean that social-psychological variables are 
unimportant. Weber clearly thought they were important, as, for 
example, his theory on the origins of capitalism shows. However, 
Weber's fundamental correlation was between two broadly social- 
psychological variables: the '. '! Protestant ethic' and the 'spirit 
of capitalism'. 
' 
once this correlation is seen to exist, the 
next step, the founding of capitalist undertakings (i. e. structural 
change) is seen as a likely consequence. Weber makes no crude 
jumps from psychological to structural variables. Another important 
point is that Weber's claim is only that capitalism started in this 
way. Once established it could spread across the world by direct 
imitation, without the transplantation of the 'Protestant ethic'. 
In the same way there seems to be no reason to believe that Western 
economic modes and institutions cannot be transferred to the 
developing countries without the installation, alongside, of the 
Western 'modern man'. This 'modern man' will arise within and 
around the new institutions, which is, in the end, all Inkeles and 
Smith really show. "Life is not determined by consciousness, but 
consciousness by life". 
2 (By no means a contradiction of Weber). 
The above diffusion theorists base their ideas on Weber's social- 
psychological approach while omitting his analysis of the structure 
of society. If Marx could say he is not a Marxist, Weber could 
say he is not a Weberian. 
1 Weber (1930) 
2 Marx: German Ideology, in Selected Writings, ed. Bottomore (1963), p. 90 
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Not only is the theoretical basis of the psychological 
approach largely fallacious, but its empirical nature is very 
weak too. It is interesting to note some criticisms made of 
McClelland's concept of 'achievement motivation', as applied 
to Africa. According to Lloyd, McClelland's ranking of the 
Yoruba and other African tribes in terms of 'achievement 
motivation' would 
"mystify most anthropologists as his conclusions do 
not agreed with what is known about them. With 
such a distribution among peoples that one knows, 
one wonders what quality, if any, is being measured. "1 
In other words, these psychological tests merely skim the surface 
of social reality. 
The ethnocentric nature of these American psychologically 
based enquiries, which always seem to be comparing 'traditional 
man' with some conception, real or otherwise, of 'modern American 
man', prevents real understanding. An example of the sort of 
question Lerner asked in order to elicit the degree of empathy 
with modern living was one asking if the respondent was able to 
"imagine living in the United States". 100% of those on high 
incomes, etc., said they could. These people Lerner called 
'moderns'. 74% of those on low incomes said they could not. 
Rather than see this not particularly low percentage as reflecting 
a realistic assessment by the respondents of their ever living 
in America, Lerner chooses to view this reaction as representing 
a lack of 'empathy' with modern living. The ethnocentric bias 
of Lerner's work is as clear as it is unpleasant, but other writers 
of the same ilk are equally paternalistic, for instance, Wilbur 
Schramm. 2and Lucian Pye3. 
The sense of ideology is strong: developing countries should 
copy the American political model; furthermore, they should invest 
in politics (the spread of information), using resources for this 
that others might say would be more fruitfully spent on industry, 
agriculture, or the social services; economic modernisation, it 
is claimed, depends on democracy for its progress. Such ideological 
1 P. Lloyd, (1966), p. 44 
2 Schramm (1964) 
3 Pye (1963) 
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strains in a supposedly academic field would not matter if this 
functionalist-based approach to the mass media did not continue 
to find official support. Despite Third World participation in 
an important recent communications study undertaken by UNESCO 
(with which Schramm and others like him have been connected), 
and despite some variety of opinion appearing in the report as 
a result of this, the same Western-oriented arguments appear. 
For instance: 
"Obstacles to freedom and distortions of democracy are 
dangerous symptoms in any society. 
.... 
There are no 
justifiable reasons or excuses for violations of freedom 
and democracy. "1 
It also makes the usual tendentious recommendations. 
"communication should be considered a major development 
resource, a vehicle to ensure real political participation 
in decision-making, a central information base for 
defining policy options, and an instrument for creating 
awareness of national priorities. "2 
Related to this ethnocentric bias is the major problem, inherent 
in the functionalist-diffusionist theory, of the fundamental stress 
it lays on stability (the functioning of the system), and its 
concomitant denial of the importance of social divisions or of 
conflict. Schramm, who even goes as far as to resurrect the 
biological model, is fairly explicit about this. The communication 
network is compared to the "sensory and nervous'systems' of the 
individual". It 
"passes back and forth the danger signals of rising 
strain, the need signals, the opportunity signals of 
ways to satisfy needs, the decision signals by which 
the organism tries to maximise its derived functioning, 
minimise the associated stress and strain, and maintain 
a satisfactory working balance inside and outside. At 
any moment in the history of society the function of 
communication is to do whatever of this is required 
by society. 13 
1 MacBride et al (1980), pp. 141 and 144 
2 Ibid, p. 258 
3 Schraamn, in Pye (1963), p. 32. 
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The actual socio-economic structures of the developing countries 
hold little interest for the above writers. As regards the 
media themselves, in reality they are only a vehicle, which can 
as well be used to support the status quo as for change, which 
can divert as well as teach or inspire, agitate as well as 
integrate. The above writers ignore such things as the content 
of the media, and the motives of those who own and control them. 
It is assumed that the media's inherent nature is to promote the 
"social good", not the interests of particular groups, however 
powerful. 
In sum, neither of the two major theoretical approaches to 
the study of the mass media in development provides an adequate 
base for analysis. (The neo-Marxist theory of cultural imperialism 
will be discussed later). The idealism of the functionalist 
argument, in particular, seems grossly unrealistic. It is 
necessary, in my view, to show what the media. in developing countries 
actually do, not what some people think they should do. They have, 
in fact, a very limited capability to inspire change. They are 
largely an elitist instrument, by-passing most of society (both as 
subject and as object); insofar as they do have any practical 
effect, it is more likely to be one of exacerbating the intense 
social divisions I described in the previous chapter than one 'of 
their solution. Divisions, after all, are what society consists 
of. I shall consider the nature of the media's connection with 
conflict in the next section and then go on to describe the elitist 
aspect. 
2.2. Conflict and the Development of the Press 
The press is the original 'mass medium'. Yet in underdeveloped 
countries it can hardly be said to be a mass medium at all. The 
press (and other media, which will be discussed later) in the Third 
World is subject to overwhelming constraints that severely limit 
its effectiveness. Illiteracy, low GNP, and relatively low levels 
of urbanisation have a critical effect on the press. The effect 
of high levels of illiteracy is obvious, but this problem is 
exacerbated by language fragmentation. A large rural population 
inhibits the spread of newspapers. Low per capita income restricts 
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the purchase of papers by the public, and also limits advertising 
revenue. Poor transport and technical communication make things 
yet worse. 
These economic problems are vital to an understanding of the 
press in the Third World. They affect all aspects of it, including 
the careers of those engaged in it. Salaries tend to be low, 
except in a few major papers; professional status tends to be 
uncertain. But the overriding problem the press faces is its 
inability to stay independent. Financial support is sought, 
usually from government or from a political party, both by the 
newspapers and their journalists. The market alone is insufficient 
to support them. In addition, the conflictual political climate 
of developing countries already described, means that the press 
finds it very hard to avoid a strong relationship with politics, 
even if it wants to. 
What I wish to argue is that the necessity of subsidy, in 
combination with the nature of the political market, makes the 
press highly dependent on politics and political conflict for its 
growth. The press is highly partisan in its origins. However, 
when a political party becomes sufficiently established in power 
it attempts to control the press and to make it dependent upon it. 
The press then becomes 'government-oriented'. Only as the economy 
grows and political conflict subsides can the press rely on the 
general market without other support. It then becomes "market- 
oriented". The history of the press across the world, in fact, 
seems to show that the press originates and grows through partisanship 
at some relatively early stage of development, then emerges into 
either a government or a market-oriented stage. The processes 
involved will now be discussed in more detail. 
2.2.1. A Framework for the Development of the Press 
a) Partisanship 
There are two causes of partisanship in the press. The first 
is the obvious demand on the part of competing political parties 
for a public mouthpiece. As a country is developing (or changing) 
the press is bound to go through such a phase. Social divisions 
are often severe; the various competing interests use every means 
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available to become dominant. The second cause is economic: 
the social divisions just mentioned split the reading audience 
into camps according to political affiliation. Newspaper 
content is geared to appeal to a particular camp, thus restricting 
its readership and making it more dependent on political subsidy. 
But it is a reciprocal process. Each political readership offers 
a restricted but guaranteed market. In other words, this political 
readership does at least offer a market, but it is a limited one. 
Papers might find it hard to appeal beyond partisan lines partly 
because conflict might be very important and neutrality a difficult 
position to adopt, partly because in a developing country a large 
market is not usually available anyway. To capture a limited but 
guaranteed political market could be a great advantage. Partisanship, 
therefore, by offering the press markets and subsidies, is very 
important to the press. The press thus grows through conflict. 
However, the individual papers, appealing to limited markets, would 
always be small. The press grows but the individual newspapers 
hardly do at all; they merely increase in number. 
b) Government-orientation 
A government that has got some sort of firm footing after a 
period of intense conflict will not wish to see itself opposed by 
a partisan press. It might also wish to put forward a development 
programme that will require public support, again incompatible with 
a partisan press. It is often, at least in its own eyes, compelled 
to take the press in hand. Its exact reaction depends on what type 
of government it is. Two types of government-orientated press are 
possible: positive and negative. If the government tries to 
establish a sweeping programme of change, government-orientation 
will be positive (hortatory). If it is an autocracy simply interested 
in maintaining the status quo, this orientation is negative: news 
might be required to be non-political and the press is often severely 
cut down. It is not 'used'. 
c) Market-orientation 
As a country develops economically and becomes more stable 
politically the press is likely to emerge from partisanship into 
the market rather than the government-orientation stage. This has 
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been the case in most Western countries, though the press might 
go through the latter phase before becoming orientated to the 
market. Then, instead of relying on government for support it 
turns to the public. It goes for a higher readership by appealing 
beyond partisan lines. The expense of running a modern newspaper 
inhibits direct government involvement in the industry; public 
feeling and the prestige of the press inhibit its indirect 
involvement. Newspaper organisations are big; the press is of 
high quality; the journalist is relatively free, and well-off. 
He is also credited with more of a professional status arising 
out of a certain amount of training, a general ethical code and 
certain 'professional' perceptions of how a journalist should work 
(e. g. of 'news values). 
The media in all countries will tend to acquire market- 
orientation characteristics as the country develops, even if 
government or political parties have the primary influence. This 
can lead to considerable internal conflict in the press. There 
are, as I have just indicated, two aspects of a demand-orientated 
press: the first is a content geared for the general public market, 
the second is the 'professional' status of the journalist. Sometimes 
there can be a disjunction between the two. The press in the Third 
World (and in Communist countries) frequently remains under government 
control while the journalists seek the status and rewards usually 
available in the market-orientated press. This conflict of interests 
will be referred to in detail in the empirical sections of this 
thesis. 
Before going on to describe the development of the press in a 
number of countries, in the light of the above scheme, such a format 
seems to find general support in an analytical study of the press 
in Scandinavia, by Hoyer, Hadenius and Weibull, who also posit three 
simple stages of development, the determinants of which are market 
size and size of optimal plant. These they call the initial, 
expansion, and consolidation phases. In the first, optimal capacity 
is low, the market is limited and so is competition. The second 
of these phases is equivalent to what I have called the partisan 
stage, which the press needs in order to break out of its minimal 
beginnings. From the history of the Norwegian press, for instance, 
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it can be seen that 
"electoral support, as judged by the party commitments 
of papers, through the early period of operation was 
contributing both to survival and to a present market 
leadership. "l 
Subsidies from parties have also been conmon in Scandinavia. Thus 
both political markets and political aid have been important for 
press development. In fact the writers see the press and the 
party as engaged in a 'transaction', both aiming at the same market 
(the press at sales, the party at votes). There is, to put it 
another way, an "overlap of clientele"2. This phase ends in time 
because, as described above, strict market boundaries, defined by 
political loyalties, "limit the possibilities for expansion to 
certain segments of the market"3. The press at this period is 
highly fragmented. The writers show that in the U. S. A. and France 
the fastest expansion in numbers of papers was in highly partisan 
periods. 
In the "consolidation" (market-orientated) phase, things are 
different. The press becomes too expensive to subsidise and the 
public less partisan; there is no longer so much of an "overlap of 
clientele". The market becomes more open and the papers need 
larger markets as their investments become more technologically 
advanced. The result is increasing concentration in the press 
and a more popular, less politically partisan style. Those papers 
with small circulations fail. Advertising rather than political 
subsidy now becomes the most important source of revenue. 
2.2.2. The History of the Press 
A brief historical review of the press in several countries 
in both the West and the Third World will bring out these processes 
more clearly. In England a fully partisan press occurred as early 
as the civil war. One of the most well-known of the political 
organs was the Royalist. paper, the Mercurius Aulicus. Its rabid 
attacks on the Puritans led to the establishment of an anti-Royalist 
paper, the Mercurius Britanicus. This came to be run by Marchamont 
Nedham, one of the most famous of Interregnum journalists. The 
1 H6yer et al (1975), p. 13 
2 Ibid, p. 31 
3 Ibid, p. 27 
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following is an example of the sort of writing the partisan press 
of the time could bring forth. Nedham, addressing in his paper 
the editor of the Aulicus, writes: 
"all the world knows thou art an underling pimpe 
to the whore of Babylon, and thy conscience an 
arrant prostitute for base ends. " 
Conscious of the need for objectivity Nedham adds: 
"This is truth, not railing*. "' 
With the Restoration the press, as it had been before the civil 
war, became heavily controlled (negatively oriented to government). 
During the 18th century, with the growth of party politics, the 
press developed further, and again became highly partisan. But 
it was only during the 19th century that some papers became 
economically secure enough to begin to do without political subsidy. 
2 
Indeed, the establishment of newspapers became sufficiently expensive 
to deter the parties, concerned to find reliable propaganda outlets, 
from setting up their own party organs. Thus, after alternating 
between partisanship and government-orientation, the press was 
beginning to become oriented to the market. (This does not mean, 
of course, that papers have lost all their political leanings). 
In France, as in England, political struggle enabled a partisan 
press to appear. This occurred first during the power struggle of 
Louis XIV's minority. The "feebleness of government permitted a 
real freedom of information from which the journalists profited. "3 
The press came subsequently under strict royal control. Partisanship, 
and therefore the press, flowered again during the revolutionary 
period, firstly between monarchists and revolutionaries and, within 
the latter, between Girondins and Jacobins. The partisan papers 
had restricted but guaranteed markets. Analysis of readers' letters 
to the Girondin Patriotg Francais indicates that most of its readers 
were in fact from Girondin areas. 
4 Despite revolutionary belief 
in the freedom of the press, the conflict was far too great for 
partisanship to continue. During the Reign of Terror editor after 
editor went to the guillotine. The press became strongly government- 
oriented. This process went further under Napoleon. Since then, 
1 Frank (1961), p. 76 
2 Aspinall (1949), p. 379 
3 Translated from Trenard e Godechot (1969), p. 99 
4 Ibid 
- 
64 
- 
of course, the French press has become oriented primarily to 
the market. 
Partisanship has been just as important for the development 
of the American press. 
"That there was a close alliance between the party 
papers and the politicians often extending to aid 
and patronage, no observer doubted... Indeed, the 
whole period of 1801-1833 was in many respects 
disgraceful 
-a kind of 'Dark Ages' of American 
Journalism. Few papers were ably edited; they 
reflected the crassness of the American society of 
the times. Scurrility, assaults, corruption, 
blatancy were commonplace. Journalism had grown 
too fast. "1 
To put if less moralistically, partisanship makes journalism thrive. 
However, by the 1830 s this period was coming to a close. The 
penny press was starting, appealing to the lower classes which had 
previously not been part of the newspaper-reading public. America 
was now entering the era of market-orientation, exemplified in 
particular by the muckrakers and the yellow press. 
2 
In Spain the press has fluctuated between partisanship and 
government-orientation. 3 Under the monarchy it was negatively 
oriented to government. In 1791 all papers but two, including 
an official gazette, were banned. The press began to grow with 
the political factionalism of the nineteenth century. By the end 
of the century there were 500 papers. But, as is usual in the 
partisan period, the papers themselves were small; average 
circulation was only 2,000. Finally, under Franco the press, 
as it had been before under the unprogressive monarchy, was stripped 
down to its bare minimum. Franco had no positive political 
programme; a negatively oriented press was sufficient for him. 
In Japan the press began to develop with the partisanship of 
the Meiji era, reflecting the conflict between the Meiji followers 
and the old Tokugawa Shogunate. The papers became attached to 
parties. When these collapsed in the 1880s, their papers suffered 
badly. 4 The press became market-oriented with economic development, 
1 Mott (1962), pp. 253 and 169 
2 See Filler, in Harrison and Stein (1973) 
3 See Schulte 
4 Lent (1968), p. 15 
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except for the substantial interruption of the fascist period. 
The same principles apply to the Third World now as to 
the developed world in the past. In their case, though, 
partisanship usually started as anti-colonialism, i. e. it had 
an international component. 
"The press everywhere - including Africa 
- 
is 
intimately involved with politics, government and 
efforts to attain political power. 
... 
Nationalism 
gave to the press its principle message, its 
'raison d'etre', in extending its circulation. "1 
Whereas in the West the press went from partisanship to market- 
orientation, in the Third World it has usually become oriented 
to government. However, there are exceptions (usually only 
partial ones). 
India, during the nationalist period, had a strongly partisan 
press. This led to considerable, if intermittent, government 
repression. Some journals were clearly dangerous. "We find 
in these pages instructions on manufacturing bombs, organising 
secret societies... 
*#12. And no doubt other educational material. 
These papers were mostly political in function, some living only 
for politics. As argued in chapter one, nationalism is rarely 
a united force. Different groups see different ways of gaining 
independence; and the nationalist struggle is also a competition 
for power after independence. These divisions are reflected in 
the press, so partisanship gets a further boost. "The most 
important development in the Indian press is the growth of the 
party press. "3 This occurred especially after the founding of 
Congress in 1885. There were now not just nationalist papers, 
but Moslem nationalist papers, Hindu nationalist papers - and 
newspapers of other persuasions. 
After independence the press changed, becoming increasingly 
market-oriented. "Instead of relying upon the favours of individuals 
or political parties, they have developed advertising as their 
primary source of revenue. They have also built up circulations 
giving more attention to news and entertainment. "4 
1 Hachten (1971), pp. 143/4 
2 Natarajan (1962), p. 153 
3 Agrawal (1970), p. 149 
4 Murthy (1966),, p. 342 
- 
66 
- 
Nevertheless, the highest circulation ever reached by a paper 
in India prior to 1965 was 120,000. The press was, in these 
circumstances, simply not strong enough to support itself, even 
with advertising. With the dominance of Congress and the 
concomitant decline in partisan support, the press increasingly 
turned to business interests for the support it needed. The 
press was, therefore, not an independent market-oriented one 
of the normal sort, depending on the market through sales and 
advertising. 
This trend has, according to Banerjee, increased rather 
than declined since 1954.1 With advertising and circulations 
as limited as they are (total circulation in 1970 was only 6.3 
million) this very direct relationship between capitalist interests 
and the press is likely to remain for a long time. 
In all cases, then, it seems the press develops through 
conflict, until this is either suppressed by government or 
dissipates with economic growth. However, even in the latter 
case, partisanship can persist in certain circumstances. In 
Japan, partisanship continued in the provincial press while the 
major papers became market-oriented. This is also a characteristic 
of the Swiss press. The underlying reason is probably that the 
provincial papers tend to be small and less capable of self-sufficiency; 
but in Switzerland another reason is the great importance of local 
politics. For this reason most papers are very political but, 
having very limited political markets, they are also very small. 
In the early 1970s some had circulations of only 1,000 or so. 
2 
In France and Italy, where politics is much more polarised than 
in the U. K., the role-of political ownership and influence in the 
press is of greater significance too, though the overall orientation 
is certainly to the general market. 
Though the situation is more complex than the simple scheme of 
partisanship, government-orientation and market-orientation outlined 
above, as exemplified by the Indian and Swiss cases for instance, 
it is clear enough from the general account just given of the 
development of the press across the world, that it has its origins 
in conflict and that it develops through this connection with conflict. 
1 Banerjee (1973) 
2 See Sandford (1976) 
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The same applies in the Third World as, historically speaking, 
in the West, but with even more force. The endemic poverty 
of the developing countries makes the press even more dependent 
on subsidy and on political or government support, as does the 
generally greater importance of social and political conflict. 
The press in the Third World rarely achieves full market-orientation. 
The market is simply too limited. For this reason, the press - 
indeed the media as a whole - remains essentially an elitist 
affair.. 
2.3. Elite Media 
The media in developing countries are elite rather than mass 
media. They are elitist in three ways: they are produced (or 
controlled) by an elite, they are produced for the elite, and are 
about the elite. (I am using this concept in a very general sense, 
not trying to say anything, through my use of the term, about the 
class structure). Claiming that the media are an elite affair is 
perhaps putting the argument in too extreme a form. The media, 
some more than others, extend down the social hierarchy in a 
number of ways. All I wish to claim is that they are primarily 
elite media. 
2.3.1. The Elite as Subject 
The media are about the elite partly out of political necessity. 
Government, in particular its leading stars, takes up a large amount 
of content. In much of the Third World this is not only the result 
of the importance accorded to government, nor even the status of 
government members, but of sheer force too. Both government and 
its individual members use the media to project themselves. 
"Journalism, and especially television news, is the last refuge of 
the great man theory of history. " Golding exaggerates the argument 
when he claims that-the consequence of this is that "individual 
authority rather than the exertion of entrenched power is seen to 
be the mover of events, "' but it is possible that the concentration 
on elite individuals, or even the elite as a whole, helps obscure 
deeper social processes. 
1 Golding, in Katz and Szecskö (1981), p. 77 
I 
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2.3.2. The Elite as Object 
The media are also produced primarily for the elite. It 
is this fact more than any other that makes them elite media. 
Access is the crucial factor. Only the well-off can afford 
television sets. They will certainly all have radios (probably 
more than one), and not just a share of a communal set. They 
can read, and they often read in a Western language (often used 
in broadcasting too). Furthermore, access to media confers 
status. Owning TV sets, radios and hi-fi, reading English or 
French-language papers- such things provide prestige for individuals, 
while national possession of media systems provides prestige for 
the elite as a whole, both nationally and internationally. 
That the media in developing countries are not mass media is 
clear enough from comparisons with developed countries. The 
following figures come from a UNESCO survey published in 1975.1 
According to this, while the U. K. had a total daily newspaper 
circulation of 437 per 1,000 population and 671 non-daily, in 
Africa it was 17 per 1,000 population for daily and non-daily 
circulations combined. For 36 Asian countries (excluding Japan 
and China) it was 34 per 1,000. In the U. S. A. there were estimated 
to be 1,695 radios per 1,000 population! In both Africa and Asia 
it was 56 per 1,000. There were 472 television sets for 1,000 
population in the U. S. A., 7 in Asia and 6 in Africa (counting only 
those countries which had TV then. ) 
At this time 55 countries in Africa and Asia had invested in 
television despite the enormous cost and the tiny coverage, reaching 
only the elite. In 1963 Kenya had some 5,100 TV sets, most of 
them owned by European officials, Asian traders and a few farmers 
within range. The average price of a set was £85. The estimated 
price that would have been within the means of the "average" 
citizen was at the most £10. Of the 311 hours per week broadcasting, 
261; were in English, and the major proportion of the time was taken 
up with British and American films and television series. While 
licence fees brought in £15,400 in 1963 and advertising revenue 
£32,600, the total cost of the service in that year was £140,000.2 
1 UNESCO (1975) 
2 Ainslie (1966), p. 177 
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The data applies to nearly 20 years ago, but when one is looking 
at the rationale behind such investments, that hardly matters; 
the situation is even now not substantially different in most 
developing countries. In the above case this poor country 
subsidised a service put out nearly entirely for the elite, and 
carrying largely Western trivia, by nearly £100,000 for one year 
alone. 
Newspapers also cost money which the poor of the Third World, 
as individuals, can ill afford. They might be a marginal household 
cost in the West, but not in developing countries. Illiteracy, 
therefore, is not the only constraint. India had 114 million 
literates in 1964, yet newspapers had a combined circulation of 
only 5.5 million. In the Philippines the figures were 28 to 0.5 
million. 
1 If large numbers in developing countries are illiterate 
in their vernaculars, only tiny numbers are literate in English. 
Yet a large proportion of newspapers in the Third World are in 
English. There are several reasons for this. One, of course, 
is historical 
- 
the influence of colonialism. English is also 
often used as a 'lingua franca' in linguistically fragmented 
societies in political and administrative institutions. Whatever 
the reasons, the strength of the English-language papers in the 
Third World far exceeds what would be expected from the tiny number 
of those capable of reading them. More than 50% of the circulation 
of all periodicals in the Philippines is in English. 
2 In India 
English papers numbered 1,843 in 1969, just lower than the 1,931 
papers in Hindi. In 1963 total English-language daily circulation 
(56 papers) came to 1,526,000, higher than that of any other language 
(of which there were many). Next came the 799,000 circulation of 
the 49 Hindi dailies. 
3 Though the latter was growing much more 
quickly than the English-language circulation4, in 1969 the latter 
was still far ahead. 
Despite tiny readershipsthe English-language papers have 
continued to thrive. The overwhelming reason for this is prestige 
(which underlies the successful advertising policies of these papers). 
In Kenya, though many more people speak Swahili than English, in 
Hachten's view this vernacular was treated by Kenyans largely as 
1 Chowdhury, in Head (1974), pp. 5/6 
2 Pickerell (1966), p. 3 
3 Ibid, pp. 16/17 
4 Mishra (1971), p. 249 
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a 'stepping-stone' language. 
"Once their English was good enough, Africans began 
reading the more prestigious English-language press. 
Swahili papers had a continuing problem of holding 
on to educated readers. "1 
For those aspiring to join the elite there are good reasons for 
this. 
"the English-language newspaper is a symbol of status 
to some people, and perhaps especially to the reader 
himself. It is also one means of furthering his 
education, and especially his knowledge of English., 
2 
From a world survey of bl editors in 52 countries Lee found that 
in 
"varying degrees, most indicated that their English- 
language publications enjoyed a definite advantage 
over vernacular papers in readership, prestige and 
influence. ,3 
The most important economic reason for the continued success of 
the English-language press in the Third World, is its connection 
with advertising. This is itself connected with the question of 
status. As those who can read English are, on average, far 
wealthier than those who cannot, these papers not only receive 
a large amount of advertising, but can charge high rates for it. 
A Press Commission study in India found (in 1960) that the advertising 
revenue received by English-language papers was over double (per 
copy) the highest received by a vernacular paper. 4 There is a 
strong link, as I shall further show, between elitism, westernisation 
and commercialism. 
- 
As regards television and the press, then, it is impossible to 
say they constitute mass media in the Third World. The Indian 
government (as have most others, in different ways) have claimed 
it would make television a truly mass medium through the use of 
community sets. Yet no significant provision has been made for 
this. On the other hand, a satellite was completed in 1967, even 
though the number of TV sets in India was minute. "The operational 
1 Hachten (1971), p. 213 
2 Condon (1967), p. 339 
3 Lee, in Lent (1971), p. 20 
4 Pickerell (1966), p. 33 
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dynamics of India's communications institutions are related to 
the nature and structure of elitism 
....... 
1 
One medium of communication that is considered by many to 
be a truly mass medium in the Third World is radio. But even 
this has not lived up to its promise. Its advantages are that 
it is relatively cheap, does not require literacy, and, unlike 
television, can be broadcast over long distances. Radio is 
believed to be an effective means for bridging the major gap - 
that between the rural areas and the cities. But there are 
several reasons for doubting the efficacy of radios as a medium 
of information: 
i) statistics show that radio (56 sets per 1,000 population 
in Africa and Asia in 1974) is far from widespread. It 
is still mostly concentrated in urban areas. 
ii) different media overlap. Those that use one medium 
often use others too; the statistics therefore obscure 
large 'pockets of unreachables". 
2 
iii) much, if not most, radio output is entertainment. There 
is no guarantee that educational programmes would even be 
listened to; music is far more popular. 
iv) radios are not that cheap. Even where poor people have 
sets these are often poorly made and break-downs are 
common. Getting repairs or replacement batteries is 
often noteasy, nor cheap. Research shows that a high 
proportion of sets reported to be in existence are 
inoperative. 3 
v) many people do not have their own sets. Communal listening 
schemes (such as the farm forum) are no doubt beneficial, 
but they are limited in purpose and programme time. 
vi) the most important problem with radio in the Third World 
is the multi-lingual nature of marry of these countries. 
Creating new channels to cater for these languages is 
expensive. Different languages are rotated on the same 
channel, none receiving much time, and some none at all. 
In Zambia in 1972 even with 2 channels only 7 of the 10 
main language groups received broadcast time, getting 
1 Head, in Gerbner (1977), p. 153 
2 Frey, in Pool and Schramm (1973), p. 364 
3 Defever, in Teheranian (1977), p. 218 on Dahomey, and 
Mytton (1972), p. 27 on Zambia. 
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only 59.5% of broadcasting time between them. English 
got 38.4% (the small remainder was external)'. Thus, 
while radio can overcome the barrier of illiteracy, it 
is very much limited by the barrier of language. 
Furthermore, for this reason, the colonial language is 
often used as a 'lingua franca', thus adding to the 
already strong elitist tendencies in the media. At the 
time Head looked at radio in Ghana, radio there had three 
channels; one broadcast in six vernaculars while the 
other two broadcast in English, and one of these played 
mostly pop music. 
2 
(vii) even where radio or other media are used educationally 
they often benefit those who need it least. They are 
in a position to take advantage of information (and to 
hear it and understand it in the first place) and of any 
facilities (e. g. agricultural subsidies) offered through 
this information. 3 
In sum, probably no medium in the Third World, not even radio, 
can be called a truly mass medium. The elite has by far the greatest, 
sometimes, almost exclusive, access to the media. So far, in talking 
about the elite as the object of the media, I have only discussed 
access. I have hardly mentioned the elitist content of the media, 
i. e. content geared largely for the satisfaction of the elite. This 
I shall do a little later, under the heading of 'westernisation', 
this being a substantial topic in its own right. 
2.3.3. The Elite in Control of the Media 
The media are often controlled, directly or indirectly, by the 
political elite, i. e. government; but even in terms of professional 
management the media can be considered to be under the spell of 
elitism. The media 'professionals' in general see themselves as 
part of the elite, and are usually as westernised as this elite. 
Rao writes that the editorial staff of papers in developing countries 
"have continued, generally speaking, as the Westerners 
did. They have continued to belong to an elite group 
which is invariably far removed from the mass of the 
people.... This has left the newspapers catering only 
1 Mytton (1972), p. 12 
2 Head (1974), p. 90 
3 Beltran, in Rogers (1976), p. 137 
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to a small minority, however important that minority 
may be in the decision-making process. "1 
The search for professional status applies to all levels of media 
production. It affects technical personnel as well as the 
journalists and broadcasters. Many broadcasting engineers from 
the Third World are trained in the West. They are often influenced, 
in choosing equipment (or media systems) for their countries, by 
foreign standards not necessarily consonant with their countries' 
needs. 
"The technology of broadcasting is almost without 
exception imported by developing countries, designed 
for production systems as they grew up in response to 
metropolitan needs and markets., 
2 
The following quotation, though it applies to a different 
professional group, describes the various influences involved in 
the quest for professionalism extremely succinctly. 
"Professional allopathic medicine in India.... has, in 
Weberian terms, a carrier status group for its style of 
life and its concept of status honour; it has, in 
Marxist terms, a class base internally in the emerging 
petty bourgeoisie and in the bourgeois ruling class; 
it has an international class base in the structure of 
both the international medical economy and the international 
pharmaceutical industry., 
3 
Much of this also applies to journalism - the need to feel part of 
an elite status group, both nationally and internationally; the 
linking of journalism with the power structure and with the business 
class; and the role of the media in advertising Western goods. 
However, there are two dissonant factors here for the media 
professional, and one of these is in fact the state. While he has 
learnt the Western norms of the 'Fourth Estate', his government is 
more interested in censorship. The other is the fact that his 
professional status is insecure. As a civil servant he is lower 
paid than those in the private sector. More important, he is not 
a member of a traditional liberal profession. He does not have the 
1 Rao, in Wells (1974), p.. 252 
2 Cruise O'Brien (1976), p. 11 
3 Frankenberg (1978), p. 32 
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professional autonomy of the lawyer, for instance. In fact, 
this relatively low professional status is not unconnected with 
the government control of broadcasting just mentioned. 
"This conflict and subordination in ideology and 
identification is one of the explanations for the 
relatively low status of broadcasting as compared 
to other professional channels for graduates in 
developing countries. "1 
As I shall be arguing later, the problems of the 'professional' 
part of the bourgeoisie are important to an understanding of 
the nature of this class in the Third World and its relations 
with the rest of the elite. I shall be looking at media-people 
very much in this light. 
2.3.4. Westernisation 
I have tried to show in the above paragraphs that the media 
in developing countries are elitist in a number of ways: the 
elite itself usually receives a disproportionate share of media 
attention, it has a vastly disproportionate access to the media, 
and is in large measure in control of the media; even where it 
is not a matter of control, media content is produced by people 
in or on the periphery of the elite, or aspirants to it. One 
theme running through this discussion so far is that of westernisation. 
In fact, these two aspects, elitism and westernisation, are closely 
connected. Not only is the elite highly westernised, so is much 
media content. Not only does the elite have greatly superior 
access to the media but what it reads, hears, and sees is largely 
geared to its own westernised tastes, though, as with much else 
to do with the media there are economic causes to take account of 
too. 
I have described how economic constraints are one reason why 
the press became dependent on politics' for its development. The 
effects of such constraints on other media are- different. The 
difficulty of maintaining viable media applies. to television as 
well as the press. This problem is world-wide. The production 
of programmes which, moreover, cannot be sold directly to the 
public, is expensive, and for this reason many countries are heavily 
1 Cruise O'Brien (1976), p. 13 
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dependent on imports. 
"Even economically and artistically strong nations 
like Sweden, complete with its own national language, 
defended by state subsidies to the arts and media, 
and surrounded by its own circle of smaller Scandinavian 
states, even Sweden could not continue with its current 
level of media consumption without large imports of films, 
television series, international news, music, comics 
and so on. "1 
The main media exporter in the world, by far, is the U. S. A., with 
Britain second. 
If European countries are dependent on imports from America, 
how much more so must be the developing countries, with their low 
resources and greatly inferior media infrastructure and experience. 
This dependence affects all aspects of the media: hardware and 
content, television and the press, news and entertainment. Perhaps 
the reliance on foreign news sources is the most serious effect of 
economic weakness. As is well known, most of the exporting of 
news and features is done through the five big international news 
agencies (two European, two American and one Russian), with two 
television news-film companies, Visnews and UPITN, in which Britain 
has, all told, the major interest. In the case of these organisations 
most news they gather is fed through headquarters, with one version 
going out for all users. Though developing countries use this 
news, some of which might indeed be about them, the news is generally 
shaped for Western clients, who are, economically speaking, the 
most important consumers. This problem has been recognised for 
a long time. The Asian Conference of the International Press 
Institute, for instance, looked at the news flow problem, in detail, 
as far back as 1956.2 
In some cases the control of the agencies is much tighter and 
more direct than even the above indicates. In ex-French colonial 
Africa, which had been treated by France as an extension of the 
'mother-country', France set up news agencies which were bound by 
contract with Agence France-Presse (AFP) "to distribute automatically 
and immediately, without omission or qualification the radio-teletype 
1 Tunstall (1977), p. 17 
2 International Press Institute (1956) 
- 
76 
- 
service received from AFP. "l This problem of control over 
news flow becomes even more overt where western interests actually 
own media in the Third World. The British, for instance, have 
been strong in the West African press and are still so in the 
press of East Africa. U. S. A. interests have had considerable 
but variable direct stakes in the media of Latin America. 
2 
Though the influence of the West in the flow of news is 
perhaps the most crucial, its influence in entertainment is more 
pervasive. The cowboy television series Bonanza at one time 
had an estimated audience of 350 million in 59 countries. Such 
programmes also take up a large amount of viewing, time in the 
importing countries. A summary of studies on this covering 85 
countries (57 of them in the Third World) showed 47 of them had 
imports of foreign material taking up over 40% of their total 
television programming with 27 of them having over 60% foreign 
material. 
3 
2.4. Elitism and Westernisation in Perspective 
As I have mentioned, there is a strong connection between 
elitism and westernisation. The elite has by far the greatest 
access to the media and a considerable amount of media output 
is westernised in nature. To this must be added the Western 
education and style of living of the elite, and their consumption 
of the few, expensive Western goods in the shops. The media 
accentuate the great division between the elite and the masses. 
"Even those who have no contact with foreign persons 
or Western education are exposed constantly to 
westernising influences through popular media - 
newspapers, radio, motion pictures, books, magazines, 
billboards..... "4 
Far from having, therefore, a process of media-inspired development, 
working through the magic ingredient 'empathy', what we might be 
witnessing is what some call a process of 'media-imperialism' (an 
element of 'neo-colonialism'). This is described, simply, as 
follows: 
"The international media system is one mechanism by 
1 Quoted in Ainslie (1966), pp. 206/7 
2 Beltran and de Cardona, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp35/6 
3 Lee, Chin-Chuan (1980), p. 76 
4 Smythe, H. and M. (1960), p. 70 
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which developing countries are brought within the 
common cultural hegemony of western capitalism. "1 
One of the major proponents of this theory is Herbert Schiller. 
He links up American media exports (and the rapid spread of 
commercial media across the world) with the great volume of 
overseas advertisements for American goods, with, finally, the 
overseas sale of these goods. This advertising is also 
connected with America's huge foreign investments. 
"The advertising men follow their manufacturing clients 
wherever the potential markets lead, generally where 
the capital investment is set down.... the mass media, 
wherever United States manufacturing companies operate, 
have been summoned to promote the global expansion of 
American consumer goods, sales and services. "2 
In 1969,23 out of the top 25 international advertising 
agencies were American. 39% of the total billings of the biggest 
of these agencies, J. Walter Thompson, originated outside the U. S. A. 
in 1969, bringing in $292 million. It operates in 28 countries, 
including Latin America, India and Pakistan. 
3 One of the top five 
global agencies, Ogilvy Benson and Mather had, in 1972,42 offices 
in 24 countries. Four of these were in India, where the agency 
(according to a booklet published by them in India) had been 
established for 44 years. In the introduction they claim that 
"The closest bond exists between OBM offices worldwide: 
the entire network is one agency indivisible, inspired 
by unanimity of purpose. "4 
Possibly then, Schiller is right to stress the role of advertising 
in the process of. 'media imperialism'. Yet strangely, advertising 
in developing countries is just the thing the functionalist 
(diffusionist) writers try to whip up enthusiasm for. 
"A function of advertising is to 'create a want' in 
the consumer.... This is part of the 'raising aspirations' 
role of the mass media. Bicycles, bright clothes, 
aluminium. cooking pots, torches, transistor radios in 
the hands of other villagers or advertising in the 
1 Elliott and Golding, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p. 230 
2 Schiller, in Merritt (1972), pp. 301 and 319/20 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ogilvy Benson and Mather (1972), introduction 
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newspapers help induce a discontent with poverty, 
stimulate a desire for ownership and become an 
incentive for harder or better directed work and 
greater production.... Advertising is an integral 
part of economic development, in which the media 
play an essential part. "' 
This mixture of Victorian morality, simplistic psychology, and 
what is virtually a plea for Western commercial expansion, makes 
ludicrous reading. 
'Media-imperialism' is made up of numerous closely connected 
elements - including media infrastructure sales, aid and advice, 
training facilities, programming, perhaps even, as the above 
quotation might suggest, an academic element. The connecting 
link is, of course, a commercial one. By 1965 television systems 
in over 50 countries were at least partly controlled by private 
interests, and only a few of the 95 television systems in the 
world did not carry commercial advertising. According to Dizard, 
the U. S. A. had a "direct stake" in this expansion. 
"we have set its standards and its pace. Television 
abroad is often a reflection, or at least a caricature, 
of our own.... (American programme exports) send out a 
forceful image of ourselves and of our society., 
2 
Or, as others might put it: 
"Commercially produced entertainment and recreation 
are the chief channels that convey internationally 
the values and life-styles of United States corporate 
capitalism.. 
3 
It seems impossible, from the evidence, to doubt the penetration 
of the West, particularly America, in the media of the Third World, 
and in all stages of media production, from infrastructure to content. 
The 'media-imperialism' thesis is tempting but it contains major 
faults; the thesis rests on too many assumptions, in particular, 
those to do with the effects of this 'imperialism'. It can be 
shown that the West is strong in the Third World in media investment, 
production, advertising and exports. But its strength is highly 
1 Soaanerlad (1966), p. 64 
2 Dizard (1966), p. 3 
3 Schiller, in Merritt (1972), p. 336 
- 
79 
- 
variable, being particularly strong in only limited sectors of 
the media and in limited areas. It cannot be shown that all 
these variable influences combine to have some overwhelming 
effect on developing countries. The implicit assumption of a 
vast mechanism of control and influence is exaggerated. 
A more misguided assumption concerns the supposed effects 
of media imperialism. Central to this is the assumption that 
Third World media are mass media. As I have argued above, 
Third World media tend to be very weak and their diffusion 
through society extremely limited. It is, in fact, limited 
largely to the elites of these societies. By concentrating on 
media outflow from the West, Schiller and others neglect the 
actual nature of the societies that receive these influences. 
It is only the elite that is influenced; moreover, it is unlikely 
that it resents this influence. The elite is usually highly 
westernised. Furthermore, it is probably only the elite that 
the'media-pushers' and advertisers are interested in. In the 
words of an advertising man, talking about selling in the Third 
World: 
"In the absence of a middle class, it is often tempting 
to the advertiser to intensively cultivate the small 
segment of the market which can presently afford what 
he has to sell rather than to go about the thankless 
and long-range task of building a mass market for his 
products. "l 
In their assessment of both the supply of and demand for Western 
media output the media imperialist writers have overestimated the 
truth of the case. 
There are also, as I mentioned at the start, economic reasons 
for the dependence on the West. In fact, the lack of resources, 
infrastructure, experience, etc., are basic to this dependence. 
Just as in the case of the press, where there was a political 
pull and economic push behind its dependence on politics, so in 
the case of broadcasting there is the pull of westernisation, and 
the economic push to the West provided by its superior economic 
position. Even where countries try to resist the Western influence 
I Bogart (1959), pp. 160/1 
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they might find it hard to do so. The Saudi Arabians, out 
of religious scruples, for a long time rejected television. 
Eventually it came. The authorities subsequently tried to 
make it 100% a "public service" vehicle. Yet, by 1970 or 
so, 40Z of its programming was imported, mostly from the U. S. A. 
and U. K. Some programmes came from Lebanon, but at $1350 
per series, compared to perhaps $600 for a Western series l, 
it is not surprising the latter were preferred. 
To put it another way, if the elites of developing countries 
want media systems they have to import the infrastructure, expertise, 
and programming material to make them operational. The problem, 
as I have indicated, "is as much one of demand as supply. "2 
Western media institutions, advertisers, even governments, might 
encourage developing countries to invest in modern media systems, 
and participate themselves in such investments, but the demand is 
also there - from those in control who want to make their countries, 
on the surface at least, a part of the international community of 
advanced nations, and from the wider elite which wants, too, to 
feel a part of this community (but also to have access to a greater 
level of information and entertainment). The media are primarily 
for this generally highly westernised elite. Other groups are 
marginal to this. Thus, the elite becomes a part of the international 
order, and actively seeks to, while the masses are ignored. If 
there are commercial and industrial"compradors", there are "media 
compradors" too. Salinas and Paldan argue similarly. 
"Despite the non-existence of a powerful industrial 
bourgeoisie, the local dominant class is supported 
by activities centered on industry and finance, 
commerce, transport, communications, and advertising... 
The sector of the national bourgeoisie that owns the 
media is closely tied to the industrial bourgeoisie 
and constitutes a central link to metropolitan 
interests., 3 
2.5. Conclusion 
I have tried to show in this chapter that in developing countries 
the media are firstly tools of conflict, secondly playthings of the 
1 Shobaili (1971), pp'. 241-7 
2 Katz, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), p. 70 
3 Salinas and Paldan, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp. 89/90 
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elite. The first mass medium is the press, and this develops 
through its connection with conflict. As the media grow and 
develop, in particular with the advent of broadcasting, they 
tend to lose their link with conflict, either coming under 
government control or becoming primarily commercial in orientation. 
Either way, as they follow this change, they become instruments 
of the elite, providing it with both information and entertainment, 
while at the same time incorporating it, but not the masses, into 
the international order of 'advanced peoples'. 
I have undoubtedly put this statement in extreme form; it 
is in need of some qualification. Part of the media, in particular 
radio and film, have a degree of mass reach. In fact, it is 
possible to argue that there are two levels of informational media 
coverage, one elitist (newspapers and television), one with a 
certain reach into the masses (radio). In more general terms, 
though, we have the bulk of the population at best intermittently 
and superficially touched by the media, and an elite saturated by 
them. 
In general, the media have played a negative, or at best very 
limited role in developing societies. Other means of communication 
are often more important. Wall posters and personal dissemination 
of information through party members have been important means of 
communication in China. 
' The mosque has had a powerful influence 
in a number of Moslem countries. Asghar Fathi has shown that the 
mosque has been an important source for the generation of conflict 
in Iran and Egypt and more recent events in Iran, Egypt and also 
Pakistan (the downfalls, respectively, of the Shah, Sadat and 
Bhutto) bear this out. In Fathi's view, probably in all Moslem 
countries the mosque "performs at least some of the functions of 
mass media". 
2 Though personal and other forms of communication 
are possibly often of greater significance in the Third World 
than the mass media which often, in fact, tend-to be elitist, some 
countries have made significant attempts to use the media for social 
purposes, though not necessarily with great success. Tanzania 
is one example. 
3 
1 Liu (1971) 
2 Fathi (undated), p. 13 
3 See Wedell and Pilsworth (1975) 
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The mass media in developing countries have nowhere near 
the structural importance that either the functionalists or 
Marxists suggest. They are neither a source of development 
and integration, nor a powerful class weapon. Mostly urban, 
elitist and westernised, they have little structural impact in 
Third World society. Where they do have an impact it is quite 
likely to be a destabilising one. It is in the major urban 
centres - just those areas where ethnic and intra-class conflict 
is usually generated - that the media have their greatest sway. 
This is not to say the media cannot be involved in inter-class 
conflict. Major conservative papers, for instance, probably 
played a role in bringing down leftist governments in Jamaica, 
and Chile,. (Manley's and Allende's respectively), through helping 
to create an atmosphere of fear and instability. 
1 The conservative 
press in Sri Lanka probably helped to bring down the leftist 
regime of Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1965. However, in this case the 
press was under threat of nationalisation. It was able to gain 
the support from the 'professional' part of the bourgeoisie - even 
a large part of Mrs. Bandaranaike's parliamentary support. 
2 In 
the view of one writer "it is not an exaggeration to say that the 
attempt to fetter the press was the single most important and most 
immediate factor in the government's downfall., 
3 
It is impossible to deny the potential power of the media to 
destabilise regimes, whatever the nature of this power. Sometimes 
its basis might be a class, at least partially. More often, as 
the rest of this thesis will hopefully show, it will be an ethnic 
group or a part of a class. As I argued in chapter one, classes 
should be seen as "class clusters", consisting of a number of 
"class fragments" which often find themselves in competition with 
one another. Within the bourgeoisie intra-class conflict takes 
place between the professional, commercial, military and bureaucratic 
elites, and this conflict affects the media. 
"There are many types of elites: government elites, 
commercial elites, intellectual. elites, religious elites, 
and so forth, whose concerns and interests may coincide 
at times but may diverge at other times. They all 
participate in the politics of the media., 
4 
1 New Internationalist, No. 100 (June 1981), pp. 14-18 
2 Gunaratne (1970), p. 536 3 Vickery (1967), p. 437 
4 Lee, Chin-Chuan (1980), p. 39 
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It is better, Lee argues, to talk in terms of "class coalition? ' 
rather than of united classes. Salinas and Paldan, explicitly 
referring to the commercial differences of interest between strong 
government and professional media-owners, call these "contradictions 
between sectors of the dominating groups in society. "1 
1 Salinas and Paldan, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp. 96/7 
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PART ONE : OVERVIEW 
It is impossible to view society in the Third World without 
reference to the importance of conflict. As ethnicity rather 
than class forms the main type of social identity this conflict 
is primarily ethnic in nature. But as class grows in significance 
it develops into conflict between different fragments within the 
growing classes and, finally, into conflict between these classes 
themselves. Conflict reaches its culmination in the struggle 
for power. As the economy is very poor the means of becoming 
rich through direct ownership of resources are highly limited: 
for the elite, therefore, power which offers control of substantial 
parts of the economy, becomes the main economic resource. 
These conflicts are reflected in the media. In general the 
media are for the information and entertainment of the elite, but 
they also, in particular the press, reflect the struggle between 
different elites for power. This does not necessarily affect the 
content of the media. It can affect all aspects, as different 
elites with different roles in the media (politicians, media-owners, 
journalists, etc. ) struggle to make the media truly their instrument. 
Where conflict is ethnic in nature such intra-class divisions are 
unlikely to be of importance. This is the case in Nigeria. The 
Nigerian press has been overtly partisan. Before the civil war 
most papers wholeheartedly supported their particular ethnic causes. 
In Pakistan conflict has had a strong intra-class element, and 
this has been reflected by divisions within the press, i. e. struggles 
between partisanship, government-control and orientation to the 
market. The following chapters will examine these two countries 
in detail. 
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PART TWO, THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 
Introduction 
In the following chapters I shall be looking at Nigeria, a 
country where ethnic conflict has been of paramount importance. 
The major event of Nigerian history is the civil war of the late 
1960s. The popular explanation of this as simply the result of 
tribal hatred is sociologically inadequate, and is rejected by 
those who have studied the build up to the war and the nature of 
Nigerian society. What they reject is the irrationality implied 
in the explanation. Certainly the war was the outcome of tribal 
antagonisms, but these had a rational basis. The answer lies in 
the political-economy of Nigeria, not in its cultural diversity; 
cultural fragmentation alone does not create wars. Nor necessarily 
does the struggle for political power. A lot depends on what 
economic consequences hang on the power balance. The use of 
economic variables to elucidate the nature of the political conflict 
of the 1960s does not mean that this conflict can be accounted for 
in Marxist terms. The civil war was clearly not a war between 
different economic classes. Ethnic rather than class differences 
were primary. Yet some accounts of this period take cognisance of 
classes (or elites) within each ethnic group. The suggestion is 
that some sectors of society had more to gain from ethnic competition 
than others. It is only one step and a generalisation from this 
position to argue that in developing countries class conflict, 
insofar as it exists, is structured ethnically. Conflict in 
Nigeria has been primarily ethnic, but within this was germinating 
a strong core of intra-class conflict. 
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CHAPTER THREE : THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
I shall argue in this chapter that the Nigerian economy had, 
around the time of independence, little to offer native Nigerians 
in the way of substantial advancement. Such a condition I believe 
to be common to developing countries (as a result of the general 
scarcity of resources), but the circumstances vary between them. 
In the Nigerian case the two main sectors of the economy were, in 
effect, closed to up-and-coming Nigerians. The 'feudal' route 
had never existed; land was fairly equitably distributed, and 
there were few big landowners. Industry, and even large-scale 
trade, were monopolised by outside interests. Some Nigerians were 
prepared to take on a'comprador' role in this industrial and 
commercial system, but the most attractive route to economic 
advancement was through the acquisition of power. Power became 
the main economic resource. 
3.1. Agriculture and Industry: The Lack of Opportunity 
Nigeria's economic development before and after independence 
was uninspiring but, until the civil war, at least continuous. 
Estimates vary, but GDP seems to have grown at just over 4% per 
annum from 1950-57 and at 4.8% p. a. from 1962-66, with rates in 
between being more doubtful. Agriculture, when population growth 
is taken into account, was at best stagnant. It grew at 2.9% per 
annum from 1950-57 and at 2% p. a. from 1962-66. There are no 
accurate figures but population was probably growing at about 2.5% 
p. a. Nevertheless, agriculture dominated the economy. In 1950 
it contributed 66% to GDP, in 1966,55%. 
1 By Third World standards 
Nigeria had no serious food problem, it being, despite the predominance 
of cash crops, more or less self-sufficient in food. When its 
cash crops began to decline Nigeria was lucky enough to find oil. 
As far as distribution was concerned, there was no substantial 
inequality on the land. 
1 Data from Wells, J. (1974), pp. 17-19 
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Table 3.1 : Size Distribution of Farmers' Holding s 1964/651 
Size of farm 
in acres 
East 
% 
Mid-West 
% 
West 
% 
North 
% 
0.25 
- 
1.0 
1.0 
- 
5.0 
5.0 
- 
20.0 
20.0 + 
64.1 
33.4 
2.4 
<0.1 
33.0 
62.4 
4.6 
nil 
50.4 
45.6 
4.0 
nil 
16.0 
59.1 
24.3 
0.6 
The North had the least equality on the land, but even here only 
0.4% of farmers in 1972 had holdings of between 25 and 50 acres. 
2 
Most of Nigeria's farmers were independent, but their holdings 
were generally very small. 
The income available from cash crops, the relative self- 
sufficiency in food, and the lack of any great land inequality 
might suggest that the average peasant farmer was, in Third World 
terms, in a relatively favourable position. The state ensured 
this was not to be. As there was no powerful landowning class 
to siphon off the agricultural surplus the state introduced its 
own means of doing this - the Marketing Boards. These were set 
up by the British, one for each major export crop. Their task 
was to buy the crops from farmers at fixed prices and then export 
standardised products at the best export price, partly in order to 
stabilise prices for the producer, partly to use their surplus 
profits to invest in national development. This latter, initially 
subsidiary role, soon came to take primacy over the former. From 
1962-66 the farmer's share of the export value of crops grown by 
him but exported by the Boards was 637 for cocoa and groundnuts, 
49% for palm kernels and 481 for palm oil. These shares, except 
for cocoa, were significantly lower than those applying from 1958-61.3 
The Western State government was dependent on its Marketing Boards 
for nearly 50% of its current revenue from 1961-71. 
Olatunbosun blames Nigeria's agricultural stagnation in large 
part on governmental. expropriation of a large part of the peasants' 
labour. Investment in new plantings was low and production declined. 
Groundnut production fell by 13.7% from 1963 to 1965, cotton production 
by 11.8%. Furthermore, the Boards were not very successful in 
1 Re-arranged from Wells, J. (1974), p. 52 
2 Calculated from Olatunbosun (1975), p. 11 
3 From Wells, J. (1974), pp. 204/5 
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stabilising producer prices. In some cases, it seems, the 
Boards' activities actually destabilised prices. 
l It should 
be added that little of the extracted surplus made its way back 
to the rural areas, either for welfare or for agricultural 
improvements. Olatunbosun estimates that less than 10% of 
Marketing Board funds were spent on the rural areas. 
2 Only 
about 7% of total government spending went into agriculture from 
1962/3 to 1966/7.3 
In sum, agriculture was left broadly to its own devices both 
before and after independence. It seemed to provide enough food, 
and also gave an impetus to development through the export of cash 
crops. The government could then happily siphon off the agricultural 
surplus through taxes and the Marketing Boards. Agriculture was 
neglected. It was not a profitable avenue for the individual. 
Moreover, what profits it offered were appropriated by the government, 
as has just been explained. Finally, there was no feudal class; 
nor, with the system of ownership that existed, could the rising 
urban bourgeoisie become big landowners (though no doubt some did). 
For these reasons agriculture offered no significant access to 
wealth. 
Though Nigeria was heavily dependent on trade and the export- 
import business was a lucrative one, there were limited openings 
in even this field for indigenous Nigerians. This trade was 
controlled by monopolistic interests, one of which was the government! 
"The export field was pre-empted by the setting-up of 
statutory Marketing Boards and trade in controlled imports 
was very largely monopolised by foreign firms. ,4 
In 1949,95% of the import trade was in the hands of Europeans, 
Levantines or Indians (mostly the first of these). This meant that, 
in trade, openings for Nigerians were limited primarily to internal 
wholesaling, petty retailing and service activities (especially 
transport). 
Industry was also dominated by outsiders (in particular, the 
British). In this field, Nigerians rarely extended beyond small 
processing operations. Nigerian firms were in baking, sawmilling, 
rubber creping, furniture, printing and textiles. Foreign ownership 
1 See Ibid, pp. 64/5 
2 Olatunbosun (1975), p. 53 
3 Wells, J. (1974), p. 165 
4 Aker edolu-Ale (1975), p. 53 
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was mostly in mining, oil, and large and medium-scale manufacturing. 
In 1964, British firms owned 63.6% of foreign-owned industrial 
share capital. 
1 British investment was 50.2% of all industrial 
investment. 2 Private Nigerian investment was only a fraction of 
this. Moreover, Nigerian firms were generally very small. In 
1961 a survey of over 10,000 firms in Eastern Nigeria revealed an 
average size for these of 2.7 workers. 91% of the firms lacked 
a power-driven machine. 
3 
Nigerians faced considerable difficulties establishing themselves 
industrially, even in sectors where foreign competition was slight. 
Some writers argue that Nigerians lacked ability and experience, and 
so could not absorb what capital was available from state or private 
lending agencies. Of all Nigerian firms aided by the Federal Loans 
Board from 1956 to 1963 "only about one third functioned successfully. "4 
On the other hand, whatever their problems once established, Nigerians 
clearly had difficulty obtaining credit to get established. One 
study of 52 Nigerian industrialists in Lagos found that 50% of them 
started with capital of less than £N2,000.5 
"to argue that applicants without sufficient collaterals 
have no genuine or effective demand for capital, is the 
counterpart of the contention that famishing survivors 
of a shipwreck are not really hungry because their demand 
for food is not backed by adequate purchasing power., 
6 
Whatever the arguments on either side, the difficulties of new men 
lacking in experience and resources breaking into a field dominated 
by rich, well established foreign interests is clear enough. The 
same applied when Nigerians tried to enter the field of finance 
themselves. Nigerians started 14 banks from 1945 to 1951 but only 
one survived much beyond then. 
7 
The government's attempts to increase the Nigerian share of 
industry were pretty feeble. The government's own industrial 
investments were much larger than private Nigerian holdings but 
still much smaller than those of private foreign interests. In 
1965,61% of total paid-up capital in all industrial firms was 
foreign-owned, 12% was private Nigerian investment, and 27% 
government-owned. 
8 Most government ventures were, anyway, 
1 Kilby (1969), p. 21 
2 Hakam, in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p. 160 
3 Kilby (1969), pp. 18/19 
4 Schatz in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p. 285 
5 Akeredolu-Ale (1975), pp. 77/8 6 Diaku (1972), p. 138 
7 Oni (1966), p. 388 8 Schätzl (1973), p. 45 
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in partnership with foreign firms. When the opposition leader, 
Awolowo, suggested in the House of Representatives that there 
should be more nationalisation, the Federal Minister of Finance, 
Okotie-Eboh (later assassinated), answered "We all know that 
nationalisation of industry is akin to communism. "1 
The government's main intervention was, in fact, through 
the private sector. At the centre of this policy was a high 
tariff system. However, its original purpose was less to boost 
industry than to provide revenue for the government. In fact, 
the secondary motive was to try and control imports. It was 
for this very reason that the tariffs probably encouraged 
investment from foreign firms, as the system virtually invited 
them to invest and get behind the barriers. The big British 
companies, especially those already döminating trade in Nigeria, 
protected their dominance by initiating major industrial investments. 2 
Foreign firms benefited from government aid as well. Amongst 
those foreign companies receiving tax relief as protected industries 
were Glaxo, Raleigh, I. C. I., Michelin, Dunlop and Metal Box. 
3 
British and other foreign interests were dominant not only in 
ownership. They predominated, too, in management, even in many 
indigenous firms, while Western firms took on few Nigerians. A 
government labour force survey of 1966/7 found that 55% of commercial 
management and other staff in senior positions were foreigners. 
This percentage went as high as 73% in the Northern Region. 
4 This 
study showed that foreigners received 2.5 as much pay as indigenous 
management. In 1968,25% of the country's industrial pay-roll went 
to foreign skilled manpower. One study, taking account of wages, 
profits and interest, calculates that 70% of industrial value added 
was transferred abroad in 1963.5 
The above discussion has shown that for most up-and-coming 
Nigerians large-scale trade and industry were, broadly speaking, 
a closed shop. The best that could be hoped for against government 
monopoly (the Marketing Boards) and strongly established foreign 
competition was an opening on the periphery of the major areas of 
activity -a small business linked to, rather than competing with, 
the big foreign firms. Insecurity was a constant factor, and 
1 Quoted in Blunt, in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p. 81 
2 Kilby (1969), pp. 63-71 
3 Report of Proceedings of House of Representatives, P. Q. answer (5.8.63) 
4 Schätzt (1973), p. 136 
5 Ibid, p. 44 
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large profits or salaries rare. A study of small indigenous 
firms with 20 workers found average annual salaries for their 
entrepreneurs of £N180 in the East and £N300 in the North. In 
firms of less than 5 workers the entrepreneurs could be nearly 
at subsistence level. By comparison, in 1965 a typist could get 
£N240, a driver £N200 and a nurse £N200.1 Those who ended up in 
business were likely to come from fairly lowly backgrounds; after 
all, they might be able to earn more in even rather lowly jobs 
outside private business. One study of Nigerian industrial 
entrepreneurs found 18% of those in 225 small firms had no education, 
29% a partial primary education, while another 39% had achieved a 
full primary education. 
2 The occupational backgrounds of these 
and other entrepreneurs, by size of firm, is given below. Kilby 
compares his sample to one by Harris. 
Table 3.2: Occupational Backgrounds of Entrepreneurs (%) 3 
Kilby sample 
(298 firms) 
Harris sample 
(54 firms) 
Farmer 5 
- 
Trader 14 22 
Craftsmen 69 45 
Clerical-administrative 4 
Teaching 3 33 
Professional 1 
Domestic 4 
- 
Total 100% 100% 
Kilby's sample was mostly of small, Harris' of fairly large firms. 
The overall picture is pretty clear. Most Nigerian industrial 
entrepreneurs of this time had a poor educational background and 
had previously, i. e. before entering industry, been either craftsmen 
or (mostly petty) traders. 73% of the fathers of businessmen in 
Imoagene's sample were illiterate. While most businessmen started 
as apprentices in a skilled or semi-skilled trade, the majority 
of their fathers had an even lowlier start, as small farmers or 
lowly employees in trade. 
4 
1 Nafziger (1977), p. 82 
2 Kilby (1969), p. 336 
3 Ibid, p. 336 
4 Imoagene (1976), p. 96 and Nafziger (1977), p. 176 
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The above data show that after independence Nigeria's 
businessmen generally. came from rather humble backgrounds. It 
seems clear enough from the earlier discussion that the chances 
of Nigerians wanting to get on directly through trade or industry 
must have been daunting (and we have seen that agriculture offered 
no better hope). The prospects of obtaining capital and then 
succeeding with it must have seemed slim. Far better, and easier, 
to get into a position where resources could be controlled, or at 
least to attach oneself to someone in such a position, than to 
actually own and operate such resources. The way to do that, 
for the ambitious, was through politics. Direct meddling in 
business could be left for the more lowly. 
3.2. The Politicians' Socio-Economic Background 
It has just been shown that Nigeria's early businessmen had 
rather humble backgrounds. The politicians also had somewhat 
lowly backgrounds, but significantly higher than those of the 
businessmen. To some extent they can be considered to have been 
the modern indigenous elite waiting for independence to rise from 
their relatively modest positions (i. e. modest compared to the 
real elite of Nigeria - the 'expatriates - and the elites of many 
other countries) to stations of wealth and power. Politics, 
rather than direct intervention in the economy, offered the most 
profitable route to success. 
I have described these politicians as an elite, but obviously 
only a small number of them attained to positions of real power. 
The term 'elite' is, as has been mentioned, a very vague term. 
Perhaps it would be best to consider the Members of Parliament 
to be a 'sub-elite', while those actually controlling things - 
the ministers, governors, premiers, etc. - were part of the elite 
itself. Some idea of the wider nature of the sub-elite can be 
obtained by looking at the backgrounds of electoral candidates 
rather than just the M. Ps. themselves. 
Post found that of 633 candidates in the 1959 federal elections, 
26.12 were Northern Native Authority functionaries (councillors, 
officials, etc. ), or court functionaries from the East (only a very 
few of these); 25% were businessmen; the third biggest category 
were teachers (11.2%). 
1 The Native Authority(NA) system was a 
1, Post (1963), pp. 278/9 
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local administrative structure 
-largely under the control of the 
Northern aristocracy, and applicable exclusively to the North. 
Many of the NA functionaries, though, were teachers, so the 
proportion of teachers attempting to enter parliament was 
significantly higher than the above 11.2%. There were clear 
differences between regions. The main recruiting ground for 
candidates in the South (i. e. the Western and Eastern regions) 
was the professions (mostly education and the law), with business 
a close second. In the North it was the NA structure, again with 
business coming a close second. In general the businessmen were 
small-scale, most big businessmen being foreigners. Politics 
for these men, too, then, was a means of increasing access to 
scarce resources. Manual workers, company employees (mostly 
clerks) and trade union officials between them comprised only 
6.4% of candidates, farmers a mere 8.4%. 
Whereas 30% of Southern candidates in 1959 were businessmen, 
only 22.521 of M. Ps. actually elected from the South were businessmen. 
The latter was also a lower figure than the 1951 figure of 28.2%2 
of Southern M. Ps. coming from business. Business ambitions 
apparently did not find quite the political outlet they sought. 
In 1959 a mere 2.2% of Southern federal M. Ps. were trade unionists, 
and another 2.2% were farmers. 
3 In terms of education the Southern 
M. Ps. in the Federal House were, by Western standards, modestly 
educated, but substantially better than most of the rest of Nigerian 
society, including its business class. 41.9% had a primary or 
post-primary education, 28.3% education up to secondary level or 
teacher-training, and 24.4% a university education. 
4 
The Northern M. Ps. in the Federal House in 1959 were very 
different from the Southerners, both occupationally and educationally. 
Instead of lawyers and teachers we have Native Authority functionaries. 
It is important to note that some of these had rather lowly positions 
in the NAs. 35.2% of these Northern federal M. Ps. were or had been 
NA teachers; another 19.2% were NA clerks or other relatively lowly 
NA employees. 
5 The education of the Northern federal M. Ps. was 
clearly inferior to that of the Southern members. 
1 Mackintosh (1966), p. 91 
2 Post (1963), p. 45 
3 Mackintosh (1966), p. 91 
4 Ibid, p. 91 
5 Ibid, p. 90 
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So far I have said nothing about the regional assemblies, 
or about the differences between those actually holding power 
and the bulk of the M. Ps. There, in fact, seems to have been 
little difference between the backgrounds of federal and of 
regional M. Ps. I have extracted the following information from 
the biographical data given by, the Eastern Region's government 
on its politicians, and I have divided this into mere M. Ps. and 
those in real positions of power. The latter can be considered 
to be the elite, the former the 'sub-elite'. 
Table 3.3: Occupational Backgrounds of Politicians in 
Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly &, Government, 1963 (in %) 
Elitea Other M. Ps. Total 
Teachers 52.9 58.3 56.5 
Lawyers 5.9 5.2 5.4 
Other professionalb 13.8 2.1 6.1 
Businessmen 7.8 12.5 10.9 
Administratorsc 3.9 1.0 2.0 
Clerksc 9.8 5.2 6.8 
Army 
- 
2.1 1.4 
Farmers 
- 
8.4 5.4 
Manual 2.0. 1.0 1.4 
No occupation given 3.9 4.2 4.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Numbers) (51) (96) (147) 
Source: Know Your Legislators: Biographical Notes of Members of 
the Eastern House of Assembly and Chiefs, 1963, Enugu. 
Notes: a 23 Ministers, 11 Provincial Commissioners and 
17 Parliamentary Secretaries 
b Apart from 1 accountant, all medical 
c Both mostly either civil service or Local Authority 
It can be seen that there is very little difference between 
M. Ps. and the more powerful politicians in terms of occupational 
background. Some of the politicians had had more than one job. 
At least 17% of the entire sample had been clerks at one time, at 
least 21% had, or had had, business interests (however small). 
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All in all, there is no big difference between the regional and 
federal M. Ps. As far as education is concerned, 23% of these 
Eastern politicians had a university background, again making 
them very similar to their federal counterparts. 
The same lack of difference between regional and federal 
M. Ps. applies to the North. 80% of M. Ps. in the Northern House 
were from the NAs. Most of these were from quite high positions, 
but over 40% of those from the NAs were teachers, clerks or other 
fairly lowly employees. 13% of the M. Ps. were businessmen. 
There were none from manual occupations. 
I One sample of 92 M. Ps. 
in the Western House of Assembly (the only one of the three original 
regional assemblies not so far mentioned) in 1965 shows that six 
out of every seven M. Ps. started as either clerks or teachers. 
2 
(The clerks were largely of urban origin, the teachers rural). 
This suggests a considerable amount of social mobility. Most 
of these politicians had, in fact, held several previous jobs 
(the mean number being five). Furthermore, about a third of 
these M. Ps. ended up with some government office. Thus, from low 
middle-class rankings (the rural teachers were particularly lowly), 
positions of considerable power (and wealth) were reached. When 
the occupations of the fathers of these M. Ps. are examined this 
becomes even more apparent. 56% of the fathers of M. Ps. in the 
Western Region's House of Assembly in 1965 were, or had been, farmers. 
Another 23% were petty traders. 80% of these fathers were "non- 
literate". 3 
In sum, M. Ps. in Nigeria in the 1950s and early 1960s were 
drawn from a wide variety of occupations. These were mostly, by 
Western occupational standards, of a lower middle-class nature. 
Absent are big landed interests and close to absent are manual 
workers. The professions are the most represented group in the 
regional and federal assemblies, especially teaching; however, 
teaching is a rather lowly profession, with poor pay and fairly 
low status. Thus, the politicians came from higher backgrounds, 
as a rule, than most of Nigeria's indigenous businessmen, but, 
nevertheless, still had in the main modest beginnings. 
1 Whitaker (1970), pp. 319 and 323 
2 Imoagene (1976), pp. 81 and 85 
3 Ibid, pp. 77/8 
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0 
Power opened up great opportunities. 
The second most important entrants into politics were, in 
fact, businessmen. These tended to be small businessmen (and 
traders rather than industrialists). Moreover, Nigerian 
businessmen themselves tended to have rather low status backgrounds, 
as shown above. The entry of these businessmen into politics 
was less a reflection of an economic class attempting to dominate 
government than of the control of government over the economy. 
In other words, politics was a business; businessmen were dependent 
on government, notvice versa. 
"In Northern Nigeria the government was the largest 
source of contracts. Government and quasi-governmental 
agencies provided a variety of economic services, 
formulated policies, and laid down economic regulations 
all vital to businessmen. "1 
The same applied to all the governments. Some bigger businessmen 
achieved positions of power, though they were still politically 
dependent; in the North, for instance, they found it "politically 
advantageous to support the old ruling class., 
2 
In the South what we have is a collection of 'new' men from 
a variety of occupations broadly 'bourgeois' in nature. In no way 
did this 'class' hold a dominant economic position before independence. 
There was no feudal class, and large-scale trade and industry were 
in the hands of expatriates or the marketing boards. The politicians 
were men who had worked their way into moderate positions in society - 
through teaching, law, middle or even low-ranking administrative 
positions, small or medium sized businesses and farms. The situation 
was different in the North. Here there was a dominant class - 
the aristocracy, whose local power had been left untouched by the 
British. However, the introduction of a political party, the 
Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), to represent the interests of 
those in control of the local power structure in the North, brought 
with it a widening of that power outside purely aristocratic bounds. 
Those who represented the party were the functionaries of the 
Native Authorities, many of them quite lowly (including a large 
number of teachers). It would be wrong to view the NPC merely 
1 Whitaker (1970), p. 334 
2 Dudley (1968), p. 151 
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as an extension of aristocratic power. It included a large 
number of relatively'small'men, and it often clashed with the 
aristocracy. These men used the NPC to maintain the system 
of power as it existed in the North, but also to wean some 
power away from the aristocracy. Politics opened a way for 
relatively 'small' men in the North to break into the power 
structure, up until then in the control solely of traditional 
authority. 
In the whole of Nigeria, then, though less so in the North, 
politics represented a means of getting on for those seeking to 
increase their wealth and prestige, means which were unavailable, 
or extremely difficult, in other spheres. Most direct access to 
substantial economic wealth was foreclosed. Politics offered 
new horizons for the control of economic resources. Finally, 
the above data seems to be extraordinarily well replicated in 
other African countries. Worsley summarises results from a 
number of African countries. For our purposes we can just 
compare his results for Nigeria (the federal plus the three 
regional assemblies) with those of several other African states 
(seven of them). 31.8% of Nigerian M. Ps. were teachers compared 
to 32.3% for the seven other countries. The figures for lawyers 
were 6.4% and 6.3% respectively, 7.2% and 8% for various other 
professions, 16.1% and 14.4% for traders, 22.9% and 15.9% for 
civil servants (the biggest difference). 1 
3.3. Power as a Basis of Wealth 
I have shown that the economy offered no easy direct benefits 
for those Nigerians seeking substantial advancement. Land was 
moderately well distributed, and what surplus it was able to offer 
was largely siphoned off by the state. Indigenous trade and 
industry were not, in general, a very lucrative affair, and were 
left largely to the lowly. Prospects were better through politics, 
the means whereby resources could be controlled. I have also shown 
that politicians were, as a rule, neither as lowly as the bulk of 
Nigeria's indigenous businessmen, nor at the top of the social 
heights 
-a place usurped mainly by the expatriates. They were 
of fairly modest background, poised for the openings independence 
1 From Worsley (1967), p. 148 
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would offer. Their spring-board was in education (in the South) 
and the local power structure (in the North). 
The benefits that politics offered were enormous. In 1965 
a Cabinet Minister in any of the Nigerian governments received 
£N2,700 p. a., plus various benefits and allowances. A parliamentary 
secretary received from £N1,350 to £N1,800.1 It was very much 
worthwhile becoming even an M. P., for the salary alone. 
"Some indication of the status of an M. P. and the desire 
to be nominated for election appears when it is appreciated 
that for teachers (including headmasters), and Native 
Authority officials, the salary scale runs from about 
£200 to £300 p. a. "2 
Federal M. Ps. got £900 p. a. plus a car allowance of £266, and mileage. 
There could also be numerous secondary awards through patronage 
and corruption, and there often were. For instance, in the North 
"regionalisation of power produced a prodigious new 
concentration of wealth, opportunity and perquisites - 
access to and control of which persons enjoying 
disproportionate political power in the emirates also 
had a disproportionate share.... ,3 
In return for jobs, as is well known, the beneficiaries of political 
patronage were expected to pay 10% of their salaries to their parties. 
In return for contracts, businessmen, who found it paid to support 
the government, gave a similar cut. Politicians who profited from 
their control of resources could then set up in business themselves, 
or expand what were initially only small businesses. Each regional 
government also owned or controlled a bank on which the party could 
rely for support. In 1937, Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National 
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), later Premier of the 
Easter Region and the President of Nigeria, started speculating 
.' 
in Lagos real estate. In 1948 he founded the African Continental 
Bank. By 1956 he was dealing in property, commodities, transport, 
printing and the press (he owned a number of newspapers). But in 
1956, while he was Premier of the Eastern Region, the British set 
up a tribunal to investigate his business activities. It was found 
1 Nafziger (1977), p. 91 
2 Mackintosh (1966), p. 89 
3 Whitaker (1970), p. 461 
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that Azikiwe was making illegitimate use of the bank to finance 
his other companies which, by 1955, had lost £98,000.56% 
(£321,000) of the bank's total funds had been lent to these 
companies. In 1955 the bank was insolvent. The Eastern Region 
Finance Corporation (a regional government body) invested £800,000 
of Marketing Board money in the bank. This action, the cause 
of the investigation, raised the value of the bank's shares from 
nil to 14s. 10d. 
The bank also gave money to the party. An NCNC report 
stated (in 1960) that the NCNC spent £1.2 million between January 
1957 and July 1960, but received only £500,000 from all sources, 
other than the bank. In 1959 the bank was taken over by the 
Eastern Region-Development Corporation 
- 
that is, under direct 
control of the government. 
1 Over one third of all the money 
this corporation disbursed was lent to a real estate concern in 
Lagos, the chairman of which was also the chairman of the Development 
Corporation. 2 
A similar story applies in the Western Region. The Coker 
Commission, set up by the federal government as part of its attempt 
to break the Action Group (AG) party, found that of the £64 million 
disbursed by the Western Region Marketing Board between 1954 and 
1962, all but £10 million went to the Western government or its 
corporations. This £10 million went to seven organisations, four 
of which were in the hands of AG politicians. £6 million of it 
went to the National Investment and Properties Co. Ltd. (NIPC) and 
£3 million to the National Bank; both were then in the hands of 
AG men. The chairman of the Western Region Development Board 
(a government organisation) was a director of NIPC which, by 1962, 
had paid over £3.5 million to the AG. 
More detail in this field is hardly required; most writings 
on Nigerian politics are replete with such data. It is clear enough 
that politics was a crucial source (I would say prime source) for 
the accumulation of capital, of access to the country's scarce 
resources. Ownership of the country's assets through trying to 
work directly in the economy without political intervention was 
a difficult and not very promising business. All that was needed 
1 Post (1963), pp. 58-60. 
2 Helleiner (1964), pp. 108-17 
- 
100 
- 
was to control these resources. 
"For in the last years of colonial rule the largest 
accumulation of capital was made not by the foreign 
firms, which repatriated the bulk of their profits, 
nor by the Nigerian bourgeoisie, but by the State 
itself, through the various Marketing Boards... 
This was State Capitalism with a vengeance, and from 
about 1957 onwards these funds came increasingly 
under the control of the Nigerian bourgeoisie. "1 
This describes well the pre-eminence of government-controlled 
resources. The reference to 'State Capitalism' is, however, 
misleading. The Marketing Boards did not represent state 
intervention aimed at supporting a capitalist economy. Nigeria 
had then, and still largely has, a peasant economy. The Boards 
represented 'state capitalism' only in a very literal sense; they 
were the state's means of accumulating capital; as such they 
could have been used in exactly the same way in a socialist economy. 
There is a danger in applying Marxist categories too rigorously 
to developing countries. For instance, Post argues that 
"attention must be drawn to the way in which the State 
in Nigeria conforms with the classic formulation of 
Marx and Engels. It is in the most literal sense the 
instrument of the ruling class. "2 
This is confusing. If there is a ruling class then, by definition, 
the state is its instrument. Marx and Engels claim that those who 
control the state manage "the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"3 
and the basis of this class lies in its control over a particular 
economic force - industrial capital. In Nigeria the 'bourgeoisie' 
was in control of no major economic force before it came to control 
the state. Indeed, Post himself suggests as much: 
"there is the contradiction of the fact that in the 
colonial period no Nigerian class controlled the means 
of production and thus formed the ruling class per se. "4 
Though Post adapts Marxism to Third World conditions, he does not 
go far enough. Dudley argues that for the NigeriaAbourgeoisie 
1 Post (1964), p. 175 
2 Ibid, p. 174 
3 Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto, ed. Taylor (1967), p. 82 
4 Post (1964), p. 170 
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thy' state was "nothing more than a conmittee for the 
administration of their consolidated affairs. "1 However, Dudley 
(elsewhere) 2 and other writers have to admit that 
"political power is the primary force that creates 
economic opportunity and determines the pattern of 
social stratification., 
3 
The bourgeoisie had no real economic base. It was a disparate 
group of men, a mixture of professional men, small businessmen, 
and people with lowly administrative backgrounds. It had little 
unity and become even less united when in control of the state. 
But the state was clearly enough the source of their economic 
pre-eminence. The reverse was not the case. 
3.4. Social Inequalities and the Class Structure 
I have argued that power in Nigeria is a source of wealth, 
wealth ncta source of power. To put it another way, power is 
not determined by the class structure. This does not mean class 
was of no significance, despite the overriding importance of 
ethnicity, nor that there were not severe social inequalities. 
3.4.1. The Nature of the Inequalities 
Looking at Nigerian society as a whole, one study (for the 
year 1967/8) ranks the incomes of various occupational sectors 
as follows: 
Table 3.4.: Indices of Wages by Occupational Sector 
Total labour force 1 
Industrial sector as a whole 3.9 
Unskilled workers 1.9 
Skilled and semi-skilled workers 2.8 
Clerical and other staff 4.7 
Nigerian professional, admin. and 
management 16.4 
Foreigners 40.9 
The average annual income of farmers was £N34-72, while the minimum 
wages of urban workers was £N84-108.4 This compares to £3,900 p. a. 
(plus generous allowances) for the highest public service post in 
1965, and £8,625 for a minister. 
5 
1 Dudley (1964), p. 162 
2 Dudley (1973), p. 162 
3 Sklar (1965), p. 204 
4 Schätzt (1973), pp. 15213 
5 Kilbv (1969). D. 305 
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The public sector in fact did little to reduce inequalities. 
It added to them rather. Even though top civil servants, like 
the politicians, had rather modest origins, their positions of 
power turned'them into a distinctive elite. One study of a small 
sample of civil servants (mostly higher grades, but including a 
few clerks) showed that 63% of their fathers were illiterate, while 
59% of the fathers were farmers; another 21% were petty traders 
and another 11% clerks, tailors or craftsmen. 
l. About 60% of the 
civil servants themselves started as clerks, about 25% as teachers. 
Only two had degrees. How much top civil servants had improved 
their own circumstances can be seen from the fact that, while in 
1963/4 the top Nigerian in the Eastern Region public service got 
£3,900 p. a., plus allowances, the lowest official got £172 p. a., 
and daily paid public sector employees the equivalent of less than 
£60 p. a. 
2 In 1963/4 those in the highest grade in the Nigerian 
civil service (supervisors) got 33 times as much as daily paid 
workers in the public service. 
3 
Inequalities in Nigerian society were (and still are) very 
great. They seem to reflect a clear distinction between an elite 
comprising politicians, top civil servants, Nigerian management and 
top businessmen, and the expatriates; a sub-elite, going down to 
clerical level; and the masses. Within the latter the rural poor 
form a huge bottom rung. The tax structure did little to alter 
this. From Western government statistics4 it can be calculated 
that, in 1966/7, the top 1.09% of income earners who paid income 
tax had 15.3% of the total income of the region's tax-payers before 
tax, and exactly 15.3% after tax. The reason was the very generous 
tax allowances given for the well-off, including a life-assurance 
allowance, and a special allowance for the education of children 
overseas! Allowances (including the latter) were even more 
generous in federal territory. 
5 
In 1957/8 the Smythes analysed what they called an elite 
(156 Nigerians considered to be members of the elite by others) 
and also a much broader elite of 956 Nigerians listed in 'Who's 
Who in Nigeria', which can be taken to include a part of the 
'sub-elite' too. 
6 Though a detailed break-down of occupations 
1 Imoagene (1976), pp. 88-90 
2 Eastern House of Assembly Proceedings, PQ Answer (1963) 
3 Akeredolu-Ale (1975), p. 69 
4 Given in Teriba and Philips (1971), p. 92 
5 Adedeji (1965), pp. 168/9 
6 Smythe, H. and M. (1960) 
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revealed that the 156 elite members came from 15 occupations, 
113 of these were government officials or politicians. 
1 This 
is partly explained by the way the sample was selected, but 
the dependence on government and politics is clear enough. 
Though old elite status was of some value, mobility was 
very high. As the Smythes put it, 65.4% of the 156 were of 
"ordinary stock"2. Many had at one time been clerks or teachers. 
The rapid change in the nature of power, the expansion of 
government, the departure of most expatriates, and the greatly 
increased need for educated people stemming from these changes, 
made this mobility possible. And the most rapid mobility for 
those seeking elite positions was through government. "The 
government, their experience had taught them, can provide the 
surest means to their goal. "3 
Nigerian society contained great inequalities, but, as it 
is possible to isolate a relatively small number of people, of 
generally modest background, who reached the top primarily through 
the acquisition of power or some link with the power structure 
(achieved mainly through educational advantage or, in the North, 
this in combination with traditional authority), and who became 
vastly richer than the bulk of the population because of their 
access to power, it seems more appropriate to characterise them 
by the term 'elite' rather than the term 'class'. 
3.4.2. The Role of Class Conflict 
There was very little political representation of lower class 
interests. The only radical party was the Northern Elements 
Progressive Union (NEPU), which never achieved any great standing 
and also had a strong pro Northern ethnic bias. 
4 Representation 
through labour unions was more significant. However, industrial 
labour in Nigeria was not a powerful force. Its numerical strength 
was rather small,. as is to be expected in a developing country. 
In 1961 there were 423,000 people employed in. establislmments of 
10 or more people. Most workers in such establishments were in 
the construction and service sectors. In 1962 only 10% of them 
were in manufacturing or processing. 
5 In the same year there 
were about 300,000 in trade unions. There were unions only in 
1 Ibid, p. 79 
2 Ibid, p. 87 
3 Ibid, p. 120 
4 O'Connell (1961), p. 182 
5 Kilby (1969), pp. 202/3 
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the civil service, public corporations and European firms. 
Moreover, most unions were very small. 195 out of 360 unions 
in 1961 had 250 members or less. In that year only eight 
unions had 5,000 or more members, though these took up 46% of 
total union membership. Not all these unions were in the 
industrial field. The largest of them was the Teachers' Union 
with 54,000 members. The largest industrial union was that 
of the Northern Mine-Workers, with 12,000. Only three of the 
bigger unions were in the private sector. 
' 
The unions were thus small and atomised. The few relatively 
big ones were in limited sectors. They were mainly non-industrial 
and government was (directly or indirectly) the main employer. 
Even the bigger unions were fragmented as they covered establishments 
separated by huge distances and included a multitude of different 
types of worker. They were also severely affected by ethnic and 
other internal rivalries. Though these facts mean that the unions 
were not a powerful force in Nigerian society, they have had 
significant strikes and some notable successes. In 1955/6,900,000 
man-days were lost when workers struck to get a public pay award 
applied in the private sector. In 1964 there was a general strike 
in which 722,000 man-days were lost. 
2 
The latter instance is a rare case of an over-arching unity. 
If the unions are as separate entities not very united, the 
difficulties of creating an all-embracing union structure have 
been horrific. The Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) was 
formed in 1943. In 1948 the TUCN split into two, partly on 
ethnic, partly on ideological lines. In 1963 there were three 
moderate and two radical central labour organisations, but they 
came together for the general strike of 1963/4.3 This was aimed 
at the government 
- 
as employer. There was a great deal of 
resentment at the very large inequalities of pay in the civil service, 
and the new Joint Action Committee (JAC) demanded both a pay rise 
for the low-paid and a restructuring of the salary scales. The 
government conceded the Morgan Commission, whose recommendations 
for large increases the government refused to publish. The' 
general strike started on 31 May, 1964. The government offered 
1 Ibid, pp. 271/2 
2 Ibid, pp. 274/5 
3 Ibid, p. 286 
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half the Morgan recommendation on 3 June, but this was rejected. 
The government issued an ultimatum which persuaded the two 
Northern components of the JAC to order a return to work. 
Eventually an overall agreement was reached across the whole 
federation. 
A strong element of ethnic politics was clear enough. A 
Federation of Labour leader from the North, for instance, said 
that he was supporting "our Loving Premier" against the "Southern- 
based Trade Unions". He was protecting the "father-land" and 
"the interest of the workers of the North according to our 
tradition instead of allowing some Southerners to come and dictate 
to us how to run our affairs". 
1 Most unions in the North were 
in fact branches of federal unions, the headquarters of which 
were in the South (Lagos). When the Northern branches broke 
the strike they were also breaking away from what they saw as 
the ethnic and political control (and politics was ethnic) of 
the Southern unions. A. Northern M. P., in an "open letter" to 
the NCNC. leader, complained of what he saw as an Ibo/NCNC attempt 
to infiltrate the Northern mines through the Southern-based 
Nigerian Mine Workers' Union. According to him the attempt failed 
because the NCNC could not find enough Northern agents to "sell" 
the region "to what I can describe as barbarous Region made up of 
diabolical and fierce-looking greedy brutes". 
2 Under these 
circumstances even a genuinely radical attempt by the Southern- 
based unions to stoke up the North would be bound to fail. The 
North was certainly conservative, but ethnic and political 
confrontation increased this conservatism. Ethnic divisions have 
been a constant problem in Nigerian labour affairs. A more specific 
example is that of the Northern mine-workers of the Jos area; most 
of, these were from Northern ethnic groups but some were Southern 
and they were all (in the early 1950s) incorporated in two unions 
under Southern leadership.. Through political interference there 
were by 1961 three completely different unions each with its own 
ethnic membership and leadership. 
3 
Industrial workers, then, suffered from pronounced ethnic 
divisions. They were also divided off from the bulk of the rest 
1 Nigerian Citizen, Zaria (26.9.64) 
2 Ibid, (5.12.64) 
2 Dudley (1968), pp. 239/40 
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of the lower classes through being in a position of relative 
privilege. This does not mean they were not very poor or that 
the urban conditions they lived in were pleasant. A government 
study found in 1961 that 67% of all residents in Lagos shared 
a 10-foot square single-room dwelling with an average of two 
other people. 
1 A government survey of the late 1960s put 
urban unemployment at 8% but reaching 20% in some instances. 
It put underemployment at about 20% of the labour force. 
2 
Nevertheless, the cities were far better off than the rural areas. 
From 1953 to 1965 real urban wages grew at least twice as fast 
as per capita GDP. 
3 
For this reason Kilby argues that "rather than being an 
exploited group, organised labour is already a highly privileged 
minority". 
4 This is a gross exaggeration. One writer argues 
convincingly that the pay rises the government has ensured for 
workers, and its general control over wages, reflect exploitation 
rather than paternalism and protection, or even a policy of 
stability. Wage awards have been spaced very far apart and are 
often given for special reasons - e. g. war inflation. 
5 However, 
the relative privilege of the workers (comparing them to the 
peasantry and the urban unemployed) in conjunction with other 
factorsr weakening labour (already discussed), made it very unlikely 
labour would be a radical force. It gained most by integration 
into the political system - at the cost of its independence. 
To conclude this section on class: those in positions of power 
and influence were an elite rather than a class based on an economic 
division of labour. Workers had little effective union or political 
representation. They were also severely ethnically divided, 
competing within themselves on ethnic lines. The unions became 
integrated into the political system and its leaders into the 
patronage structure. The ethnic divisions in the labour force 
meant that what class conflict there was was mostly "intra-class" 
in nature. 
1 Kilby (1969), p. 221 
2 Falae (1971), p. 65 
3 Kilby (1969), p. 281 
4 Kilby (1969), p. 282 
5 Weeks (1971), p. 332 
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3.5. The Motivations of the Politicians 
I have argued that ethnic conflict, such as that which has 
occurred in Nigeria, is likely to affect every level of the social 
hierarchy. Equivalent socio-economic groups of different ethnic 
identities compete against each other; in other words, ethnic 
conflict has a built-in intra-class element, at least in potential. 
This reaches its greatest intensity, or at least its greatest 
significance, at the highest level - that of the power struggle; 
this is because it is here that most is at stake, and it is from 
the heights that ethnic conflicts lower down often receive their 
encouragement. I shall try to throw further light on the motivations 
involved here-of the elite and the sub-elite - by looking more 
closely (I have already examined their socio-economic backgrounds), 
at the country's politicians. I have done this by examining their 
activities in the various Houses of Assembly. 
However pointless the Assemblies were as decision-making units, 
they were important for two reasons. Firstly, they were public 
institutions, and as such they necessitated the explanation by 
government of its actions and policies. The M. Ps., too, had to 
justify themselves. Their activities were scrutinised by their 
constituencies. The M. Ps. were very concerned to show their local 
supporters they were doing what was required of them. In that 
sense they became important sources of communication, if not of 
action. Secondly, though the Assemblies lacked power, they were 
battle-fields where the power struggle was verbally fought out (but 
literally fought out in the case of the Western House in 1962 when 
the House was closed down after the M. Ps. become involved in physical 
conflict. What happened in the Assembly at that time played a 
crucial part in the political crisis of the time, and was a stepping- 
stone in the sequence of events that led to the civil war). 
In my analysis of the proceedings of the Nigerian Assemblies 
I have attempted to see what weight was given to various topics, 
and then, from this, to say something about the motivations of the 
participants. This assumes that there is some correlation between 
the M. Ps. ' statements and their real interests. That this was so 
is very likely because there was little reason for the M. Ps. to 
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behave differently. Though the Assemblies' were formally public, 
they were still chambers. They were not at the fore-front of the 
propaganda battle. I an not suggesting that analysis of Assembly 
proceedings can determine what the M. Ps. actually believed in. 
Interests are more apparent than beliefs. (Indeed, they often 
contradict each other). The analysis is not of subjective 
categories. The Assemblies gave their members the opportunity 
to express their political and economic interests, even if they 
forced them to suppress their real beliefs. The futility of the 
Assemblies as legislative institutions makes this more rather than 
less likely. Their very weakness meant that the M. Ps. could 
express their interests freely. There was very little at stake 
in real terms. 
The weight given to various topics is assessed by the amount 
of time spent on them. But it is impossible to estimate the 
amount of time actually spent on any subject. As a substitute 
I have used the amount of space occupied by these topics in the 
very detailed government records of proceedings (the equivalent 
of the British Hansards) - in which even laughter is noted. Even 
then, little can be gained from study of the formal schedules of 
the proceedings. I have assessed themes as actually spoken, whatever 
the formal subject under discussion. In formal terms, the budgets 
took up by far the most time in the Assemblies, but within this 
numerous subjects would be referred to, many not even economic. 
Little in the way of other legislation was enacted, and those 
Bills that were enacted received in general very little discussion. 
This is not surprising given the time these Assemblies sat for. 
The Federal House of Representatives sat in all for 42 days in the 
year studied (1963/4). The Western House sat for 16 days (in 1961/2), 
the Eastern House for 30 days (in 1963/4), and the Northern House 
for 14 days (in 1964). The choice of years for the analysis was 
determined by availability, and the need to avoid events which 
might make the sample unrepresentative. 
As I have said, the Assemblies were not important as decision- 
making units. Each was completely dominated by a single party, 
(in the case of the Federal House a coalition of two parties) and 
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each party was completely dominated by its leadership. I shall 
concentrate mostly on the three regional assemblies as these more 
'domestic' Houses seemed to show less restraint, and therefore 
more of interest, than the Federal House. Each Regional House 
was dominated by one party, and in each case this party was 
dominated by a single ethnic group. In the Northern Region the 
party was the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) representing two 
ethnic groups that had become virtually merged in the upper regions 
of the power structure - the Hausa and the Fulani. The Eastern 
Region was dominated by the Ibos and their party, the National 
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Western Region by the 
Yoruba and their party, the Action Group (AG). The Federal 
Government consisted of a coalition of the NPC and the NCNC, with 
the AG very weak in opposition. 
I have divided the data on Assembly proceedings into broad 
categories such as 'political' and 'economic' in order that 
certain key factors would not be lost in vast tables of figures; 
I have then analysed these broad categories individually. The 
key factors that stand out are mostly concerned with various 
communal conflicts. At the lowest level this was reflected in 
demands by M. Ps. for facilities for their local constituencies 
(nearly always their home town or village). These demands were 
for such things as water. facilities, roads, local industry, schools, 
hospitals, etc., and were only the first level of a whole system 
of communally based competition which, going from such local demands, 
went through to a higher level to claims by minority ethnic groups 
which considered themselves both politically and economically 
deprived by the large ethnic groups in power in each of the regions, 
and finally on to the conflict between the regions themselves (i. e. 
between the major ethnic groups in power in each region) which led 
to the civil war. The representative of the local communities 
at the first level were the nation's M. Ps. They channelled local 
demands, which were occasionally satisfied by the government; in 
exchange for at least the prospect of obtaining facilities for their 
constituencies they brought the government local political support. 
These two things were the opposite sides of the same coin, the coin 
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being the patron-client system. In mediating political support 
upwards and (hopefully) economic gains downwards the M. P. not 
only hoped to take his share of these economic rewards, but to 
build up his own local power base as well, with its concomitant 
economic and social influence. But the elements of communal 
competition for resources is also clear. As one M. P. put it 
"Tribalism does not begin here (in parliament). It starts 
right from home, village against village. "1 
The representatives-at the next level, i. e. of the ethnic 
minorities, were the subordinate political parties. They pressed 
their claims through overt political competition, trying to 
weaken the power of the dominant groups in their regions through 
alliances with major groups in other regions. They paid a price 
for this; opposition to the regionally dominant parties resulted 
in exclusion from economic facilities, or in outright repression. 
Some groups, especially the smaller ones for whom opposition 
offered no real hope, could possibly gain more by joining the 
majority; their leaders, by becoming 'clients' of those who 
controlled the region, certainly could. 
At the next level came the three major ethnic groups who 
were represented by the three main political parties. It would 
be impossible to formally separate this representation of the 
major ethnic groups from regional representation, as these parties 
in effect spoke for both; each party's ethnic group was the basis 
of its control of the region and the representation of its interests 
at federal level. The major ethnic groups had to fight through 
wider territories - the regions, in effect little empires - to 
achieve dominance. 
Another key area to which I pay much attention is that of 
government jobs, to which I have devoted a whole category. I 
have broken this up into four items: the M. Ps. ' pay and conditions 
of work, the public service, corruption and Nigerianisation. 
Sometimes a considerable amount of time was spent on the first 
of these, including such things as arguments by M. Ps. over their 
travel allowances. More significant was a continuous antagonism 
between ministers and other M. Ps. (not always from the opposition), 
1 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (18.3.63) 
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the latter often complaining about the elite living-style of 
the ministers and comparing it to their own (relatively) hum-drum 
existence. Politics and administration were together the most 
promising sector for up-and-coming Nigerians. The public service 
received a good deal of attention. For instance, in the Federal 
House it received more discussion than agriculture (the pay and 
conditions of M. Ps. achieving only a little less attention than 
this). The core of this was concern for the availability, pay, 
prospects and conditions of government employment, though the 
efficiency of the service was a further (lesser) concern. 
Nigerianisation was directly related to this. Surprisingly 
little concern was shown about this despite the fact that it was 
one area - the replacement of expatriates by Nigerians in the 
public service - that offered substantial employment prospects. 
one parliamentary question (PQ) in the Federal House elicited 
the information that in 1963 there were still 542 expatriate 
officers in the Federal Public Service, 142 of them in 'super- 
scale' posts. 
1 Despite this fact far more interest was shown 
in the distribution. of government jobs between the various 
indigenous ethnic groups. 
Corruption is the 'underside' of all the above factors. In 
a situation of scarce resources extensive corruption is inevitable. 
The extra income to be earnt from corruption can be very substantial. 
Because of this it is the thing that makes many a job in politics 
or the civil service so attractive. This led, of course, to 
continuous accusations and counter-accusations. Implicit in this 
was a great deal of envy. One M. P. in the Federal House, for 
instance, went as far as to name the "millionaires" and "near- 
millionaires" in the Federal government. When another M. P. 
complained that he was "talking very badly of our Ministers" the 
Deputy-Speaker defended the accuser as he had not "gone to the 
extent of describing the sources of their wealth". To this the 
first M. P. replied, "Thank you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I am also 
working very hard so that I can become a millionaire some day. "2 
(The humour of this exchange and the honesty of the Speaker's 
Chair were typical of the proceedings of the Federal House). 
1 Proceedings of the Nigerian House of Representatives (31.7.63) 
2 Ibid, (23.9.63) 
- 
112 
- 
The most spectacular accusation of corruption in the period 
reviewed was in the Federal House against the Minister of Finance, 
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, who was an unsavoury character indeed, 
at least until his assassination in the first coup. The Minister 
was accused of raising the duty on imported shoes in order to help 
his own shoe factory, which he was in the process of setting up. 
The Minister's self-defence was quite frank. 
"If an increase in duty is justifiable in the interests 
of protecting Nigerian industry, it surely does not 
cease to be justifiable because a Minister has an 
interest in one of the twelve individual concerns to 
be protected. "' 
The Minister's raw defence of his actions - that what is good 
for business is good for Nigeria, even if it is exceptionally 
good for him - expresses well enough the attitude of those in 
power to their business interests. It also shows how power 
could be used either to establish or further such interests. 
One other category worthy of mention before looking at the 
data on the regional assemblies is what could be called 'slanging 
matches'. This was closely connected with the communal disputes 
and accusations of corruption just mentioned. There was very 
little ideological discussion, and even practical discussion of 
policies was often replaced simply by the hurling of insults. 
In order to concentrate on other material more effectively I have 
separated out all material consisting solely of either pure praise 
or pure abuse of government (i. e. unrelated to any concrete 
discussion of policy). I have nevertheless included these 
categories, which I have called 'pro-government' and 'anti-government' 
respectively. Finally, as well as analysing the content of debates, 
I have counted the number of parliamentary questions (PQs) asked 
by M. Ps. broken down according to subject-matter. These I consider 
to be a more accurate reflection of their interests as they are 
totally voluntary and, if they do have a political purpose, they 
nevertheless do not form a part of the antagonism of political 
debate. 
1 Ibid (11.4.63) 
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3.5.1. The Eastern and Western Houses of Assembly 
I have taken the same year (1963/4) for the analysis of the 
Eastern House as I have for the Federal House, but I have chosen 
1961/2 for the Western Assembly for it was shortly after this 
that both the region and the government of the region were broken 
up by the federal government. The following table shows all 
political discussion, which, in whatever context it occurred, 
took up 17% of debating time in the Eastern House and 40% in the 
Western House. The figures for PQs were 7% and 8% respectively. 
Most political discussion had little to do with particular policies, 
but consisted of the hurling of insults or the bestowal of praise - 
at least in the Western House. Noticeable is the importance of 
regionalism and the minorities, important certainly by comparison 
with the themes of nationalism and federal unity. In the Federal 
House the latter took up 10.4% of political discussion while the 
minorities and regionalism together took up 16.2%. 
The category regionalism is concerned with the regional claims 
of the majority ethnic groups in power in each region against the 
majority ethnic groups in power in the other regions. The category 
on minorities reflects the claims of the minorities in each region 
against the ethnic groups in power in their respective zegions. 
Table 3.5: Breakdown of Political Discussion in the Eastern 
House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2 
Debating time (%) PQs (number) 
West East West East 
Constitution 0.4 16.0 
- - 
Pro-government 34.4. 23.2 
- 
1 
Anti-government 28.2 6.8 9 2 
Federal unity/nationalism 1.3 7.3... - 1 
Minorities 19.0 8.7 4 2 
Regionalism 0.4 7.2 1 
- 
Chiefs 7.5 6.5 
- 
9 
Other political 8.8 24.3 3 5 
Total 100.0 100.0 77 20 
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One of the major grievances of the minorities was that resources, 
including government jobs, tended to go to ruling party men or 
areas, to the exclusion of the minorities opposing the party of 
the ruling ethnic group. For instance, one member from the Mid-West 
(later to be made independent of the Western Region) complained 
in the Western House that 
"You deny us all things. Our only economic crop 
- 
rubber 
- 
is today now relegated to the background 
while you boost your cocoa. "' 
Economic affairs took-up 44% of debating time in the Eastern House, 
34% in the Western House, and 62% and 51% of all PQs respectively. 
Again there are certain similarities with the Federal House. For 
instance, industry gets rather limited coverage, even though it 
was in fact primarily a regional subject. 
Table 3.6: Breakdown of Economic Discussion in the Eastern 
House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2 
Debating time (7. ) PQs (number) 
West East West East 
International trade/aid 0.9 7.3 
- 
2 
Industry 6.8 8.2 6 4 
Agriculture/rural. amenities 19.9 20.2 18 12 
Trade and commerce 6.3 5.6 2 2 
General development 4.7 9.1 
- 
2 
Government finance 40.0 17.8 1 1 
Workers/industrial relations 0.5 0.4 1 
- 
Unemployment/poverty 3.9 4.0 6 
- 
Local facilities 15.0 25.0 65 153 
Other economic 2.0 2.4 8 3 
Total 100.0 100.0 107 179 
Interest in poverty and unemployment was extremely limited, while 
discussion of labour and industrial relations was virtually non-existent. 
Some idea of governmental concern for unemployment, and of governmental 
understanding of the problem, can perhaps be gauged from the following 
extraordinary cure for it proposed by the Eastern premier. 
a1 Proceedings of the Western House of Assembly (28.3.61) 
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"If all these people loafing about in the cities could 
go home to help their parents with the farm there would 
be less unemployment. As soon as we have the resources 
all such loafers will be sent to farms to work for a 
decent living. Honourable members can all help by 
having at least a five-acre farm in their villages. "' 
In the Federal House unemployment/poverty took up 8% of economic 
debating time, workers/industrial relations 1.3%. Out of the 374 
PQs on economics only 20 were on these two subjects. 
The great concern for government finance gives a further 
indication of the conservative nature of the politicians. Saving 
(rather than investment) was itself considered to be fruitful. 
Thus, in the Western House discussion of government finance took 
up more time than discussion of industry, agriculture, trade and 
general development matters combined. One Eastern M. P. proposed 
that "we should give bonus to any Ministry that saves money at 
the end of each financial year. "2 
Most noticeable of all is the very large amount of time 
absorbed by demands for local facilities. In the Federal House 
these took up 12.3% of economic discussion, which was half as 
much again as that spent on poverty or unemployment. 196 PQs 
were in the form of demands for local facilities 
- 
over half of 
all economic PQs and 282 of all PQs asked in the House. In the 
Eastern House such demands took up 25% of economic debating time 
and 11% of all debating time in the House. 85% of economic PQs - 
54% of all PQs 
- 
consisted of requests for local facilities. In 
the Western House such requests took up 63% of economic PQs and 
31% of all PQs. The distribution of PQs reflects best the real 
interests of the M. Ps. In the Western House less debating time 
was spent on such demands, but this seems in part to have been 
the result of deliberate suppression of them by the Speaker and 
the government, who evinced considerable cynicism over the matter, 
as the following statement from the Minister of Economic Planning 
shows. 
1 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (28.3.63) 
2 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (8.4.63) 
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"I do not propose to comment on such matters as 
requests for the tarring of named roads or the supply 
of water and electricity to named places and villages. 
Honourable Members must be given some opportunity of 
playing to the gallery, particularly when they receive 
information that a Member of their constituency is 
around. I do not wish to diminish the air of 
importance which honourable Members may thus acquire 
in their local areas. "1 
Below is the table for discussion of and PQs on social matters. 
These took up 25% of debating time in the Eastern House and 16% 
in the Western House (26% and 35% of PQs respectively). 
Table 3.7: Breakdown of Discussion of Social Matters in the 
Eastern House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2 
Debating time (%) PQs (number) 
West East West East 
Socio-economic 8.7 2.6 2 2 
Police/crime/justice 31.6 18.4 18 13 
Higher education 7.3 10.9 - 10 
Primary & secondary 
education 16.4 22.2 23 18 
General education 8.6 12.3 15 11 
Health 15.2 13.1 12 13 
Other social 12.2 20.5 5 7 
Total 100.0 100.0 75 74 
Of special note is the priority given to education, which took up 
45% of all discussion on social matters in the Eastern House and 32% 
in the Western House, with about half of all 'social' PQs being on 
this in both cases. It received far more attention than health 
matters. It is interesting to note that while only 1.3% of all 
debating time in the Western House was spent on unemployment or 
poverty, and 1.8% in the Eastern House, the former spent 5.2% of all 
debating time on education, and the latter 11.3%! The reason, 
I suggest, is the important relationship between education and access 
1 Proceedings of the Western House of Assembly (10.4.61) 
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to jobs, especially government jobs. Such access, to the 
Nigerian M. P., was probably more important than health, unemployment 
or poverty. To him welfare seemed to depend on access to 
government employment. 
In both Houses nearly a quarter of the time spent on education 
was concerned with higher education, and a significant amount of 
this was on foreign scholarships. In the East a quarter of PQs 
were on higher education (though none in the West were), and half 
of these were to do with foreign scholarships. It should be 
pointed out that at independence it had been intended that higher 
education should be primarily a federal subject. The combination 
of elitism and regional rivalry induced the regional governments 
to make higher education largely their own business. Each made 
huge investments in universities. 
The importance accorded to government jobs comes out in the 
following table too., In the Eastern House these subjects together 
took up 12% of total debating time, in the Western House 9% (4% and 
6% respectively for PQs). In the Federal House they took up 9% 
of debating time, 7% of all PQs. The public service and corruption 
together take up most of this time in the two regional assemblies, 
in fact taking up more time in the Western House than demands for 
local facilities (and about the same time in the Eastern House). 
The public service and corruption should be looked at in tandem. 
Corruption is possible when a government job is acquired. A job 
in government service is a highly sought after career, and the 
possibility it offers of increased means of income, from whatever 
source, is often a strong additional attraction. 
Table 3.8: Breakdown of Discussion of Government jobs in the 
Eastern House 1963-4 and the Western House 1961-2 
Debating time (7. ) PQs (number) 
West East West East 
M. Ps. pay and conditions 16.6 12.3 4 
- 
Public service 16.3 45.2 4 4 
Corruption 63.3 37.9 3 5 
Nigerianisation 3.8 4.6 1 2 
Total 100.0 100.0 12 11 
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One Eastern M. P. gave a list of 11 properties supposedly owned 
by a civil servant by virtue of his position. Over 50% of the 
time spent discussing the public service was explicitly concerned 
with it as a career. The importance of the public service can 
be gauged by the fact that 247. (E9.4 million) of the Western 
government's total proposed budget for 1961-2 (including capital 
expenditure) was for general administration. Obviously there 
was also administrative expenditure under particular budgetary 
heads; for instance, in 1959-60 10% of educational spending was 
on administration. The public service absorbed a huge proportion 
of the government's resources. The pay and working conditions 
of the M. Ps. got less discussion but were the subject of some 
bitter debate. One Western M. P., for instance, complained to 
ministers in the House that "when an ordinary man like myself 
gets £11 car consolidation allowance, you get £75. "1 
3.5.2. The Northern House of Assembly 1964 
As in the other Assemblies the budget dominated proceedings, 
in this case taking up 65% of parliamentary time. The Northern 
House was far more of a rubber stamp than the other Houses, in 
which the governments usually made strong attempts to justify their 
policies while meeting genuine criticism from the opposition parties. 
In the Northern House there was little genuine discussion; yet it 
is in the analysis of its proceedings that lies the greater 
sociological significance. 
The discussion of political topics in the House is represented 
below. These took up about 18% of total debating time, only 37. 
of all PQs. 
Table 3.9: Breakdown of Political Discussion in the 
Northern House, 19 
Debating time (%) PQs (number) 
Pro-government 53.0 - 
Anti-government 4.7 - 
Constitution 1.0 - 
Federal unity/national ism 0.5 - 
Regionalism 21.5 
- 
Minorities 11.1 3 
Chiefs 0.5 - 
Other political 7.7 2 
Total 100.0 5 
1 Ibid (11.4.61) 
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Political topics, then, did not have as much place in the Northern 
Assembly as in the others, and over 50% of this consisted merely 
of eulogies of the government. Most of the rest consisted of 
some form of communal antagonism-denunciation of the other regions 
(and their dominant tribes) and claims by the minorities of the 
North of Hausa/Fulani oppression. There had been extremely 
violent riots in Tiv-land that year in which, possibly, hundreds 
were killed. The core of the trouble it seems had been attempts 
by the NPC to gain total control of the Middle-Belt area. The 
reason for this attempt was probably the fear that one of the 
other major parties, based outside the North, would be able to 
use minority dissension in the North to break up the region, and 
thereby weaken the political and economic power of the NPC. 
This is reflected in the Premier's summing-up at the end 
of the session, in which. he refers to the Tiv riots. 
"They thought that they will be able to get a 
slice out of the North. God has not allowed 
them to do that and I do not think He is in 
sympathy with them. "' 
It seems He was not. in sympathy with the Premier either, as He 
allowed him to be assassinated shortly after. This conflict 
between the Hausa/Fulani and the Tiv was only a shadow of the 
conflict to come between the Hausa/Fulani and the Ibos from 
the Eastern Region.. Though a minority in the North, the Ibos 
represented to the Northerners a threat from another region. 
Much of the 'pro-government' category was concerned with 
support in the political struggle against the Ibos and 'their' 
party. 
Economic discussion. is given in the following table. 
This took up 50% of total debating time and 53% of all PQs. 
1 Proceedings of the Northern House of Assembly (18.3.64) 
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Table 3.10: Breakdown of Econotaic Discussion in the 
Northern House, 1964 
Debating time (%) PQs (number) 
International Trade/Aid 1.1 1 
Industry 4.8 9 
Agriculture/rural amenities 26.1 20 
Trade and commerce 7.6 15 
General development 2.5 
- 
Government finance 13.7 5 
Workers/Industrial relations 0.1 - 
Unemployment/poverty/low wages 1.3 1 
Local facilities 41.6 55 
Other economic 1.2 - 
Total 100.0 106 
Of the top six subjects in the table (the major elements of 
the economy) agriculture easily takes priority, using up nearly 
five times as much time as industry. The reason for this is 
probably fairly simple. The North was less industrialised than 
the South, and its M. Ps. had a more rural background. Northern 
M. Ps. were established in the local power structure. Southern 
M. Ps. tended to come from the 'middle' classes rising in the urban 
areas. 
Demands for local facilities reach extraordinary proportions 
in this House. They take up nearly 42% of time spent on economic 
matters and 21% of total debating time, nearly 52% of economic PQs 
and 27% of all PQs. Northern M. Ps. show far greater interest in 
their own local areas, and their own positions in these areas, than 
they do in either regional or national affairs. The interest shown 
in workers, industrial relations, unemployment and poverty is 
absolutely minimal. These M. Ps. saw economic development in local 
terms. The following exchange exemplifies the simple logic of 
these demands and of their denial. 
Speaker: "It is not correct for an honourable Member 
just to say that he wants a hospital for his area. 
He should state the reasons why a hospital is necessary 
for his constituency. " 
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M. P. "Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. The reason 
why a hospital is necessary is because we have no 
hospital near us. "1 
The constant reiteration and denial of these simple requests led 
to considerable frustration in this House as well as the others. 
One M. P., who saw the M. P. as an 'ambassador' from his constituency 
had this to say on the problem! 
"Everybody has complaints of his Division or district. 
In my constituency, we are being accused of not saying 
something when we come here but we do say something. 
We find that our complaints are not heard., 
2 
Thhr discussion of social matters is represented in the 
following table. These took up 20% of total debating time, and 
40% of all PQs. 
Table 3.11: Breakdown of Discussion of Social Matters in 
the Northern House, 1964. 
Debating time (7) PQs (number) 
Social-economic 6.8 1 
Higher education 5.6 5 
Primary & Secondary educat ion 13.1 14 
General education. 11.9 16 
Police/crime/justice 16.3 12 
Health 22.3 21 
Other social 24.0 11 
Total 100.0 80 
Again education takes precedence, with 30.6% of time on social matters 
and 44% of social PQs. In the case of this Assembly, higher education 
takes a small proportion of M. Ps. ' time. Unlike the South, the 
North did not hold that a degree was important for progress in the 
power structure, based as it was on tradition. Of the Northern M. Ps. 
discussed above, it was shown that none had degrees. Nevertheless, 
30% of time spent on higher education concerned foreign scholarships, 
as did four of the five PQs on higher education. So, in the North 
too, there is a certain elitist slant to the M. P'. interest in 
education. The M. N. more direct interests are represented below. 
1 Ibid (5.3.64) 
2 Ibid (9.3.64) 
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These subjects took up nearly 10% of total debating time and 
nearly 5% of all PQs. 
Table 3.12: Breakdown of Discussion of Government Jobs 
in the Northern House, 1964 
Debating time (%) PQs (number) 
M. Ps'. pay and conditions 9.1 2 
Public service 38.3 1 
Corruption 7.3 
- 
Northernisation 44.1 6 
Nigerianisation 1.2 
- 
Total 100.0 9 
The extra category here - Northernisation - is the Northern 
version of Nigerianisation. Extremely relevant to the job 
situation, it concerned the policy of the Northern government of 
eliminating Southern Nigerians, particularly Ibos, from the 
Northern public service, which prior to independence they had 
dominated. The policy tacitly acknowledged the following order 
of priority for selection or retention of regional civil servants: 
Northerners first, expatriates second, Southerners third. The 
table shows that Northern M. Ps. were apparently little concerned 
with the power of expatriate administrators in their bureaucracy. 
Only 1.2% of time spent on social questions (about 0.1% of total 
time) was spent on Nigerianisation. Their attention was turned 
on the Ibos. Removing Southerners from the public service, and 
more general concern about the service, together take up 82.4% of 
time under the above classification and about 8% of total debating 
time in the House. Nearly 50% of the time spent on discussing 
the public service itself was explicitly concerned with it as a 
career. These facts indicate the great importance attached to 
this job sector by Northerners 
- 
for whose bourgeoisie there was 
little scope for advancement elsewhere. 
If one puts all the 'communal' categories together 
- 
that is, 
regionalism, minorities, local facilities and Northernisation 
- 
they take up 31% of total debating time in the House and 32% of all 
PQs. By comparison the six major economic categories 
- 
from 
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international trade to government finance in the economic table - 
took up 27% of total debating time. The communal interests can 
also be compared to what are possibly the M. Ps. 'class'interests, 
namely 'middle-class' jobs and higher education which (consisting 
of table 3.18 above and higher education from table 3.17) take up 
10.9% of total debating time. Questions of social welfare - 
labour, unemployment, poverty, rural amenities and health - together 
take up 6.2% of debating time. Looking at these under such broad 
heads gives the following results. (There is an overlap between 
communal demands and 'middle-class' jobs because Northernisation 
is included in both). 
Table 3.13: Community and Class in the Northern House, 1964 
Total debating time (i) Total PQs (%) 
Communal demands 31.1 31.7 
'Middle-class' jobs 10.9 7.3 
Major economic concern 27.1 23.8 
Social welfare 6.2 11.9 
Communal demands certainly seem to be of greater concern to the 
M. Ps. than what might be considered to be their class interests. 
But both these together take precedence over economic affairs and 
social welfare. 
There is no doubt that communal questions are uppermost, in 
particular that of the Ibos. Unlike the territorial minorities 
such as the Tiv this migrant minority did not threaten to split 
away from the North. The argument was over government jobs and 
private trading opportunities. In a poor country such things are 
precious resources. Government is often the main employer, but 
there are nowhere near enough government jobs for everyone; and 
in trade competition is fierce. These were the two main sectors 
open to up-and-coming Northern Nigerians. Finding that those who 
dominated these sectors were ethnically different (i. e. came from 
elsewhere and spoke a different language), their economic fears 
turned into intense racial hatred. There can be no doubt as to 
the depth of this hatred, even amongst the Northern leadership. 
It was not simply a prejudice of the uneducated masses coolly 
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whipped up by the region's leaders for political purposes, as 
some writers have claimed. Many of these leaders were themselves 
infected with this hatred; many of them were, anyway, relatively 
uneducated men, 'small' men from the periphery of the traditional 
power structure, who felt that their type, even their 'class', was 
directly threatened by the Ibo 'intrusion'. 
The core source of antagonism was competition for government 
jobs. The following request from one M. P. in the House was typical 
of many M. Ps. expressed concerns. 
"I would like to appeal to the Honourable Premier to 
cross-check all the Ministries in order to find out 
and clear all the Non-Northerners from the services 
of Northern Nigeria, and this should be effective as 
soon as possible. " (Prolonged applause). 1 
The same feelings applied to private trading opportunities, but 
here a good deal of irrationality creeps in, as the role of Ibos 
in trade could not be statistically confirmed as easily as could 
their holdings of government posts. Great exaggeration, probably 
given some mild colour of truth by a few local cases of Ibo success 
in trade, was inevitable. The following quotations from different 
M. Ps. displays this paranoia. The first is from an M. P. who 
complained that the Ibos own too many petrol stations. 
"Mr. Speaker, Sir, It is really high time we stand against 
our black imperialists. Our black imperialists are the 
Ibos who are trying to dominate us in all fields., 
2 
Another M. P. claimed that the Ibos are penetrating the North 
"to have all the natural resources of the North and absorb it to 
their own region., 
3 According to another "about nine tenths of 
Sabon Gari Market stalls in Kano are owned by the Ibos. "4 And, 
for another: 
"the Ibos in general are trying to underrate the IQ 
of the Northerners... I think it is because they are 
allowed too much in the North - in market places, in 
our public services and in many other fields. They 
have plenty to eat.... they are very bad people. i5 
1 Ibid (4.3.64) 
2 Ibid (9.3.64) 
3 Ibid (9.3.64) 
4 Ibid (12.3.64) 
5 Ibid (12.3.64) 
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The complaints of Ibo domination of trade continued despite 
the fact that, as the Minister of Trades and Industry confirmed 
in answer to a PQ, "the great majority of trading companies are, 
however, owned by Northerners. " Despite this, even those owned 
by non-Northerners would vanish "as a result of government's 
policy to Northernise the wholesale and retail trades. "1 
No-one complained about the domination in both the bureaucracy 
and large-scale trade of the expatriates, for so long accepted 
as masters and who could not be oppressed as could the Ibos. In 
fact, the Government itself made quite clear where the outside 
influence lay, in answer to a PQ asking for the origins of senior 
civil servants in seven Northern ministries. The answer was as 
follows. 2 
Table 3.14: Employment by Ethnic Group in 7 Northern 
Ministries 1964 
Northerners 451 
Non Northern Nigerians 198 
Expatriates 1112 
Total 1310 
The reason for the nature of the prejudice was partly that it was 
the lower government posts and small trading opportunities that the 
Northern sub-elite could realistically aim at, and it was here 
they faced most Ibo competition. 
The fear created by competition for jobs and trade, however 
irrational, extended to a much more general antagonism. 
"For instance, in Sokoto, there is an Iboman with five 
houses or seven whereas the indigenous people of this 
"3 place have little or no houses. 
He then complains about an Ibo in Makurdi with 29 houses! Whatever 
fragments of distorted truth such complaints might have contained, 
they flew in the face of statistical facts. Existence in the 
ghettoes of the Sabon Garis was by no means pleasant for the vast 
majority of Ibos. The concern over housing extended further, to 
fear over Ibo land-holdings. One M. P. even wanted Ibo farming 
rights to be withdrawn. He did not mind Christians as long as 
1 Ibid (11.3.64) 
2 Ibid (12.3.64) 
3 Ibid (17.3.64) 
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they were non-Ibo Christians. 
However, not all members contributed in this fashion. One 
or two - no more than that - bravely stood up for the Ibos. One 
ironically thanked the Premier for allowing that 
"people from different parts of Nigeria have come 
to live in the North, especially from Eastern Nigeria, 
and for the good example that the Premier has set 
before his people in the North, the Northerners have 
also accepted Easterners to stay here in the Region. "1(sic) 
Some M. Ps. were aware of the economic and administrative damage the 
North would suffer if the Ibos were removed wholesale. This M. Ps 
thanks were, of course, pointless, as the government was doing what 
it could to eliminate Ibos from all fields; it also seemed to be 
doing something to fan the hatred against the Ibos. When one M. P. 
demanded that the current government regulation that 80% of vacant 
land be allocated to Northerners should be altered to 100% for 
Northerners, the relevant minister replied: 
"I have directed that not more than 20% of any of the 
vacant plots should be granted to Non-Northerners in 
any one area. The last speakers said that 20% was 
too much; if it is the wish of the honourable Member, 
it can be changed. " (Applause) 2 
The Premier himself contributed to the process by emphasising the 
political danger to the North of the Ibos. The danger of NCNC 
victory at the polls is deliberately confused with their supposed 
economic domination of the North. 
"Now to those who are bent on making the Northern 
Region their Colony I will say that, that will never 
happen in their life-time. "3 
For the average member, however, this political message 
(of the danger to the North of the NCNC) was unnecessary. Fear 
of Ibo success - in business, in the administration, or in the 
professions - was enough. It is from such fear, with its element 
of economic realism, that irrationality grows. 
1 Ibid (4.3.64) 
2 Ibid (17.3.64) 
3 Ibid (4.3.64) 
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"This point is about the Ibos who obtain licences 
to administer medicine. After they have obtained 
these licences they inject sick people and by so 
doing many people lost their lives. The Ibos do 
not like us. They hate us, and, for that reason, 
they would gladly employ ways, by these licences 
they have obtained, to administer medicine to kill 
most of our people. "1 
It would be difficult in fact to say there was any real distinction 
between the government benches and the rest of the House as far 
as 'bashing' the Ibos is concerned. It is with government 
exhortation that this, in the following words of one M. P. reaches 
its verbal climax. 
"But of all the insults I received in my life, I was 
never hard hit as by the statement by a little head 
of state - Chief Dennis Osadebay (NCNC Premier of the 
Mid-West) 
- 
that Northerners were ignorant. (Applause). 
Is it not a shame for a man-who is uncultured, uncouth, 
very cantankerous like the Ibo man to call Northerners 
ignorant? People who have no history beyond 65 years? 
People who before the advent of the White-men had 
nothing to be associated with, people who have not even 
completely come out of their last metamorphosis as 
human beings. " (Applause and shorts of FIRE! FIRE! ) 
Government Bench: "Apes 
... 
and monkeys and such creatures. "... 
M. P. ".... And they were in fact referred to by great historians 
as half-beasts and half-something else...., 
2 
To sum up on the House of Assembly and their members: it 
seems possible to point to two broad types of interest - the first 
associated with community, the second with 'class'. The former 
are far more significant, and are represented by regional antagonism 
(or tribalism), complaints by minorities about the unequal distribution 
of resources, demands by local areas for more facilities, and, in 
the North, for the exclusion of Southerners from the administration 
(even from the economy) of the North. The 'class' interest, less 
1 Ibid (14.3.64) 
2 Ibid (12.3.64) 
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easily defined, concerned educational opportunities and career 
prospects, both political and administrative. 
Very few interests were espoused which could be considered 
to have specifically represented those of the business community. 
Even as regards general economic concerns, agriculture received 
significantly more attention than industry, and trade and commerce 
broadly about the same as industry. Nigerian M. Ps. tended to be 
farmers and traders rather than industrialists 
- and above all 
they tended to be people with professional or administrative 
backgrounds, hence their class interests were often directed 
towards education and career prospects. On the other hand the 
'business ethic' of free competition was never opposed (even if 
it existed more in theory than practice). The ethic was accepted 
as given. But, whether the M. Ps'. class interests originated 
in business or the professions, these men showed very little 
interest in the miseries of those lower down than themselves. 
Whatever the cultural divisions of Nigeria's politicians they 
certainly formed a distinctive elite. 
3.6. Conclusion 
I have tried to show in this chapter that conflict in Nigeria 
has been based primarily on ethnicity rather than class. Nevertheless, 
this conflict was essentially economic in origin. The struggle over 
scarce resources followed ethnic lines. But, despite its ethnic 
base, this struggle affected all socio-economic groups, from traders 
to politicians. The latter are in fact crucial, as this struggle, 
though economic in origin and working through communal antagonisms, 
reached its greatest intensity in the struggle within the elite for 
power. In an economy where direct economic profit, whether from 
agriculture or trade or industry, was difficult for a native Nigerian 
to achieve, it was power that offered the greatest access to resources. 
Even those perforce left to derive benefit solely from their place 
in the economy, such as workers and traders, found that political 
attachments could be as important to them in their competition with 
equivalent class fragments from other ethnic groups as their economic 
activity itself. The analysis of parliamentary proceedings showed 
that this communal competition starting from the smallest village 
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and rising to the regions themselves, was fully reflected at the 
level of the elite and sub-elite. In the next chapter I 
shall go on to discuss the nature of the communal conflict, 
and its culmination in the civil war. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROCESS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 
4.1. Nationalism or Regionalism? 
The history of politics in Nigeria is essentially the history 
of regional and tribal conflict. 'Regional nationalism' rather 
than 'nation-state' nationalism has dominated Nigerian politics 
from well before independence in 1960. How these nationalisms 
developed depended on the nature of Nigeria's constitutional 
development. The first constitution allowing a measure of autonomy 
was the Richards Constitution of 1946. This hardly allowed any 
real independence, or any real regional authority. 
It aroused much antagonism, before ending in failure. The 
objections to it were directed as much against the lack of regional 
autonomy as the lack of national autonomy. Nigerian nationalists 
were quick to realise that their individual sources of power and 
wealth lay in the regions rather than. in the nation as a whole. 
As I argued in chapter one, what 'space' nationalism fills depends 
on what its boundaries have to offer. In this case the 'regional' 
boundaries had certain rewards, the national boundary inviting but 
doubtful rewards - as well as risks of domination by other regions. 
"After independence it became fashionable for young 
nationalists to say that federalism was imposed on the 
country by the British in order to keep it weak and 
divided. But at this stage the Richards Constitution 
was unitary with regional elements and it was now up 
to the Nigerian leaders to decide which aspect they 
wished-to emphasise. "1 
They opted for federalism, with the regions as the dominant sources 
of power. 
The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 allowed a great deal more 
regional autonomy, though still not enough for the regional leaders. 
The constitution was again radically changed. The politicians were 
quick to realise that their power-bases would have to be their ethnic 
communities. Initially politics was restricted to Lagos. A party, 
the National Youth Movement (NYM) was formed to gain control there. 
1 Mackintosh (1966), p. 23 
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In 1941 this party split along ethnic lines. The eventual 
result was two new parties - the NCNC, led by Azikiwe, and 
the Action Group (AG), led by Awolowo. The NCNC relied on 
the Ibo members of the NYM for its initial support. The AG 
relied on the Yoruba members, but it also drew support from 
a Yoruba cultural organisation, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (E00), and 
was formed as a direct response to the creation of the NCNC. 
The Northern People's Congress (NPC), the major party of 
the North, like the AG, had its origins in a cultural organisation. 
It was formed after the other two parties. Just as the AG was 
formed to protect the Yoruba from the Ibo-based NCNC, the NPC 
was formed as a reaction-to the creation of these latter parties 
to protect the North from the South. The NPC did not join the 
nationalist movement;. in fact, in its attempts to protect the 
North, it tried to slow it down. I have already argued that 
the struggle for power between rival factions could severely 
dampen the expression of nationalism. In India, the Muslims, 
in a weak and backward social (and political) position, deliberately 
slowed down the nationalist movement in order to place themselves 
more favourably vig 
ä-vis the Hindus.. The eventual result was 
Pakistan. The Muslims of Northern Nigeria were in a similar 
position. Most clerks in both government and commerce in the 
North were Southerners. Southerners were also doing well in the 
Northern economy, and the Southern political parties were much better 
organised. The NPC wanted time to redress this balance. It 
threatened the secession of the North if the move to independence 
was not delayed. 
In all the regions the major parties clearly built on ethnic 
foundations. They each came into power through the support of a 
major ethnic group. More important than this,, though, is the 
fact that the parties could extend this power beyond this immediate 
support. Being. in control of a region a party held both political 
and economic power over the minorities in the region. In 1952/3 
there were about 4,300,000 Yoruba in the Western Region, but the 
AG, through Yoruba support, could wield power over a total Western 
population of about 6 million. In the Eastern Region there were 
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about 4,900,000 Ibos - the NCNC's support - enabling the party 
to rule over 7,200,000. In the North the NPC was essentially 
Fulani-Hausa. These two groups together comprised about 
8,500,000 people, the next biggest being the Kanuri (1,300,000), 
which was also pro-NPC. This enabled the party to rule over 
more than 16,800,000 people. 
1 In fact, as this base was sufficient 
to enable the NPC to dominate the federation, it effectively ruled 
over the entire Nigerian population. 
In each region there were many minorities. Most of them 
found it to their advantage to knuckle under and support the party 
in power. Within each region there was, thus, a sort of 'mini- 
imperialism'. Electoral results over the years (both federal and 
regional) show this clearly. The Western Region was somewhat 
more ethnically fragmented than the other regions, largely because 
the Yoruba themselves contained a number of significant divisions. 
The Western Region also contained a large number of Ibos (over 
340,000 in 1952/3). For these reasons the AG had the hardest job 
of the three major parties in consolidating its power. In a 1954 
election with only limited suffrage the AG got only 18 of the 42 
seats in the West, while'the NCNC got 23 seats and over 50% of the 
votes. In 1956 the AG got 48.3% of the votes to the NCNC's 45.3%, 
in 1959 49.6% to the NCNC's 40.3%, and in 1960 53.6% to the NCNC's 
36.2%. The AG, thup, slowly acquired full sway over the region. 
More important is the nature of its ethnic support. 
2 In 1954,10 
of the NCNC's 23 seats were from non-Yoruba areas. In 1956,50% 
of its seats came from non-Yoruba areas, while the AG got only four 
non-Yoruba seats. 
3 Thus, the Yoruba looked to the AG, while the 
minorities looked to the NCNC for protection from the Yoruba. 
However, gradually the minorities were forced to face up to reality 
and support the AG. 
The same processes applied to the Eastern and Northern Regions, 
but in the former the NCNC had an easier job than the AG because 
the Ibos were highly homogeneous. By 1965 the NCNC was getting 
75% of the votes in the region. 
4 In the minority areas of the 
region the votes of the opposition parties (the AG in alliance with 
parties representing. the minorities or other groups) fell from 
1 Figures taken from the Population Census of Nigeria, 1952-3 
2 Mackintosh (1966), pp. 509/10 
3 Post (1963), p. 105 
4 Mackintosh (1966), p. 516 
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45.8% in 1957 to 13% in 1965.1 However, the process is seen 
most clearly in the case of the Mid-West region, carved out of 
the Western Region by the NPC/NCNC federal government shortly 
after independence. The region was largely Ibo and Edo. In 
elections in this area in 1956 the AG got 31.1% of the votes, the 
NCNC 63.5%. By 1960, with the AG firmly in power in the Western 
Region, despite the small number of Yoruba in the Mid-West, the 
AG's share of the votes was up to 46.6% and the NCNC's down to 
50.9%. Had the Mid-West not been given autonomy it is likely 
the AG would have been able to win the area over completely in 
time. However, in 1964, after the creation of the new region, 
its share of the votes had gone down to 3%, the NCNC's up to 65%. 
2 
We have, then, a picture of 'mini-imperialism' by the major 
ethnic groups and of 'mini-nationalism' by the minorities. This 
nationalism was expressed primarily through the minorities' own 
political parties. In the early 1960s seven of the 13 small 
parties represented the interests of ethnic minorities, five of 
the others relied to some extent on communal differences within 
the major ethnic groups. 3 The most important of all the smaller 
parties was one representing an ethnic minority; this party, 
the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) sought autonomy for the 
pagan and Christian 'Middle-Belt' enclave in the Muslim North. 
More important, the area was not part of the Hausa-Fulani emirates 
and its people were Tivs, Birom, and from several other small 
tribes. However, being in the Northern Region, these groups came 
under overall NPC control. 
The UMBC derived from two small parties, one basically Birom, 
the other basically Tiv. In 1957, J. S. Tarka, a Tiv, gained 
control of the UMBC. In alliance with the AG it opposed the NPC 
and demanded a Middle-Belt state. The UMBC did well in the 1959 
elections, but the Birom and other small ethnic groups feared Tiv 
domination and, therefore, supported the NPC. The Tiv, meanwhile, 
had both secessionist and expansionist leanings. 
"The peculiar internal balance of forces among the Tiv 
seems to have decided their political alignment with 
UMBC and AG, along with the belief that they could dominate 
a Middle-Belt state. "4 
1 Ibid, p: 527 
2 Ibid, p. 516 
3 Post (1963), p. 90 
4 Ibid. P. 83 
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The Bironn and other tribes, sought protection from the Tiv 
in the NPC. The Tiv had no-one to turn to against NPC domination. 
In 1960 and 1964 the Tiv acted, through rioting, in defence of their 
interests as a minority. In the North the Tiv NA was one of the 
few almost exclusively elected Councils, and it was controlled by 
the UMBC. 1 The NPC tried to gain control of the NA and, through 
this, control over the Tiv. This caused the riots on both 
occasions it was tried. In September 1960 at least 50,000 Tiv 
went out in gangs burning the houses of the chiefs, tax collectors, 
court members, and supporters of the NPC. Nearly 30,000 houses 
were burnt, though only five people were killed by the rioters, who 
themselves lost twenty lives. 
2 The February 1964 riots were again 
caused by the NPC, trying to control the NA through injecting 
traditional members into it, but also by arbitrary government 
taxation and the closing down of markets in Tiv-land. 
3 These 
riots led to several hundred deaths. They could only be put down 
with the use of the army. 
This case indicates the myriad pulls and pushes of different 
ethnic groups within the political system. Imperialist and 
nationalist strains are felt at all levels: the Hausa-Fulani, 
through the NPC, seek to dominate the whole Middle-Belt area and 
to incorporate it properly into their empire. The Tiv, through 
the UMBC, seek to escape this but to dominate at the same time the 
minority groups within their own area. These groups seek to avoid 
this through alliance with the. NPC. At the same time the Yoruba, 
through the AG, ally with the UMBC in an attempt to break NPC 
domination of the whole federation. 
It is obvious enough that Nigeria's political conflicts of 
the 1950s and 1960s were ethnic in nature. It is more important, 
though, to see the economic struggle underlying this. 
"Communities that look like being condemned to 
perpetual opposition to the ruling regime - condemned 
to more exigent imposition of taxes, to the absence of 
certain social services, to seeing distinctions of one 
kind or another being awarded to rival areas and to 
perpetual vexations that include the removal of 
1 Dudley (1968), p. 190 
2 Dent in Mackintosh (1966), p. 46 
3 Dudley (1968), p. 190 
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traditional leaders and the imposition of a disliked 
pattern of rule - quickly come to heel. "1 
As power is the main economic resource, control of territory and 
people, through which power is expanded, is crucial. It is 
equally necessary to endangered groups to try to avoid becoming 
subject to such control. The result is a fluctuating pattern 
of internal imperialisms and nationalisms. 
4.2. The Civil War 
I shall now describe how the civil war was the culmination 
of a deep and continuous conflict rather than merely an accident 
of bad leadership or of a failure in political bargaining. This 
does not mean the war was inevitable; I simply wish to show that 
the underlying antagonisms described are a continuous principle, 
and must be so in any communally divided society. 
4.2.1. The Background to the Civil War 
In developing countries the struggle to gain most from the 
distribution of resources tends to fall along ethnic lines. 
Individuals in one ethnic group compete against individuals in 
other ethnic groups for government jobs, business opportunities 
in the gift of government (whether legally so or not), and for 
other facilities. In Nigeria this struggle occurred at all levels: 
between local communities,. between tribes, and between entire 
regions. Even within one small area there could be cultural 
differences, and this could have political effects even within 
the same party. Communal differences were especially prominent 
amongst the Yoruba, represented politically by the Action Group. 
Cultural differences within the Yoruba were one of the causes of 
the eventual split of the Action Group. One account describes 
local cultural differences which caused a pronounced struggle 
within the Action Group even over candidature for a single 
constituency. 
2 
An ethnic group that dominated the political structure of an 
area, a region, or the Federation, even if it barely had a majority 
of the population, would nevertheless also control the economic 
resources of that territory. It was, of course, those in control 
and those near those in control - the elite and the sub-elite - 
1 O'Connell (1961), p. 183 
2 Oyediran (1972), p. 206 
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that had most to gain. For these the acquisition of government 
jobs was of vital importance. The greatest struggle for 
government jobs occurred in the Northern Region; it was there 
that most ethnic friction existed. The competition for 
government jobs in the North was one of the major underlying 
causes of the massacres of Ibos in the North, and therefore of 
the civil war. Competition from the generally successful Ibos 
in the Northern Region was greatly feared by the less educated 
indigenous majority Hausa population. 
The 1952 census showed that just over 2,300,000 out of an 
estimated population in Nigeria of 31,000,000 were settled outside 
their regions of origin (or were foreigners). Most of these, 
nearly 850,000, were in the Western Region (excluding Lagos). 
Almost as many were in the Northern Region. 
1 To the figure 
of 2,300,000 can be added nearly 1,000,000 migrations (after 
taking account of people returning) over the next 10 years, i. e. 
up to 1963.2 This includes migrations across the borders of 
the new Mid-Western Region. The civil war was finally triggered 
off by the massacres of Ibos in the North. There were a large 
number of Ibos in the Northern Region, yet they were still a 
tiny minority - hardly a substantial threat to the region. 
However, the important point is this: they were a threat not to 
the whole region but to a small part of it, itself rather a small 
minority - those most in need of government jobs and also of trading 
opportunities - those who had most to fear from 'outside' competition. 
First of all it should be noted that the Ibo migrations were 
themselves the result of acute pressure on the land in Eastern 
Nigeria, where there was a very high density of population. Ibos 
did well in the North partly because the North's Islamic social and 
political system had resulted. in Northerners, being educationally 
backward relative to Southerners (as it had at one time amongst 
Moslems vis-a-vis Hindus in India). The breakdown of migrations 
by region shows several important things: 
i) by 1952 most migrants had been Westerners (about 770,000 
compared to about 650,000 Easterners); 
ii) in 1952 there were three times as many Westerners as 
1 Eleazu (1977), p. 97 
2 Schätzl (1973), p. 146 
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Easterners in the North (about 548,000 against 179,000). 
iii) though migrations by Easterners easily outstripped those 
of Westerners over the next 10 years, three times as 
many Easterners (and not all of them Ibos)went to the 
West and Mid-West as went to the North (347,000 against 
111,000). 
Yet it was in the North, and against Easterners in the North, that 
the pogroms were carried out. That severe anti-Ibo pogroms did 
not occur in the Western Region despite some incitement to this 
by politicians there was because the Yoruba, on average at least 
as well educated as the Ibos, did not fear Ibo competition so 
much, while, additionally, the West was not so culturally self- 
enclosed as the North. That Ibos rather than Yoruba suffered 
in the North, despite the size of the Yoruba community there, was 
largely because most recent migrants to the North were Easterners. 
(111,000 Easterners from 1952 to 1963 against 14,000 Westerners 
and Mid-Westerners). These new 'intruders' would be blamed by 
Northerners for loss of jobs and trading opportunities in the North, 
and it was, after all, for these that Easterners moved there. 
(There were a small number of Hausa in the South, but they were 
usually engaged in a limited range of economic activity where they 
did not come into competition with Southerners)1. 
As I have argued above, neither land nor large-scale business 
offered substantial opportunities to up-and-coming Nigerians. 
Opportunities lay in politics and administration. Competition 
for government jobs was, therefore, intense. Government was by 
far the biggest employer and it functioned at three levels: 
federal, regional and local. Government, in fact, became the 
honey-pot of the economy. It does not matter how poor that economy 
might be. What we are concerned with is the centralisation of 
resources, much as Baran emphasises surplus value rather than GNP. 
2 
Regional government in particular was a fast growth sector. 
From 1953 to 1960 the revenues of the three regional governments 
grew over 180%, compared to 74% for the federal government. 
3 It 
is important to note, though, that when looking at the growth of 
the government job sector, the rate of growth in the Northern Region 
1 See Lloyd, P. (1972), pp. 202/3 
2 Baran (1973), pp. 132-4 
3 Dudley (1968), p. 269 
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was the slowest: 94% compared to over 200% for the East and 
West. 
1 Thus, the North's capability for providing jobs was 
relatively restricted. When it is also considered that Ibos 
had got many of the jobs available it is not surprising Ibo 
competition was resented. This was, of course, the basis of 
the policy of Northernisation. 
After independence there was an expansion of government, 
and an additional increase in the number of jobs available in 
the civil service through the departure. of expatriates. But 
the expansion could not last for ever. 
"By the middle of the 1960s, the scramble for the 
few remaining posts was very intense, and communal 
competition for these contributed to the enmity and 
bitterness which sparked off the crises of 1966 and 
1967. "2 
The conflict was, in fact, a long-standing one. As early as 
1953 there were riots in Kano - the result of Northern fears of 
Ibo domination of job chances. The number of Southerners 
(mostly Ibos) in the 'sabon Bari' of Kano had gone up from 2,000 
in 1921 to 21,000 in 1954.3 36 people died in these riots. 
Nkemdirin estimates that 7,000 people - over 40% of Kano's labour 
force 
- 
took part in them. 
4 
The riots were apparently spontaneous, 
rapidly escalating as fear and prejudice took over, absorbing 
artisans, industrial workers, merchants, traders, casual labourers, 
etc. But in origin the conflict was essentially political, caused 
by a fear that Southern parties might be able to gain independence 
for Nigeria before the North was ready to defend itself against 
Southern competition. 
"the Northerners rioted because they perceived that 
they would be overwhelmingly disadvantaged by the 
distribution of power and wealth in an independent 
Nigeria in 1956. "5 
The riots in fact started with a major clash between supporters 
of the NPC and supporters of the Action Group. 
The intense conflict that developed during the 1950s and 1960s 
1 From figures in Imoagene (1976), p. 69 
2 Ibid, p. 71 
3 Nafziger (1977), pp. 67/8 
4 Nkemdirin (1975), p. 92 
5 Ibid, p. 92 
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was not primarily over regional but over individual benefits, 
i. e. over access to jobs, to positions in the patron-client 
network, and to business opportunities. There were differences 
between the regions in terms of resources, but these were not 
substantial and they worked both ways. There were occasional 
complaints in the South of economic exploitation by the North 
(through its control of the Federal government), yet the North 
was very poor. Adedeji gives figures for per capita GDP (in 
1965) as follows: Western Region, £25; Mid-West, £31; East, 
£20; North, £19.1 Despite the conflict between Ibos from 
the East and Hausa from the North they were equally poor. The 
regions all had a roughly equal share of industry (though not 
in per capita terms): in 1964 the North had 22.3% of Nigeria's 
industrial employment, the East 21.4%, the West 19.9% and the 
Mid-West 12.2%. 2 
Government revenues were distributed with rigorous fairness. 
Export duties and income tax stayed with the regions. Import 
duties were the most important source of revenue, accounting for 
just over half of all government income. The federal government 
kept 70% of this income. The rest was distributed between the 
regions on the basis of population. In 1962/3 the total tax 
revenues, from all sources, were £18.1 million for the Northern 
Region, £14.6 million for the East, and £18.9 million for the 
West. 3 The Federal Government's total income was £41.4 million. 
It is possible that the North, as the prime political power, did 
manage to swing more federal resources its way than it otherwise 
would have been able to. The North's Niger Dam, for instance, 
took 10% of the federal government's total spending during the 
period of its construction. However, it must be remembered that 
the North was the biggest region by far, had over half of Nigeria's 
population, was more poorly endowed with resources, and had the 
lowest per capita tax revenue. Whatever inequalities there might 
have been in the distribution of national resources, they were 
clearly not great. The South was not exploiting the North, nor 
was the North exploiting the South. The conflict was over access 
to jobs controlled by government and to business opportunities. 
1 Adedeji, in Teriba and Philips (1971), p. 81 
2 Government survey, in ibid, p. 83 
3 Calculated from Adedeji (1965), p. 161 
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4.2.2. The Start of the Crisis 
It is common to view Nigeria's crisis of the 1960s as political 
in origin, as a reflection of the struggle within the elite for power. 
I have tried to explain, contrary to this, that the political conflict 
was the result of much deeper social processes (of more interest to 
the sociologist than to the political scientist), of which it was 
merely the culmination. The above description of the anti-Ibo 
antics of members of the Northern House of Assembly gave an idea of 
the intense antagonism felt by a large part of the political sub-elite 
to the apparent threat of Ibo competition in a region of very poor 
resources. It is also clear from the expression of this antagonism 
that numerous underlying interests were being reflected - those of 
traders, lower and higher civil servants, professional people, etc. 
The Ibos were seen as a common threat. Ethnic antagonism was not 
manipulated from above, though it was certainly utilised. It is 
also of importance that the civil war itself occurred during the 
period of military rule. In fact, the underlying ethnic antagonism 
was not essentially affected by the change from political to military 
rule. 
Another explanation given for the conflict, understandably enough, 
is that it represented a struggle by one ethnic group (the Ibos) to 
be free of oppression from another (the Hausa-Fulani). Frederick 
Forsyth, for instance, romantically portrays the Ibos as the innocent 
victims of virtually an evil power. 
I In reality, it is difficult 
to see in what way the North can have been exploiting the East that 
could have made such a bloody civil war so necessary. 
Though the war can be seen as having been essentially between 
the North and the East (given that the North was the major actor 
in the Federation), it was, in my view, over the Western Region 
that the war was triggered off. This region was culturally the 
least homogeneous and politically the weakest of the three. As 
such it was a temptation to the political rulers of the other two 
regions. Not only did it offer them vastly increased sources of 
patronage, but it could add to the political strength of each of 
these two regions in their struggle against each other. Both the 
North and the East, then, had their reasons for ending the political 
autonomy of the West. 
1 Forsyth (1977) 
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The crisis in the Western Region started with the federal 
election in 1959, when Action Group leader Obafemi Awolowo 
abandoned his premiership of the region in order to contest the 
elections and, therefore, have a chance of becoming Prime Minister 
of the Federation. After failing to become Prime Minister 
(becoming only leader of the opposition in the Federal House) 
Awolowo, still leader of the AG, continued to try to control 
events in the West, thereby coming into considerable friction 
with the new Premier there, S. L. Akintola. Akintola was unpopular, 
and was willing to collude with those in power at the centre (the 
NPC, to which the AG was opposed). Because of this, despite 
his poor following, Akintola was assured of his maintenance in 
power. Awolowo and other AG leaders opposed to Akintola were 
charged with treason by the Federal government, the party was 
broken into two and a new region (the Mid-Western) carved out 
of the territory of the Western Region. This, containing many 
Ibos opposed to the AG, became associated with the NCNC in the 
East. The remainder of the Western Region, under a regime 
dependent for power upon repression and corruption (in 1964, 
five out of every six M. Ps. on the government side had a government 
post), 1 became a dependency (through Akintola) of the North. 
Thus, within a few years of independence, the two biggest parties 
had crushed the third, while the regions controlled by the former 
devoured the carcass of the region controlled by the latter. The 
trend of internal imperialism had extended beyond regional borders. 
The non-Yoruba tribes of the Mid-West area were now no longer a 
minority. They now had a region of their own. By contrast, at 
Federal level, the Yoruba had become politically speaking more 
a minority than ever. The Yoruba empire had significantly 
diminished, while the empires of the other two major tribes had 
significantly grown. On this basis there were now (in 1964) 
only two parties: the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) on the one hand 
consisting on the one hand of the NCNC, some minor allies, and the 
NCNCs old enemy, the AG! On the other hand was the Nigerian 
National Alliance (NNA), comprising the NPC, some minor allies, 
and the NNDP, the new party formed by Akintola to rule in the West. 
1 Mackintosh (1966), p. 517 
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Though the fundamental clash was between the North and the East, 
the conflict started in the West, which was the "cockpit of 
Nigerian politics". 
' The events just described quickly brought 
chaos to the region. Akintola's regime was only in power through 
trickery, corruption and repression. This led to considerable 
street violence in which many people were killed. It is believed 
that the federal government, at Akintola's request, was at that 
time considering bringing in the army, in order to control an 
increasingly explosive situation. Eventually, the army brought 
itself in, killing Akintola, the Prime Minister of the Federation, 
(Abubakar), the leader of the NPC and premier of the Northern 
Region (Sir Ahmadu Bello), and some others. The coup only served 
to exacerbate this growing violence. 
An inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this saga is that 
if the NPC and the NCNC had not attacked the Western Region, the 
whole crisis might not have started. That they did attack is 
an indication of the very simple mechanism of aggrandizement 
applicable to an ethnically based, as opposed to a class-based, 
society, i. e. control over other ethnic groups. Each major 
ethnic group practised a 'mini-imperialism' in its own region, 
but extending this imperialism to federal level led to chaos. 
4.2.3. The Military and the Civil War 
The earlier political struggle had been fundamentally ethnic, 
so was the military struggle of the civil war. In other words, 
little changed with the imposition of military rule. The army 
itself was ethnically highly divided. The following data on 
the army comes from Dudley (1973). 
To avoid domination of the army by one ethnic group a quota 
system of recruitment was adopted in 1962 (50% from the North, 
25% from each of the other two regions), but by then the army had 
already become divided into ethnic layers. At the top (Colonel 
and above) were mainly Westerners (largely Yoruba), then, a layer 
down, the Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors were mostly Easterners 
(mainly Ibo). Northerners (mostly Middle-Belters) were the 
Second Lieutenants and Captains of the army, and the rank-and-file. 
There were, thus, very powerful cleavages in the army, which were 
1 
. 
Ibid, p. 550 
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not counterbalanced by professionalism or experience. 
I 
The first coup was led by Ibos. Six out of the seven 
leading officers were Ibos. In all, 27 people were killed, 
including most of the top political leaders and army command. 
However, the coup leaders did not take control of the government. 
Through a quirky set of circumstances Major-General Ironsi, 
who had not played a part in the coup, became the country's 
new leader. Dudley concludes that there possibly was a partisan 
(ethnic) motiv ation behind the coup. But the main intention 
of the coup-leaders was to root out increasing opposition and 
corruption epitomised by the growing violence in the Western 
Region. 2 
Ironsi is generally considered to have been incompetent. 
Of several, his biggest blunder was his Unification Decree. 
His solution to the ethnic conflict was to abolish the regions, 
and the regionalisation of the civil service, i. e. to have a 
unified administrative structure. He made this decision very 
abruptly, before any decisions on the constitution had been made. 
The point of this is that it critically affected elite and sub- 
elite jobs. According to Dudley there was general agreement 
that it was right to amalgamate the administrative class (to 
facilitate uniform policies). This would mean the whole of 
this class would be open to people from any part of Nigeria. 
But there was intense concern over open competition to the 
executive class. Northerners, less educated by far than Southerners, 
greatly feared the loss of protection that regionalisation of the 
service offered to those seeking a place in it. It is noteworthy 
that the greatest fear was felt at executive class (or sub-elite) 
level. Up until then, due to Northernisation, there had been in 
the North more vacancies than people to fill them. Now job chances 
in the public service would be nil. As for the Federal service, 
taking all grades together, Northerners comprised less than 3% of 
its staff. 
3 
The next coup of July 1966, entirely an intra-military affair, 
was certainly ethnically motivated. It was undertaken by Northern 
soldiers against what they saw as Ibo domination. It was planned 
1 Dudley (1973), pp. 88-95 
2 Ibid, pp. 101-109 
3 Ibid, pp. 116-123 
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to kill only a few of the army leaders, but the officers lost 
control of their men, who started random killing of Ibo soldiers. 
General Ironsi, also Ibo, was killed. Again, the new leader of 
the nation was not one of the coup-leaders. The choice was 
Lt. Colonel Gowon, from a minority tribe in the North. Gowon's 
first major action was to revoke the Unification Decree and 
restore the regions. 
1 
Instead of military intervention acting to calm the growing 
ethnic conflagration, it had thrown oil on its flames. This 
was because of its greater, more arbitrary, power and its 
consequently greater ability to affect people's well-being (e. g. 
through Unification). The political rulers had generally to 
move more slowly, through compromise (which was negotiated 
chiefly through the patron-client system). 
In September 1966, during constitutional discussions between 
the regions, huge massacres of Ibos began. Those responsible 
were soldiers (in a limited area) and 'marginal' people - the 
urban unemployed, street-hawkers and "rootless migrants". All 
in all perhaps seven to eight thousand people died. 
2 In Dudley's 
view (and that of others too) the massacres were instigated by 
the North's politicians and senior civil servants, who were afraid 
of the break-up of the North'(as Gowon seemed to be considering 
the creation of more states) - in other words of the Hausa-Fulani 
'empire'. 
The East under Ojukwu started making moves towards secession. 
In April 1967 Gowon made a crucial move. In order to "remove 
the fear of domination"3 he'abolished the regions and created 
twelve states. Thus, as Dudley points out, exactly one year 
after Ironsi's Unification Decree came completely the opposite 
solution to the problems of federalism. - the breaking up of the 
regions into small units in which the minorities (or most of 
them) would be free from the major ethnic groups. This decree, 
which promised to break the East into three (and therefore to end 
the Ibo empire) was the final straw for Ojukwu. He promptly 
declared independence, a move which got nowhere but killed an 
estimated one million people. 
1 Ibid, pp. 136-143 
2 Ibid, pp. 165/6 
3 Quoted in Ibid, p. 192 
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Why did the war go on so long? And why did the Biafrans 
continue it long after it was a lost cause? Why was it felt 
necessary to sacrifice a million lives in order to protect Ibos 
from further pogroms (unlikely, anyway, as most Ibos had left 
Northern Nigeria by now), which, however terrible, had killed 
seven thousand people -a minute fraction of the war losses? 
The East was not being exploited by the North, even if the North 
had been the dominant political power. Nigeria had only been 
independent for six years, and it was the Western Region that 
had suffered most in this time, and then politically more than 
economically. The earlier regions had had a very substantial 
autonomy, and the Aburi Decree, negotiated by Ojukwu, Gowon and 
other leaders, whatever the arguments over the original agreements, 
would have made this very much greater. What the Eastern leaders 
were afraid of was the break-up of the Ibo empire, not the position 
of the East relative to the rest of the federation. Gowon had 
suggested as early as November 1966 the possible creation of 
more states. 
1 Northern fears of this had been at least a partial 
cause of the Ibo massacres. 
Acceptance of the 12 states would have meant for Ojukwu and 
his supporters the loss of 60%, of the region's agricultural revenues 
and 95% of its oil income. 
"Cut off from Calabar, Ogoja, and Port Harcourt provinces 
the overpopulated Ibo heartland would thus become land- 
locked, underfed, and relatively impoverished. "2 
By creating the new states, Gowon gave Nigeria's minorities, 40% 
of the population, freedom from domination by the major ethnic 
groups, and got the loyalty of non-Ibos in the East. 
"As later events would show, nothing contributed more 
to the isolation of the Ibo-led rebellion than the 
disaffection of the Eastern minorities. "3 
The secession attempt had little to do with the massacres in 
the North as cause, however terrible they were. The importance 
of oil and the possibility of secession based on this had been 
realised at least as far back as March 1963, when Dr. Chike Obi, 
1 Panter-Brick (1978), p. 17 
2 Stremlau (1977), p. 60 
3 Ibid, p. 55 
- 
146 
- 
leader of the small opposition Dynamic Party, said in the 
Eastern House of Assembly: 
"What has this Region gained by being a member of 
the Federation of Nigeria? That is the question I 
want to ask. My answer is, nothing. Other members 
keep their groundnuts, other members keep their cotton, 
but share our oil and coal with us..... Eastern 
Nigeria, because of its oil and other resources, is 
viable; it can run by itself. "' 
Just as the Hausa-Fulani feared the loss of their empire 
in the North (and had already with the coups, lost it in the 
Federation as a whole) and the Yoruba had lost theirs in the 
West, so Ibo leaders feared the loss of their Eastern empire. 
In 1959 oil comprised only 1.7% of exports. By 1965 the figure 
was already 25.9%, 
2 (and by 1975 92.9%). The loss of the "COR" 
area of the East would have meant the loss of these oil resources 
altogether. The granting of independence in states of their 
own to the minorities of the East would have left the Ibos with 
a very small, densely populated area, also poor in natural resources. 
Thus Ibo imperialism rather than Biafran nationalism might have 
been the deciding factor behind the secession bid. Having lost 
the chance to govern the Federation, the leaders of the East were 
certainly not going to be left merely with the tiny Ibo heartland. 
4.3. After the Civil War 
In many respects fundamental features of the Nigerian political- 
economy remained the same, despite coups, counter-coups, and, finally 
the return of democracy. During military rule only one major 
element changed: the power of the military. This was merely an 
inevitable reflection of the general ability of functionary groups 
in developing countries to achieve access to scarce resources. 
The armed forces expanded from a strength of 10,500 in 1965 
(before the civil war) to 250,000 in 1971. The ratio of military 
personnel to total population rose from 1: 5,500 to 1: 220.3 
80-90% of the huge military budget of this time went on salaries. 
The following table shows the proportion of central government 
spending on military personnel for certain years in the 1970s. 
1 Report on the Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (22.3.63) 
2 Dudley (1973), p. 67 
3 Rimmer, in Panter-Brick (1978), p. 150 
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I have calculated these from government accounts of actual 
expenditures for all the departments. here actual expenditure 
for a department's staff is not given I have used either the 
previous or following year's actual expenditure, or the planned 
(i. e. provisional) expenditure for that year. The number of 
staff employed is also given. The figures include pensions 
and gratuities. Given, too, are figures for the other functionary 
group - the civil service. 
T! m11c 4.1 ! Fadarnl rnvarnmant SnPndino on Emnllunent . i(million) 
1971/2 1972/3 1973/4 1974/51 1975/6 1976/71 
Forces 179.9 189.6 239.4 227.9 474.6 474.6 
Civil Servant 90.1 106.6 119.2 184.4 269.7 347.6 
Total 70.0 296.2 358.6 412.3 744.3 822.2 
Forces as % 66.6 64.0 66.8 55.3 63.8 57.7 
of total 
Note: l Provisional figures; all other actual 
Source: Calculated from the Recurrent and Capital Estimates 
(Approved) of the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 1973/4,1974/5,1975/6,1977/8. 
As can be seen, expenditure on military emoluments (actual spending) 
was about two thirds of total federal government spending on emoluments 
in the early 1970s. But the wages bill of both the military and the 
civil service grew enormously in this period - military emoluments 
by 164%, those of the civil service by 199%, from 1971-2 to 1975-6. 
The forces stood at a membership of about 250,000 in 1971, compared 
to 90,000 other government employees in 1972-3. But this latter 
figure was up to very nearly 140,000 in 1974-5.1 
The other functionary group, then, the civil service, was also 
a large growth sector (as can be seen from the above table). This 
is. even more the case when the regional services are also taken 
into account. Provisions for establishments in the federal service 
alone increased by 1572 in the four years from 1972-3 to 1976-7. 
The great, almost desperate, value placed on government jobs can be 
seen from the fact that the East-Central State Public Service 
Commission received 41,000 applications in 1970-1 for a mere 197 
positions. 
2 
1 Calculated from Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Federal 
Government (1973-4 and 1975-6). 
2 East-Central State Public Service Commission: Annual Report 
(1970-1), pp. 10 and 22. 
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While the first two coups. were concerned with the regional 
distribution of power, they established the army as the prime 
beneficiary of power. The army now had access to national 
resources. The second two coups reflected the result of this 
clearly. They were both concerned with struggles between 
different sectors of the army for the most favourable access to 
resources. A huge network of corruption had been built up 
under Gowon (not by him), which he had done little to control. 
There was particular anger at the way oil money was being 
squandered; it was this that gave the deepest thrust to the 
coup against Gowon. But this anger included a great deal of 
resentment over the way the benefits were distributed. 
"The coup-makers were primarily concerned with the 
greedy manner in which officials were appropriating 
oil money..... The coup-makers were not likely to 
question, much less eliminate, the triangular and 
bi-lateral relationships. Rather, by seizing power 
they could henceforth participate in them. "1 
The coup against Gowon was motivated partly by genuine horror 
at the scale of corruption in the country. The 'Dimka' coup 
of February 1976, in which Murtala Mohammed, Gowon's successor, 
was killed, seems to have been motivated by less altruistic 
reasons. Mohammed had conducted massive purges in the administration 
in order to weed out corruption. 11,000 civil servants lost 
their jobs. At the same time the government planned to demobilise 
a large part of the army, still the size it had been in the war, 
as well as to weed out incompetent officers promoted during the 
war (the 'conversion exercise'). The coup was directly the result 
of these policies. 
"Those entrusted with its execution, for the most part 
junior and middle-ranking officers, seem to have been 
prompted mainly by fears regarding individual career 
prospects, inspired by the 'conversion exercise'; and 
the threat of demobilisation; by antipathy to the 
aggressively 'professional' approach of the new army 
commanders.... "2 
1 Turner (1976), p. 77 
2 Campbell, in Panter-Brick (1978), p. 87 
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The leaders of the coup also had the tacit support of the large 
number of civil servants displaced by the government. 
Some Marxist writers see the military take-over simply as 
an alternative way for the bourgeoisie to retain control once 
the politicians had made a mess of things. This is taking the 
meaning of class so loosely that it would make genuine class 
analysis next to impossible. There was never any danger of 
a 'lower' socio-economic group taking control. The army did 
not support the politicians, allowing some of them only a 
secondary role in the power structure, and was more concerned 
with feathering its own nest than that of the wider bourgeoisie - 
a very disparate group, as I have already argued. The military 
take-over, whatever patriotic motives were involved, also 
represented a conflict between the military and the politicians. 
The third and fourth coups represented a struggle within the 
military itself. In both cases the conflict was clearly intra- 
class in nature, i. e. always within the bourgeoisie - firstly 
between the politicians and a functionary group, secondly between 
different segments of the functionary group itself. 
The exchange of political for military rule merely meant 
that the incumbents at the head of the patron-client network had 
changed. Little else of fundamental importance was different. 
One such area was foreign domination in the industrial and commercial 
economy. In 1969 60.4% of paid-up share capital was expatriate. 
Expatriate board members had majority or total share-holdings in 
62.8% of firms. 
' In order to try and increase the role of Nigerians 
in business the military government introduced in 1972 the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree. This prohibited foreign participation 
in 22 types of enterprise (half of them industrial) and limited it 
in others. The range of the decree was extended in 1977. 
However, not all of even Nigeria's enterpreneurs wanted any 
radical change. Association with foreign firms was easier than 
direct investment in the economy. Middle-men find it easier in 
developing countries, as I have argued above, to trade rather than 
to produce. 
1 Teriba, Edozien, Kayode in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p. 94 
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"They find little incentive to produce when middle- 
manship requires little capital, complements and 
facilitates but does not compete with foreign capital, 
and most important offers easy profits. "1 
Government officials are also happy to co-operate with foreign 
enterprise, finding it profitable to act as compradors. The 
same also applies to those in political control. Again, as I 
argued above: 
"State control stems mainly from its role as a major 
buyer, but also from its regulatory power over other 
commercial activities. Because the state controls 
opportunities to profit through coumierce, politics 
becomes a struggle for positions in the state or for 
access to those who have influence over government 
decisions. "2 
While indigenisation has reduced the role of individual foreign 
interests in Nigeria, the West owns or controls a predominant 
part of Nigeria's industrial assets in toto. Indeed, British 
investment in Nigeria is estimated to be worth £1,000 million3. 
(This does not mean, though, that outside interests are in control 
of the Nigerian economy. "Though the economic influence of... 
foreign firms is considerable, their political influence is 
negligible 
.,, 
4) 
While there was some increase in indigenisation in Nigerian 
industry, no change occurred in its structure. The position of 
industrial workers remained the same. The working class was, 
in fact, weak and undeveloped, as indeed was the class structure 
as a whole. This does not mean industrial workers were entirely 
lacking in class consciousness. Adrian Peace studied industrial 
relations in two expatriate-owned companies near Lagos after the 
Adebo Commission had (in 1971) recommended an interim cost of 
living award (COLA), the result of the inflation caused by the 
civil war. Companies tried to avoid giving the award. In one 
factory Peace studied there were stoppages of work, despite the 
existence of an anti-strike law, and an assault on the personnel 
1 Turner (1976), p. 65 
2 Ibid, p. 64 
3 The Guardian (2.8.79) 
4 Bhambri (1964), p. 187 
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manager. Eventually the award was conceded. A consideration 
in the decision was a fear that expensive equipment would be 
damaged by the workers. This also became a consideration in 
the other factory, which similarly conceded. 
Peace argues that 
"This was not a protest by industrial workers solely 
against their position within the industrial system 
as such, but was against the prevailing inequalities 
within Nigerian society at large. "1 
Peace is right to argue that class relations pertinent to an 
industrial society can exist in an industrially undeveloped 
society: they can exist in small areas simultaneously with class 
relations pertinent to earlier modes of production. Yet it is 
not possible to conclude from Peace's evidence that workers in 
Nigeria are likely, or even potentially able, to participate in 
significant class conflict. Their actions are sporadic, 
essentially instrumental, and generally poorly organised. 
Another writer2 has examined worker reaction to the Adebo 
award, this time in firms in Kano owned by non-Europeans. There 
were hardly any multinationals in Kano, most industry being owned 
by Levantines, Asians etc., Nigerians, or the government. These 
treated the workers far more harshly than did the Europeans, and 
at that time there were no factory trade unions. The three 
factories Lubeck studied all refused to pay the award or hedged 
it about. In each case there was violence and the management, 
the worst being Hausa rather than foreign, responded with bribery 
of strike leaders, sackings, and lock-outs. The workers were 
weak and fatalistic. Even when, in one factory, they struck for 
two weeks, they were unsuccessful. The worst employers were 
indigenous Nigerians, even where the state or its politicians 
were involved in ownership. 
Industrial workers are just one small element of urban economic 
life. Probably more important, at least numerically, are the 
innumerable craftsmen and petty traders. Williams, studying 
these in Ibadan (an important city), found that they were basically 
accommodating. They saw their future in the patron-client system. 
1 Peace, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p. 158 
2 Lubeck (1975) 
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"Throughout the trading hierarchy, advancement is seen to require 
privileged access to clients or suppliers.... "1 These small 
businessmen do not oppose the system, merely try to improve their 
individual positions within it. The most famous case of organised 
protest that has occurred in Nigeria has in fact come from the 
peasants rather than from urban groups (except for the workers' 
general strike discussed above), though they are in general quiescent. 
This was the Agbekoya rebellion of 1968, which occurred during the 
civil war in what was then the Western Region. The basic causes 
of the rebellion were declining income from cocoa, years of 
exploitation by the 14arketing 'Boards, and new heavy taxes to 
finance the war against Biafra. Many people were killed during 
the riots, which were not spontaneous but appear, rather, to have 
been well organised. 
2 
The class structure, then, was not affected by military rule. 
This is reflected, too, in the continued elitist nature of Nigeria's 
education. At independence there had been only one university. 
Each of the three regions then built its own one. There are now 
13 and four more states plan to have one. There are also at least 
8,000 Nigerians at universities in the U. K. (many others in other 
countries). 
"The universities are an annex to wider Nigerian society 
slotting graduates into the world of car allowances, 
pensions, and Western style homes., 
3 
The establishment of universities by individual states is, of 
course, as much an aspect of regionalism as it is of elitism. 
Underlying regional tensions are still there, and still powerful, 
despite the civil war and military rule. The three regions had 
become even before the start of the civil war 12 states. But 
this was not the end of the process. Between October and December, 
1974,19 advertisements publicising demands for the creation of 
particular states appeared in the New Nigerian. 
4 During the 
first half of that year 
"administration throughout much of Nigeria was seriously 
impaired, and in some cases paralysed, by agitation for 
1 Williams, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p. 118 
2 Ibid, pp. 123-134 
3 Guardian Special Report (30.3.81) 
4 Yahaya, in Panter-Brick (1978), p. 204 
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the creation of new states -a campaign in which 
civil servants were especially prominent. "1 
The influx and progress of Ibos outside their own area is still 
being impeded. 2 
Gowon's 12 states were increased to 19 in 1976 but this has 
not stopped the demand for more. Such a process is an underlying 
principle of the Nigerian political economy. Not only does the 
creation of new states give minorities political freedom, it gives 
the elites of these minorities increased economic opportunities 
by allowing them access to and control over resources. 
"The movements for a realignment of state boundaries 
are primarily movements by elites seeking to consolidate 
their influence in their own localities. Leaders of 
state movements, especially those which emerged between 
1967 and 1975, saw the Government's commitment to create 
states as an opportunity to share booty. "3 
In many respects post-military Nigeria is much the same as 
before 
- 
in fact, remarkably similar to the earlier democratic 
period. The same political set-up has returned -a Northern 
party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), in power in alliance 
with a party under Azikiwe (still going strong), and poor old 
Awolowo still in opposition. The political system (a presidential 
one) is different but the contenders broadly the same. The new 
ruler, Shehu Shagari, had been parliamentary secretary to Nigeria's 
first Prime Minister, and a minister in several departments, both 
before and after the coup. 
4 
The fact that the NPN could get in largely through the Northern 
vote, despite changes in the rules designed to mitigate the 
regionalisation of politics (presidential candidates had to gain 
25% of the votes in two thirds of the now 19 states), indicates 
the continuing importance of ethnicity. 
-. 
Shagari gained the 
required proportion in 12 states (what is two thirds of 19? ) while 
the NPN won in the states and federally but did not have a clear 
majority at either level. The continuing importance of ethnic 
rivalry is obvious enough. Since Shagari became President he 
1 Campbell, in Ibid, p. 76 
2 Schätzl (1973), p. 140 
3 Yahaya, in Panter-Brick (1978), pp. 220/1 
4 Nigerian Government advertisement in The Guardian (16.3.81) 
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apparently received requests from representatives of different 
ethnic groups for at least 12 more states. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Ethnic antagonisms have existed (and will exist, whether on 
or below the surface) throughout Nigeria's history - during colonial 
rule, during the First Republic, during military rule, and after 
the restoration of democracy. These antagonisms reached their 
climax in the struggle between the elites for access to scarce 
resources, which could only be obtained through power. The result 
was a continuous ebbing and flowing of ethnic imperialism and ethnic 
nationalism. The civil war itself reflected both Ibo nationalism 
(the struggle against more powerful ethnic neighbours) and Ibo 
imperialism (the attempt to retain control over nearby minorities). 
In many fundamental respects no essential change was caused 
either by the military take-over or by the later return to democracy. 
The nature of underlying ethnic competition, of the class structure, 
of the patron-client system, and of foreign commercial influence - 
all these remained broadly the same. Changes in the political- 
economy have reflected little more than changes in the elites: 
first the military displacing the politicians, then one element 
of the military displacing another. This, then, reflected a 
process of change from ethnic to intra-class conflict. It is 
possible to be more specific and say the first military coup was 
the result of ethnic conflict while the later coups were intra-class 
in nature. 
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PART TWO: OVERVIEW 
Nigerian history clearly shows the primacy of ethnic over 
class conflict. This principle is relevant to most developing 
countries. Naturally Nigeria had its own special conditions - 
for instance, the political arrangements left by the British 
(regions dominated by major ethnic groups) and the pre-eminence 
in the economy of foreign interests; but these hardly created 
the antagonisms that were to appear. They merely determined 
the intensity and form of these antagonisms. I have tried to 
show that communal competition is present throughout Nigerian 
society: at the lowest level it was reflected in local competiton 
for resources (expressed through representation in the Houses of 
Assembly), then in conflict between minorities and majority ethnic 
groups in one region, and finally in conflict between the major 
ethnic groups across the whole federation. Changes in the nature 
of political rule have affected the expression of ethnic competition 
but not its essence. 
The primacy of ethnic conflict does not mean class conflict 
is not important; in particular ways I think it is. The nub of 
my argument as regards class can be put as follows: in a situation 
of scarce resources class conflict is likely to be within rather 
than between classes. The Marxist theory of class conflict 
presupposes a developing economy in which new economic forces bring 
into existence new economic relations. A new class based on the 
new economic forces eventually arrives to challenge the dominance 
of the old economic class. In developing countries these new 
economic forces develop in dribs and drabs. They do not bring 
whole new classes into existence even over a long period of time - 
just fragments of classes. Development does bring into existence 
a small class of educated people, with some capital in trade or 
land perhaps (which are hardly new economic forces), but there are 
no new economic forces on which their rise is based or that they 
can take control of - except governmental resources. In all 
societies with modern, centralised governments an economic surplus 
can always be generated through government, however poor these 
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countries may be. Access to governmental resources provides 
the main opportunity for economic advancement; they are in a 
sense the new 'economic force'. The productive power of this 
force comes through control of the patronage structure, which 
becomes the means by which economic benefits and political support 
are mediated. The superficially feudal nature of the patron- 
client network, control of which depends wholly on control of 
government resources, reflects a system of economic relations 
appropriate to the nature of this new 'economic force'. 
In a situation of scarce resources it is especially impossible 
that there can be enough positions of control to satisfy everyone. 
Both controlling and inferior positions in the patronage structure 
have to be fought for. As ethnicity is the main basis of social 
identity in most developing countries, the basis of the struggle 
is usually the ethnic group. Ethnic conflict has been described 
in detail above. However, this conflict is usually not between 
ethnic groups as a whole but between equivalent socio-economic 
sections of different ethnic groups. This is because they are 
competing for similar resources: ethnic elites compete against 
each other for political control, traders for trading opportunities, 
manual workers for jobs, etc. Various aspects of this intra-class 
conflict have also been described above. Conflict was initially 
ethnic but intra-class elements gradually became of more significance. 
As resources were so limited only a fragment of a class at best 
could be satisfied. Thus fragments of classes fought each other 
for economic benefit. Inter-class conflict was of little importance. 
In conclusion, Nigeria's political-economy both before and 
since independence has been characterised in the main by intense 
ethnic competition for scarce resources. This conflict has 
centered on access to government resources - the main source of 
economic surplus available for exploitation. The struggle for 
control of central resources led to ethnic imperialism and to 
ethnic nationalism, both flowing and ebbing against each other. 
There was no significant conflict between classes for control of 
central resources. The class structure was little more than a 
set of tenuous clusters of loosely related class fragments. The 
dominant cluster is the bourgeoisie, but even this is little more 
- 
157 
- 
than a loose group of disparate interests (professional, business, 
functionary, political) only related at the analytical level. 
Its various elements have no more in common than a vaguely similar 
socio-economic background. They are too busy fighting each other 
to unite. None of these elements sees itself as part of a class. 
Each hopes to be a controlling class in itself. This aspect of 
conflict is intra-class in nature. 
A possible picture of socio-economic change in Nigeria, seen 
in terms of conflict, is as follows: 
(1) Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict) 
(2) Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict) 
y 
(3) Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict) 
According to Marx, conflict in all societies is based on class. 
As societies develop the nature of class conflict changes. I have 
tried to show an alternative way of looking at socio-economic 
change. -- As societies develop the nature of conflict changes. 
It does so with changes in the nature of its base - from ethnic 
groups to parts of a class to developing classes. Nigeria before 
and during the civil war was firmly locked in the ethnic stage. 
Conflict since then has been of an intra-class nature, with elements 
of ethnic and inter-class conflict. 
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PART THREE : ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA 
Introduction 
In the following two chapters I hope to throw further light on 
the ubiquity and depth of conflict in Nigeria, and on the country's 
highly elitist social structure, through a study of communication 
in the country (mostly the press). In doing so I shall be looking 
at 'process' rather than 'structure', and hopefully thereby obtaining 
a more purely sociological insight into these elements of Nigerian 
society. 
Marx believed that socio-economic change takes place through 
changes in the class structure. I have argued, by contrast, that 
it takes place through changes in the type of group involved in 
conflict, of which class is only one. As regards the mass media, 
in Marx's view they are vital means for the transmission of ideology: 
they are under the control of the bourgeoisie and reflect its 
interests. I do not believe things are quite as simple as that 
in the West, let alone in the Third World. It cannot be argued 
that conflict in developing countries is based on class antagonisms, 
nor can it be argued that the media simply reflect particular 
class interests. But the media in the Third World do reflect 
the socio-economic structure of their countries in very broad ways. 
The press in developing countries has a far stronger political 
connection than do the electronic media. At various times in its 
history it often strongly reflects the nature of political conflict. 
But this conflict is not necessarily reflected in content. The 
power of government often prevents this. However, the press can 
reflect conflict in other ways, less publicly - for instance, in 
antagonism between owners of the press and its journalists. The 
press contains numerous interests and influences: those of business, 
of government, of political parties, and of the journalists themselves. 
In times of ethnic conflict these interests might be united: i. e. 
the business, political and professional elites in one ethnic group 
combine against those of another. In a period of intra-class 
conflict these particular. elites might oppose each other. For 
instance, political parties (often supported by the 'professional' 
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part of the bourgeoisie, including the journalists) vie for power 
with the functionary groups. This is, in fact, often the main 
form of intra-class conflict. As business interest usually 
support functionary groups (for stability), the professional 
bourgeoisie also finds itself opposed to the 'business' bourgeoisie. 
As journalists can generally be considered part of the former 
group and the owners of newspapers part of the latter, a conflict 
of interests arises between the two. 
In periods of ethnic (or nationalist) conflict the press is 
highlk: 
- partisan. All members of one ethnic group generally 
oppose those of another. This conflict is often directly 
reflected in newspaper. content. In times of intra-class conflict 
the press is likely to be government-oriented (though partisanship 
is always under the surface). The government gains strength and 
uses this to keep opposition groups out of power. One weapon it 
uses to maintain its power is control of the press. In this case 
there is often a broad conflict between the personnel of the press 
(supporting politics, freedom, and market-orientation) and the 
government (representing a functionary group or an autocratic party). 
The owners of the press split in opposite directions. The big 
commercial ones often find it pays to support the government 
(thereby coming into conflict with their own journalists); the 
small, political ones - remnants of partisanship - often oppose 
the government and show little interest in the market. Of the 
two countries I shall be analysing, Pakistan reflects the phase 
of intra-class conflict just described, while Nigeria, which I 
shall be discussing now, reflects the simpler case of ethnic 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER FIVE : THE COMMUNICATION OF CONFLICT 
The press in Nigeria has from the start had a strong connection 
with conflict. I argued in Chapter 2 that it is through such a 
connection that the press develops. In the case of Nigeria this 
conflict, and its communication, has been almost wholly ethnic in 
nature. I am not arguing that the press necessarily promoted the 
growth of conflict, though I would find it hard to believe it had 
no effect in this respect; my interest is, rather, simply in the 
expression of this conflict. If the media reflect in some way 
or other the structure of the society they exist in, then the 
importance of ethnic confrontation is bound to be reflected in 
the press. I also argued in Chapter 2 that the media in developing 
countries have a fragmented connection with their social environment. 
I do not think it possible to say that the media are 'determined' 
by any particular element of the social structure (though they are 
usually heavily controlled by government, whatever the nature of 
this government). Rather, the media reflect underdeveloped 
society in very general ways: they reflect conflict, the clash 
of ethnic identities, the elitist structure of society, and the 
overpowering primacy of politics and the state - all the elements 
I have laid great stress on above. 
5.1. Conflict and the Origins of the Nigerian Press 
Though the first newspaper in Nigeria appeared in 1859 the 
press did not gain a firm footing until the 1880s. It was an 
indigenous press; its initial partisanship took the form of 
antagonism to the British. One paper wrote in 1898 that "a 
black Englishman is an absurdity not. only in Europe but also in 
Africa". ' This did not stop the Nigerian press from using 
English as their medium of expression: it was a westernised elite 
that was speaking. Though only about 5,000 out of the Lagos 
population of 86,000 or so spoke English, most newspapers published 
there were in this language. The press did not develop in the 
interior of Nigeria until the 1920s. 
Though the newspapers of the 19th century frequently opposed 
the increasing European domination of Africa, where the interests 
of the newspapers themselves or of their localities were concerned 
1 Omu (1978), p. 7 
- 
161 
- 
the tune could change. In 1877 a long war broke out in the 
Yoruba interior between different Yoruba tribes, seriously 
affecting trade between Lagos and the hinterland. Lagos and 
the indigenous press established there not only wanted trade 
restored but viewed an extension of British power as an extension 
of the influence of Lagos. When two areas adjoining Lagos 
were annexed to it the Lagos Weekly Record saw this as "highly 
politic and satisfactory", and a suitable way of "dealing with 
the surrounding native tribes". The Lagos Times, before 
military action to open up trade again was decided upon, described 
the British policy of non-intervention as "altogether ruinous 
and suicidal". 
' The press can reflect 'internal nationalist' 
just as well as 'state nationalist' aspirations. 
Press opposition to the colonial government began to be of 
some significance in the early 20th century. But, while 
nationalism was growing, so were conflicting interest within 
the nationalist movement. These too the press reflected. 
The first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic 
Party, was founded (in 1923) by two newspapermen, Herbert Macaulay, 
journalist-owner of the Daily News, and Thomas Jackson, who similarly 
owned and ran the Lagos Weekly Record. Macaulay, his faction, 
and his paper, were strongly opposed by another political faction 
represented by the Daily Times. The press began to thrive on 
partisanship. The interdependence of the press and politics 
was very close, but there was also 
"the natural disposition of the newspapers to exploit 
political excitement for commercial ends. The polemics 
inevitable in electioneering gave a boost to newspaper 
r2 sales. 
The first really successful paper in Nigeria was Nnamdi Azikiwe's 
West African Pilot. As the title implies, Azikiwe had a pan- 
African outlook. His paper, founded in 1937, was the first major 
journalistic offensive against colonialism in Nigeria. The 
paper was at the same time highly market-oriented, designed to 
appeal in both style and content. It quickly bacame the leading 
paper, stripping past the Daily Times, and forcing it to compete 
1 Ibid, pp. 120/1 
2 Ibid, pp 233/4 
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fiercely. (By the end of the 1940s Azikiwe owned six papers, 
spread across the entire Federation). Ultimately the latter 
paper sold a controlling interest to the British Daily Mirror 
Group who duly turned out a vastly improved paper, forcing the 
Pilot, in turn, to compete even harder. However, partisanship 
was the main pattern. 
5.2. Conflict Between Partisanship and Market-Orientation 
During the build-up to the civil war Nigeria was in the 
peculiar position of having a press that was firmly partisan 
but a best selling paper that certainly was not partisan. In 
1966, this paper, the Daily Times, sold nearly as many copies 
as all the other major papers put together. I have argued that 
partisanship is necessary for the development of the press, but 
that does not mean it is necessary for the development of an 
individual paper, or that papers are always founded for political 
purposes; nor, indeed, that partisan papers must lack any concern 
for a wider market. 
Papers often suffer what eventually become conflicting aims: 
the maximising of political support, or of profits. There can 
thus be a conflict between partisanship and market-orientation; 
in fact, if a political paper really wants to expand, this must 
happen 
. 
Another possibility is that a paper might be partisan 
at the same time as oriented to government. This can, of course, 
happen when the government allows some press freedom; and such 
freedom is, in varying degrees, fairly cm on. It can also happen 
where there is a federation of states, each with its own government. 
Each government might control the press in its own state, thus 
making the press government-oriented. But, if these states are 
in conflict within the federation, then the press, across the 
country as a whole, is a partisan press. This was the case in 
Nigeria. The original trichotomy of partisanship, and government 
and market-orientation, is therefore too simple. Though the 
broad developmental pattern is correct, there are numerous 
complexities and contradictions to be taken account of. 
Nigeria has had papers of all the above types. The West 
African Pilot is an example of a paper founded for a mixture of 
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partisanship and market-orientation. A 1958 editorial claimed 
"We support 100% all that the NCNC stands for. But 
we cannot live and eat politics all the time. We are 
a commercial organisation.... This paper must survive 
either as a commercial concern or political enterprise. 
But we are the former - at the moment at least - and 
being so, we intend to maintain our independence whilst 
upholding the principles of the party. "1 
Yet the Pilot had an essentially partisan market. It "reached 
only NCNC members and Ibos". 
2 Nevertheless, this political and 
ethnic constituency offered a limited market. The Pilot started 
declining when it faced competition from the truly market-oriented 
Daily Times. 
The Times could only be a successful market-oriented paper 
with foreign support. It was one of three papers owned by the 
Daily Mirror Group in West Africa. The other two were in Ghana 
and Sierra Leone. (In Chick's view the Mirror Group started their 
West African venture solely out of a profit motive. No inducements 
were offered by the government and the Group was not interested in 
supporting the government). 3 
When the Daily Times came under the control of the Mirror Group 
it received by far the best equipment of any paper in Nigeria, as 
well as experienced expatriate management, an extensive distribution 
system (including its own fleet of lorries), while its staff got 
salaries one third higher than those of its competitors. It was 
successful for these reasons. It was also politically cautious. 
Despite its success, though, and its relatively large circulation, 
the Times was bought in the main "by members of a small elite". 
4 
The English-speaking population itself was a very small percentage 
of the total population. 
The Times was not the only expatriate-owned newspaper in 
Nigeria. The Thomson organisation also had an interest; it owned 
the Daily Express in partnership with an organisation controlled 
by the Action Group. Thomson had been invited to participate 
in a paper by the AG because it wanted a well-run paper to support 
1 Grant (1975), p. 29 
2 Ibid, p. 64 
3 Chick (1967), P. 158 
4 Ibid, p. 230 
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its interests. Thus, in this case, the origins of foreign 
participation lay in partisanship. But Thomson wanted a neutral 
market-oriented paper, the AG a partisan paper. Trying to be 
both, the paper failed. It could hardly avoid being partisan, 
especially during the crisis of the AG's split. It had to 
support either Akintola or Awolowo. Thomson closed the paper 
in 1965. 
How was a market-oriented paper, the Times, able to survive 
in a partisan situation? First of all, of course, the market 
was hardly a mass market. The Times public came in large measure 
from the elite. As was made clear by the failure of the Express 
there was not room, anyway, for two such papers. In developing 
countries the market is too small to support a demand-oriented 
press, even if it can support a solitary paper of this nature. 
Secondly, there are always those in any conflict situation who 
do not want to be involved. The Times skimmed off the politically 
uncommitted, or not-so-committed, from around the rocks of political 
conflict. Thirdly, even the politically committed, especially 
where there is no question of ideology (it would be difficult to 
call the ethnic conflict ideological) might want a full (or 
relatively full) account of events, as well as the views that 
appeal to him. Fourthly, the demand for partisan papers certainly 
did exist, and this limited the market greatly; the demise of 
the Express, unable to make the transition from a partisan to a 
market-orientated paper, exemplifies this well. Fifthly, it 
took outside-resources to create such a paper as the Times. The 
Nigerian economic and political environment was unable to create 
or maintain such a paper itself. Finally, all the foreign-owned 
papers in West Africa eventually gave up. In Sierra Leone the 
Mirror's paper, the Daily Mail, found the market too small, and 
increasingly encroached upon by government papers. It sold out 
in 1965. In Ghana the political environment was such that the 
Mirror's paper, the Daily Graphic, could hardly say a word without 
offending Nkrumah. It sold out to the government in 1962, and 
the press there quickly become entirely government-oriented. In 
Nigeria the Daily Express just could not cope; even the Times 
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eventually found the political environment too much and sold 
outs leaving no politically independent paper on the scene. 
While there was one successful market-oriented paper, the 
rest of the Nigerian press was entirely partisan. I hypothesised 
in Part One that, in a partisan situation, the main growth would 
not be in the size of the individual papers but in the numbers 
of newspapers competing against each other. This was certainly 
the case in Nigeria. Moreover, while it is true that in a 
politically and socially fragmented market, a partisan paper 
could not make a mass appeal, a neutral paper could skim off 
readers in all the nooks and crannies of such a fragmented 
market, but even then it could hardly make a mass appeal. For 
this it would need large-scale literacy (in English in this case) 
and some political tranquillity. The above arguments indicate 
that it is very difficult to maintain a successful market-oriented 
paper in a developing country, and probably impossible to have 
an entire press of this nature. 
The table below summarises the various orientations of some 
of the more important, papers of this period (between which, though, 
there were very big differences in circulation and resources). 
Table 5.1: Orientations of Nigeria's Major Newspapers 
Partisan Partisan/. 
market- 
oriented 
Partisan/ 
government 
oriented 
Market- 
oriented 
Government- 
oriented 
Times 
Express 
Pilot 
Post 
Gaskiya 
Citizen 
Outlook 
Sketch 
Tribune 
Telegraph 
- 
166 
- 
In the case of the Tribune and the Express their orientations 
changed over time. For a while their party, the Action Group, 
was in power in the Western Region. When Akintola took over 
the reins with a new party these papers were no longer oriented 
to government. The table shows that most of the papers were 
partisan in one form or another. The only paper oriented solely 
to government was the Nigerian Morning Post, though even this 
position was qualified. The Post was owned by the federal 
government. As this government was a coalition of opposed parties 
the paper avoided overt partisanship. 
Partisanship was even more intense than the above table 
indicates, because it could occur within parties, between different 
factions. This occurred with the Action Group. Both the Express 
and the Tribune had great problems when Akintola and Awolowo split 
up (both these men had previously worked on the Tribune); the 
factional dispute became the primary concern. Eventually these 
papers remained with the AG (though the Express tried to keep a 
foot in both camps), while Akintola, in government, established 
his own paper, the Sketch. Such factionalism also occurred, to a 
much lesser degree, in the NCNC. The Pilot, founded before the 
NCNC, was Azikiwe's paper. It supported the NCNC, but always 
Azikiwe's view of the NCNC. He did not refrain from using it to 
criticise the NCNC. The Nigerian Outlook was established by the 
Eastern Region government to represent the NCNC itself. 
5.3. The Economic Foundations of the Political Press 
I have given some indication of the dependence of the Nigerian 
press on political and government support, and of the difficulty 
of establishing an even partially market-oriented press. There 
were both political and economic reasons for this. In this 
section I shall examine the latter. 
5.3.1. The Income of the Press 
Partisanship does not guarantee profitability; profits are 
probably rare. Many of Nigerian's partisan papers only managed 
to survive with regional government support. The table below 
clearly indicates that the Nigerian press was overall a loss-making 
affair. Inclusion of other papers would have made this even more 
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apparent. Even if the profits of the Times were spread out over 
all the leading papers the press would still be a loss-maker as 
a whole. 
Table 5.2: Newspaper Ownership, Scale and Prof itability, 19641 
Newspaperl Owner Investmentsa Assetsa Employees Profit/loss p. a. a 
Times IPC 525 1,000 600 +112 
Pilot Azikiwe 10 60 100 
-20b 
Tribune member 20.4 10 100 
- 
Post ed. govt. 1,000 545 800 
-200 
Outlook East. govt. 
- 
200 200 
-47.3 
Citizen North. govt 
- 
>50 100 
-50 
Sketch West. govt. - -. - -80 
Express Thomson's/ 371.4 196 
- -46 AG 
Notes: a £1,000's 
b For January and February only 
Government patronage became much more important, of course, with 
regional and national autonomy. As the above discussion suggests, 
such patronage was necessary. In 1962/3 the Outlook, with a 
circulation of 16,500, got a subsidy of £50,000. In 1963/4 (its 
circulation now at 21,000) it received from the Eastern Government 
£47,0002 (probably over 60% of the revenue it received from sales, 
advertising and job printing). 3 In 1964/5 the Sketch received a 
subsidy of £84,000 from the Western government, the next year 
£72,500.4 Its circulation came to no more than a few thousand. 
In a number of ways, as I have already indicated, the press 
reflects the political and economic structure of Nigeria. It 
also became, along with so many other institutions, a part of the 
patron-client network. Any participation in government, or a 
government organisation, could be a profitable affair. It meant 
a finger in the pie. The same applied to government newspapers. 
It applied to all government papers, but in particular to the Post 
and the Nigerian National Press, of which the Post was part. 
"From the beginning the Nigerian National Press had 
been open to plunder in its function as one piece of 
the national cake. "5 
1 Grant (1975), p. 15 
2 Ibid, p. 257 
3 Ibid, p. 380 
4 Ibid, p. 389 
5 Ibid, p. 261 
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Even without corrupt sources of income the top editorial 
and management staff were extremely well paid. On the other 
hand, the lower workers were very poorly paid. Thus the elitist 
nature of Nigerian society was also reflected in the press. In 
the 1960s 
"While editors had the status and salary of senior 
civil servants, reporters started at a maximum salary 
of £20 per month with most earning the equivalent of 
a cook-steward. "1 
I described in Part Two the strong links between the regional 
governments, the regional public corporations, the banks, and the 
parties. One final element in this was the press. The money 
that came from the banks and the marketing boards was used not 
only to prop up the parties and its individual members, but the 
party papers too. By 1955 the African Continental Bank, owned 
by Azikiwe, NCNC leader and Eastern Premier, had loaned Azikiwe's 
large commercial organisation, Zik Enterprises, of which the West 
African Pilot was part, £321,000. The Pilot's share of this was 
an overdraft of £68,051. The Bank itself relied largely on funds 
from government corporations. Zik Enterprises lost money and the 
bank became insolvent. The banks managing-director, A. Blankson, 
was also managing-director of the Pilot and its editor-in-chief. 
2 
There were also strong links in the Western Region between the 
Action Group, the National Bank (in which the biggest share-holder 
was the Western Regional Marketing Board), and the Action Group's 
newspaper organisation, the Amalgamated Press, which included the 
Tribune. 
5.3.2. Circulation and Distribution 
Grant3 gives the circulations of the major newspapers, derived 
from a British advertising agency and other sources, as follows. 
(I have selected only certain years). 
1 Ibid, p. 50 
2 Ibid, p. 115 
3 Ibid, p. 403 
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Table 5.3: Newspaper Circulations 
1960 1961 1964 1965 1966 
Times 94,250 106,570 108,960 111,880 141,110 
Express 50,000 40,000 52,220 47,000 Closed 
Pilot 40,000 
- 
23,100 35,000 20,000 
Tribune 15,000 
- 
5,000 10,000 7,000 
Post 
- 
30,000 16,000 32,000 37,800 
Citizen 20,000 
- 
8,100 
NNew ig rian 42,410 
Outlook 13,000 
- 
21,100 30,360 34,650 
Sketch 
- - 
2,000 3,550 1,000 
The total circulation of these papers in 1964 was a mere 236,480. 
Readership, of course, is likely to have been considerably higher, 
probably over one million - still a tiny proportion of the population. 
In addition to this, readership was distributed very unequally across 
Nigeria. It was limited by and large to a few urban centres, in 
particular Lagos. Most of the early papers were established in 
Lagos; it was the commercial and administrative centre of Nigeria, 
and politics too was for a long time limited to Lagos. 
I have calculate the geographical distribution of the papers 
according to their own locations using data from Grant. 
Table 5.4: Regional Daily Circulations of Nine Newspapers 
by Location (in March, 1964 
Circulation in: 
Lagos 
papers 
Western 
papers 
Eastern Northern 
papers papers 
Total 
Lagos 80,800 2,250 1,620 300 84,970 
West 57,260 4,750 150 200 62,360 
Mid-West 17,490 
- 
420 
- 
17,910 
East 39,740 
- 
15,660 80 55,480 
North 23,050 
- 
150 7,523 30,720 
Total 218,340 7,000 18,000 8,100 251,440 
Source: Grant, pp. 27,47 and 62. 
The domination of the press by Lagos is clear enough. 87% of the 
combined circulation of the nine papers (the eight)list. d. in Table 5.3. 
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plus the Telegraph) is contributed by the Lagos newspapers, 
(218,340 out of 251,440). Only 17.4% of the circulation in 
the four regions (i. e. excluding Lagos) was contributed by 
papers established in those regions. The circulation of 
newspapers in the North would be considerably higher, about 
equal to that of the other two major regions, if the only 
vernacular paper of any significance, the Gaskiya Ta Ti Kwabo 
(Hausa), were taken into account. In 1947 the circulation of 
this vernacular weekly was 24,000 (going down to 19,000 in 1949). 1 
The regional distribution of individual papers is more 
interesting. The two big papers, the Times and the Post, were 
fairly evenly distributed across the Federation, but the smaller 
more political papers were more localised and also, in some cases, 
suffered an apparent disjunction between their economic and 
political markets. Of these papers, the Pilot, with some 
pretentious to being a market-oriented paper, sold fairly equally 
across the Federation. Nevertheless, though its political 
constituency was in the Eastern Region, in 1964 25% of its sales 
were there, compared to 31% in Lagos. 
2 Nearly half of the 
Tribune's circulation of 5,000 was in Lagos though the paper was 
published in Ibadan. The Express, another AG paper whose political 
constituency was in the Western Region, sold marginally more in 
Lagos than it did in this region (even including the Mid-West). 
Despite the dominance of Lagos in sales, and of the relatively 
widespread sales of the non-partisan Times and Post (less non- 
partisan) throughout Nigeria, the regions had a strong partisan 
component. In the Eastern Region, the Outlook sold about 15,500 
to the Times'21,500. In the North, the Citizen had half the 
circulation of the Times; Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo might have excelled 
the Times. In the Western Region, the Express sold 18,500 to the 
Times'24,000. Thus, in all regions there was a very significant 
partisan outlet. Broad confirmation of the importance of partisan 
papers comes from a readership survey (of over 12,000 people) carried 
out in 1962 by a market research organisation on behalf of 49 firms. 
(Circulation figures say nothing about actual readership). In the 
Western Region 63% had read the Times 'yesterday', 30% the Express. 
1 Post (1963), p. 321 
2 Grant (1975), p. 106 
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In the Eastern Region, 35% had read the Times, 26% the Outlook. 
In the North, 51% had read the Times, 22% had read the Citizen 
and 39% Gaskiya (both bi-weeklies) in the 'last seven days'. ' 
The Post, shortly before its demise, was also widely read. 
There are no circulation figures for individual towns (apart 
from Lagos), but some indication of local circulations, however 
vague, can be gained from analysis of the origin of letters and 
classified advertisements printed in the papers. (My samples 
were of 15 issues, generally over a period of a year or six 
months, or the period of an election campaign). Again there 
seems to have been a disjunction between economic and political 
centres: a number of Lagos papers printed classified advertisements, 
mostly from Lagos (the main economic centre), but had a much wider 
distribution of letters, coming in particular from regions where 
the papers had their 'political constituencies'. However, it 
appears that this tendency might have decreased with the growth 
of political conflict, the 'political constituency' gaining 
ascendancy over the economic market. For instance, in the case 
of the Tribune, an Ibadan paper, whereas in 1950 Lagos was apparently 
not far behind Ibadan as a source of letters, by 1958 it was a 
significantly lower source both of letters and of classified 
advertisements. By the 1959 general election Lagos had become of 
negligible importance in this respect. However, it should be 
added that such data is of uncertain value. (Political letters, 
for instance, might not be genuine, and the selection of all letters 
must be influenced by the newspaper's policy). 
I will now discuss the newspapers' areas of coverage by content, 
which was as geographically limited as their distribution. The 
following figures are in average daily column inches (height of 
article by width). The Pilot, in a 1950 sample of 15 issues, 
split its domestic coverage as follows 
Table 5.5: Domestic Coverage of the Pilot's Content, 1950 (in col. inches) 
National 1 132 
Northern Region 15 
Eastern Region 35 
Western Region 45 
Lagos 60 
1 Report of an Enquiry into Advertising Media in Nigeria: 1962/3, 
Research Bureau Ltd., 1003, Nigeria, September 1963. 
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Clearly the national coverage is strongest. The East had not 
yet become the political constituency it was later to become, but, 
as Eleazu1 shows, the regional distribution of content did not 
change much in the 1960s, when the Pilot's political market was 
in the East. Though, in terms of circulation the Pilot had 
moved somewhat out of Lagos by the 1960s, it was still an essentially 
Lagos-bound paper. 
The domestic coverage of the Action Group's Ibadan-based 
paper, the Nigerian Tribune, was as follows for three separate years. 
Table 5.6: Domestic Coverage of the Tribune's Content 
for Three Years (in col-inches) 
1950 1958 1959 
National 114 68 163 
Northern Region ) 45 30 56 Eastern Region ) 12 13 
Western Region 132 149 96 
Ibadan 90 78 30 
Lagos 68 3 17 
In 1950 the Tribune was very much a local paper. I have separated 
coverage of Ibadan out from the Western Region. Taking the Western 
Region, Ibadan and Lagos together, 290 column inches were on the 
Western area of Nigeria, compared to 114 on national affairs. In 
the politically 'peaceful' year of 1958 national coverage was much 
lower, but in the general election period of 1959 national coverage 
shoots up and local news dives. The reporting of the other regions 
went up slowly, but this was mostly negative (about crime, corruption, 
political violence, etc. ). The most interesting result is the 
relative decline in importance of Lagos. In 1950 Lagos takes 23% 
of the coverage of the Western area of Nigeria, in 1958 it is 
negligible, in 1958 it takes exactly half of its 1950 proportion. 
The most extreme case of a split between market and political 
base occurred with the Daily Telegraph, a Lagos paper and the organ 
of Mbadiwe's DPNC. Mbadiwe's base was in the East 
- not even the 
whole region, but a part of it (Mbadiwe's home town, Orlu). He 
had been in the NCNC but left and opposed it with his own party. 
1 Eleazu (1977), pp. 214/5 
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The NCNC was in firm control in the East, which might partly be 
why Mbadiwe published from Lagos. It appears that nearly all 
the paper's sales were in Lagos (according to Grant1, about 6,200). 
In 1959, out of 23 letters received 20 came from the Western 
Region (including Lagos), only three from the Eastern Region. 
Yet its regional coverage was mostly of the East. 
Table 5.7: Domestic Coverage of the Telegraph's Content, 1959 
(in col-inches 
National 201 
Northern Region 14 
Eastern Region 159 
Western Region 37 
Lagos 41 
Of the Eastern coverage over half was what I call 'negative'. 
Mbadiwe was seeking to criticise the Eastern government, and, in 
particular, to stoke up communal differences within the East but 
in a thoroughly Lagos-bound paper! 
To sum up so far; the Nigerian press, in its origins and 
development., was clearly bound up with politics. In terms of 
circulation and resources it was very small, largely restricted 
to a few urban centres, and mostly loss-making. It depended on 
political parties and governments for support. In doing so, many 
of the papers became a part of the patronage system. General 
appeal to the market was of some significance, but only one paper 
was successfully market-oriented. Even this could only be so 
with foreign support, and that did not last. The press was basically 
partisan, and each region had a significant partisan outlet. But 
the contradiction between economic and political orientations applied 
not only across the press but within particular papers too. While 
politics was 'in the regions', economic life was dominated by Lagos. 
The press was largely based in Lagos, yet Lagos only had a tiny 
proportion of the population, and was politically (in terms of 
voting) insignificant. Some papers based in Lagos, and reliant 
on the commercial side of Lagos, nevertheless had their 'political 
constituencies' elsewhere. The economic foundation of the press 
was clearly very poor, driving most of it towards political dependence 
1 Grant (1975), p. 47 
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(even if it had wanted to be non-political). There was both 
an economic push and a political pull. The disjunction between 
economic and political centres, at which I have little more than 
hinted, is just one indication of this. 
5.4. The Extent and Nature of Partisanship 
5.4.1. The Importance of Politics 
In my content analysis of the Nigerian press I have distinguished 
between particular periods of the press, in particular two general 
election periods, the first in 1959, which determined who would 
rule Nigeria after independence, the second in 1964, which was the 
start of the conflict leading to the civil war. The figures are 
of percentage total space after subtraction of advertisements. 
They include all coverage, including editorial and letters-to-the- 
editor. The sample of fifteen issues for each paper was taken from 
the last month of the general election campaign, which makes it a 
concentrated sample (the period for bi-weeklies was longer). The 
aim is to see partisan papers at their most partisan. 
Table 5.8: Coverage of Politics and Government in Two 
General Elections (%total space less ad's. ) 
1959 
Service Telegraph Tribune Citizen Outlook 
Politics 
Government 
32.4 
3.3 
49.3 
4.4 
50.7 
5.0 
37.4 54.3 
6.2 13.5 
Total 35.7 53.7 55.7 43.6 67.8 
1964 
Sketch Citizen Outlook 
Politics 
Government 
39.4 
9.1 
40.5 
7.0 
41.1 
7.1 
Total 48.5 47.5 48.2 
It can be seen from the above that on average about half of 
total space (less advertisements) was taken up by political/governmental 
content. Most of the above papers were the organs of parties in 
power at the regional level and, for some, at the federal level; 
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so, much of the reporting of government was also indirectly of 
the party. More important, though, is that party and other 
political news overwhelms government news. During an election 
period especially, whether the paper is a 'government' paper 
or a 'party' paper, the party is the thing. 
The next thing to do is compare this coverage with that in 
non-election periods, and when there was no major controversy 
raging. I shall do this by comparing two newspapers, the Tribune 
and the Outlook, over several periods. 
Table 5.9: Coverage of Politics and Government in Two 
Newspapers (% total space less ads. 
ribune Outlook 
1950 1958 1959 1954 1959 1961 1964 
Politics 
Government 
12.6 
2.9 
26.6 
16.3 
50.7 
5.0 
14.0 54.3 
22.1 13.5 
11.4 
20.6 
41.1 
7.1 
Total 15.5 42.9 55.7 36.1 67.8 
-L- 
32.0 48.2 
I 
In 1959 and 1964 there were elections. It can easily be seen that 
total political/governmental content goes up very substantially in 
these years, especially the political content. In fact 'government' 
declines drastically at these times, so that a clear trend is 
discernible. In non-election times government content is high 
(1950 must be excluded here as only the colonial government existed 
then), and political content low or moderate. In election times 
the former plummets and the latter increases enormously. The Outlook 
exhibits these swings most clearly. Government content is higher 
than political content in non-election times, political content is 
higher than government in election times. (In the Tribune of 1958 
politics is higher than in either paper earlier because of the 
imminence of independence). 
What these samples show then are swings between partisanship 
and government-orientation, which are determined by the political 
circumstances of the time. The papers were always highly partisan; 
in non-election times they were orientated to government, in election 
times to their party. Although government and party were the same 
thing it was only during elections that the parties, each in government 
in its own region, came into conflict with each other. 
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So far I have said nothing about how coverage of politics 
and government was distributed within the papers. The following 
example shows the various types of coverage for the 1964 sample. 
(This was not different from the 1959 sample in any particular 
way as far as distribution is concerned). I have made a broad 
distinction between news and other material: political features, 
political advertisements, political cartoons, and editorials and 
letters on politics. I have also divided news into straight- 
forward reporting on parties, political analysis/comment, and 
other political matters not explicitly connected with particular 
parties (for example, local politics or electoral arrangements). 
The distinction between comment/analysis and editorials is a 
little artificial; the idea is to separate out analysis or comment 
within the body of the paper, or even within an article, which 
need not necessarily be opinion. 
Table 5.10: Political Coverage in the 1964 General Election 
(% total space, less ad's. ) 
Sketch Citizen Outlook 
Parties 23.8 11.3 18.4 
Comment ne ws 5.5 10.7 9.3 
Other politica 2.0 14.0 1.8 
Features, ads., 
cartoons 3.1 1.8 5.2 
Editorial 4.6 0.8 3.2 
Letters 0.4 1.9 3.2 
Total 39.4 40.5 41.1 
It can be seen from this that all parts of the paper contributed 
a significant amount to total political coverage. This tends to 
be the case in periods of intense partisanship. It is the sum 
total of all types of political coverage that makes these papers 
so overwhelmingly political and overwhelmingly partisan. 
5.4.2. The Importance of the Parties 
So far I have shown how important politics were to these 
papers. Now I shall describe the importance of the parties themselves. 
It is clear enough that coverage of politics is very large, especially 
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during periods of political tension. Within this political 
reporting the parties played an increasingly very large part. 
The main indication of the increasing part played by the party 
within all political news is the comparison of the increase of 
party news, and comment, with the decline of 'other political' 
news. This can be seen by looking across the Nigerian press 
as a whole over three periods: 1950-4 (three newspapers), the 
1959 election campaign (five papers) and the 1964 election 
campaign (three papers). The figures are averages for the 
samples of each period, and are percentages of total space less 
advertisements. 
Table 5.11: Types of Political Coverage over Three Periods (% total space less ad's. ) 
1950-4 1959 1964 
Parties 4.0 25.8 17.8 
Comment 1.6 4.5 8.5 
Other political 7.3 7.5 5.9 
In 1950-4 'other political' news is greater than party news and 
political comment together. In 1959 it is the second largest 
category, but well below party news. By 1964 it is the smallest 
component, while political comment shows a significant increase, 
as it does over the entire period. There was only one 'deviant' 
paper in this respect, the Nigerian Citizen. Without this 
exception the figures would have shown the trend even more clearly. 
(The press as a whole in the North was less partisan than in the 
South. The government was more autocratic and did not bother to 
make that much use of the press. The press was negatively oriented 
to government, i. e. its function was less to positively boost the 
government than to ensure no criticism should appear of it. ) The 
trend, however, is of a clear increase in news on political parties 
in the press at the expense of other sorts of political news. As 
the party comes to dominate political news, the papers are used 
more and more as vehicles of comment. 
5.4.3. The Importance of Partisanship 
I have shown the increasing importance of political news in 
the period studied, and within this, of general party coverage. 
- 
178 
- 
Individual papers were, of course, increasingly partisan too. 
In times of political. crises-and Nigeria has not been short 
of these - the political papers spring to life, they become 
fully geared for battle, and their circulations shoot up. 
Without politics there would have been very little in the way 
ofaNigerian press. Most papers in Nigeria were born for and 
lived for politics. 
The concern of the individual papers, of course, is usually 
for a particular party. Moreover, the party takes over the 
whole paper - news, comment, editorial, letters, features, cartoons. 
The following tables will show the extent of this partisanship. 
The figures are of average number of column inches per day (height 
of articles by width), not percentages of space. Naturally, the 
labels 'favourable', 'unfavourable' and 'neutral' incorporate 
a good deal of artifice and some subjectivity. Yet such judgements 
have to be made. On the other hand, in the case of the Nigerian 
press, the extreme partisanship of the press means that one's 
judgement is rarely tested. In addition, I took a very simple 
standard to define 'favourable' news: I called news favourable 
which the party would probably like. This could be overt propaganda, 
or, a simple party statement, or a 'factual' account of violence 
done at a party-gathering 'apparently' caused by another party 
(if both sides are not given), however neutral in tone. In other 
words, I tried to minimise the subjective component. 
The following table shows the distribution of all party coverage 
(news, editorials, letters, etc. ) in a sample of 2 different 
newspapers in 1950 (in average daily column inches). 
Table 5.12: Distribution of Party Coverage (in col. inches) 
Pilot (1950) Tribune (1950) 
Favourable Neutral Unfav. Favourable Neutral Unfavourable 
NCNC and allies 
Egbe Omo Oduduwa 
43.9 3.7 4.5 
--1.5 
4.1 
14.6 
3.3 
- 
3.2 
- 
There was little in the way of party politics at this stage. The 
Action Group had not yet been founded and the NCNC, as can be seen, 
was associated with a number of other organisations. Even then, 
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the Pilot is clearly partisan to the NCNC and its associated 
organisations. It hardly mentions the Egbe Omu Oduduwa. 
This was a Yoruba cultural organisation on which the later 
Action Group was largely to be based. The Tribune hardly 
mentions the NCNC and is clearly partisan towards the E00, 
in which it certainly saw the beginnings of political representation 
for the Yoruba. In May 1950, the Tribune explained the reasons 
for the existence of the E00, as follows 
"The spirit of Yoruba Nation was sick before the great 
Egbe Omo Oduduwa came into being. Our tradition was 
being trampled on, our Native Authorities have no 
authority... Our tradition is no more sacred and 
honourable and those who are placed over us revel in 
in our disunity. It is the duty of Egbe Omo Oduduwa 
to preserve all that is wholesome in our law and 
customs, tradition and usage. "1 
Coverage of government (at that time only the colonial 
government existed) was also limited, in particular that of the 
Tribune, which had a daily average of only 25.3 column inches to 
do with government. Nearly all of this was neutral or favourable 
to the government. However, the paper did manage to offend the 
colonial government once, suffering the banning of a few issues 
as a response and several police raids. This led the paper to 
print in a substantial space on the front page of one issue a 
large crucifix and the words 
"Obituary. Freedom of the Nigerian Press Is Dead. 
May It Be More Fulminating In Its Resurrection Than 
It Was Before Its Death.. So Mote It Be. "2 
The Pilot was much more consistently nationalistic. Of its average 
daily 71.8 column inches on the colonial government about 50% was 
unfavourable to it, only 12% favourable. 
The coverage of the various governments in the mid-1950s by 
the Outlook and the Tribune is given below in average daily column 
inches. (There was no indigenous federal government in 1954). 
1 Nigerian Tribune (26.5.50) 
2 Tribune (4.9.50) 
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Table 5.13: Governmental Coverage in the 1950s (in col. inches) 
Outlook (1954) Tribune (1958) 
Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable 
East govt. 21.1 95.8 1.0 
--- 
North govt 
- 
0.4 
--1.3 7.0 
West govt. 
---8.3 79.8 0.3 
Colonial govt. 18.5 34.4 --1.3 11.2 
Federal govt. of applicable 
- 
9.3 
- 
Most reporting of government is neutral. As regards the use of 
the description 'favourable', this is defined somewhat differently 
from its use in relation to the parties. As a government can expect 
to get much of what it wants said published in a newspaper (it might, 
for instance, be an announcement of a new law) I have called 'favourable' 
anything which positively, however weakly, supports the government. 
It can be seen that the Outlook treated the colonial government about 
as favourably as its own government in the East. It would hardly 
appear to have been a nationalistic organ. The Tribune was more 
critical, but it concentrated its main attention on speaking for its 
own government in the West, albeit at this stage in neutral terms. 
Coverage of the parties by these two papers is given below (in 
average daily column inches). 
Table 5.14: Party Coverage in the 1950s. (in col. inches) 
Outlook (1954) Tr ibune (1958) 
Favour. Neutral Unfav. Total Favour. Neutral Unfav. Total 
NCNC 21.1 4.9 
- 
26.0 11.4 2.1 41.4 54.9 
NPC 0.3 
- - 
0.3 
- - 
8.1 8.1 
AG 0.4 
- - 
0.4 32.0 7.1 
- 
39.1 
UMBC 
- - - - 
0.8 
- - 
0.8 
Others 3.8 
- 
1.0 4.8 0.9 
- - 
0.9 
Notes: NCNC a National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
NPC 
- 
Northern People's Congress 
AG 
- 
Action Group 
UMBC 
- 
United Middle Belt Congress 
Partisanship is very clear in the case of the Outlook. 82.5% of 
its party coverage was devoted to the NCNC. (The Eastern Regional 
Government, which owned the paper, was an NCNC government). Most 
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of this coverage was favourable, but the paper made little use of 
unfavourable reporting of the NCNC's opponents. The Tribune, by 
contrast, made great use of unfavourable reporting of the AG's main 
opponent of the time, which was the NCNC. This is because the 
AG was much weaker in the Western Region (where the Tribune published) 
especially under the threat of the NCNC, than the NCNC was in the 
Eastern Region (where the Outlook was published). 
So far we have seen highly partisan reporting of political parties 
combined with largely neutral coverage of governments, though there 
is also some partisan reporting of the government with which each 
paper was associated. Even then, most reporting was neutral. In 
the 1959 election campaign, in the samples of five newspapers I 
analysed (the Service, the Telegraph, the Tribune, the Citizen and 
the Outlook), 60% of all coverage of the governments of Nigeria, 
whether colonial, federal (now an indigenous government), or regional, 
was neutral; 30% was favourable, only 10% unfavourable. More of 
this government coverage was of the 'non-news' type (features, 
editorial, cartoons, etc. ) than in earlier samples which had 
contained a negligible amount. In 1959 the proportion of 'non-news' 
coverage was up to 13%. 
The proportion of neutral coverage in party news, as the 
following table (which is in average daily column inches) shows, 
is much lower (less than 10% of all party news). For the sake 
of convenience I have devised 'rates of partisanship' which enable 
one to see how partisan a paper is at a glance. I have defined 
these as proportions (in percentage terms) of total party news 
ina paper favourable to that paper's party or to its allies, or 
unfavourable to its opponents. For the Outlook of 1954 this 
partisanship rate was 67%, i. e. that amount of all party news was 
either directly or indirectly favourable to the paper's party. 
For the Tribune of 1958 the rate was 74%. For the Tribune of 1959 
it was 89.5%. Other partisanship rates are given at the bottom 
of the table. The Outlook's rate of 677. has now gone up to 87.4%. 
There are, thus, significant increases in partisanship over time, 
reaching a crescendo in this crucial general election. The only 
low rate is that of the Citizen. This is another example of the 
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Table 5.15: Party Coverage in the 1959 Election Campaign 
(in col. inches 
Service Telegraph Tribune Citizen Outlook Total 
F1 11.3 1.1 0.4 70.0 - 82.8 
NPC N2 5.0 
- - 
13.9 
- 
18.9 
U3 8.5 0.2 9.4 1.2 - 19.3 
F 1.6 0.5 0.1 13.5 342.2 357.9 
NCNC N 5.8 2.5 2.6 0.8 43.1 54.8 
U 13.5 15.6 15.5 0.3 1.7 46.6 
F 245.0 28.3 133.9 
- 
0.2 407.4 
AG N 12.0 0.7 11.1 - 0.5 24.3 
U 
- 
0.5 0.6 3.9 4.4 9.4 
F 0.6 
- - 
8.1 0.9 9.6 
NEPU N 1.0 
- - 
1.3 
- 
2.3 
U 
- - 
- 
3.8 
- 
3.8 
F 1.6 
- - 
0.6 
- 
2.2 
UMBC N 
- - 
- 
1.1 
- 
1.1 
U 
- - 
- 
1.0 
- 
1.0 
F 3.1 115.2 0.5 
- 
2.3 121.1 
DPNC N 0.6 5.2 0.9 - 2.2 8.9 
U 
- - 
- - 
7.1 7.1 
F 2.4 7.5 3.0 2.6 0.2 15.7 
Others N 
- - 
- - 
0.8 0.8 
U 0.4 
- 
- - - 
0.4 
TOTAL 312.4 177.3 178.0 122.1 405.6 1195.4 
P. RATE4 86.4% 89.8% 89.5% 61.6% 87.4% 
Notes: 1 Favourable 
1 Neutral 
3 Unfavourable 
4 Rate of Partisanship 
NEPU 
- 
Northern Elements Progressive 
Union 
DPNC 
- 
Democratic Party of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (For other parties - see previous table) 
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negative government-orientation of this Northern paper. The 
government was less interested in projecting itself than in 
simply maintaining the status quo. The above table is for 
news coverage. 'Non-news' coverage of the parties is now very 
high. This is a sign of increasing partisanship. All parts 
of the paper are used to support the party. Such a trend, 
though slight, had been noticed before (the Tribune of 1958), 
and it applied to some extent to government news in the 1958 
samples. Now non-news coverage of the parties is 26% of total 
party coverage. Partisanship rates for non-news is as follows: 
Service Telegraph Tribune Citizen Outlook 
100% 99% 100% 88.3% 100% 
It should be added that the amount of non-news party coverage 
in the Citizen and Outlook was very small, so the last two figures 
mean little. But in the case of the ether three papers we have 
a very large amount of non-news space devoted to the parties (over 
50% of all party coverage in the case of the Telegraph and Tribune), 
and this is entirely given over to support of their associated 
parties. 
A clear trend is discernible so far of an increasing intensity 
of partisanship. This is reflected in increased use of non-news 
items in the political battle, in increased support for the 
appropriate regional governments, in increased political news over 
time (already discussed), and within this, the growing domination 
of party news. Finally, there are increasing rates of partisanship. 
The Tribune's total party coverage in 1950 was a mere 17.8 inches 
per day. In 1958 it was 103.8 inches and its partisanship rate 
(for news) was 74%. In the 1959 election campaign its total party 
coverage was nearly 330 inches and its partisanship rate for news 
was 89.5%, and for non-news 100%. The proportion of total newspaper 
space (less ad's. ) absorbed by the political parties in the Outlook 
of 1954 was a mere 4.1%. 'Other political news' took up 9.9%. 
In 1959 the parties took up 49.6% of the paper's total space, while 
'other political' took up only 2.5%. It is interesting to compare 
this to the Outlook of 1961, a year after independence, when, for a 
- 
184 
- 
while, there was political 'peace'. Then a mere 7.1% of its 
total space was given over to the political parties (though the 
partisanship rate, 86.7% was high). The relationship between 
party and government coverage and between news and non-news is 
given below, in average daily column inches. 
Table 5.16 : Coverage of Parties and Government in the 
Outlook, 1961 (in col. inches) 
Party news 61.8 
Party non-news 4.9 
Government news 175.1 
Government non-new 10.8 
It can easily be seen that government news is now significantly 
more important (by about three times) than party news, while non- 
news is now of hardly any significance in coverage of either party 
or government. Moreover, while the rate of partisanship for 
party news was high little government news was overtly partisan. 
The situation changes dramatically again with the general 
election of 1964, though not in coverage of government. In fact, 
this coverage is even more neutral than it had been previously. 
In the sample issues (again, 15 issues over the period analysed) 
of the three papers analysed (the Sketch, the Outlook and the 
Citizen) 70% of total coverage of the five Nigerian governments 
(four regional ones plus the federal government) and of the 
President was neutral. Only 5% was unfavourable. 
The position was very different in the case of party coverage. 
In 1964, the party position was even more intense. and entrenched 
than it had been in 1959. Several parties had coalesced, until 
two broad coalitions existed, which between them incorporated all 
the political parties. The coalitions were formed around the 
NCNC on one hand and the NPC on the other. This meant that the 
reporting of party conflict became simplified. In the following 
table I. have treated the major party and the coalition as one, 
except where the minor parties were separately treated. Often 
NNA (Nigerian National Alliance) was used synonymously. for NPC, 
and UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) for NCNC, while the 
lesser parties were simply ignored. In other words, the Outlook 
would talk sometimes of the UPGA, sometimes of the NCNC, as if 
they were interchangeable terms, but only very occasionally did 
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it give the AG separate status. The Sketch was the organ of 
the NNDP, ally of the NPC. It is to be noted that partisanship 
rates in this table, which is for news only, are even higher than 
in 1959. While the Citizen had the lowest rate in 1959 (61.6%) 
it is now up with the rest, with a rate of 87.2%. The Outlook's 
rate is the same as in 1959. The Sketch, a new paper, has an 
amazingly high 94.6%. 
In addition to this, the amount that 'non-news' sections of 
the papers were used in the party battle was once again significantly 
larger. In 1959 26% of all party coverage was of the 'non-news' 
type. Now it is 487.. In other words, non-news is nearly as 
important in the party struggle as news, so much so that the 
distinction between the two now barely exists; it is only nominal. 
The whole newspaper is a propaganda outlet. Whereas in 1959 two 
papers had had low non-news party coverage, the Citizen with 13.7 
inches per day and the Outlook with 14.4 inches, these papers, the 
main media outlets for the two coalitions, now had 272 and 283 
inches respectively of non-news coverage of the parties. Moreover, 
partisanship rates for non-news party coverage were also very high: 
91.2% for the Sketch, 96.5% for the Outlook, and 98.3% for the 
Citizen. The latter paper, slow in becoming fully involved in 
the party battle, was now involved-up to the hilt. 
The above discussion has shown the increasing importance of 
political reporting, of party reporting within this, of partisanship 
within this again, during the process of escalating political conflict. 
It hardly seems possible that the Nigerian papers could have gone 
further along this path. In the next section I will examine the 
regionalist and tribalist nature of partisanship. 
5.5. The Ethnic Nature of Newspaper Partisanship 
In the following discussion I have labelled content which could 
be described as 'tribalist' or 'regionalist' (or, more broadly, as 
simple 'ethnic') under the single term 'tribalism'. However, I 
have split this up according to degree as follows: 'tribalism', 
'discussion of regions', 'unity-regionalism' and 'unity'. The 
latter category is also associated with another category 'independence'; 
together these two categories denote some sort of (nation-state) 
nationalism. 
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Table 5.17: Party Coverage in 1964 Election Campaign (in col. inches) 
Sketch Outlook Citizen Total 
F 53.1 0.8 167.2 221.1 
NPC/NNA N 0.8 2.2 7.8 10.8 
U 
- 
11.3 2.2 13.5 
F 6.8 180.9 5.8 193.5 
NCNC/UPGA N 5.1 14.0 5.0 24.1 
U 37.9 0.7 18.4 57.0 
F 
- 
7.8 3.5 11.3 
AG N 
- 
1.7 0.2 1.9 
U 
- - 
0.3 0.3 
F 205.5 
- 
4.9 210.4 
NNDP N 3.3 
- 
0.4 3.7 
U 0.8 0.4 
- 
1.2 
F 
- 
0.8 1.6 2.4 
NEPU N 
- - 
0.5 0.5 
U 
-_ 
0.2 1.4 1.6 
F 
- 
5.6 1.0 6.6 
UMBC N 
- 
0.8 
- 
0.8 
U 
- - 
4.4 4.4 
F 
- - 
4.7 4.7 
DP N 
- - - - 
U 
- 
0.9 
- 
0.9 
F 
- 
5.1 
- 
5.1 
Others N 
- 
0.7 
- 
0.7 
U 
- 
4.7 
- 
4.7 
Total 313.3 238.6 229.3 781.2 
Partisanship 94.6% 86.7% 87.2% 
rates 
Notes: NNA s Nigerian National Alliance UPGA - United Progressive Grand 
DP a Dynamic Party Alliance 
NNDP Nigerian National Democratic Party 
(For other parties see earlier tables). 
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'Tribalism' applies to apparent incitement of tribal hatred. 
There can be some objection to this in that one of the major ethnic 
groups at least (the Hausa) could not be called a tribe, if this 
vague term is to retain any meaning. Perhaps other terms, such 
as 'linguistic' or 'cultural' group, would be more appropriate. 
On the other hand, the conflict that occurred between these groups 
can be called tribalist; this was a term often used by Nigerians 
themselves at the time, in the press and elsewhere; furthermore, 
the main 'reference group', the Ibos, are generally considered a 
tribe. So, whether it is Northerners speaking against Ibos, or 
Ibos denouncing Northerners, 'tribalism' enters into the conflict. 
Whatever the accuracy of the term to denote ethnic conflict, it 
can conveniently be used to describe the most intense forms of 
ethnic antagonism. 'Discussion of regions' refers to content 
which lacks overt tribalism but which dwells on the same subject 
matter: for instance, content which discusses tribal or regional 
differences. 'Unity-regionalism' describes content which pleads 
for national unity but in the process emphasises the regional 
conflict, often by blaming other regions for tribalism. There 
is an inherent ambivalence in this category. Often the call for 
unity is a disguise for the further incitement of tribal hatred. 
'Unity' applies to content expressing a plea for unity unambiguously. 
The following figures are in average daily column inches. 
Table 5.18: Tribalist Content in Individual Newspapers (in col. inches) 
Tribalism Discussion Unity- Unity Independence 
of regions Regionalism 
Pilot '50 2.3 10.4 1.7 4.0 58.6 
Tribune '50 12.5 19.6 1.6 4.1 23.6 
Outlook '54 0.3 1.5 1.3 3.7 
- 
Tribune '58 43.4 4.7 7.1 9.5 2.9 
Outlook '59 3.8 20.0 0.7 13.7 11.7 
Tribune '59 11.3 61.3 0.7 1.6 
- 
Service '59 21.2 16.9 8.3 8.1 2.3 
Telegraph '59 27.8 4.5 13.7 7.0 
- 
Citizen '59 4.9 1.9 0.7 1.2 2.3 
Outlook '64 57.7 
- 
22.5 41.3 0. 
Citizen '64 37.3 21.9 6.6 16.8 
- 
Sketch '64 104.0 
- - 
17.8 
- 
Total 326.5 162.7 64.9 128.8 101.7 
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First of all, it is quite apparent that, as would be expected, 
the role of nationalism in the press declined as independence drew 
near. It is of some significance in 1950, especially in the Pilot, 
but of little significance thereafter; independence was granted, 
it was not struggled for. The press was far more interested in 
the struggle between the various ethnic groups. 
Over the whole period 'tribalism' is clearly the most significant 
category. Moreover, it increases over time. There is an addition 
to be made to this picture which increases the 'tribalism' pole even 
more. This is the Citizen's coverage of the Northern government's 
policy of Northernisation, which, in the way it was publicised, 
supported, and carried out, and in its effects on the build-up of 
conflict, was highly tribalistic. The figures for this, with the 
other figures for the 1959 and 1964 samples of the Citizen, are given 
below. 
Table 5.19: Tribalist Content in the Citizen (in col. inches) 
Tribalism Northernisation Discussion Unity- Unity Indepen 
of regions Re ionalis dence 
1959 4.9 14.1 1.9 0.7 1.2 2.3 
1964 37.3 7.6 21.9 6.6 16.8 
- 
The Citizen's rabid support of the Northernisation programme significantly 
added to the tribalist-nature of the paper. 
The picture for the press as a whole can be simplified by adding 
the two categories at the tribalist end of the scale together (along 
with the Citizen's Northernisation coverage) and, at the other, unity 
and independence (calls for unity replacing calls for independence after 
it was gained in 1960). The totals are averaged over each period. 
This simplified picture can be seen below. It emerges as a 'see-saw' 
pattern, with the intermediate variable 'unity-regionalism' acting as 
a fulcrum. % 
Table 5.20: Average Tribalist Content in the Press (in col. inches) 
Tribalis / Unity- Unity/ 
Discussion of Regionalism Independence 
regions 
19502 22.4 1.6 45.6 
1954/83 24.9 4.2 8.0 
19594 37.5 4.8 9.6 
19645 76.2 9.7 25.4 
Notes: 1 Including Northernisation 
2 Two newspapers 
3 Two newspapers 
4 Five newspapers 
5 Three newspapers 
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The trend to greater tribalism comes out more clearly here. 
In 1950 the balance is towards unity/independence. By the mid-1950s 
it has tipped significantly in the other direction, dipping even 
further that way in 1959. By 1964 the weights had increased at 
both ends. 
The same trend can be seen within individual papers over time. 
In the table below I have included the outlook of 1961, not incorporated 
in the above table. 
Table 5.21: Tribalist Content in Three Newspapers over time 
(in col. inches) 
Tribalisml/ Unity- Unity/ 
Discussion of Regionalism Independence 
regions 
Tribune 
1950 32.1 1.6 27.7 
1958 48.1 7.1 12.4 
1959 72.6 0.7 1.6 
Outlook 
1954 1.8 1.3 3.7 
1959 23.8 0.7 25.4 
1961 0.3 
- 
3.4 
1964 57.7 22.5 41.6 
Citizen 
1959 20.9 0.7 3.5 
1964 66.8 0.6 16.8 
Notes: 'Including Northernisation in the Citizen. 
The Tribune is a very clear case. The tribalist content of 
the paper increases substantially and consistently over the period, 
while content appealing for independence or unity declines even 
more substantially. The tribalist content of the Outlook shoots 
up over the years 1954,1959, and 1964, but calls for unity increase 
too. Moreover, in 1964 it has a significant amount of coverage 
in the intermediate category, unity-regionalism. The ambivalence 
of such content in this paper must have been extreme, with its 
propinquity both to overtly tribalist content and to content which 
appealed less ambiguously for unity. The dependence of partisanship 
in the press on ethnic antagonism in times of severe political conflict 
can be seen from the Outlook of 1961, perhaps Nigeria's politically 
most peaceful year ever. Now there is virtually no tribalist 
L 
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content at all. The Citizen shows the same trend as the Outlook 
for the two election periods. 
It is clear enough, then, how regionalism and tribalism 
increasingly became a central part of press partisanship. But 
it is not correct solely to contrast the amount of space in a 
paper which is tribalistic with the amount that apparently appeals 
for unity. Such a contrast is important, but it is equally 
important to see these themes as closely interconnected; the one 
is obviously the inverse of the other, and for that reason the 
two are fully inter-dependent. Though most of the content 
expressing these themes was extremely crude, there was sometimes 
a subtle interplay between tribalist content and calls for unity, 
expressed most neatly in the ambivalent category 'unity-regionalism'. 
Pleas for unity, even if genuine, were used as a tool in the regional 
struggle. Fear of escalating tribalism and of being the loser in 
this often accompanied political dependence on the tribalist appeal. 
More important than this, because of the reciprocal dependence 
of 'tribalism' and 'unity', appeals to the latter could not help 
but stoke up tribal fears. By stressing the need for unity and 
the growing dangers of tribalism, a paper unavoidably added to 
the tension. Thus, even the Daily Times, however accurately and 
blandly it might have reported the political statements of the time, 
contributed to the increasingly ugly climate. In other words, 
conflict was inherent in the political (and social) situation, and 
any reference to this, positive or negative, became a part of it. 
Thus, that the Outlook of 1964 had nearly as much content appealing 
for unity as it did tribalistic content, and half as much content 
ambivalent between unity and regionalism, does not mean this paper 
was likely to have a more integrative effect than, say, the Tribune 
of 1958, with about five times as much tribalistic content as 
appeals for unity. The point is that the Outlook had nearly twice 
as much content (in column inches) connected with all these themes, 
i. e. with conflict, as did this earlier Tribune. 
Just as Nigeria had been subject to an interplay of the two 
related but contradictory forces, nationalism and sub-nationalism, 
since well before independence, so the press too had for long been 
hký 
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subject to the same contradictory pulls, reflected in ambivalence 
between unity and tribalism. I have already indicated how the 
Tribune of 1950 combined anti-imperialism with antagonism to the 
North. On occasion it made this very clear, for instance when 
it spoke of a. "grand alliance between the representatives of 
British imperialism in Nigeria and the unyielding, narrow-minded 
politicians of the North. "' In fact, it was, it would seem, more 
concerned with the danger of domination by the North than with the 
continued rule of the British; in other words, its primary concern 
was for the Yoruba, whether in the Western Region or outside. 
Thus the West 
"will not rest until the Yorubas under the Northern 
yoke are emancipated and grouped with their kith and 
kin in the West for administrative purposes, even if 
it is necessary to do so on the dead bodies of the 
Northern people. "2 
Ethnic competition reached its climax in the anti-Ibo riots 
in the North in the mid-1960s. But attempts to arouse hatred of 
the Ibos occurred elsewhere in much the same way, even before 
independence, and as usual the concern was often over elite jobs. 
For instance, in an editorial in Western Nigeria's Tribune of 1958 
headed 'Ibo-Imperialism', concerning evidence given to the Minorities 
Commission, the paper stated that the evidence from people 
"vehemently protesting against being left in the same 
camp with the Ibos, goes to prove that the NCNC is simply 
an Ibo cult, aiming, with the help of a handful of 
misguided, disgruntled or food-seeking quislings from 
other tribes, to achieve the complete domination of this 
country. "3 
Sometimes the oppressors were Ibos, sometimes the Hausa and Fulani. 
A certain degree of artifice in these journalistic attacks is 
apparent. 
It was surprisingly, in a Northern paper (the Citizen) that 
one of the few convincing appeals for unity occurred. 
1 Nigerian Tribune: editorial (20.9.50) 
2 Ibid, edL orial: (20.9.50) 
3 Nigerian Tribune: (14.1.58) 
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"It has come to my notice that some Northern boys in 
the Survey Department of the Ministry of Land & Survey 
have petitioned against the retention of Southern 
trainees... This petition against the Southern trainees, 
in my humble opinion, is uncalled for and characterises 
the type of Northerner who is too lazy to work hard for 
himself, but takes refuge in the Northernisation policy 
which, in any case, is not designed for dullards. "1 
Despite the support that one columnist in the. Citizen gave to 
Southerners in the North, as the content analysis showed the usual 
stance was totally the reverse. Sometimes, though, the expression 
of ethnic competition was merely local, as for instance, in the 
following-letter. 
"It is very discouraging and disgraceful (please my dear 
government) to see that throughout the length and breadth 
of Argunga Division there is not even a single general 
hospital... If this inconvenience could be remedied by 
building a general hospital for these strong NPC believers 
it will save their every-day death which decreases the 
population of Northern Nigeria which is a loss to NPC 
politically, and I hope the time for this will never come. "2 
The local nature of genuine political representation, and of the 
distribution of economic benefits, was made even clearer by the paper 
itself 
- 
however exaggeratedly. In an election commentary "Know 
Your Candidates", a journalist claimed that the readers' M. Ps. had 
"brought tarred and better roads, hospitals, and dispensaries, 
television and radio stations, electricity supplies, schools 
and colleges, pipe water and improved wells, industries of 
different kinds.... Your constituencies need more amenities 
and these will certainly not come if you do not vote for 
the right person. The right candidates are none other 
than those presented to you by the NNA. "3 
Most communal demands and complaints in the paper, however, were 
ethnic and anti-Ibo, and they were often concerned with jobs (usually 
elite-jobs), as in the following front-page editorial, which complained 
1 Nigerian Citizen (4.11.59) 
2 Ibid (12.9.64) 
3 Ibid (2.12.64) 
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that the federal government's Nigerian National Press Ltd. had 
only ten Northerners in a staff of 300. The editorial claimed 
that "Northern Nigeria has been cheated. The Region has paid 
an expensive price for Nigerian unity. " It criticised the 
"neglect and ineptitude"Z of the federal government under Sir 
Abubakar as if he, belonging to the NPC, had a primary duty to 
help Northerners acquire federal jobs! In the same issue the 
'political correspondent' in a half-page article head-lined 
"Scandalous! Treacherous!! Wicked!!! North's infinitesimal Role, 
a dangerous abnormality, " complained that there were only six 
Northerners in the 433 senior staff of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation, and no more than 50 out of 4,000 permanent junior 
staff. He also claimed (untruthfully) that the North contributed 
over 70% of federal revenues, but got back less than 35% in 
development spending. 
2 
Ethnic antagonism was also reflected in the letter columns. 
One, for instance, from a clerk in a building firm, demanded that 
only Northerners should be staff managers in private firms. 
"Unless this is done, the Ibos will be conspiring with 
and dictating to the foreigners who have given their 
whole hearts to the Ibos and who are enslaving the 
Northerners to Ibos. I can say I am doing my utmost 
best to the company, but still I am regarded as inferior 
to my Southern counterparts. "3 
Southerners accused the British of favouring the North politically. 
Northerners accused the British of favouring Southerners for 
employment. Both were right. The pathetic tone of the above 
letter expresses well the fear felt by Northerners of Southern 
competition-for employment. While such feeling was widespread, 
and it itself encouraged the Northern government's racial propaganda, 
this does not mean everyone accepted this propaganda. Indeed, 
as the Citizen was one of the main vehicles of this propaganda, 
the following letter does at least indicate a certain degree of 
openness in the paper. 
1 Ibid (22.4.64) 
2 Ibid (22.4.64) 
3 Ibid (16.9.64) 
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"Your article about the Ibo occupants of our region is 
almost unbelievable. I do not seem to agree with all 
the views your expressed therein. Temperamental traits 
of a few individuals should not be extended to all... 
Moreover, this is a time when even the empty wind can 
stir up feelings. "1 
Dissidents certainly existed, as was shown in the Northern House 
of Assembly, but they could rarely freely express their views. 
Though, perhaps, ethnic conflict per se does not have the 
conceptual logic of class conflict, it does, as I emphatically 
argued in Part One, have a very strong practical logic. Economic 
resources were competed for ethnically, and such competition took 
precedence over class conflict. This was reflected in the press 
as well as in the Federal and Regional Assemblies. 
The above quotations from the Citizen of 1964, mostly from 
the period of the general election campaign of that year, show how 
deeply that paper was committed in the battle of ethnic propaganda 
during this crucial period (not long before the military coups and 
the subsequent massacres of Ibos in the North). The Outlook was 
not so intensely tribalist, and much of its propaganda was of the 
curious sort which was ambivalent between unity and tribalism. 
The content analysis showed that the Outlook was more concerned with 
unity than the other papers. This is because the Ibos were under 
the most genuine threat. Anti-Ibo feeling was being stoked up in 
both the West and the North; moreover the NCNC were likely to lose 
to the NPC in the elections. It was quite possible that the East 
would then be subject to division (through the power of the NPC at 
the centre), as the West had been (largely due to the collusion 
of the NCNC with the NPC). The Outlook's accusations against the 
NNDP and NPC of tribalism were no doubt the result of a full under- 
standing of the dangers of this tribalism, especially to the Ibos. 
But these accusations must inevitably have further inflamed the 
Ibo's own tribal feelings. 
"Singing the songs of sectional and tribal hatred is not 
a new exercise for the old and new crop of politicians 
1 Ibid (2.12,64) 
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who are running the show at Ibadan.... People in 
Akintola's position must realise the great harm 
they are doing to the cause of unity and peace by 
fanning tribalism. "' 
This served not only to express the genuine fear of escalating 
conflict, but to arouse the Ibos for the coming battle. Its 
ambivalence is clear. So, again, the ambivalent nature of 
nationalism and sub-nationalism is seen in Nigeria's newspapers. 
Both politics and the press fluctuate between these two alternatives, 
between unity and tribalism; but always the latter wins. The 
UPGA, with the aid of the Outlook, could portray itself as an 
enemy to tribalism, as, for instance, in a cartoon showing an 
NNA camel watching a UPGA elephant uproot a tree labelled 'tribalism' 
(in which the camel asks 'Why are you uprooting the precious tree 
under which I always take shelter? '); but in doing so it unavoidably 
made use of a tribalistic appeal and increased the temperature of 
the d hnic climate. Another example of this is the following statement 
from an editorial: "Once more, we deprecate the attempt of any 
political party to seek the annihilation of any tribe in the 
Republic, 2or, again, in the following statement from a political 
commentary: 
"Where are all of you Ibo people?... You may not know 
it but you are 'wanted persons'. Wanted by intensely 
pathological and incurable tribalists, namely the NPC 
"3 and (more so) the NNDP. 
The paper that relied most of all on tribal appeal was the NNDP's 
Daily Sketch. It indulged in extreme anti-Ibo propaganda. Akintola 
himself expressed the ambivalence between tribalism and unity very 
well. 
"I am not a tribalist... It is not sufficient to pay 
lip service to national unity... There must be practical 
demonstration. Why is it that people who are cheated 
and therefore complain are referred to as tribalists 
when the man who cheats does so with impunity without 
accusing fingers being pointed at him? 1,4 
1 Nigerian Outlook (25.11.64) 
2 Ibid (27.11.64) 
3 Ibid (16.12.64) 
4 Daily Sketch (30.11.64) 
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This justification of tribalism achieved religious sanctity in 
a political coumaentary elsewhere in the same issue. 
"Self-love is not a sin. It is, in fact, according 
to the gospels, the yardstick by which one's affections 
for his brother must be measured. 'Thou shalt love 
thy neighbour as thyself', writes St. Matthew. It is 
a sacred duty, for individuals no less than for the 
groups to which they belong, to fight for self-preservation 
which is said to be the first law even in heaven. This 
is the spiritual basis of tribalism as a 'pragmatic 
instrument of national unity ....... 
1 
Just as in the North, the core of tribalism was the concern 
for jobs, especially elite jobs. One article, for instance, claimed 
that 
"Barely nine months since the Management of the Nigerian 
Railway Corporation rocked Nigeria with shocking and 
glaring acts of nepotism and Ibo preferential treatment 
in making appointments into the top cadre of the Railway 
Service, darker and more frightening scandals have now 
been exposed in the Nigerian Railways..... the Nigerian 
Railway Corporation is the seat of Ibo tribalism in 
Nigeria. " 
The article lists the management and other posts apparently held 
by Ibos and then quotes the Ibo chairman of the Railway Board as 
saying "This is my kingdom and I rule it as I like. "2 As I have 
already mentioned more than once, this concern for elite jobs was 
also associated with a concern for elite education; thus an NNDP 
leader claimed in the paper that 400 out of 700 recent federal 
government scholarships had gone to the Ibos, "leaving 300 to 
the rest of the country. ,3 
The anti-Ibo propaganda of the paper achieved an intensity 
comparable to the savage anti-Ibo behaviour of the Northern 
legislators, which has already been described. The onslaught 
was master-minded by Akintola - "the great apostle of Yoruba 
family unity"4 
- who warned the Yoruba against trusting the Ibo: 
1 Ibid (30.11.64) 
2 Ibid (3.12.64) 
3 Ibid (3.12.64) 
4 Ibid (4.12.64) 
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"Immediately the unsuspecting Yorubas gave them-the 
support, the Ibos would come out in their true wolf's 
clothing devouring the Yorubas and getting every good 
thing for themselves. "1 
The paper called for the unity of the Yoruba against the Ibo. 
"For how long will the Yorubas vegetate in the 
cesspool of internecine squabbles and perennial 
stagnation?.... The NNDP is a party for the Yorubas 
and other suppressed peoples... Today the Yoruba 
man needs unity and reconstruction more than 
anything else"2 
for, according to an NNDP member quoted in the paper, "the NCNC 
had no other plan than the total annihilation of the Yoruba West 
.,, 
3 
Student supporters of the NNDP spoke of"Iboism, Ibocrasy, and 
Ibophism. "4 
The most extreme anti-Ibo statements came not from outside 
sources but from one of the paper's regular columnists, Ejon'gboro, 
who had an effective, if rather repulsive, style. 
"Them Ibo boys've been talking.... They ain't got no 
fight with Yoruba people... How come 300 jobs open 
in the New Railways and them non-fighting, non-tribalist 
Ibo-boys just manage to corner 259 ? "5 
In another article, in which he refers to members of the UPGA as 
"Ibo-jerks" the same writer, as had one or two already quoted, 
brings in religion again. 
"The Lord God, He likes to build..... All God's children 
they like to build. But them UPGA fellows, like Satan... 
they like to SACK 
.... 
All they know is SACK! Evict, 
oust, dislodge, dispossess.... (Oh my, where is my 
lexicon? ah, here are some more UPGA favourites) displace, 
kick downstairs.... fire, blast, can, break, bust.... 
They do the real thing. They fight. That means fists 
and cudgels. And matchets, guns, and dynamite. And 
pistols, shot-guns and pine-apples. The more dead the 
better. Like they used to say in them story-books, 
1 Ibid (2.12.64) 
2 Ibid (2.12.64) 
3 Ibid (2.12.64) 
4 Ibid (11.12.64) 
5 Ibid (2.12.64)_ 
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dead men don't tell no tales. Simple dead candidates 
don't win no flipping elections. "' 
5.6. Conclusion 
I have described in Part Two the ethnic nature of political 
and economic conflict in Nigeria. Just as the press in developed 
countries might reflect the class structure of these societies, 
the press in Nigeria reflected the country's ethnic foundations. 
This was so because of the great power of the political conflicts 
of the time, which were ethnic in nature, and because of the 
economic weakness of the press. The latter made the press 
dependent on those involved in the ethnic battle (the political 
parties, whether out of power or in government). Only one paper - 
the Daily Times 
- 
was economically strong enough to avoid direct 
involvement in the conflict. Even then the intensity of conflict 
was so great that the paper could not retain its neutral position 
and survive. Sometimes it was possible to see a clear disjunction 
between the economic and political needs of the papers; inevitably 
these needs would reflect contradictory motives at some stage (the 
political market being a secure but limited economic market), but, 
before the civil war at least, the political motive easily won 
through. 
As the political conflict increased, culminating in the civil 
war, the press became more and more political, more partisan and 
more tribalistic. However, unlike the tribälis't conflicts expressed 
in the chambers of the Houses of Assembly, we are dealing here with 
overt, calculated propaganda designed to influence the general public. 
Thus, much of the intense anti-Ibo content of the Daily Sketch served 
to cover up the absurdity of Akintola's new political alliance with 
the anti-Ibo NPC and his estrangement from his former party, 
the Action Group, which was now pro-Ibo (i. e. pro-NCNC). However, 
it cannot be doubted that this and other papers fed on a real sense 
of tribal rivalry. There was some expression of more local 
competition for resources 
- 
the equivalent of demands for local 
facilities made in the Houses of Assembly 
- 
but this was very limited. 
The press was the tool of a higher level of communal conflict - the 
political struggle between the major ethnic groups. That this 
1 Ibid (30.11.64) 
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struggle was over access to scarce resources, in particular, 
elite jobs 
- was also reflected in the press. 
The press could not help but be partisan; indeed, 
partisanship was its justification for existence. Without 
conflict most of the papers would have disappeared. As the 
political conflict of the time was ethnic in nature, so was 
the political propaganda of the press, and it engaged itself 
in the ethnic battle with extraordinary intensity. Indeed, 
whether tribalism was openly exploited, was merely justified 
as self-defence, or was denounced in favour of unity, such was 
the power of ethnic competition that this, with every word, was 
inevitably invoked. It could not be avoided. Even the most 
impartial paper, simply by describing the political conflict 
going on around it, would have contributed to the growing ethnic 
tension. 
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CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATION FOR THE ELITE 
6.1. Introduction 
I showed in the last chapter that the press in Nigeria has 
developed through an intimate connection with political conflict, 
in particular ethnically motivated political conflict. This 
does not mean, though, that the press had a mass appeal. In 
the previous chapter I also showed that the press had a narrow 
market basis. It was essentially an urban phenomenon, and even 
then mostly restricted to a few major cities. As far as the 
connection with conflict is concerned, this does not matter, as 
the major conflicts themselves generally occurred in a few major 
cities. The connection was, therefore, quite intense. 
Another aspect of the limited reach of the press - in a 
sense a corollary of it - is the pronounced factor of elitism. 
There are several elements involved here: elitist content and 
readership, westernisation, and professionalism, all of which 
I shall discuss below. But, before doing this, it is worthwhile 
getting a broad picture of overall newspaper content, at least 
from a number of the more important or interesting papers. I 
have included in these, two samples from an election period but 
all the other samples are from non-election periods. I have 
concentrated on the latter in order to show the press as it 
'normally' is. (This can then also be compared to overall 
election-output). The figures are percentages of total space 
after subtraction of advertisements. 
The first thing to note is the increasing amount of political 
coverage, especially that of the political parties, upto the 
general election of 1959, when it reaches a climax. It then 
falls in the one issue represented for the period immediately 
after independence. The general importance given to politics 
can be seen from the fact that average political coverage (including 
all political categories) is 22.5% of total space while economic 
questions together occupy only 7.7% of space, and social questions 
3.5%. The difference is much less in non-election years, but 
even then political questions take up significantly more space 
- 
201 
- 
Table 6.1: Breakdown of Entire Content of a Number of 
Newspapers % of total space less ads. 
Pilot Trib. Outlook Trib. Trib. Tel. Outlook Average 
'50 '50 '54 '58 '59 '59 '61 
Pol. parties 5.4 2.5 4.1 11.9 24.6 26.0 7.1 11.7 
comment 0.8 4.1 - 1.8 15.41 8.8 - 4.5 
" other 6.7 5.4 9.9 10.2 3.7 4.4 3.8 6.3 
Military 
- - 
0.4 
- - 
0.1 
- 
0.1 
Social 3.8 2.4 6.7 5.1 2.6 1.3 2.9 3.5 
Economic2 6.5 6.8 11.5 5.4 4.5 11.2 7.9 7.7 
Sub-total 23.2 21.2 32.6 34.4 50.8 51.8 21.7 33.8 
For. relations 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.0 - 1.0 3.0 0.9 
Africa 5.8 1.7 2.1 1.1 2.8 1.5 7.7 3.2 
U. K. 2.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.4 0.3 2.0 1.2 
U. S. A. 0.9 1.0 0.4 2.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.8 
USSR/E. Europ 0.6 0.4 
- - 
0.4 
- 
0.7 0.3 
Rest West 1.1 0.3 0.2 1.8 0.2 
- 
0.5 0.6 
Rest World 2.8 2.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 
- 
0.7 1.0 
U. N. 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.4 
Sub-total 14.4 8.1 4.0 7.6 5.7 3.0 16.3 8.4 
Local 12.8 20.4 15.63 6.7 1.3 4.2 6.9 9.7 
Information 5.9 4.2 9.1 2.3 0.6 2.7 3.6 4.1 
Religion 1.7 0.6 0.3 2.7 0.6 
- 
1.4 1.0 
Justice/crime 4.9 6.2 0.9 6.5 3.4 3.4 2.6 4.0 
Disasters 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.2 0.6 
Sub-total 25.8 32.3 26.0 19.1 6.1 10.5 15.7 19.4 
Features 5.0 18.7 20.8 9.5 7.0 9.6 19.9 12.9 
Sport 8.8 5.8 5.3 17.1 17.1 3.9 13.4 10.2 
Radio, TV, etc4 4.5 4.9 4.4 3.2 4.5 6.2 3.3 4.4. 
Sub-total 18.3 29.4 30.5 29.8 28.6 19.7 36.6 27.5 
Editorial 12.0 3.8 2.3 5.0 5.3 9.7 3.2 5.9 
Letters 6.3 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 5.1 6.5 5.0 
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 'Includes political advertisements (6.7 inches) 2Includes international trade and aid (0.4 inches) 9lncludes Cameroons before becoming separate from Nigeria (6.9 inches) 
4Radio, TV, weather and newspaper title. 
5Percentages do not tally because of rounding. 
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than either economic or social matters. The 'state of the 
country' is apparently seen in largely political, rather than 
economic or social terms. 
Another thing to note is the relatively small amount of 
space given to international news, an average overall of only 
8.4%. Two papers go as low as 3 or 4%. Moreover, in the case 
of the Outlook of 1961, which has the highest porportion of space 
on international news, over three fifths of this is concerned 
with Africa, or with Nigeria's own foreign relations. The 
largest proportion of the Pilot's relatively high international 
news is on Africa. The same goes for the sample as a whole. 
Out of 8.4% of space on international news 3.2% is concerned 
with Africa - compared to 2.6% on Western countries (in which 
the U. K. predominates). 
The papers do not seem, either, to have been influenced by 
Western modes of reporting. Apart from the obvious factor of 
partisanship, they are also less sensationalist than Western papers. 
In length and visual style they are like the British 'popular' 
papers, but, whereas in the latter 'law, police and accidents' 
took up (in 1975) 12% of the Daily Mail's space (after subtraction 
of ad's. ) with the same for the Daily Express, and 11% of the 
Daily Mirror's space, 
' 
'justice, crime and disasters' took up 
an average of 4.6% of space in the above Nigerian papers from 
1950 to 1961. The U. K. papers also had more international news - 
17% in the Express, 16% in the Mail, and 10%2 in the Mirror. In 
these two respects then 
- coverage of international news and 
reliance on sensationalist types of news - the Nigerian papers 
would not appear to have been particularly westernised. 
Another feature of note in the above table is the declining 
importance of local news over time. (This means news about any 
local area, not just news about the town of publication). The 
papers were becoming increasingly regional in scope over this 
period. Initially their content had a lot to do with the major 
town of publication and a few adjacent areas, and, as I have shown, 
their sales and influence were restricted to these places. Their 
scope widened in all respects during the 1950s. 
1 Royal Cou! nission on the Press, Analysis of Newspaper Content, 
Research Series Volume 4, p. 17 (Cmnd. 6810-4) 
2 Ibid, pp. 17/18 
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Keeping this overall analysis in mind, I will now look in 
more detail at the nature of these newspapers, concentrating on 
the themes I have already discussed in general terms in Part 
One, namely, elitism, westernisation, and professionalism. 
6.2. Elitist Content 
One aspect of elitism is an interest in higher education. 
As I have shown in the case of the proceedings of the Houses of 
Assembly, much of the interest there in education was in the 
education of the elite. The same applies to the press. The 
following table is in average daily column inches. 
Table 6.2: Coverage of Education (in col. inches) 
Primary Secondary, technical, Higher 
teacher training 
General 
Pilot '50 
- 
0.8 12.1 
- 
Tribune '50 
- - 
5.8 
- 
Outlook '54 3.2 8.1 10.9 8.6 
Tribune '58 0.4 3.6 13.5 4.6 
Outlook '59 1.8 14.7 4.8 12.7 
Tribune '59 0.7 9.5 28.3 3.9 
Service '59 2.0 3.2 5.2 0.8 
Telegraph '59 0.3 0.8 7.2 5.2 
Outlook '61 0.6 14.1 40.5 2.1 
Total 9.0 54.8 128.3 37.9 
It should first of all be stated that the total amount of space 
devoted to education is not large, but, within this coverage, there 
is clearly a very strong bias towards higher education -a distinctly 
elitist tendency. The papers were very much aiming at an elite 
public. Most of the coverage on higher education seems to be 
attributable to the newspaper's own resources (or to paid contributors). 
Over 66% of it appeared to be of that nature 
- 
i. e. not specifically 
attributable to government, a party, or to letters from the public; 
but virtually all the letters which were not on general education 
were on higher education. It would thus seem that the bias towards 
higher education in these papers is less due to any bias in the 
presentation of party or government statements, etc. than to the 
letters the papers receive, and even more, to their desire to 
allocate space 
- 
mostly in the form of features and comment - to 
matters of. higher education. 
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More light can be thrown on the elitist or general class 
nature of the press by looking at a number of other categories, 
which are represented in the following table (in average daily 
column inches). 
Table 6.3: Elitist Coverage of Various Topics (in col. inches) 
Education Agriculture/ 
Industry 
Businessmen Unions Unemployment 
Poverty 
Pilot '50 12.9 10.4 2.9 35.9 6.1 
Tribune '50 5.8 29.4 
- 
10.7 
- 
Outlook '54 30.8 71.5 
- 
14.9 
- 
Tribune '58 22.1 12.8 3.3 13.4 
- 
Outlook '59 34.0 1.1 
- - 
0.2 
Tribune '59 42.4 11.1 
- 
26.7 1.4 
Service '59 11.2 21.8 3.7 17.5 0.3 
Telegraph '59 13.5 4.2 15.2 79.7 
- 
Outlook '61 57.3 30.9 
- - 
2.3 
Total 230.0 193.2 25.1 198.8 10.3 
As before I have excluded 1964 and most of the 1959 samples in order 
not to concentrate on periods when conflict was intense. In the above 
period, leading up to independence, one would expect considerable airing 
of policies to do with the above themes. 
Table 6.1 showed that a rather small proportion of average total 
space (7.77. ) in these papers was concerned with economic matters. 
This was mostly taken up with the areas covered by the four last columns 
(i. e. excluding education) in the above table. A surprisingly small 
amount of space is devoted to agriculture and industry (just over half 
of which was on agriculture). These are areas one might expect to 
have a primary interest for the people of a developing country just 
approaching independence. Moreover, over half the coverage of 
agricultural matters came from one paper - the Outlook of 1954. This 
consisted of very useful development-oriented informational articles 
on agricultural techniques, stemming almost undoubtedly from expatriate 
sources in the government. 
Little space was given to the activities of businessmen - only 
25 inches per day between the above nine papers - while the unions 
got nearly 200 inches a day. This does not mean the governments 
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and the parties, to whom most of the above papers belonged, were 
in any way radical or interested in the welfare of the working 
class. Far from it. The point is that these things were seen 
politically. The function of the papers was political rather 
than to propagate a particular economic ideology. The indigenous 
business interests in the newspapers, which were minor, and of 
Nigeria as a whole, succeeded in business largely through politics. 
Their interests 
- 
the interests of the papers, and naturally of 
their political owners - were in the acquisition or retention of 
political power. Economic wealth could, for most, only be 
achieved through politics. The unions were seen primarily as 
collections of people which could be organised politically. The 
newspapers were not the tools of businessmen (either direct or 
indirect) used against the unions in a propaganda battle, or in 
favour of a particular economic ideology. They were the tools 
of politicians, one of whose interests was to get the unions on 
their side. Hence, a large part (nearly half) of newspaper 
coverage of union affairs was favourable tothe unions (i. e. it 
openly expressed union views). I could define only one fifth 
as unfavourable, with the rest as neutral. Neither the indigenous 
businessmen nor the industrial workers formed an economically 
powerful class. Their interests were largely expressed through 
politics. 
The only paper in the above table which individually gave 
substantial coverage to the unions was the Telegraph. In the 
1959 sample this had a daily union coverage of 79.7 inches. 
Nearly all of this I classified as favourable. The paper was 
very much involved in union factionalism and seemed to be making 
an appeal to workers in particular unions. The attempt to link 
the unions with the paper's party (the DPNC) failed wretchedly. 
The party did not win a single seat in the 1959 elections, not 
even its leader, K. O. Mbadiwe. The unions were an insufficient 
basis; it was the regional or ethnic appeal that counted. It 
seems likely to me that the Telegraph was concerned to forge a 
link between its party and the workers because the party had a 
very small communal base. Mbadiwe had left the NCNC, and was 
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trying to gain support by stoking up local communal rivalries 
in the East in favour of the DPNC and against the NCNC; but this 
meant the DPNC's total political constituency was tiny. Furthermore, 
the paper was based in Lagos, making a communal appeal in the East 
yet more difficult. There was thus some reason to try to appeal 
to the workers, and it was Lagos that had the largest proportion 
of unionised workers. But this appeal, as I have said, failed. 
It would seem, then, that the moderately high coverage of 
the unions in the newspapers in the above table did not make them 
'workers' papers'. They were elitist in nature. This comes out 
even more in the papers' coverage of things to do with poverty or 
unemployment -a mere 10.3 inches per day between all the nine 
samples of newspapers. Thus, the main problems of Nigeria (as 
they are of any developing country) went virtually unregarded in 
the press. The powerful appeal in these papers to communal interests 
did not in any way reflect a concern for the masses; they were far 
more concerned with the communal distribution of elite jobs. 
6.3. Elitism Through Westernisation 
The above discussion has highlighted certain aspects of elitism 
in the press -a strong bias towards higher education in educational 
coverage, and a great lack of concern for questions of unemployment 
and poverty. The nature of these papers seems more explicable in 
terms of politics and ruling elites than in terms of class. Another 
aspect of elitism is westernisation. I shall look at this in two 
ways: through examination of the reporting of international news 
and through analysis of the influence of the West on advertising. 
One major aspect of westernisation, of course, is the very existence 
of a predominantly English-language press. The vernacular press 
was never, relatively speaking, of any great importance. There 
were only two vernacular papers of any significance, Gaskiya Ta Fi 
Kwabo (Hausa for 'Truth is Worth More than a Penny'), and Irohin 
Yoruba. Furthermore, both these vernaculars only appeared weekly. 
The Citizen, which was established after Gaskiya, as its sister-paper, 
appeared from the start at twice the frequency (bi-weekly), and 
also took some of Gaskiya's circulation, which dropped from 24,000 
in 1947 to 19,000 in 1949. In 1948 the Citizen had a circulation 
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of 8,0001. Thus, the extension of the English-language press 
apparently actually damaged the already limited vernacular press. 
Only two of the above papers devoted over 10% of their total 
space (less advertisements) to international news. Furthermore, 
only 31% of international news over the entire sample was concerned 
with the West; there would thus appear to have been no bias in 
this direction. But the influence of the West can be seen in 
other aspects of the papers - e. g. in features and sports coverage. 
In the case of the Pilot of 1950 and Outlook of 1961 inclusion of 
these elements multiplied by two or three times the coverage given 
to the West. Overall, though, the press did not give especially 
great attention to Western countries. 
The not particularly great importance of the West does not 
apply to news sources. All of the Outlook's international news 
in 1961, for instance, came from Reuter's. Exactly half of that 
of the Pilot of 1950 came from Reuter's (though over half of the 
remainder came from George Padmore, a coloured, strongly anti- 
colonialist correspondent domiciled in the West). This only 
refers to 'hard' international news. 18% of all the Pilot's 
Reuter articles and 30% of all the Outlook's Reuter articles were 
of the 'soft' variety. These were mostly features and sports 
items, but included a few articles on crime and disasters. About 
10% of the Pilot's total space and 17% of the Outlook's was 
attributable to Reuter's. 
The above two papers were the only two from my sample in 
which both international news and material from Reuter's was 
substantial. (I chose not to examine the Daily Times as I was 
interested in the indigenous press and the Times was essentially 
a foreign paper). So, on this score, westernisation in the 
Nigerian press was not particularly significant. I will now look 
at advertising. I defined 'westernised advertisements' as display 
ad's. that represented in picture-form: Europeans, Nigerians in 
'high-class' European dress (suits, ties, evening dress), or 
Nigerian women with straightened hair. (There might be some doubt 
whether all pictures of Nigerian women with straightened hair 
necessarily reflect western values; however, there were nearly 
1 Grant (1975), p. 106 
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always other indications of such values in the advertisements to 
make the inference highly plausible). In addition to calculating 
the percentage of advertising space which could be considered 
westernised according to the above criteria, I counted the number 
of figures represented in all advertisements and categorised these 
according to dress. These figures are given in the bottom half 
of the following table. The figures on advertisements (in inches 
and percentages) are daily averages over the fifteen issues in 
each sample. The figures for figures (as it were) are totals 
for all the fifteen issues of each sample. 
A number of things stand out in the following table. Firstly, 
the papers were all clearly commercial, or had a strong commercial 
content. There was no attempt to manage without advertising, as 
many partisan papers in the Third World have to do. Secondly, 
the amount of advertising received varied considerably between 
papers and over time. 43% of the Outlook's space was taken up 
by ad's. in 1959, only 21.7% in 1961. In absolute terms, its 
average daily advertising content fell from 615 to 250 column 
inches. The Citizen suffered a similar loss. This appears to 
have been the immediate result of independence, when many British 
firms were doubtful as to the future. The Outlook had picked up 
somewhat by 1964. Then its advertising space (not given below) 
was 409 inches (24% of total space). (In Britain in 1975, the 
Express had 41.6% of its total space taken up by advertising, the 
Mail 34.77., and the Mirror 37.2%). 1 
Table 6.4: Elitist Advertising in the Press 
Pilot Out- rib. Out-, Trib.. Service Citizen Out-C itizen Ave. 
. look look look 
1950 1954 1958 1959 1959 1959 1959 1961 1964 
Advertise r ents 
Inches 412.3 401. 08.4 615.0 220.7 660.0 738.0 250. 343.6 427.7 
% space 37.6 34. 22.3 43.1 23.6 27.2 40.0 21.7 14.6 29.3 
Westernised ad's. 
Inches 104.1 35.9 41.6 201.7 59.9 115.4 171.3 30.6 59.8 102.2 
% of ad's. 25.2 33.9 20.0 32.8 27.1 17.5 23.2 12.2 17.4 23.2 
Westernised fi ur s 
Number 88 86 20 92 23 54 94 13 11 53.4 
2 total 
fi s 
73.3 44.6 32.8 43.8 31.9 34.2 40.0 68.4 50.0 46.5 g 
. 
1 Royal Commission on the Press, Research Series 4, p. 23 (Cnmd. 6810-4) 
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It must also be considered that these papers got low rates 
for much of their advertising space. Given the cost of newsprint, 
this means that the marginal profit on advertising was probably 
not very high. No paper could hope to compete with the Times, 
which in 1965 had an advertising revenue of £325,000, nearly as 
great as its sales revenue of £329,000 (in 1964 its advertising 
revenue exceeded its sales revenue by £39,000). The Times had 
a further revenue of £425,000, mostly from printing. 
1 
Despite the variations in advertising, all the papers had 
a strong element of advertising, and a substantial proportion of 
this was in the form of what I have called 'westernised ad's. '. 
Nearly one quarter (23.2%) of advertising space consisted of such 
advertisements. The Outlook (before independence) had the highest 
proportion of westernised advertisements - about one third of all 
advertising space in 1954 and 1959. The latter, of course, 
includes non-display ad's. (such as classified advertisements). 
In other words, a very high proportion of all advertisements 
containing pictures were westernised - reflected in the fact that 
46.5% of all figures appearing in these pictures were either 
Europeans or westernised Africans. This means that readers of 
these newspapers were faced with a great amount of westernised 
imagery. 
It needs to be said that Western firms were mostly responsible 
for the bias towards Western images in advertising. (For instance, 
BOAC, Lux, Guinness. ) However, though expatriate firms would, 
a priori, be more likely to place advertisements that reflected 
western values than indigenous firms, they would be unlikely to 
do so unless they thought such an appeal was likely to be successful. 
In other words, they must have felt sure their westernised appeal 
would find an effective response. 
The papers (as did TV) appealed primarily to the elite; so too, 
therefore, did the advertisements in these media. And, as I have 
shown, there was a strong element of westernisation in these 
advertisements. There is, thus, a link between elitism, commercialism, 
and westernisation. 
1 Chick (1967), p. 312 
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"The prestige given to Western ways inevitably exalts 
those who epitomise these ways, and the elite receives 
prestige from the masses as well as from each other... 
Even those who have no contact with foreign persons or 
Western education are exposed constantly to westernising 
influences through popular media - newspapers, radio, 
motion pictures, books, magazines, billboards..... Their 
advertisements exhort their readers to purchase gasoline, 
soap, furniture, bicycles, beer, or insecticide of 
Western origin. "' 
Such westernisation is readily apparent in the pages of Nigeria's 
main papers, even those fully engrossed in political warfare. I 
have shown that this was not so much apparent in the reporting of 
international news as in total coverage (i. e. including features, 
sports articles, etc. ), reliance on Western news sources, and 
advertisements. For the Citizen this was particularly so. The 
following extract from an editorial in this paper was head-lined 
'Thanks to Britain'. 
"The close link between Britain and Nigeria was given 
much emphasis last week, when the Sardauna opened the 
new Flying Doctor Service in Northern Nigeria. The 
link between Nigeria and Britain is one which has 
brought great benefits to the people of this country 
in several ways apart from the tutelage which Britain 
was circumstanced to have undertaken up to the stage 
of independence over a period of fifty years. " 
2 
This humble adulation was in response to a gift from the British. 
In other cases such favourable coverage was more gratuitous. For 
instance, the papers used embassy hand-outs freely because of their 
own poor resources. Free information would not be turned down, 
however useless. Western institutions, both embassies and business 
firms, could easily take advantage of the weakness of the Nigerian 
papers. Company hand-outs might work out, in effect, as free 
advertisements. We are familiar in the West with promotional 
coverage in the press of fashions and the motor industry, 3 but in 
1 The Smythes (1960), pp. 70/1 
2 The Citizen (26.8.64) 
3 See Tunstall'(1971) pp. 92-4 
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this instance such coverage was not an instance of commercial 
influence in a rich country, but of a rich country's commercial 
influence in a poor country. 
Sometimes this influence appeared rather sinister, as, for 
instance, when the Citizen blandly printed, under the head-line 
'NTC Contributes to Our Progress', a statement by a PRO of the 
mostly British firm, the Nigerian Tobacco Company, that "tobacco 
farmers were happy with the prices being paid by the NTC for 
their products. "1 There was no confirmation of this from the 
farmers. On another occasion an apology appeared in the same 
paper addressed to EMI (Nigeria) Ltd. for saying EMI had sacked 
six workers on account of a fall in demand, which EMI denied they 
had done. Hence the apology: "We very much regret the error 
and extend our unreserved apology to Mr. Scanlon and his Company 
for the embarassment that would have been caused by the story. " 
Though the original offending article was on page two and was 
only 2.5 inches high, the apology was 5.2 inches high and was on 
page one. 
2 
However, the Citizen was a Northern paper, and the 
relationship in the North between the British and Nigerians was 
particularly cosy. This did not apply to quite the same degree 
in the South though. 
The other main aspect of the reliance on Western sources was 
the use of material from international news agencies. I do not 
know if Nigerians could in the 1950s and 1960s enter the British 
pools competition, but even if they did, and it does not seem likely, 
this does not explain why Nigerian papers should have had photographs 
of action from English football matches! The irregularly appearing 
English football results were probably a space-filler. Whatever 
the reason for the football forecasts, they were certainly an aspect 
of westernisation. Most Northern Nigerians must have found it 
strange to read in their newspaper, the Citizen, that "with Arsenal 
at home, Chelsea must have to work very hard to make this match a 
draw", or that "Manchester City is in a position to win this match 
if she still retains her usual striking force., 
3 
Light articles and features could be even more incoherent or 
trivial than that. For instance, readers of the Tribune could 
1 The Citizen (19.12.64) 
2 Ibid, (29.4.64) 
3 The Citizen (29.9.64) 
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learn of a fire at Jesus' College, "discovered by an undergraduate 
Mr. C. A. F. Rainbow, 20, of Glyn Mansions, London. "1 Readers of 
both the Sketch and the Outlook (I found the article in both papers 
in exactly the same form) could learn of a man in London who had 
false teeth down his throat for four years without knowing it. 
2 
And readers of the Daily Service discovered, from a feature 
attributed to Reuter's, a 
"Mrs. Abagail Cox, celebrating her hundredth birthday 
(and) quoted today as saying firmly that she has never 
believed those stories that the people on the television 
screen cannot see into your room. That is why Mrs. Cox, 
a devoted television fan for the past seven years, 
always puts on her best dress and gives her silver hair 
a careful brush before allowing the set to be switched 
on. Mrs. Cox of Hitchin, Hertfordshire, has one worry: 
that those T. V. people 'must be sick of seeing me in 
the same old dress'. "3 
The essential point is that these papers had very poor resources, 
and were dependent on filler material of Western origin; this not 
only served the purpose of using space the papers themselves found 
difficult to fill, but did it with material which brought readers 
into contact with the West. Such material, however trivial, might 
be interesting; but above all, it offered the newspapers and their 
readers a feeling of prestige, of being in contact with the rich, 
modern world of the West. Though these papers were primarily 
political, politics cannot fill a paper. So they became a strange 
combination of intense political partisanship and incoherent western 
trivia. The contrast was most striking in the Sketch. In the 
midst of the paper's rabid tribal abuse, which I have already described, 
it was possible to follow a most moving love-story, in a cartoon 
serial distributed by 'King Features Syndicates, Inc. '. This, 
'The Heart of Julie Jones', was, of course, about a white couple. 
Dancing with his loved one, the man makes a confession: 
"There's such a sudden quickening of my pulse. 
.... 
Such 
an unexpected and wonderful thrill just being near you... 
Julie, do you know what I'm trying to say? Julie -I 
1 The Tribune (24.2.50) 
2 The Sketch (14.12.64) 
3 Daily Service (9.11.59) 
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don't expect miracles to rain down on me like a 
summer shower, but if there's hope, give me a sign. 
Any old sign will do. " 
The response was disappointing. 
"Oh, Mike 
- 
It's not as easy as that. This is a 
dream.... the music, the night... the sheer pleasure 
of being together. But, Mike 
- 
Life isn't like that. 
It's so full of unexpected surprises. " 
Mike did not have long to wait for the final put-down. It came 
in the next instalment, when Julie tells him that 
'" .A woman looking for love isn't looking for perfection, 
Mike. She's searching for some kind of magic... And 
when it strikes it's like lightening! She knows 
- 
He 
knows. "1 
6.4. The New Journalism : Orientation to the Market 
The press in Nigeria is still primarily a mixture of partisanship 
and government-orientation. But market-orientation has made significant 
strides, particularly since the establishment of The Punch, a racy, 
popular-style newspaper which is Nigeria's biggest-selling independent 
paper, next only to the Daily Times (which is no longer independent). 
The Punch is owned by a businessman, and is certainly a commercial 
enterprise. I analysed a sample (of the same size as my other samples) 
from early in 1980 and found that over 40% of total space was taken 
up with advertisements. The paper is also distinctly western in 
style. Very much modelled on the British "popular" newspaper, it 
also contains a number of regular features and other light material 
from the West, such as cartoons, crosswords, and, more spectacularly, 
large photographs of nude ladies. The extent to which the British 
press, or particular British papers, were taken as a model can be 
seen from the fact that Punch's regular nude appears on page three. 
Most interesting of all, these nudes are not Nigerian, but white. 
Thus hundreds of thousands of Nigerian readers are faced nearly 
every day with almost half a page of naked white flesh. It would 
seem from this that Nigerians are unaffected by the feeling that 
'black is beautiful'. 
1 Sketch (30.11.64 and 2.12.64) 
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Total Western features (mostly from the West, but some were 
specifically about the West too) took up an extremely large 
proportion - nearly 20% of total newspaper space (after subtraction 
of ad's. ). If it is considered that most advertisements are of 
products made by western companies and, also, that a large amount 
of economic news is of western companies operating in Nigeria, it 
can be seen how much the paper is in the grip of western commercialism. 
The paper, like the British popular papers, concentrated heavily 
on domestic concerns. It had little international news, and this 
was often treated as ephe mera, as, for instance, in a column called 
'Last Week: The World Briefly' in which items extended no further 
than the concise 'British auto-industry imports supercede auto 
exports'. 
1 It would be difficult to be briefer than that. However, 
much of the paper's foreign news was of Zimbabwe, and some of its 
international news had a nationalistic slant. Unlike earlier 
Nigerian papers, The Punch contains a great deal of sensationalised 
crime news. Its political news is highly populist. When it is 
critical of the government, it is 'for the people', not for a 
particular political party. 
Despite the highly populist style of the paper, there was in 
it a strong streak of elitism, evinced particularly in wide coverage 
given to students in higher education. For instance, in a Sunday 
issue of 24 pages the federal government took up 121 pages with a 
list of 1,444 students who had been awarded federal government post- 
graduate scholarships. The countries where the awards were tenable 
were also listed. I counted 400 - nearly 28%-which were tenable 
in Western countries (mostly the U. K. and U. S. A. ). 2 
One last aspect of the paper's westernisation is the presence 
in the U. K. of a foreign correspondent -a rare event. In fact 
Gordon Tialobi, the correspondent in question, seems to have become 
a journalist because of his residence in Britain. He has had no 
other experience of journalism. 3 The fruits of his work for Punch 
can be seen from a typical article, headlined 'And now the M5 Rapist', 
which starts off: 'They caught the Cambridge Rapist two years ago. 
They are still searching for Jack the Ripper (Jack! ). But now 
the nation's attention is being drawn to the sexual activity of 
1 Ibid (4.2.80) 
2 Ibid (3.2.80) 
3 From a personal interview 
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of another sick citizen, the M5 Rapist'. Included is an 
artist's impression of the rapist, in case, perhaps, a Nigerian 
in Lagos would be able to identify him? 
1 
The new Nigerian magazines are full of elitist, westernised 
imagery, showing rich Nigerians enjoying a swinging, modern, and 
highly western life-style, totally unencumbered by the problems 
of their country (still one of the poorest in the world, in per 
capita terms). Nudity, plush ad's. with Europeans or Nigerians 
in expensive suits, bow ties, evening dresses; romance; western 
fashions; letters on love problems; light features 
- 
these are 
the staple diet of these magazines. In Drum, in a whole page 
advertisement for Benson and Hedges' cigarettes, you can at last 
see Europeans and Nigerians actually mixing - in an expensive bar 
and extremely elegant dress - as equals? In another magazine, 
Sadness and Joy, this process goes one step further. In a long 
and trite 'photo-story' a Nigerian secretary wins a large sum of 
money in a competition, including the use of a chauffeur-driven 
limousine for a day's shopping. The story is set and photographed 
in England (though the prize is in dollars! ) and the chauffeur 
is white. 
"Could we go back to the first store, please, Parker? 'I 
"Certainly, madam, Your wish is my command. " 
"You are very kind, Parker. " 
"Yes, ma'am, it's my pleasure. " 
3 
The ethnic roles are now reversed. 
6.5. Westernisation and Elitism in Broadcasting 
Broadcasting in Nigeria, as in developing countries generally 
(and not only these), is very much under government control - for 
technical, economic and historical reasons. The technical and 
economic resources needed make private ventures very unlikely; 
furthermore, most broadcasting organisations in developing countries 
require considerable government subvention. Broadcasting also 
lacks the fragmented political. history of the press. Nigeria did 
not produce its own radio programmes until 1951, when the colonial 
government set up the Nigerian Broadcasting Service. 
1 The Punch (5.2.80) 
2 Drum (October, 1979) 
3 Sadness and Joy, No. 85 
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Nigeria is one of those rare examples of a country where 
broadcasting, both radio and television, has been partisan (some 
Latin American countries supply other examples). This was 
caused directly by regionalisation. Each region (upto the 
civil war) had its own broadcasting organisation. Within each 
region these institutions followed the normal pattern in developing 
countries 
- 
they were perfectly government-oriented. By contrast, 
at the federal level, they were partisan, supporting the ruling 
party in each region against the ruling parties in the other regions. 
The development of these organisations was itself the result of 
regional rivalry, as each regional government wanted to be in 
the lead in broadcasting. This rivalry produced an extraordinary 
race, the results of which were i) that two of the regional 
governments had established television in their regions before 
the federal government had set up its own national-service, while 
the third region, the North, started its service in the same year 
(1962) as the federal government; ii) that the Western Region had 
the first fully operational TV service in Africa; iii) that this 
region had television in 1959, a year before it had its own radio 
service, while the Eastern Region acquired radio and television in 
the same year (1960). 
This latter fact is remarkable when it is considered that many 
believe that radio is the best medium of communication for development 
in the Third World, because of the ease and cheapness with which 
radio signals can be both widely broadcast and received. Television, 
on the other hand, reaches only a few, is very expensive, and remains 
invariably solely a medium of entertainment. This rivalry of the 
three regions, then, was particularly elitist, and also considerably 
increased the westernisation of the media. The infrastructure, 
equipment, and much of the management of the new TV systems came 
from commercial Western broadcasting companies, apart from the amount 
of programme content imported. The Federal Government's TV venture 
was set up by NBC of America in 1962. It was managed by NBC until 
1967. Western Nigeria's system was set up by the U. K. firm, Overseas 
Redifus ion Ltd., and run in partnership with them. However, the 
clash between the regional government's political and Redifus ion's 
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commer6ial objectives resulted in the former acquiring full 
ownership in 1961. The Northern government had two partners, 
Granada TV and EMI. It bought out these U. K. firms in 1970.1 
These services are reliant on foreign news agencies for 
their international news. At the time of Golding and Elliott's 
study 86% of NBC TV's foreign news came from three Western news 
agencies (Visnews, Reuters, and AP), 81% of NBC Radio's foreign 
news came from Reuters and AP. Furthermore, most reported news 
was of foreign events -a direct result of setting up TV stations 
before establishing an effective news-gathering capability. In 
the opinion of Golding and Elliott 
"in Nigeria the relative simplicity of dealing with 
föreign news contrasts with the difficulties of local 
news-gathering, particularly in television, where 
foreign news is two-thirds of the total., 
2 
As with the press a large proportion of this is of events in other 
African countries (about 30% of NBC TV's and 38% of NBC Radio's 
foreign news stories). The coverage of Western Europe and the 
U. S. A. was about 21% on television and 17% on radio. 
Nigeria's other television programmes were also very dependent 
on Western sources. An NBC quarterly programme schedule for 1974 
shows that about 40% of total evening programming (from 6 to 11 p. m. ) 
was of foreign origin. (There were also two hours of educational 
programming per day, completely separate from the rest of the 
programmes - one in the morning, one in the early afternoon). 3 
Nigerian television was thus highly westernised and, by its very 
limited nature, extremely elitist. For this reason, there was 
some opposition to its establishment, as certain exchanges in the 
various Houses of Assembly show. One M. P., for instance, said: 
"We want this money for water, roads and for drugs and 
"4 machinery for agriculture... 
There is no doubt that the costs of television were very high. 
In 1971-2 the federal government gave a subsidy of N2.2 million 
to the NBC (radio and television). In 1973-4 it was W5 million, 
in 1975-6 over 911 million, with a further provision of over N15 
million to other Nigerian television stations. 
5 In 1972 the 
1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p. 43 2 Ibid, p. 155 
3 NBC 
-TV programme schedule for January March, 1974 
4 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (10.4.63) 
5 Recurrent and Capital Estimates (approved) of the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1973-4,1975-6,1977-8. 
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Western broadcasting services' expenditure on radio was N520,000, 
but on television it was N602,000. Its revenue from radio 
advertisements was N803,000, while its revenue from TV ad's was 
only N157,000. Thus radio made a profit of N283,000, television 
a loss of N445,000. In the North television took up about three 
quarters of recurrent expenditure, costing about Ni million p. a., 
while providing a mere N60,000 in income. 
1 
All in all, television in Nigeria is expensive, wasteful 
(taking away resources from radio and partly subsidised by it, 
to the extent that "television is a millstone around radio's neck")2 
and elitist. Only about 0.1% of the population owns sets, and 
at most 1% of the population can see television. In 1973 there 
were only 75,000 sets. Ownership of these is thought 
"to be concentrated in the urban middle and upper-classes 
professional men, academics, the more prosperous businessmen, 
etc. "3 
6.6. Professionalism 
Another aspect of both elitism and westernisation I consider 
to be the ethic and structure of professionalism. I shall look 
at this with respect to broadcasting as the only study I know on 
the profession of journalism is on broadcasting. Broadcasting 
does not have its origins in political partisanship; it is also 
the most technological of the media. For these reasons professionalism 
is likely to be strongest in this medium. The sense of professionalism 
is not only an aspect of elitism and westernisation; it is also a 
major element of market-orientation. A professional journalist 
justifies the standards of his occupation (realistically or not) 
by reference to the market. He resents government or political 
interference. He sees his occupation in terms of career rather 
than political commitment. At the same time, the standards he 
judges his profession by tend to derive from the West - the original 
source of so much to do with the media. It is in this respect, 
and in the implicit aim of building a respectable, even enviable 
career, that the sense of professionalism can be seen to contain 
a certain elitism. 
1 Wedell and Pilsworth (1974), pp. 19,30 and 39 
2 Ibid, p. 84 
3 Ibid, p. 79 
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A westernised journalistic profession in broadcasting in the 
Third World is nearly inevitable insofar as broadcasting institutions, 
career structures, journalistic training and practice, were all 
often established by the colonial powers, whose influence declined 
rather than disappeared after independence. But the supply of 
this influence is matched by a strong demand. Many Nigerian 
journalists study in the West and many more do correspondence courses 
with Western institutions. Golding and Elliott found that British 
schools of journalism were well endowed with subscriptions from 
Nigerian students. 
' The link between career and elitism was 
strong. For many of these writers' respondents, journalism 
"was just one of a variety of possible ways of 
exchanging their general educational qualifications 
for entry into the elite occupations in government 
or industrial administration. "2 
Aspiring journalists paid a lot for the chance to enter the 
professional career structure. At the time of the above study a 
2-year course in journalism in Nigeria might cost £600.3 Taken 
abroad this would be a great deal more. 
The journalists' growing sense of professionalism has altered 
their conceptions of the nature of their jobs. Government interference 
- 
"harrassment, intimidation, threatening phone calls, arbitrary arrest, 
abuse of office, corruption and dictatorial requests , 
4_ 
was strong 
but greatly resented. The same applied to any political connection. 
Golding and Elliott found that the broadcasting journalists they 
studied felt some disgust at the highly partisan press of the pre- 
civil war period. They saw themselves as part of a Fourth Estate 
and complained that the authorities did not understand the nature 
of news production, which should be left solely to the 'professionals! 
5 
They also felt that news should be rigidly separated from current 
affairs. The journalist's job was to report, not to comment. 6 
This does not mean partisanship is dead. It has merely been 
suppressed, both by the desire for professional status and by 
government control. The underlying antagonisms of Nigerian society 
cannot be completely avoided. 
1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p. 181 2 Ibid, p. 173 
3 Ibid, p. 181 4 Ibid, p. 68 
5 Ibid, p. 132 6 Ibid, p. 81 
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"Just as Nigerian political life more generally lies 
dormant, but very much alive beneath the wintry crust 
of military rule, so the party press and political 
commitments were often not far below the surface. "1 
The relative decline of partisanship has, as has been indicated, 
run parallel with an increase in market-orientation and the 
professional status of the journalist. 
"Instead of working for small entrepreneur proprietors 
or shoe-string political party papers, journalists in 
Nigeria now work for large, mostly government corporations, 
with intricate career and salary structures and well 
defined, if contentious, grading schemes and entry and 
"2 seniority requirements. 
In the early days of the Nigerian press newspapers had been little 
more than one-man concerns. In a list of 41 Lagos newspapers 
given by Omu in operation between 1880 and 1937,34 can be seen 
to have had editor-owners. 
3 The role of the proprietor did not 
stop there. 
"Normally, the proprietor had to act as editor, reporter 
and printer... The journalist's status in society was 
low, and this made it difficult to attract good recruits 
and to build up a sense of professionalism., 
4 
(As against this, the political and social influence of the actual 
editor-owners, or at least some of them, could become considerable). 
Golding and Elliott found, by contrast with the early days, 
that a large number of broadcasting journalists came from a fairly 
'respectable' background. However, the alteration in the status 
of the journalist has not been universal. It has affected only 
an elite within the profession. Elliott and Golding found that 
30% of the fathers of their sample of modern broadcasting journalists 
had been civil servants, teachers, journalists (or from other 
professions) or politicians, (civil servants were over half of 
this group), while 24% had been farmers, 12% had been in business, 
and only about 9% had held manual jobs. This suggests a fairly 
respectable, middle-class background for many journalists, but 
1 Ibid, p. 196 
2 Ibid, p. 180 
3 Omu (1978), pp. 252-4 
4 Chick (1967), p. 43 
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still a rather lowly one for at least a third of them, probably 
much more (most of the civil servants will have been clerks). 
Only 7.2% of the journalists had degrees (though another 16.9% 
of them had a technical or professional qualification). 1 
This analysis is probably also relevant to modern newspaper 
journalists in Nigeria. Though the status of broadcasting 
journalists was in general probably higher than that of newspaper 
journalists, 64% of Golding and Elliott's sample had previously 
been journalists in indigenous newspapers or magazines, and some 
others might have worked for foreign publications; only 10% had 
been in broadcasting alone. 
2 Their sample would therefore seem, 
to a certain extent at least, to describe both press and broadcasting 
journalists. 
In both broadcasting and the press there was a highly unequal 
salary structure. A junior reporter in the Northern broadcasting 
corporation earned only £310 p. a. (though this was probably double 
the earnings of a manual worker). A chief sub-editor in the WNBC 
got £876; his counterpart in the NBC got £1,020. The maximum pay 
for NBC editors was £2,380. The editor of the Daily Times got a 
reported £6,000 p. a. There is, then, within the journalistic world, 
a highly elitist structure of rewards, with the top men actually 
becoming a part of the wider social elite. But even the lower 
paid could view the occupation as the first rung in the climb to 
professional status - as indeed, it appears they did. 
In sum, the growth of the press has offered new 'professional' 
opportunities to up-and-coming Nigerians, but these openings are not 
of a high status. Nigerian newspapers have grown from 'tin-pot' 
enterprises to sometimes large, and, in one or two instances, almost 
bureaucratic concerns. But the 
"growth and occupational differentiation in fact lowered 
the status of journalists. From a battlefield surveyed 
by a few generals the press became a crowded arena of 
foot soldiers., 
3 
This is a very interesting statement. The old political owner- 
editors were, or became, a part of the elite. Their tiny newspapers 
offered no scope to anyone else to rise in the profession. As 
1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p. 171/2 
2 Ibid, p. 174 
3 Ibid, p. 30 
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papers have expanded those who control them have remained a part 
of the elite, but others now do the 'donkey-work'. They are 
looking for professional status but end up in routine, almost 
clerical jobs. The papers are far too limited to offer greater 
professional opportunities. 
6.7. Professionalism Against Partisanship 
The press, since its inception, has been fundamentally linked 
to the development of conflict in Nigeria. With the decline of 
political partisanship since the end of the civil war the press 
has become more market-oriented and more 'professionalised'. 
The professional instinct did exist, though, before the civil war. 
This is evinced by the press reaction to the Newspaper (Amendment) 
Bill, 1964, which prohibited publication of material considered 
"prejudicial to the defence of Nigeria or public safety, order, 
morality and health". It also required newspapers which sold 
in Lagos to establish offices there, even if they were published 
elsewhere. Another clause prohibited material which affected 
"adversely any right, reputation, or freedom of a person which is 
entitled to protection". Censorship was not proposed, but 
penalties for infringement against this vague and arbitrary 
legislation were severe. The federal government, which had 
proposed the Bill, was both NPC and NCNC. But several NCNC M. Ps. 
opposed it. Eventually the NCNC leader and Eastern premier, Dr. 
Okpara came out against the Bill. While the federal government's 
Morning Post supported the Bill, the Eastern Region's Outlook 
opposed it. 
"Last Tuesday, the Post under the guise of criticising 
Dr. Okpara for his opposition to the Newspaper (Amendment) 
Act tried to be mischievous in the extreme... the Post 
has ceased to serve the whole country by whose grace it 
is in existence at all. It has now put the Nigerian 
Citizen in the shade in its unreasoning support for the 
NPC. "1 
But the Citizen also lambasted the Bill. 
"In short, the way I look at it is that within barely 
1 Outlook (8.10.64) 
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a year of our becoming a Republic - for which we all 
rejoiced - the Nigerian press is now being made by law 
to descend from its exalted position of the Freest in 
Africa to the most guillotined in the democratic world. "1 
Later articles and editorials in the Citizen were more cautious, 
or tried to blame the introduction of the legislation solely on 
the NCNC (much as the Outlook blamed it on the NPC). But this 
defence of the press implicitly against the paper's own party (as 
the main actor in the federal government) is quite startling. Of 
course, by press freedom the paper meant the freedom to be partisan. 
Most papers were so closely connected with the parties that they 
could hardly have been considered to have been free. But they 
were free to criticise other parties, and it was that right that 
they were defending. 
It is possible to say, then, that a certain sense of professionalism 
existed before the civil war (and is much stronger now), but political 
partisanship was still quite clearly the primary orientation in this 
period. Even the Times, which did much to try to encourage a sense 
of professionalism at this time, could do little to alter this. In 
times of political non-crisis the Times thrived. It had comprehensive 
news coverage while the party papers were stereotyped, dull, somewhat 
'in limbo'. In periods of crisis the circulation of the Times and 
the Post (a federal government paper which tried to avoid extreme 
partisanship), papers which lack credibility in times of crisis, 
declines; by constrast the "political party papers experience a 
sharp increase in circulation at times of political crisis when 
they become papers of cause, and at times of non-crisis their 
circulation declines". 
2 In periods of political crisis the Times 
"practised abdication", 
3 but in no way could the paper avoid contributing 
to the climate of tension. Those seeking a rational way out of the 
growing tension would not have been able to find it in the above papers. 
The Times could not overcome the power of partisanship. 
"the Times' withdrawal and its imposition of Western 
interpret ations on what was going on in Nigerian politics 
did not create a cogent statement about Nigerian political 
events, and it was no match for the very strong and 
1 Citizen (26.8.64) 
2 Grant-. (1975), p. 422 
3 Ibid, p. 41 
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divisive forces in other sectors of the press. "1 
The Post, a government but not a party paper (as the government 
was a coalition one), suffered most from circulation losses as the 
political crisis progressed. Its circulation in 1961 was 30,000 
while in 1964, at the height of the crisis, it was 16,000. That 
of the Outlook, a government and a party paper, rose from 13,700 
in 1961 to 21,000 in 1964.2 Looking in more detail at a period 
within the crisis of the following year, that of the Western Region, 
the circulation of the Times fell from 137,000 in September 1965, 
to 97,100 in November 1965. That of the Post fell from 52,000 
to 10,000 over the same period, during which the circulation of 
the Pilot went up from 25,000 to 45,000, the Tribune's from 7,000 
to 20,000 and the Outlook's from 27,000 to 30,500.3 
This indicates well enough the importance of partisanship to 
the press. In times of non-crisis the more market-oriented papers 
dominated the scene and the partisan papers had to rely largely on 
government or party subsidies. In times of political crisis the 
latter papers had thriving sales. Partisanship could be maintained 
because of the fragmented nature of political power. In fragmented 
societies where a number of different groups have the power to express 
their interests, they also have the power to create a partisan press. 
This is why the press has been relatively free in Nigeria. When the 
government becomes significantly stronger than its rival groups it 
is then "able to suppress many of the inter-group conflicts which are 
the determinants of Press freedom". 
4 
The press then becomes 
government-oriented. 
The press in the 1960s, then, was highly partisan, and it was 
clearly deeply involved in the intense political conflict of the 
time; it is difficult, though, to say how far the press contributed 
to the escalation of the conflict. It is equally hard to imagine 
that it did not. Apart from its general inflammatory role, there 
were also particular instances when it is very likely the press 
played a specific part in the build-up of tension. 
One major instance of a possible direct contribution by the 
press to political conflict occurred during the vital Western 
1 Ibid, p. 422 
2 Ibid, p. 41 
3 Ibid, p. 406 
4 Chick (1967), p. 461 
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Region elections of 1965, when Akintola's NNDP was struggling 
against the UPGA (AG and NCNC) for control of the region. There 
was great violence during the election campaign, in which many 
people were killed. After the election Western Radio and NNDP 
papers gave one set of results, showing that the NNDP had won, 
while UPGA papers gave another set of results claiming the 
reverse. This itself gave an impetus to further violence. The 
Tribune claimed in January 1966, that over 560 people were killed 
in the crisis. 
1 It seems likely that the media played a role 
in this (the extreme anti-Ibo content of the Sketch should also 
be borne in mind) even if it did not create it. 
"Because information about the election rigging and 
violence, and particularly printed information, was 
so central to the events of the crisis and to people's 
sense of justice the newspapers took on especial 
importance. "2 
Newspapers of the time were attacked. The editor of the Tribune 
was beaten by police, and both the East and the West banned several 
papers from entry into their regions, including the Times. 
Though the press became substantially government-oriented 
after the first military coup it continued to give expression to 
ethnic antagonisms. 
"Contributions to the New Nigerian, and in the vernacular 
Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, played a key role in rallying the 
shell-shocked, rather than somnolent, public of the North 
in resistance to what was seen as a threat from the South. 
Articles headed 'Federalism Is Good for Nigeria', 'Unitary 
System Not for Us', 'Leave the North As It Is', and 
'Smouldering Fires', along with warnings that 'to force 
a unitary type of government on people without an impartial 
referendum is setting the clock backward' were all 
messages, as clear as the Bauchi highlands after a 
rainstorm, to those who cared to read them. "3 
Even after the civil war the papers continued to express ethnic 
interests. As I have already mentioned, nineteen advertisements 
1 Grant (1975), p. 336 
2 Ibid, p. 338 
3 Panter-Brick (1978), p. 15 
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appeared in the New Nigerian between October and December 1974 
publicising demands for new states. 
1 Because its owner, Azikiwe, 
at first supported the Biafran secession, the offices of the Pilot, 
once "Africa's most vociferous and successful newspaper ", were 
burnt and looted. 
2 
I have shown how the newspapers of Nigeria contributed very 
significantly to the expression of conflict, and therefore, possibly 
to the build-up of conflict itself. I have enumerated some 
particular instances where such an effect might have been possible. 
More generally, it is possible that the press as a whole did 
significantly contribute to the conflict situation before the 
civil war. This is so because conflict in developing countries 
is mainly urban; urban centres tend to be small, literacy higher 
in towns than in rural areas, and, though most newspaper circulations 
are small, they are concentrated in a few towns; also readership 
is many times greater than newspaper sales. Thus, Grant calculates 
that most urban literates were being reached by newspapers in the 
post-independence period. 
3 For instance, the population of the 
three main towns of the Eastern Region was very roughly (there are 
no reliable figures) 500,000 in 1963.4 Urban literacy in English 
was probably about 36% (49% for men and 23% for women) 5. There 
were thus probably very roughly 180,000 urban literates in the 
Eastern Region. Total newspaper circulation in the region was 
about 55,000, most of which was in the towns. With a readership 
of several people per single issue of a newspaper, this means that 
probably most urban literates did read a newspaper, even if the 
figure for urban literates is a significant underestimate. 
In sum, there is reasonable evidence that the press probably 
did play some role in the escalation of conflict in Nigeria in the 
1960s. It is difficult to believe it played none at all. Most 
violence occurred in the cities, most newspaper readership was in 
the cities (covering a large proportion, if not most of those able 
to read in the cities), and a large proportion of newspaper content 
was not only intensely partisan, but also sometimes directly 
inflammatory. Only since the civil war has the press become 
significantly market-oriented and 'professionalised'. 
1 Yahaya in Panter-Brick (1978), p. 204 
2 Ugboajah (1976), p. 17 
3 Grant (1975), p. 64 
4 Wedell and Pilsworth (1974), p. 8 5 Report on an Enquiry into Advertising Media (1963) 
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6.8. Conclusion 
The media in Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, 
are less mass than elite media. The content of the media has an 
elitist flavour 
- 
it dwells on such matters as higher education 
rather than the education of the masses, and virtually ignores the 
over-riding social and economic problems of poverty and unemployment; 
media content is also, in a number of significant respects, highly 
westernised: it contains a certain amount of news and tittle-tattle 
about or from the West (though not an excessively large amount in 
many cases), is heavily dependent on Western news sources, and 
conveys a great amount of westernised imagery in its advertising, 
as well, of course, as displaying a wide variety of Western goods 
(which only the elite could afford). Such content was aimed not 
at the Nigerian masses but at the Nigerian elite and a somewhat 
wider sub-elite. 
In the previous chapter I described in detail the close 
association between the press and conflict, in particular, the 
strongly partisan basis of the press. The elitist nature of the 
press was limited, at least in some respects, by its political 
function, which one would expect to require a mass readership. 
However, the press never achieved this mass readership, not even 
remotely. In fact, it was not even necessary. The press did 
reach a large proportion of urban literates (who were a small 
proportion of the total population), and that was all that was 
needed to create the social turmoil the various political parties 
needed in their mutual po r struggle. The elites of Nigeria did 
not want to engage the whole of society in the struggle; that 
would have been far too dangerous to their joint position. 
With the decline in importance of political conflict after 
the civil war the press has become less partisan and increasingly 
market-oriented (though it is still weak, and subject on and off 
to strong government control). Associated with this change has 
been an increase in the journalists' sense of professionalism, 
which is an important aspect of market-orientation. This 
professionalist motivation is itself flavoured by both elitist 
and westernised tendencies. This stems from journalists' growing 
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concern for career and 'getting on' (to the detriment of political 
commitment) and from their acceptance of Western standards of 
journalism, from which the quest for professional status inevitably 
takes its inspiration. The media, in particular television, are 
becoming increasingly westernised and 'professional'. Some parts 
of the press seem now simply to be a plaything of the elite. 
Television is even more of an elite plaything - an expensive one 
and largely paid for by taxes on the bulk of the people, to whom 
it means nothing. 
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PART THREE : OVERVIEW 
Politics, in the period I have studied, were the main 
ingredient of the Nigerian press, particularly ethnic politics. 
There was little in the press specifically to do with class. 
The papers were owned by or run for different political parties 
all with their own political interests at stake, which were 
primarily ethnic in nature. It was political power they wanted, 
not class domination. The papers were concerned with power. 
The press will not be able to become a class weapon until mass 
circulations are possible. Through it the elite does not speak 
to the masses but to itself (and a somewhat broader sub-elite). 
It is a readership which is very politically conscious. 
If the papers did express any non-political interests, they 
were those of expatriate business. The very economic dominance 
of the latter ensured a considerable press dependence on these 
foreign interests. Nevertheless, this was an indirect influence 
and an indirect benefit. It resulted in favourable publicity - 
through advertising, a general purveying of Western life-styles, 
and more directly through favourable news coverage. However, 
this was as much an aspect of the elite's westernisation as an 
expression of the 'class' interests of these foreign concerns. 
The papers reflected the latter's economic influence but they 
were also designed to appeal to a highly westernised elite, which 
did not in any way reject the influence of these Western companies. 
It welcomed it. 
In sum, the press reflected very well the conflicts and 
interests described in Part Two. It contributed to the intense 
political and ethnic battle of the 1960s, and did this wholeheartedly. 
The reflection of underlying ethnic antagonisms in the press was 
quite straight-forward. Parties, publics, and papers fought 
against each other quite simply as entire ethnic units. There 
was none of the political or journalistic fragmentation which comes 
with intra-class conflict, which I shall describe in the following 
discussion of Pakistan. The media also reflected the interests 
of the Nigerian elite, in large measure by-passing the bulk of 
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the population. Only in times of political crisis do the media 
(the press particularly) take on a wider significance. The 
press strongly reflects political and social divisions and has 
at least the potential to play a role in the escalation of 
conflict. It only takes some extension of newspaper readership 
beyond the politically coumtitted in a few major urban centres 
for this to be possible. Though the media, with their narrow 
base, cannot play any role in major social change, they are able 
to promote urban conflict and thereby to bring about changes in 
regime, an alternation of elites. 
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PART FOUR: THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN 
INTRODUCTION 
Both Nigeria and Pakistan suffered civil wars involving a 
secession attempt by a region with a different ethnic make-up 
from the rest of the country. The similarity goes much further: 
firstly, in both cases the war occurred during a period of military 
rule; secondly both wars started after a general election of great 
importance, which was in each case a crucial stepping-stone in the 
escalation of conflict; thirdly, political conflict in each country 
became so intense that it even reached into the legislatures, and 
in both cases this parliamentary violence was itself an important 
event in the process of violent political change. 
Despite such similarities there were fundamental differences 
in the nature of the political-economies of these two countries. 
Nigeria was in a sense more 'primitive' than Pakistan. Its 
bourgeoisie was less developed than Pakistan's: India had been 
a great deal longer under British rule and had, as a consequence, 
a more developed bureaucratic and professional class than Nigeria 
had. Furthermore, there was in Pakistan only a very limited 
foreign presence in industry and commerce. Its indigenous business 
class was, therefore, much more substantial than Nigeria's. Pakistan, 
too, had a powerful land-owning class, which Nigeria lacked. For 
these reasons Pakistan had a considerably more distinct class structure 
than had Nigeria. The class element in the growth of conflict in 
Pakistan was, on that account, also stronger than in Nigeria. At 
the same time, the communal element was weaker. Pakistan is riven 
by linguistic differences but its social structure is not predominantly 
tribal. Tribes only play a significant role in the sparsely populated 
areas of the country under the Northern frontier. 
In Part One I suggested a rough outline for social conflict as 
follows: ethnic-* intra-class-º inter-class. I also suggested, 
though, that each stage of conflict would be affected by adjacent 
stages. Thus, conflict in Nigeria was primarily ethnic but with 
a strong intra-class element. Conflict in the early part of 
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Pakistan's history had been ethnic in nature (especially that 
between Moslems and Hindus around the time of the creation of 
Pakistan). It became increasingly intra-class after independence, 
while retaining a powerful ethnic element. 
In the following two chapters I shall be analysing mostly 
the intra-class nature of conflict in Pakistan. Though there are 
powerful groups which have held sway in the country, on and off, 
for many years, Pakistan's society is a delicate balance which 
numerous social forces are on occasion able to disturb. Rather 
than powerful communal groups or socio-economic classes locked 
in straightforward struggle, what we have is a complex inter-play 
of numerous conflicting class fragments. 
Though the civil war was apparently a struggle between opposed 
ethnic groups (Bengalis against the rest) it is not possible in 
discussing this to avoid reference to class. Writers who do refer 
to class not surprisingly speak in what I have called 'inter-class' 
terms. To do so, though, is to indulge in gross simplification 
and to pay little regard to important contradictions. The various 
class fragments of Pakistan never managed to develop into substantial 
classes in their own right. (The old landlord class has to be 
excluded from this generalisation). Instead, they coalesced in 
loose and shifting alliances which broke up and reformed according 
to circumstances; they also often incorporated apparently opposed 
elements which, with the fluctuating nature of these alliances, means 
we cannot possibly consider them to have been classes in the normal 
sense. The end result is opposition between unstable alliances of 
various class fragments, which is overlaid by communal antagonisms 
and given added strength by the intrusion of incipient inter-class 
conflict. 
Despite the rapid and violent political changes Pakistan underwent 
from the time of its secession from India in 1947 to the secession 
of East Pakistan in 1971, its economic development and the policies 
associated with this were remarkably stable. In the following 
chapter I shall describe Pakistan's economic development up until 
the civil war as well as the policies that supported this development 
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and the socio-economic background to both these factors. This 
socio-economic analysis of Pakistan's economic policy-making and 
of the social effects of economic development will be followed 
up in the succeeding chapter by an analysis of political conflict. 
It will be shown that the struggle over who should benefit from 
economic development was fundamentally intra-class in nature. 
This is why economic policy over this period was so consistent in 
its goals: the struggle was purely political (as intra-class 
conflict tends to be, given that it is not based on substantial 
socio-economic differences). It was only after the civil war 
that inter-class elements (at least in the newly truncated Pakistan) 
came to be of any significance. Then economic policy at last 
underwent significant change. 
As a guide to the following discussion I give below a summary 
of the major political events that have occurred in Pakistan in the 
period under study. This can perhaps be divided into three separate 
periods: the first was political but not democratic (there was no 
general election based on universal suffrage in this period); the 
second was military; the third occurs after the civil war, when 
Pakistan was divided into two new countries, West Pakistan becoming 
Pakistan and East Pakistan, Bangladesh. 
1947 : Independence from Britain and Partition of India 
into India and Pakistan. 
1947-56: Rule of the Muslim League (which had led the nationalist 
struggle for Pakistan) in various governments. 
1956 : Pakistan adopts a Republic constitution after 
years of debate 
1956-7: 13 months of rule by an East Pakistani party, the 
Awami League, under Suhrawardy. 
1957-8: More Muslim League regimes. 
1958 : Military coup by Ayub Khan (in power for next decade). 
1968 : Start of mass disturbances against Ayub, who hands 
over power to the military under Yahya Khan in 1969. 
1970 : Pakistan's first general election. The East Pakistani 
party, the Awami League (under Mujibur Rahman), wins 
overwhelmingly. 
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1971 : Civil war. Bangladesh created through Indian 
intervention. 
1975 : Mujibur Rahman, leader of Bangladesh, assassinated. 
The military take over. 
1977 : Pakistan's leader, Bhutto, deposed by military after 
widespread disturbances; later executed for alleged 
murder. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN 
In this chapter, I shall describe Pakistan's economic 
development and economic policies from 1947 until the break-up 
of Pakistan in 1971. As is commonly accepted, some of the most 
important results of Pakistan's economic development in the first 
two periods above (i. e. up to the civil war) were rapid industrial- 
isation, the creation of a new elite of industrialists, and the 
widening of inequalities between East and West Pakistan. (The 
new business elite was largely West Pakistani and the most rapid 
industrial development occurred there). Of course, industrialisation 
was not the only factor of concern here, but, as it is one of the 
prime aspects of development and was certainly the main goal of 
the Pakistani government in the period under study, I shall 
concentrate mostly on this. I shall argue that the inequalities 
between the two wings were less the result of differences in 
industrialisation than in control of government resources and, 
further, that the argument that West Pakistan was exploiting East 
Pakistan for the sake of rapid industrial growth in the former is 
at best only partially true. More accurate would it be to say 
that a small urban elite was exploiting the rural areas (excluding 
the rich landlords: these were kept reasonably sweet) -a process 
which happened to benefit West more than East Pakistan. 
7.1. Development Policies 
At partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 Pakistan found 
itself with very little in the way of developed resources. Both 
wings (East and West Pakistan) of the new country were nearly enough 
completely agricultural. Each produced a major cash crop: East 
Pakistan 
- 
jute, West Pakistan 
- cotton. These crops had before 
independence been processed either in India (mostly by Hindus) or 
in Britain. Thus, none of the value added by the processing of 
these raw materials accrued to the areas that grew them. 
Very soon after independence, Pakistan successfully began to 
create industrial capacity for the processing of its raw materials; 
India began to increase its production of the same raw materials 
to replace those lost, and so feed its already established factories. 
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The two countries became increasingly competitive. 
People in both wings of Pakistan desperately needed cloth, 
wherever produced, so the increased production of cloth in West 
Pakistan, the main cotton growing area, found a ready market in 
both regions. East Pakistan's jute, by contrast, is a product 
useful to industry rather than households. Its great potential 
was in exports. Thus, though trade between the two regions came 
to be substantial, it was by no means reciprocal. East Pakistan 
exported jute to the outside world and imported cotton from West 
Pakistan. The implications of this for future relations between 
the two wings were considerable. 
The main plank of Pakistan's development policy was rapid 
industrialisation. This itself is hardly surprising. More 
remarkable was the single-mindedness with which this goal was 
pursued, and the obstinacy with which the same methods were 
retained despite the increasingly apparent high social costs 
which they engendered. As far as rates of industrialisation are 
concerned, however, the government was very successful, as the 
following table shows. 
Table 7.1: Gross Domestic Product & Population in Pakistan 
Absolute Amounts Annual Rates of Growth 
Sector in crores (Ru ees at 1959-60 
(Percent) 
p 
, , 
market prices) 1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 to 1954-55 
to 
1959-60 
to 
1964-65 
Agriculture 1,439 1,536 1,639 2,000 1.3 1.3 4.1 
Manufacturing 30 110 192 382 29.6 11.8 14.7 
Other 1,027 1,217 1,403 1,996 3.5 2.9 7.3 
Total 2,496 2,863 3,234 4,378 2.7 2.5 6.2 
Population(m) 78.9 88.3 98.9 112.5 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Income per 
head (Rs) 316 324 327 389 0.5 0.2 3.5 
Source: Papanek (1967), p. 7 
Note: One crore - 10 million (1 crore rupees - roughly $2m. after 1955). 
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The contribution of industry to gross domestic product was nearly 
thirteen times higher in 1964-5 than it had been in 1949-50. 
Though the overall performance of the economy during the 1950s 
was desultory, significant gains in income per head began to show 
themselves in the 1960s, under Ayub Khan. 
For some time during the 1960s Pakistan was held to be a model 
of economic development. Under Ayub Khan there was a relatively 
long period of political stability. The government pursued its 
development policies vigorously. Its chosen vehicle for the 
rapid industrialisation it wanted was private enterprise. The 
government would control and guide the movement of the economy, 
but would only indulge in a small amount of direct participation 
in it. This policy entailed a considerable shifting of income 
to the private sector, about which the government was quite explicit. 
It paid much more attention to agriculture in the 1960s, but this 
is how it described the earlier years: 
"There was a considerable transfer of savings from the 
agricultural to the industrial sector.... as terms of trade 
were deliberately turned against agriculture through such 
policies as licensing of scarce foreign exchange earned 
primarily by agriculture to the industrial sector, compulsory 
government procurement of foodgrains at low prices to 
subsidise the cost of living of the urban, industrial workers, 
generous tax concessions to industry and lack of similar 
incentives for commercial agricultural investment. " 
(from page seven of the Planning Commission's 'The Third Five-Year 
Plan'). 1 
The sum result of these policies was that the industrialist 
was able to buy his inputs at highly subsidised prices (including 
the price of credit), indirectly paid for mostly by the peasantry, 
and then sell its manufactures at uncompetitively high prices (as 
no competition was allowed). "With high produce, then, annual 
profits of 50-100% on investment were possible., 
2 
The result of these policies was a new industrial elite. 
This industrial elite, it can almost be said, was the deliberate 
creation of government policy. Initially the government was 
1 Quoted in Griffin and Khan (1972), pp. 36/7 
2 Papanek (1967), p. 33 
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solely concerned with political survival and the fruits of office. 
It needed industrialisation because with partition India got the 
industrial assets of the sub-continent; now Pakistan had to compete 
with India and also process its own raw materials. With politics 
being its main concern the government did not want to be directly 
involved in the economy. It left it to private businessmen. 
Only later did politicians become aware of the opportunities they 
had created. They then joined in the industrial bandwagon 
themselves. At the same time the government always retained 
strong control over the economy and over the favours the industrialists 
received. However, it was only in the 1960s (and then even more 
so in the 1970s) that the government began to participate directly 
in the economy. In the 1950s even the government's investment 
agencies were used to help private business -a role that diminished 
in the 1960s but which still remained. 
The most important of the agencies was the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation (PIDC), not fully operational until 1952. 
Its main function was to invest in projects which were considered 
necessary but which private investors found either too large or 
too complex (or simply unlikely to give the huge profits they could 
get elsewhere). The creation of government. agencies did not 
represent a great commitment to public enterprise. The PIDC's 
policy, laid down by government, of selling its investments to the 
private sector once the projects were established is evidence of 
its aims. The stated principle was that the agency would then be 
able to recoup funds and invest them in other neglected areas. 
But, at the same time, the extraordinary advantages to the private 
sector of this PIDC policy of selling investments already made good 
by it, so that private buyers could get the profits without the 
risks, are obvious, whatever the rationale behind the policy. With 
its re-selling policy, the PIDC's holdings were not that large 
- 
in 1959 they were about 10% of total industrial assets. 
This still leaves undiscussed the role of the government in 
agriculture. This was neglected in the 1950s, and its surplus 
expropriated for the sake of industrialisation. In the 1960s 
policy changed; the rural sector began to receive back a part of 
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what it had given. Fertiliser, water and new, highly productive 
seeds were well subsidised and their distribution increased 
substantially. A rural works programme was started in 1962/3 
to increase employment in rural areas. This mostly affected 
East Pakistan. A total of Rs. 925m was spent there under the 
programme from 1962 to 1968.1 This Thomas estimates to have 
created over 227m man-days of employment. These policies had 
their effects and, according to Falcon and Stern2, agriculture 
grew by 3.4% per annum from 1959/60 to 1968/69 (though most of 
the improvement occurred in West Pakistan). 
7.2. Development Performance 
Pakistan's success in attaining rapid industrial growth has 
been summarised above, in Table 7.1. Yet even a cursory look at 
the other figures in the table hints at a far lesssanguine picture. 
While the industry's contribution to GDP was nearly 13 times higher 
in 1964/65 than it had been in 1949/50, it still only contributed 
8.7% to gross product. Though industry grew three times faster 
than agriculture in the first half of the 1960s, the latter still 
made a far bigger contribution to the undoubted increase in per 
capita income of that period, as the industrial base was still small. 
It would seem, therefore, that Pakistan's rapid industrial growth 
did little to raise the living standards of the bulk of the population, 
despite the shifting of a large amount of resources to this sector. 
For this reason it is worth examining the main tenets of the 
governments policies, and the effects of these, in more detail. 
7.2.1. Private Savings, Investment and Taxation 
As stated above, the central thread of the government's policy 
was to shift income to the better-off sections of society (especially 
the business class) in order to raise the rate of savings and 
investment. "High incomes are more acceptable, politically and 
morally, because they are used chiefly for investment, rather than 
for conspicuous consumption., 
3 Papanek makes a rough estimate of 
industrial returns saved in one year (1958) of Rs. 770m - just over 
half of that year's total gross private savings of Rs. 1,430m. However, 
Griffin estimates that total productive investment based on private 
1 Thomas in Falcon and Papanek (1971), p. 230 
2 Falcon and Stern, in Ibid, p. 2. 
3 Papanek (1967), p. 243 
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savings was only from 1% to 3.3% of GNP during the Second Plan 
(1960-65). While private savings to the value of Rs. 6,677m were 
invested in directly productive investment during the plan period, 
investment in private housing amounted to Rs. 2,525m - spending 
on which the Planning Commission not surprisingly stated was most 
impressive in the upper income groups. 
' 
While the government attempted to restrict consumption through 
its controls on imports, it encouraged investment with a very low 
interest rate. As Khan points out2, -cheap credit either discourages 
savings or deflects them into non-productive assets such as gold; 
it also boosts profits, making it increasingly likely that a part 
of borrowed credit, being so cheap, would be consumed. Griffin 
informs us of a case-study carried out in Dacca (East Pakistan) in 
the early 1960s, which showed that as much as 42.5% of personal 
savings in the urban sector was in the form of gold, ornaments, 
consumer durables and housing. 
3 
"Income inequalities have not 
ensured markedly high rates of private savings - they have mostly 
led to privilege., 
4 Papanek too is aware that any austerity that 
there might have been occurred only in the early days. 
"Imports of such goods as cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, 
rayon yarn and cosmetics more than doubled between 1958 and 
1960, and have continued their rapid increase since... The 
relaxation seems to have been largely in goods bought by the 
middle-class - the civil servants, military officers, 
professionals and businessmen - whose support was important 
to a military government., 
5 
There is also evidence that those from whom the resources were 
taken, mostly the rural masses, could themselves significantly 
contribute to the nation's savings effort, and that pumping resources 
into the agricultural sector might have increased savings more than 
did the diversions of resources to the cities. Papanek himself 
estimates agricultural savings in 1958 as Rs. 340m, compared to 
industrial returns saved of Rs. 770m, of which only Rs. 510m was 
re-invested in industry. 
6 Bergan estimates that the rural areas had a 
higher personal savings rate (10.9%) than urban areas (7.4%). 7 
1 Griffin and Khan (1972), pp. 42/3 
2 Ibid, p. 14 5 Papanek (1967), p. 218 
3 Ibid, p. 40 6 Ibid, p. 203 
4 Ibid, p. 55 7 In Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 220 
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If even a part of these arguments is valid, the inequalities 
in income deliberately fostered by the government did not do all 
that much for savings (and, therefore, for investment based on these). 
Where, then, did the money come from for Pakistan's industrialisation? 
A large part came from foreign aid. In 1959/60 the proportion of 
investment funded by foreign aid was 31%, going up to 38% in the 
mid-1960s. 
1 A rapidly increasing share of Pakistan's export effort 
had to be used to service the debt - according to Griffin and Khan 
3.8% of foreign exchange earnings between 1955 and 1960, going up 
to 19.2% in 1969/70.2 
Though the businessman got his credit at interest rates kept 
low by the government (about 7 or 8%) the effective rate of interest 
that Pakistani society had to pay on aid (taking into account the 
effects of tied loans) Griffin and Khan estimate to have been at 
least 10%. 3 On top of this, because of the deliberately overvalued 
rupee, the entrepreneur imported his capital equipment and raw 
materials at substantially subsidised prices. "In other words, 
private businesses were acquiring resources at less than half their 
real costs. "4 At the same time there were low levels of taxation 
-a deliberate part of which was designed to create 'incentives' in 
the upper income brackets. Tax allowances for the well-off, 
especially the business sector, were so broad as to make a nonsense 
of the basic tax structure. Only incomes above Rs. 6,000 were liable 
to tax. There were very significant exemptions for divident income, 
capital gains, and certain rents. Allowances even went as far as 
permitting the deduction of Rs. 900-1,500 per annum for a car and 
Rs. 360 for a motor-bike. 
5 All in all, very few people paid taxes. 
In 1964-65 only 113,826 people paid personal income tax, and a mere 
4% of non-agricultural GNP was subject to income tax. All income 
from agricultural sources was exempt. 
It can be concluded that the government did little to save 
through the public sector, while its attempt to save through the 
private sector not only required the creation of sevem inequalities 
of income, but was also not very effective. Replacing private by 
public savings (i. e. through increased taxes) would, in the opinion 
1 Ibid, p. 188 and Papanek (1967), p. 220 
2 Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 188 
3 Ibid, p. 188 
4 Ibid, p. 192 
5 White (1974), p. 162 
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of Griffin and Khan, have increased savings (by cutting down the 
consumption of the well-off) at the same time as being more equitable. 
7.2.2. The Effectiveness of Industrial Development 
The above paragraphs have described what happened to the income 
that was shifted up the income scale. That resources went in this 
direction was an inevitable result of a number of policies including 
the maintenance of high tariffs. Tariffs provide a protected market 
for growing industries but they also raise prices and profits, thereby 
producing a shift in income from the masses to the business sector. 
Lewis and Guisinger found, taking into account the effects of the 
tariff structure and the scarcity prices that could be charged for 
goods subject to import restrictions, and therefore for their home- 
produced substitutes too, that the median industry of a sample of 
32 industries obtained 78.5% of its value-added from the overall 
protection system in 1963-64.1 Soligo and Stern found that some 
of Pakistan's largest and most profitable firms were highly inefficient, 
receiving their profits entirely through protection. Sometimes 
"the net subsidy received through tariff protection exceeds the 
total value added., 
2 Islam found, though, that at least a substantial 
core of Pakistan's industry was probably efficient. 
3 A number of 
observers mention that the low prices of capital equipment brought 
about by the government through the overvalued rupee and low interest 
rates resulted in an excessively capital-intensive industrial base. 
Thus, industrial growth was not able to soak up any of Pakistan's 
huge pool of unemployed. Furthermore, due to inefficiency, there 
was enormous excess capacity in some sectors. 
7.2.3. Concentration. in Industry and Finance 
If the government in Pakistan was unwilling to attempt to achieve 
social goals directly, through the use of its own resources, the 
rewards it had or felt it had to give to the private sector to 
achieve them were very substantial. In a situation ofscraxte resources 
needing very careful allocation, the channelling of huge rewards to 
the private sector was bound to result in a great deal of industrial 
concentration. Those few lucky enough to get licences (through 
which resources were allocated) got the rewards. Even by the later 
1950s industrial and financial concentration had become an important 
1 See discussion in White (1974) 
2 See Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 139 
3 Islam, in Ibid, pp. 149-68 
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political question which, by the late 1960s had become acute, 
reaching boiling-point in April 1968 with the announcement by 
the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission that economic 
power in Pakistan was concentrated in the hands of 20 families. 
A very careful study of the problem has been made by Lawrence 
White, who studied the period up to 1968. Rather than the 20 or 
so families which came to be of such political significance, he 
took as his sample 43 groups, 39 of which could be identified with 
particular families. Though the degree of concentration was not 
as great as the government's political opponents claimed at the 
time, it was nevertheless very substantial. The top 43 groups 
controlled over two-fifths of all manufacturing assets. Concentration 
was even greater as the top tenth or so of this group controlled 
over one quarter of the assets of the 43 groups. 
1 This degree of 
concentration becomes more acute when banking is included. At the 
end of 1968,65.9% of deposits were with private Pakistani banks, 
24.2% with government banks, 9.9% with foreign banks. Out of the 
four largest banks three were private. These three had 55.3% of 
all deposits and also happened to be controlled by three of the big 
industrial families. In all, seven of the 43 industrial groups 
controlled banks, with 60.3% of all deposits. 
2 
These facts show that there was a great deal of overlap in 
concentration between industrial and financial companies, enabling 
the big groups to extend their resources but also to keep them 
'within the family'. It is very important to see how this degree of 
concentration came about. It has already been mentioned that it 
depended very much on the allocation by government of scarce resources. 
The mechanism used was the licensing system. A licence was required 
for the initial investment, and for the subsequent importation of 
capital goods and raw materials necessitated by the investment. 
A licence meant very favourable treatment. This system of restrictions 
and incentives was highly profitable to industrialists, but they also 
acted as effective barriers to entry, and thus as a powerful mechanism 
for concentration. "Small wonder, then, that entrepreneurs who were 
within the licensing system, despite their claimed ideological 
commitments to a 'free enterprise system', were the most ardent 
1 White (1974), p. 65 
2 Ibid, p. 75 
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supporters of the licensing system. "1 
The final picture is one of an industrial base artificially 
bloated, inefficient to a large extent, but highly profitable to 
a small sector of society, and established at great cost to the 
rest of society. In some degree such economic changes might be 
inevitable in any developing country trying to industrialise at 
a fast pace, but there is no doubt that the government's policies 
brought about an unnecessarily high degree of inequity, with what 
was in reality only a partially successful industrialisation 
programme. While on the one hand a small sector of society became 
extremely rich (businessmen and politicians, military officers, 
and civil servants 
- 
and their relatives 
- who left their careers 
to join the business bandwagon), the rest of society remained 
economically stagnant or even became economically worse off. I 
will now briefly describe the situation of the masses over this 
period. 
7.3. The Social Costs of Pakistan's Economic Development 
7.3.1. Poverty in Town and Country 
Though Pakistan's industrial sector grew well from the time of 
independence, by the end of the 1960s the rural population was 
probably worse off than it had been at independence. Most of 
Pakistan's population was rural, more so in East than in West 
Pakistan. Swadesh Bose (with the usual qualifications about the 
limitations of the data) shows that rural income per capita in East 
Pakistan probably declined during the 1950s (from Rs. 271 to Rs. 238 p. a. ) 
It went up to Rs. 279 in 1963/42. Rural income per head was consistently 
about 40% of urban income per head. 
The decline in agriculture during the 1950s hit agricultural 
labourers the hardest (i. e. those with little or no land). Census 
data for East Pakistan show that the proportion of the agricultural 
labour force taken up by this group increased from 14% in 1951 to at 
least 17% in 1961. Bose estimates too that the real income of this 
group declined over the period. 
3 Thus, even with the considerable 
agricultural improvements of the 1960s, the agricultural labourer 
- 
the poor of the poor - was probably worse off in 1966 than he had 
been at independence, and saw the 'subsistence' level being pushed 
1 Ibid, p. 121 
2 In Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 254 
3 Ibid, p. 267 
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down to its lowest possible limits. Griffin calculates that 
the consumption per head of foodgrains was about the same in 
1963/4 (15 ounces per day), as it had been in 1948/9 (16 ounces 
per day). "The conclusion of all this is that the vast majority 
of the Pakistani population probably has a lower standard of 
living today, than when the country achieved its independence in 
1947. "1 
Nevertheless, even though the urban sector was the main beneficiary 
of the government's policies, not all urban dwellers gained. The 
benefits accrued solely to the elite. In fact A. R. Khan believes 
"that a very large majority of the rural population in each region 
is better off than an average industrial worker. " Industrial workers 
did not benefit from rapid industrialisation. The industrial sector 
was still small even by the late 1960s. It was not growing sufficiently, 
in absolute terms, to absorb Pakistan's great labour surplus, much of 
which comprised rural workers and farmers forced off the land by 
agricultural decline in the 1950s. This enabled industrialists to 
pay subsistence wages. A. R. Khan estimates that the industrial 
wage index (in real terms) declined by 3.6% from 1954 to 1962/3 in 
East Pakistan and 11.6% in West Pakistan? Griffin extended the 
analysis to include later years, using the same methods. He found 
that in West Pakistan in 1966/7 the real wage index was 88.8, about 
the same as in 1962/3, while in East Pakistan it was in 1967/8 101.1, 
showing a small rise over the 1962/3 level. 
3 Thus, as Griffin points 
out, in a period of rapid industrial growth, the average industrial 
wage declined or sometimes, at best, stagnated. 
These facts indicate that the benefits of industrialisation 
accrued solely to the industrialists and allied elites. This can 
be seen more clearly in labour's (factor) share of value-added. 
Khan estimates that in East Pakistan labour's share fell from 46.3% 
in 1954 to 28.8% in 1962/3. In West Pakistan it rose slightly from 
30.3% to 33.8%. 
4 White refers to figures in the West Pakistan Census 
of Manufacturing Industries showing that labour's share in 1967/8 
was only 26.4% of value-added, the rest going to capital. 
5 
The benefits that accrued to the top industrial families through 
the government's economic policies have already been described. 
1 Ibid, p. 38 
2 Ibid, p. 235 
3 Ibid, p. 205 
4 Ibid, p. 247 
5 White (1974), p. 31 
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Though the government did all it could to extract a surplus 
from the masses for this purpose, it paid little attention to 
welfare problems. 
"For example, over the entire period of planned development, 
that is, since 1954-55, the percentage allocation of development 
resources devoted to education never exceeded 6 percent; for 
health services only 2 percent; and for housing 20 percent 
(the latter even includes sizeable expenditures on the new 
capital at Islamabad and the second capital at Dacca). "1 
7.3.2. Regional Inequality: East against West Pakistan 
A large part of the inequality implicit in the discussion so 
far was reflected in inter-wing disparities, as East Pakistan was 
more rural than the Western wing, and it was the rural areas that 
bore most of the burden of development. Economic disparity between 
the two wings was the country's overriding political problem. It 
is commonly accepted that it was the cause of East Pakistan's 
secession. I shall be qualifying this argument somewhat, but 
there is no doubt that significant disparities existed, that 
government policies played some part in exacerbating them, and that 
the gap between the two wings was a contributory factor in the 
conflict that finally led to the break-up of Pakistan. 
It is difficult to be certain how much of the crucial disparities 
were the3esult of conscious exploitation by West Pakistan of East 
Pakistan, or how much, by contrast, they were the reflection of the 
exploitation by the urban sector of the rural sector. (East Pakistan, 
as I have said, being the more rural of the two areas). That West 
Pakistan urbanised at a faster rate was itself the result of 
government policies, but it has to be said that the two regions were 
at the outset not the same; West Pakistan was somewhat more developed 
right from the start and always probably had greater economic potential. 
My own belief is that the direction of exploitation was not primarily 
inter-regional. The urban elite and the landlords exploited the 
rural masses wherever they were. The West Pakistan urban elite 
and landlord class were as happy exploiting the West Pakistani as 
they were the East Pakistani rural masses. There just happened to 
be more rural poor to exploit in the Eastern than in the Western wing. 
1 Falcon and Stern, in Falcon and Papanek (1971), p. 6 
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The elite in West Pakistan would, moreover, have been quite happy 
to share this exploitation with the East Pakistan elite, and such 
co-operation more than once (right up to the very last moment) 
nearly came off; but these elites were very different in background, 
as will be shown, and this made co-operation difficult. 
The lynch-pin of the government's policy of rural exploitation 
was the consistent overvaluation of the rupee. Shortly after 
independence, less than a year after the government decided not, to 
devalue the rupee (after a number of competitive currencies had 
devalued), the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin, complained 
in the Constitutional Assembly that "there is no doubt that the major 
burden of the non-devaluation had to be borne by the East Bengal 
(East Pakistan) jute growers. "1 Though the non-devaluation decision 
probably hit East Pakistan most (because of its greater dependence 
on exports), exports of West Pakistan's raw cotton were also substantial; 
that region's poor cotton-growers therefore suffered too. However, 
the effects on West Pakistan became of decreasing importance as 
cotton was increasingly used to supply internal demand. Eventually, 
the government was forced to concede; it devalued in 1955. But even 
then the currency remained significantly overvalued. By this time, 
East Pakistan, less industrialised than its sister wing, and more 
dependent on exports, was certainly suffering more. "This is due 
to the fact that overvaluation involves a transfer of real income from 
exporters to importers, and thereby... from (East Pakistan's) exporters 
to (West Pakistan's) importers. " It seems very likely to me that the 
non-devaluation decision, and related policies, were designed to 
squeeze the peasants in general, not merely East Pakistani peasants. 
The goal of the rural squeeze was, of course, rapid industrialisation. 
Here, too, there was inequality. Though East Pakistan's industry was 
less concentrated than West Pakistan's, the structure of ownership 
there became a far more volatile political issue because of the extent 
of 'outside' ownership. The big industrialists were primarily based 
in West Pakistan, but they also had a large stake in the East Pakistani 
economy, as the following table shows. 
1 Report of Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, Legislature (3.10.50) 
2 Rahman, M. A. (1963), p. 52. 
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Table 7.2: Control of Manµfacturin Assets, East & West 
Pakistan, 1968 (Rs. m 
Assets Total Total Assets (1) (1) 
Controlled Manufacturing of Privately as a% of as a% of 
by leading Assets Controlled (2) (3) 43 families Firms 
(1) (2) (3) 
East Pakistan 1,740.8 5,581.8 3,859,9 31.2 45.1 
West Pakistan 4,563.8 9,477.2 8,405.1 48.3 54.4 
Total 6,314.6 15,059.0 12,265.0 41.9 51.5 
E. Pak. as a 
of Total 27.6 37.1 31.5 
W. Pak. as a% 
of Total 72.4 62.9 68.5 
Source: White (1974), p. 67 
Most of the big firms were controlled by groups based in West Pakistan 
(which does not mean the owners were indigenous West Pakistanis; most 
were refugees from India). It is clear from the above table that the 
top 43 groups had a substantial stake in East Pakistan. It is also 
clear, however, that this interest can only have been of secondary 
importance to them. 72.4% of their assets were in West Pakistan, 
where they controlled nearly half (48.3%) of total assets. They 
controlled less than one-third (31.2%) of East Pakistan's assets. 
Furthermore, a much higher proportion of industry (the difference 
between columns 2 and 3 in the above table) was owned by government 
agencies in East Pakistan than in the West wing, especially from the 
early 1960s, largely because the political danger of letting 'outside' 
ownership go any further in East Pakistan than it had. 
Another factor to take into account was inter-wing trade. What 
the big firms could not make in East Pakistan was exported there and 
often at high prices. This was one of the most important elements 
in West Pakistan's advantageous relationship with its sister province. 
This comes out clearly from an official study, carried out just after 
the loss of East Pakistan, on the problems this loss would cause to 
West Pakistani industry. 
"The East Pakistan crisis starting from March 1971 and 
cul minating in the complete closure of East Pakistan market 
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on West Pakistan producers by December 1971 has come 
to cause the most serious set-back to the country's efforts 
for economic development. "' 
Manufactures took up on average about half of the East wing's 
imports from West Pakistan. In 1954/5 the exact figure was 
56.3%, in 1964/5 60%, in 1970/1 45.1%. On the other hand the 
proportion of West Pakistani manufactures exported to East 
Pakistan was never overwhelming and, at least in percentage terms, 
it declined consistently over time. In 1954/5 18.1% of West 
Pakistani manufacturing output went to East Pakistan. In 1959/60 
this was 12.7%, and by 1964/5 the figure was down to 10.9%. 
2 
This official study, dealing, after all, with the loss of a 
major market, is extremely frank. After showing that West Pakistan's 
textiles exports to East Pakistan as a proportion of total textiles 
exports had fallen from 99% in 1954/5 to 30% in 1970/1, it goes on 
to point out that 
"inter-wing exports took place at much higher prices inclusive 
of internal excise taxes, than the prices fetched by overseas 
exports... the East Pakistani market was far more important 
for West Pakistan's cotton textiles than the overseas market 
from the point of view of value-added in manufacturing; 
including the provision of employment and the generation of 
income. ,3 
Though the significance of West Pakistan's advantageous trading 
relationship with its 'sister-wing' is clear enough here, it is 
equally clear that the East Pakistani market was of declining 
importance to West Pakistan. 
Having described the ways in which East Pakistan's resources 
were used, whether deliberately or not, to help develop West Pakistan, 
what were the effects of this process? East Pakistan's per capita 
income was about 91% of West Pakistan's in 1949/50. By 1959/60 
it had fallen to about 742. From 1949/50 to 1959/60 West Pakistan's 
per capita income by 13%; in East Pakistan it fell by 5.6%. From 
1959/60 to 1964/5 per capita income grew by 24.4% in West Pakistan, 
by 13.5% in East Pakistan. 4 
1 National Institute of Social and Economic Research: 
Need of the Hour (May, 1972), foreword. 
2 Ibid, pp. 30/1 
3 Ibid, pp35/6 
4 From Papanek (1967), p. 20 
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Some of the above inequality may have been the result of 
natural economic factors, but it was certainly exacerbated by 
government policy, some of which was quite overt in its apparent 
discrimination. Perhaps some bias, towards West Pakistan followed 
'naturally' upon its establishment of a greater industrial base 
than existed in East Pakistan. But even in the public sector, 
i. e. through the government investment agencies, West Pakistan 
was allocated more resources. According to Papanek1 by 1958 
almost two-thirds of net government investment made by the PIDC 
was in West Pakistan. (East Pakistan protests then led to the 
establishment of a separate PIDC for each wing). Figures for the 
other two agencies are as follows: 
Table 7.3: Re ional Distribution of Industrial Aid from 
Two State Agencies 
PICIC IDBP 
1961/2 1963 1961/2 1963 
West Pakistan 
East Pakistan 
67% 
33% 
61% 
39% 
67% 
33% 
42% 
58% 
7.3.3. The Social Costs of Development: Summary 
Pakistan's economic development entailed a considerable shift 
in income from the countryside to the cities, in particular to the 
urban elites. The rural masses in both wings of Pakistan suffered 
from this shift in income, but East Pakistan suffered more because 
it had a much larger rural population. Significant economic disparities 
existed between the two wings of Pakistan. It seems that there were 
in part the result of natural differences between them (apart from 
anything else, West Pakistan was many times larger than East Pakistan, 
and yet had a slightly smaller population to feed), but they were 
exacerbated by government policies that favoured the more urbanised 
and commercial areas. From quite early on West Pakistan was able 
to take advantage of East Pakistan's relative weakness in inter-wing 
trade and investment. However, the political dangers of this were 
recognised in the 1960s; government agencies tried to increase 
investment in East Pakistan, while much rural aid was also pumped in. 
At the same time, import substitution in East Pakistan went far enough 
1 Ibid, p. 90 
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to lead to a decline in West Pakistan's dominant trading position. 
There was some overt discrimination in favour of West Pakistan in 
the distribution of government investment spending and of foreign 
aid, but efforts were made to alter this, as can be seen from the 
creation of the EPIDC and from the IDBP's distribution of aid in 
1963 (see the above table). The discrimination was, as I have 
said, in favour of the cities against the countryside, and the 
rich against the poor. This did not, though 
, 
reflect the 
workings of an established class structure, as I shall show in 
the next section. 
7.4. Economic Development: The Political Background 
It can be argued that the issue of industrialisation and the 
means used for achieving this were, to some extent at least, a 
red herring. The greatest growth in the period under study was 
not in the industrial but in the tertiary sector (see table 7.4) - 
and a large part of this was under the control of government (in 
particular, spending on military personnel and the civil service). 
Government jobs were somewhat less important in Pakistan than in 
Nigeria because of the greater opportunities in agriculture and 
business, but they were still a very valuable source of opportunity 
as well as being the means of influencing policy in agriculture 
and business. 
Though the economic superiority of West Pakistan over its 
sister wing came to be large, surprisingly this was only to a 
minor extent due to the success of industry there. 
Table 7.4: Regional Per Capita GDP in 1959-60, Market-prices (in Rupees) 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964 65 
East West East West East West East West 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Other 
197 
3 
104 
165 
5 
161 
184 
6 
106 
161 
20 
173 
174 
9 
105 
156 
32 
185 
188 
13 
124 
165 
59 
240 
Total 304 330 297 354 288 372 326 464 
Source: Papanek (1967), p. 318 
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Though the contribution of industry in West Pakistan to 
income per capita went up from barely anything in 1949/50 to 
nearly 13% in 1964/5, the tertiary sector continued to contribute 
the most - about 50%. Its contribution to GDP per head was still 
four times bigger than that of industry in 1964/5. He who 
controlled government had access to resources, as well as control 
over industrial policy and over who should gain from this. 
Numerous class fragments were involved in the struggle for control. 
These class fragments were more substantial (and less communally 
influenced) than those in Nigeria. 
Despite rapid changes of nearly indistinguishable regimes in 
the 1950s, and the drastic change to a completely different type 
of regime in 1958 (in power until 1969), the fundamental tenets 
of Pakistan's economic policy never changed. This policy - the 
emphasis on rapid industrialisation and the continued insistence 
on achieving this through the private sector - was laid down from 
the very beginning, and retained. Why was this so? In Papanek's 
view, "inequalities in income contribute to the growth of the 
economy, which makes possible a real improvement for the lower-income 
groups. "1 Pakistan's industrialists were just tough-minded 
businessmen ("robber-barons") who took advantage of the opportunities 
the government gave to them. They did not pull the strings. 
"Contrary to some simplified neo Marxist analyses, the 
civil service and therefore the government were neither 
subservient to nor allied with either landlord or business 
"2 interests. Nor were they drawn from these groups. 
This might apply to the original formation of Pakistan's 
economic policies, but, as Papanek himself points out, during the 
period of rapid development businessmen moved into the power 
structure and politicians and civil servants into business. Other 
writers look less benignly on the policies that brought the latter 
situation about. 
"The government has created a small class of privileged 
industrial monpolists who reap enormous profits on a small 
turnover... this policy has been carried to such an extreme 
1 Ibid, p. 242 
2 Ibid, p. 139 
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that the standard of living of the majority of the 
population has declined, despite the fact that national 
income per capita has grown. "1 
Both Papanek and Griffin suggest that the government 'created' 
the industrial elite, but while the former sees this as a result of 
chance Griffin sees it as the result of conspiracy. I shall be 
arguing that the 'conspiracy' theory is somewhat too fanciful. On 
the other hand, I do not think it right to let everything be explained 
simply by chance. The creation of an industrial elite and very 
substantial inequalities was certainly deliberate, but the regional 
distribution of these inequalities was to some extent a matter of 
chance. There were conspiracies and alliances (between various 
class fragments), but these were created in order to exploit the 
masses, wherever they were; they were not created explicitly to 
exploit East Pakistan. 
The masses in both East and West Pakistan suffered from the 
inequalities produced in the name of development. East Pakistan 
suffered more because it had a larger rural population. But, more 
important than this, East Pakistan lacked an elite capable of 
receiving the fruits of this exploitation. If there was ethnic 
discrimination it was against this weak East Pakistani elite. There 
was no Moslem landlord or business elite to take advantage of the 
structure of exploitation, nor as yet a powerful political elite. 
However, as the East Pakistani elite lacked any significant economic 
foundation, it could only hope to achieve progress through politics. 
Despite the existence of pronounced class fragments in Pakistan, 
their fortunes were still largely dependent on politics. What we 
have, then, is a struggle between various class fragments which was 
carried out at the political level. 
Put as briefly as possible, Pakistan's political history can 
be summarised as an alternating sequence of political and military 
rule: first political then military, and then the same sequence over 
again. Only the second of the two political periods was democratic. 
The first political rulers were meant to establish a constitution 
and machinery for a fully democratic system. ' They never quite got 
that far. Though there were many changes of government in this period, 
1 Griffin and Khan (1972), p. 13. 
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those in power at any one time were always drawn from a small 
pool of politicians. The political struggle was intense, but 
until the encroachment of the military the struggle was always 
within this small pool of people. There was no general election 
based on universal suffrage until 1970. The political process 
in this first period was one of a continuous reshuffling of a 
limited pack of picture cards. 
During this period the conflict was entirely political in 
nature. There was little discussion of the direction that the 
economy should take. Indeed, there was little disagreement over 
this. The nature of the country's economic development was largely 
taken for granted. Politics was given primacy. This is because, 
as I have argued above, in developing countries power is the main 
economic resource. The struggle was between a limited number of 
groups for power, and the economic benefits that went with it. 
The political procrastination and the lack of disagreement over, 
or even concern for, the nature of economic development bespeak 
this clearly enough. There was no economic threat from outside 
the oligarchy. The threats were internal and political. In 
other words this was a period of intra-class rather than inter-class 
struggle. 
This oligarchical rule was, though, based primarily, but not 
entirely, in West Pakistan. There was a substantial difference in 
the background of the politicians of East and West Pakistan. The 
basis of this distinction lay in the nature of land-ownership. The 
landlords of West Pakistan were mostly Moslems, and land-ownership 
there was highly unequal. East Pakistan, a very densely populated 
area, was characterised by small holdings. Moreover, most large 
land-owners were Hindus, and these were easily dispossessed by the 
Muslim League government after partition in 1947. The results of 
the process can be seen from the following table, which applies to 
the 1950s. 
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Table 7.5: Distribution of Land-ownership 
West Pakistan East Pakistan 
Acres % owners % landlords Acres % owners %landlords 
0-5 64.5 15.0 0-5 77.0 42.0 
5-25 28.5 31.7 5-25 22.0 52.0 
25-100 5.7 22.4 25-40 
- 
3.0 
100-500 1.1 15.9 40plus 
- 
2.0 
500 plus 0.1 15.0 
In East Pakistan 94% of land-ownership is in holdings of upto 25 acres 
only. In West Pakistan less than 50% of the land is held in such 
small holdings. There over 30% of land is held in units of over 100 
acres, and by a mere 1.2% of all land-owners. 
The consequences of the distribution just described were a set of 
politicians based on wealth in West Pakistan (the large land-owners), 
and a set of middle-class politicians in East Pakistan based on positions 
of professional influence. The following table makes this clear enough. 
The bulk of Pakistan politicians had a foundation in land-ownership 
Table 7.6: Membership of the Constituent Assembly of 19551 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Landlords 
- 
28 
Lawyers 20 3 
Retired officials 9 5 
Businessmen 3 4 
Miscellaneous 8 
- 
Total 40 40 
(which did not make them a substantial or united class in their own 
right; they were a fragmented group whose power had been diminished 
greatly by the urban migrants from India). There was at the same 
time a growing industrial elite in West Pakistan and also a powerful 
bureaucracy. The elite in East Pakistan, by contrast, relied solely 
on politics. That the three West Pakistan elites just mentioned - 
politicians, businessmen and civil servants - all had a role in the 
determination of Pakistan's economic development, does not mean they 
in any way acted as a united class. In order to throw further light 
1 Jahan (1973), pp. 15 and 19 
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on this I will in the next section take a closer look at the 
backgrounds of those involved in Pakistan's economic development. 
7.5. Economic Development: The Protagonists 
West Pakistan's greater industrial development was the result 
neither of chance nor of conspiracy. I shall show that the three 
elites most involved in Pakistan's industrial development 
- 
the 
politicians, the civil service, and the industrialists themselves 
- 
had little socio-economic or geographical background in common, and 
in fact had different, even conflicting, interests. If there was 
no conspiracy, at least in the building of the foundations of Pakistan's 
development, nor was chance a factor. As regards regional disparities, 
West Pakistan always had greater potential and that is sufficient, in 
my view, to explain its faster economic development. However, that 
does not explain why particular people gained more from development 
than others, and that is what I am interested in. West Pakistan's 
industrial base did not develop faster because it had more industrialists 
(as Papanek argues); West Pakistan's industrialists grew rich because 
of West Pakistan's industrial growth and because the government greatly 
favoured the private sector. There was growth in East Pakistan too, 
but East Pakistan lacked a business elite which could take advantage 
of this. Had one existed, the government would have been happy to 
share the fruits of development with it. The three elites which I 
shall now be taking a closer look at were simply interested in squeezing 
the rural poor. They were not especially interested in squeezing 
East Pakistan. 
7.5.1. Pakistan's Businessmen 
There is no doubt that West Pakistan had a stronger business elite 
than East Pakistan, but the bulk of it was not indigenous. Most 
Moslem businessmen fleeing India at the time of partition went to 
West Pakistan rather than the East. Neither wing had at the outset 
many industrialists. The industrial class was fashioned by the 
government. Papanek's 1959 survey of 255 firmst (92 of all firms 
but responsible for 58% of value added by manufacturing) shows that 
the largest number of industrialists had originally been in trade. 
For 452 of the sample trade had been the primary occupation before 
1947, and for many others the secondary occupation. Only 177. had 
1 Papanek (1967) 
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been industrialists before 1947. Furthermore, only 6% of current 
industrial assets were owned by businessmen whose fathers had been 
in industry. Not only had most of Pakistan's industrialists 
initially been in trade, they also tended to come from religious or 
geographical communities with strong traditions of trade. 
To shed further light on the origins of the business elite I 
analysed the geographical backgrounds and migrations of 172 businessmen 
(mostly in industry), described in a Pakistani 'Who's Who' for 1959/60. 
As with Papanek's sample, this probably covered the most important 
firms in Pakistan. 
Table 7.7: The Origins of 172 Pakistani Businessmen 
Born in Now based in Total 
West Pakistan East Pakistan 
India 67 22 89 
West Pakistan 53 1 54 
East Pakistan 
- 
16 16 
Elsewhere (Moslem) 2 
- 
2 
Europe (ex-patriates) 7 
- 
7 
Not specified 2 2 4 
Total 131 41 172 
Source: Pakistan Trade Directory and Who's Who, 1959-60, 
Barque and Co. Ltd., Lahore. 
The table shows that of the 89 businessmen who had been born 
in India 67 (75%) went to West Pakistan and 22 (25%) to East Pakistan. 
(However, East Pakistanis might be under-represented in the 'Who's 
Who' as it was published in West Pakistan; as against this, the 
figures seem to fit the known circumstances). Of more interest 
than this is that West Pakistan had nearly as many indigenous 
businessmen as it received from India (53 against 67); so did East 
Pakistan, but at a considerably lower level (16 against 22 ; it 
is unlikely on the fact of it that this proportion would be affected 
by any under-reporting of East Pakistanis). This also means that 
nearly two-fifths of the total sample of 172 were indigenous West 
Pakistanis. I also managed to obtain additional information on 
53 of the 89 who were born in India. Nearly 20% of these 53 had 
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some business interests in what was to become Pakistan before 
partition. Only one of these men had interests in the Eastern 
wing before this time. Before partition, then, a large proportion 
of Pakistan's future businessmen already had a considerable nexus 
with West Pakistan. 
For those that migrated to either wing of Pakistan on or 
after partition, proximity (or relative proximity) seems to have 
determined their choice. 97 out of the 172 businessmen migrated 
from India to Pakistan (i. e. including a number not born in India). 
If a line were to be drawn mid-way through India, somewhere to the 
East of Delhi (running from North to South), it can be seen that 
60 (62%) of these 97 men went from the Western half of India to 
West Pakistan, 17 (18%)went from Eastern India to East Pakistan; 
small but equal numbers went from West to East and East to West, 
and there were a few more roundabout migrations. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from the above data that 
migrations were probably based on simple. geographical proximity or 
traditional ties. West Pakistan had a hugh border with India 
and many large Moslem communities lived fairly near this border. 
East Pakistan had a very small border and was isolated in a mostly 
Hindu part of the sub-continent. That West Pakistan attracted 
more men already established in business than East Pakistan was, 
therefore, not a matter of chance or conspiracy; there were cultural 
and geographical reasons.. for it. The same goes for the fact that 
West Pakistan already had a relatively large number of businessmen 
prior to partition. The simple fact is that in East Pakistan 
Hindus dominated business. 
7.5.2. Pakistan's Politicians 
As has already been indicated, the industrial class was actively 
created by the government; the government controlled nearly every 
aspect of the economy. "Even the most self-confident industrialists 
saw their position vis-ä-vis the government as that of supplicant, 
rather than master. "' As Papanek points out, the businessmen had 
different class backgrounds from both the politicians and the civil 
servants. University education was very important for the latter 
groups, especially for civil servants. Many entrepreneurs had no 
1 Papanek (1967), p. 138 
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more than a basic education, and only 27% of Papanek's sample 
had some sort of college education. 
' 
Both of the other two 
groups tended to view a career in industry as a matter of 'dirtying 
ones' hands'. The career structuresof politicians and civil 
servants were entirely different. 
Out of 31 ex-politicians, who had been in power before the 
1959 coup, mentioned in the 'Who's Who' for 1959/60 just referred 
to, 13 had started off in the legal profession, four had been 
administrators, two teachers and one had been in the military; 
three were land-owners and three were important businessmen. (The 
occupational backgrounds of the remaining five are not indicated). 
No doubt some landed or business interests are unstated; nevertheless, 
the contrast with the backgrounds of Pakistan's businessmen is clear 
enough. 19 out of the 25 politicians whose occupational past is 
given had been in the professions. The same applies to the politicians 
in power after the coup. Of the 14 described in the 'Who's Who', 
three were military men, five came from the administration, and five 
had been in the legal profession. Thus, out of the total sample of 
40 politicians for whom backgrounds are specified 29 had at some time 
had professional (including administrative) careers; another four 
came from the military. 
Another interesting factor is the difference in place of origin 
between businessmen and politicians. Of the sample of 31 politicians 
in power before the 1959 coup, place of birth is given for 26.23 of 
these had been born in Pakistan. Of the five whose birth-place is 
not given, four had been educated in India, one in Pakistan. Three 
of the four educated in India had gone on to work in Pakistan. The 
same goes for the politicians in power after the coup. Putting these 
together with the pre-coup politicians makes a total sample of 45. 
Only four of these have somewhere in India specified as their place 
of birth. The Pakistani political elite was, therefore, largely 
indigenous. No doubt immigrants from India, apart from the founding 
fathers of the main party, the Muslim League, found it relatively 
difficult to get political support in the new country. 
There were, thus, striking differences between the political and 
industrial elites. Their occupational backgrounds were very different; 
1 Falcon and Papanek (1971), p. 240 
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perhaps more important, most politicians were natives of Pakistan, 
most businessmen were immigrants from India. It does not seem 
likely that politicians had any reason to become the spokesmen of 
the industrialists, at least in class terms. Later on, as the 
latter group progressed, this was less so. 
"Now that they owned newspapers and financed political groups, 
their support was increasingly valuable in political life... 
Leading industrial families began to intermarry families 
important in the civil service, the military, and in the 
landed aristocracy... Some of the leading civil service, military, 
and political families began to invest in industry. "1 
But in the beginning, when the main foundations of economic policy 
were being laid, this state of affairs did not exist. 
The initial stress on private enterprise was in part due to the 
sheer inadequacy of the state apparatus at the time of independence 
and the desperate need for someone to develop the commercial and 
industrial possibilities of the country. In 1947 the government 
barely had the wherewithal to run the machinery of state, even its 
day-to-day affairs. It was happy to let anyone who eould"develop 
commerce or industry on their own initiative do so, and to encourage 
them with financial assistance. The nationalist government had no 
concrete economic ideology. Its nationalism was based entirely on 
independence from India, and the need to establish industries was 
for a long time seen in terms of competition with India, who before 
partition had processed the raw materials produded in the area to 
become Pakistan. So important was this need seen to be that the 
nationalist leader, Jinnah, had done much'to persuade some Moslem 
businessmen to establish industries even before partition. 
2 it 
seems entirely reasonable to view these efforts in terms of nationalism 
rather than as early collusion between political and business interests. 
In fact, Hannah Papanek points out that few of the businessmen who 
later became powerful in Pakistan had had this early association with 
politics. (On the other hand, though there were calls from some 
members of the early Muslim League for nationalisation and progressive 
taxation, the party could hardly be said to have had much time for 
1 Papanek (1967), pp. 140/1 
2 See Papanek, Hannah (1972) 
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socialism. As 163 out of the 503 members of the Muslim League 
Council were landlords and another 145 lawyers, this was hardly 
surprising. ) 1 
7.5.3. Pakistan's Civil Servants 
There is no doubt that the civil service in Pakistan is very 
powerful. Some consider that Pakistan has at times virtually 
been ruled by the upper reaches of the service. Most senior 
bureaucrats are 'career' civil servants. They enter at a young 
age through competitive examinations and work their way up on the 
basis of seniority. Like the politicians, in terms of background 
they have little in common with the business elite. The following 
table makes this clear. 
Table 7.8: Occupational Backgrounds of 432 Public Servant's Fathers 
Government service' 61.2 
Military 3.1 
Private from employees 2.1 
Land-owners 14.9 
Businessmen 10.8 
Legal practioners 3.2 
Medical 1.9 
Other/No response2 2.8 
Total 100.0 
Notes: 1 This includes 42 (out of the total 264) employees in the 
railways, semi-government agencies, and princely states. 
2'Other' includes a few politicians and religious notables 
Source: Ahmad, Muneer (1964), p. 53 
Ahmad ranked 46% of the above sample as having 'high status' 
backgrounds, with an equal number from 'low status' backgrounds 
(the rest being undetermined). His data was acquired from interviews 
of 432 gazetted civil servants based in Lahore(of which 31 were 
officers from the elite corps, the Civil Service of Pakistan, or CSP). 
It can be seen from the above that three-fifths of them came from 
civil service families. In fact 65.7% of the sample had themselves 
been in government service before coming to Pakistan. 2 But only 
97 out of the total 3,121 public servants who migrated from India 
1 Ibid, p. 9 
2 Ahmad, M. (1964), p. 39 
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had held high administrative posts in India. 
1 Coming to Pakistan, 
then, allowed them considerable mobility. This is confirmed by 
the fact that nearly half of Ahmad's sample of gazetted (i. e. high 
status) officers had low status backgrounds. A large number had 
fathers who were by no means very well off, though there was much 
variation here. The mean income of fathers was Rs. 532.5 per month. 
28.2% earned less than Rs. 300,10% above Rs. 1,000.2 28% of the 
fathers had degrees, while 79.4% of the civil servants themselves, 
had degrees. 3 Clearly, the educational background was strong. 
So was the urban background; 81.2% of the sample came from urban 
areas. 
To get some idea of the regional origins of Pakistan's early 
civil servants I examined the backgrounds of 163 top Pakistani 
bureaucrats (using data given in the 1955/6 edition of the Biographical 
Encyclopedia of Pakistan4). Of these, 28 were employed in East 
Pakistan, 135 in West Pakistan. This itself is not surprising 
as the capital (Karachi) was in West Pakistan. 79 of these civil 
servants had come from India, 66 from West Pakistan and 18 from East 
Pakistan. This clearly indicates the advantage that civil servants 
born in West Pakistan had. Their proximity to the capital meant 
that they were bound to dominate the upper reaches of the administration. 
Of the 79 who came from India, 68 went to West Pakistan and 11 to 
East Pakistan. There were also a few migrations between the two wings. 
Table 7.9: Origins of 163 Top Pakistani Civil Servants (upto 1955) 
From Working in Total 
West Pakistan East Pakistan 
India 68 11 79 
West Pakistan 63 3 66 
East Pakistan 4 14 18 
Of the 63 civil servants born in and working in Pakistan, 39 came from 
thePunjab. Thus nearly 30% of all of the civil servants in the above 
sample working in West Pakistan in the early 1950s came from the Punjab 
(and over half of these from in or around Lahore). This suggests a 
core of Punjabi influence over, though not domination of, a crucial 
sphere of activity. 
1 Ibid, p. 44 
2 Ibid, p. 57 
3 Ibid, pp. 48 and 57 
4 Published by International Publishers, Ltd., Lahore. 
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In sum, the civil servants were similar to the businessmen 
in terms of regional background. The dominant proportion came 
from India, and most of these went to West Pakistan, but this 
wing, in particular the Punjab, contained a significant core of 
indigenous businessmen (most of the indigenous businessmen in my 
sample were from the Punjab) and civil servants. However, these 
two groupds were unalike in class terms. They had very distinct 
class origins, the businessmen coming generally from families 
traditionally involved in small-scale trade, the civil servants 
from much more highly educated 'career' families with long traditions 
in administration. The latter had some class similarities to the 
politicians at least in terms of education and status. But they 
had dissimilar regional origins. Moreover, the politicians, being 
mostly indigenous, were much more closely connected to land in 
West Pakistan (that was their power-base) than were the civil 
servants, most of whom were migrants; the latter, meanwhile, had 
a greater attachment to career than did the politicians. There 
were, thus, considerable differences between the three elites just 
described. 
This still leaves undiscussed the core of West Pakistani, 
particularly Punjabi, members of all three elites. It is unlikely 
that these native West Pakistanis came to dominate the scene. 
Pakistan's peculiar history must not be forgotten. The major cities 
were swamped by migrants from Inida on and after partition. In 1951 
46.3% of the nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants of the major cities were 
such migrants. In Karachi, the figure was 57.1%1. Power in Pakistan 
had been in the hands of a small number of landed families. Now it 
fell into the hands of migrants who had led the Pakistan Movement. 
The distinction was profound. 
"Whereas the indigenous population of Pakistan was mostly 
rural, the migrants were mostly urban. And since the migrants 
had spearheaded the Pakistan Movement, they not only moved 
into the new country but also took over the command of its 
political, social and economic life. "2 
This is not exactly so, as, though the political leadership went to 
migrants, the indigenous land-owners held traditional political influence 
1 Burki, (1980), p. 12 
2 Ibid, p. 14 
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in their areas, and they remained in powerful political stratum 
Moreover, as Burki argues, they managed to maintain considerable 
political power in the succeeding decades. But, as Burki indicates, 
and as I have shown in section 7.5.2., the politicians through the 
1950s were becoming increasingly middle-class and, in particular, 
increasingly connected with the professions. Comparison with 
Table 7.6 makes this clear enough. It might seem odd that a class 
of politicians based on the land should barter away considerable 
economic power by actively encouraging the creation of a powerful 
industrial elite; for a class not used to industrial investment, 
though, this was necessary. It had to get its raw materials 
processed. 
1 
In sum, it would be difficult to claim, as some writers do, 
that these various elites formed a cohesive class. It is unlikely 
that they could from the outset, with their clear differences of 
geographical and social background (made even greater by the 
distinction between natives and migrants) and what must have been 
substantial differences of interest (land-ownership/bureaucratic 
control/private sector industrialisation), have coalesced as, or 
even cooperated as, a united class. There was considerable 
fragmentation, which receded only slowly. From the start there 
were clear conflicts of interest between what could be called little 
more than class fragments. That does not mean different class 
fragments did not gain differently from development. Though West 
Pakistan did not develop faster than East Pakistan simply because 
of its greater endowment of entrepreneurs, the latter certainly 
gained out of development, and gradually asserted enough influence 
over policy to at least protect their interests. East Pakistan 
simply lacked an elite which could gain from development in the 
same way. As the industrial elite was the creation of political 
decision it is worth looking at the motivations of the politicians 
in more detail. This I shall do in the next section, in which 
it shall be seen that the politicians in fact gave very little heed 
to industrial development. 
1 Personal interview with Mian Mumtaz Daultana, a big land-owner 
and ex-Premier of the Punjab. 
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7.6. The Motivationsof the Political Elite 
To throw further light on the balance of power in the first 
political period (1947-58) I have analysed one year's proceedings 
of the Constituent Assembly (later, after the eventual adoption 
of a constitution, the National Assembly). As there was no 
legislature before the 1956 constitution apart from the Constituent 
Assembly, it was responsible for law-making as well as for 
formulation of the constitution. It is only in the former role, 
as legislature, that I have examined the Assembly. Though I have 
analysed only one year's proceedings, I have examined the entire 
proceedings for that year, so the distribution of subjects discussed 
in that year should say something about the motivations of the 
politicians; this is especially so as a large part of the discussion 
concerned the budget, thus giving scope for the debates to cover 
a wide range of economic topics. But what the analysis in fact 
shows is that politics rather than economics was the primary interest 
of Assembly members. Rather little attention was paid to such 
major areas of the economy as industry or agriculture. The 
politicians were concerned with power, the regional bases of this, 
and the fruits of office. 
There is no doubt that the Assembly was not an effective 
legislative instrument, but in terms of Pakistan's power struggles 
it was exceedingly important, more so than the Nigerian assemblies 
were (but these were also more important in the power struggle than 
they were as legislatures). This was so because the Muslin League, 
the party that had led the Pakistan Movement, began to suffer a 
drastic decline in influence a few years after partition, until the 
point was reached where no party or faction had certain control over 
the Assembly. The intensity of the power struggle in the legislatures 
can be gauged from the fact that, as in Nigeria, violence occurred 
in one of the Assemblies (that of East Pakistan, not analysed below). 
30 members of the Assembly were removed by the police. A few days 
later the Deputy Speaker died, ostensibly as a result of injuries 
received in the Chamber. 
1 Because of their importance in the 
balance of power, analysis of Assembly proceedings is a useful way 
of gaining insight into the motivations of the political elite of 
the time. 
1 Feldman (1967), p. 29 
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There is a clear difference between the apparent concerns 
of the M. Ps. in Pakistan in its first political period and those 
of the M. Ps. of Nigeria in its first political period. Relatively 
little time was spent on praise or condemnation of government for 
its own sake. More significantly, very little time was spent on 
demands for local facilities, even though most discussion was on 
budgetary matters. The amount of space taken up by these categories 
in the year examined (1956) is given below (in percentages). The 
Constituent Assembly dissolved itself in 1956 and became the National 
Assembly, holding two sessions that year. 
Table 7.10: The Constituent Assembly and National Assembly 
of 1956, selected categories (%) 
Constituent National Assembl 
Assembly 1st session 2nd session 
Pro-government 2.2 1.9 2.2 
Anti-government 2.2 1.2 2.0 
Local facilities 0.5 0.8 
- 
A mere 21 out of 677 PQs in the National Assembly's first session, 
and two out of 193 in its second session, consisted of demands for 
local facilities. The Nigerian M. P! s. routine of praising the 
government and then asking for special consideration for his 
constituency is absent from the Pakistani parliament of this period. 
The reason for this is quite simple. The small number of M. Ps. in 
the Pakistani assembly of this time were not elected by universal 
suffrage. It was an elitist organisation. It did not contain the 
vast sub-elite of locally elected M. Ps. that the Nigerian assemblies 
held. As they had managed to stay at the centre since partition 
without calling a general election, they had no need to see any local 
area as their power-base, and there was more at stake than mere 
local influence. Being at the centre, unencumbered, they saw their 
interests elsewhere. 
7.6.1. The Constituent Assembly, 1956 
The crucial focus of interest was not local, but regional. 
The final session of the Constituent Assembly, before it became the 
National Assembly, though formally taken up nearly entirely with 
the budget, in fact spent the most substantial part of its time 
talking about the concerns of East Pakistan. This was the case 
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even though East Pakistani affairs were only formally tabled 
and taken up for discussion. Discussion of East Pakistan took 
up 43% of total Assembly time in this session. 
Altogether economic affairs took up 27.8% of Assembly time. 
Table 7.11 shows how this was split up (using the same technique 
as in my analysis of the Nigerian assemblies). There were no 
PQs at all in this Assembly. 
Table 7.11: Discussion of Economic Matters in the 
Constituent Assembly, 1956 (%) 
International Trade and aid 4.3 
Agriculture 7.2 
Industry 15.8 
Trade and commerce 1.1 
Government finance 11.9 
General development 18.0 
Unemployment/poverty 40.3 
Industrial relations/labour 
- 
Other economic 1.4 
Total 100.0 
There were one or two socialist-inclined members in the House, and 
interestingly, questions of poverty and unemployment were uppermost, 
though workers and industrial relations were disregarded. 
Social questions took up a mere 2.2% of total Assembly time, 
partly because health and education were provincial responsibilities. 
All political discussion took up 55.2% of total Assembly time. This 
was dominated by the East Pakistan question. 
Table 7.12: Political Discussion in the Constitutent Assembly 
1956 (Z) 
Constitution 0.4 
Pro-government 4.0 
Anti-government 4.0 
Nationalism 0.5 
East Pakistan regionalism 77.9 
Other regionalism 0.8 
Minorities 9.0 
Other political 3.4 
Total 100.0 
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'Minorities' include groups like Hindus and Christians who were 
minorities in society as a whole. They were not geographical 
communities, nor was there minority dissent within regions as 
there was in Nigeria. The regions were linguistically and 
ethnically fairly homogeneous. (There were five regions; East 
Pakistan counted as one while West Pakistan contained four). 
The discussion of East Pakistani complaints was so overwhelming 
that this itself can be divided into categories. Though the 
relationship of East Pakistan to the centre was a political question, 
naturally this revolved around economic matters. 
Table 7.13: Discussion of East Pakistan in Constituent Assembly 
Industry 22.5 
Agriculture 8.7 
Government finance 3.3 
Government jobs 11.7 
Military 10.3 
Education 0.9 
Food shortages 29.4 
Unemployment/poverty 1.0 
Other 12.1 
Total 100.0 
The disparities between East and West Pakistan dominated debating 
time even though the government had hoped that the new constitution, 
granting increased power to the provincial governments and soon to 
be brought into effect, would have satisfied the East Pakistanis. 
It was not to be so, at least not until the latter gained power 
later in the year. 
Notable in this Table is the interest in government and military 
jobs (most of the concern with the military was for employment in it). 
There are two sides to, this: i) East Pakistan wanted to gain more 
representation in the bureaucracy and the military in order to swing 
more power and influence in favour of the East, ii) the elite wanted 
jobs in these prestigious areas to swing more power and influence 
in favour of themselves. Both motivations were present, but there 
can be no doubt, from reading the long discussions in the Assembly 
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on these questions, of the frustration felt by Bengalis at the 
domination of these important job sectors by West Pakistanis or 
other non-Bengalis. Altogether, the concern of East Pakistani 
M. Ps. over (mostly elite) jobs for Bengalis took up about 10% 
of the total debating time of the House. The question of poverty 
in East Pakistan received little attention. The current food 
shortages there, which the government had done its best to alleviate, 
were used (by both sides throughout the year) simply to score 
political points. 
What we have in this period is a demand for a general decrease 
in regional disparities between the two wings, and for more jobs 
for East Pakistanis 
- mostly for the elite. Other regional (i. e. 
non-Bengali) demands are negligible, and there is not much expression 
of minority interests. Demands for local facilities were virtually 
non-existent. The communal structure of the political-economy of 
Pakistan was, thus, significantly different from that of Nigeria. 
In the latter country political competition built up from the local 
level up through tribes and sub-tribes to the regional level. In 
Pakistan communal conflict was entirely at the regional level. 
This is a factor of great zignificance. 
One similarity with Nigeria is the significant amount of time 
spent discussing corruption, the public service and the M. Ps'. own 
interests, which I have in the Nigerian case considered together as 
being concerned with the rewards and career opportunities of the 
elite. In the Constituent Assembly these took up about 6% of total 
debating time. Two-thirds of this was taken up with the public 
service. However, some of this was concerned with pay, conditions 
and career opportunities in the lower reaches of government employment, 
not solely with the prospects of the elite. 
7.6.2. The National Assembly, 1956 (First Session) 
In the first session of the National Assembly, convened only 
three days after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, East 
Pakistan took up a great deal less debating time - less than 10% of 
total debating time. 
- 
However, a massive number of PQs were asked 
in this session, and nearly half of these (305 out of 677) were on 
East Pakistan and the disparities between the wings. Nationalism 
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and the various forms of communalism together took up 14.5% of 
all debating time and 48.7% of all PQs. Internally these items 
were distributed as follows. 
Table 7.14: Nationalism and Communalism in the 
National Assembly (First Session) 
Debating Time (2) PQs (Number) 
Nationalism/unity 2.6 
- 
East Pakistani regionalis m 64.1 305 
Other regionalism 
- - 
Minorities 33.3 25 
Total 100.0 330 
No clear picture emerges from the rest of the Assembly's 
proceedings. 7.3% of debating time was devoted to other political 
affairs apart from those just mentioned. 27.2% was spent on 
economic matters and 14.4% on social matters. The distribution 
of economic discussion and PQs is given below. 
Table 7.15: Discussion of Economic Matters in the National 
Assembly (First Session 
Debating time % PQs (Number) 
International trade/aid 2.7 12 
Trade and finance 2.1 7 
Agriculture 34.9 3 
Industry 2.1 7 
Government finance 18.5 26 
General development 4.1 
- 
Industrial relations/labour 15.7 9 
Unemployment/poverty 14.4 33 
Local facilities 5.5 21 
Other economic - 4 
Total 100.0 122 
As in Nigeria, industry receives remarkably little time, infinitely 
less even than industrial relations. The latter, in fäct, gets far 
more attention than it does in Nigeria, as do unemployment and poverty; 
though the latter receives here less time than in the previous 
Constituent Assembly, it does absorb over a quarter of all economic 
PQs. (33 out of 122). Local facilities make some minimal showing, 
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more in PQs than in debates. So far, then, in comparison with 
Nigeria, there is significantly greater concern for the general 
problems of poverty and unemployment, far fewer (in fact, very few) 
demands for local facilities, while communal competition is 
expressed at the regional rather than at the local or other sub- 
regional level. 
A substantial amount of time was spent on things related to 
the career concerns of the elite. These took up 8.6% of all 
debating time and 11.1% of all PQs. The only other category to 
stand out is foreign relations, which took up about 23% of total 
debating time (in the Constituent Assembly it had been minimal) 
and 8.3% of all PQs. It was, thus, at least in debates, the 
dominant theme. (A very large part of the discussion of foreign 
affairs was introduced by a private motion on the conflict with 
India over Kashmir). 
So far I have not shown the distribution of discussion and 
PQs on East Pakistan. This is given below. 
Table 7.16: Discussion of East Pakistan in the National 
Assembly (First Session 
Debating time Z PQs (Z) 
Government finance 5.6 5.3 
Industry/trade 5.8 12.8 
Agriculture 2.5 0.9 
Food shortages 7.2 - 
Unemployment/poverty 9.5 
- 
Government jobs 16.4 67.1 
Military jobs 6.5 2.9 
Education 
- 
1.3 
Other/general 46.4 9.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
The largest category here, by far, is that concerned with government 
jobs, in both debate and PQs. This, added to the interest in 
(mostly senior) military jobs, indicates a very significant concern 
for elite and sub-elite employment. I have argued that PQs reflect 
more accurately the interests of M. Ps. than does the distribution 
of debating time - largely because the formal nature of the debates 
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is out of the control of individual M. Ps., whereas they are 
entirely responsible for which PQs they might choose to ask. 
While less than 10% of debating time was spent on East Pakistan 
and East-West disparities, 45% of a very large number of PQs 
was concerned with these matters. 
That 70% of this vast number of PQs was concerned with 
government and military jobs for East Pakistanis is a sufficient 
indication of the career interests of the East Pakistani elite. 
As an example, in one PQ an East Pakistani M. P. asked how many 
East Pakistani heads of consulates and diplomatic missions there 
were. (The answer was three out of 31 in 1950 and 11 out of 43 
in 1955 
- an increase from 10% to 25%)1. It is difficult to 
see precisely how getting a few more East Pakistani diplomatic 
chiefs could help anyone other than the East Pakistani elite. 
Nor could it be said that these posts were important in terms 
of the balance of power, or the relative well-being of the East 
Pakistan masses. Yet this matter so concerned one East Pakistani 
leader that he seems to have convinced himself that jobs for the 
elite were of crucial importance to the Bengali masses. Told 
that under the new constitution there would be parity of senior 
diplomatic posts between East and West Pakistanis, but that the 
whole process would take time (as it depended upon the retirement 
rate of current senior diplomats) the M. P. responded to the 
government's statement that it would be impossible to state precisely 
how much time, in the following terms. 
"When will the Government exercise its brain for calculating 
this?... Is not the Minister aware that the whole country 
is asking the Government to exercise its brain? 
2 (My emphasis) 
7.6.3. The National Assembly, 1956 (Second Session) 
The final parliamentary session of 1956, the second of the new 
National Assembly, was unique. For the first time the East Pakistanis, 
under Suhrawardy, were in power. The Muslim League's power at the 
centre had indeed been fragile. In this session thirteen pieces of 
legislation and one private motion were introduced. Some were 
exceedingly minor. Apart from two bills concerning the property 
of both emigrants and immigrants, the only other legislation of 
1 National Assembly Debates (26.3.56) 
2 Ibid (26.3.56) 
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importance was the Electorate Bill. This was of major significance. 
Formally, 58% of the time of the Assembly was taken up with this bill. 
Another 26% was taken up with a private motion, which was again about 
the food shortages in East Pakistan. In terms of themes, there are 
really only two: constitutional discussion which took up 45% of 
parliamentary time, and East Pakistan, with 17%. By contrast, 
industry took up 1.2%, agriculture 1.3%, industrial relations 0.1%, 
unemployment and poverty 1%, general development 1.1%, and all social 
matters 3.6% of the Assembly's time. All attention was focused on 
political questions, and the food shortages. 
The Electorate Bill, which dominated the Assembly, reflected 
similar circumstances to those discussed in the case of Nigeria. 
It reflected the process of regional conflict, but also the struggle 
for power between various elites. The question was whether Moslems 
and Hindus should vote as joint or separate electorates. The Awami 
League (the leading East Pakistani party) wanted joint, the Muslim 
League separate electorates. The latter had tradition on their side, 
a tradition of separation from Hindus, which they saw as fundamental 
to Pakistan. Ideology, on both sides, masked concrete political 
pros and cons. The West Pakistani elite feared that joint electorates 
would mean the Hindus in East Pakistan, no longer able to guarantee 
returning Hindu M. Ps. from their areas, would then vote for the Awami 
League. East Pakistan would then become politically homogeneous 
while West Pakistan was becoming increasingly politically fragmented. 
With a somewhat larger population than West Pakistan, East Pakistan 
would then provide a superior power base for its politicians. The 
Awami League said that the Hindus simply wanted to consider themselves 
as Bengalis and did not therefore need any electoral protection. 
Hypocrisy was readily apparent on both sides. But it is the only 
instance in the Assemblies of a. minority within a region coming into 
the political battle. 
So dominant was the constitutional discussion that hardly any 
other themes, apart from East Pakistani regionalism, cropped up in 
debate. Altogether political questions took up 91.4% of all 
debating time and 37.8% of all PQs. Thus hardly any attention was 
paid to economic and social matters in the debates of the House. 
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Discussion and PQs on political questions were distributed as 
follows. 
Table 7.17: Political Discussion in the National Assembly, 
(Second Session) 
Debating time (') PQs (Number) 
Nationalism 5.8 
- 
East Pakistani regiona lism 14.5 56 
Other regionalism - - 
Minorities 5.7 16 
Constitution 67.4 
- 
Pro-government 3.3 
- 
Anti-government 3.0 1 
Other political 0.3 - 
Total 100.0 73 
The large number of PQs asked on East Pakistan and disparities 
between the two wings were a left-over from the previous session, 
i. e. they were in the main asked then, before the Awami League 
came into government, but were due for answer in the current session. 
In sum, the above analysis of one year's Assembly proceedings 
reveals a broad concentration on only a few subjects. They were 
dominated by the growing conflict between the two wings, East and 
West Pakistan, culminating in the final session in the great political 
wrangle over the communal nature of the electorates. The main theme 
was, thus, political, and in the final session the debates were 
almost entirely concerned with the political struggle between the 
two camps. All in all, the fundamental nature of economic development 
received little attention. Its direction was rarely questioned. 
There were no significant debates on the road that economic development 
should take. Industry and agriculture, for instance, received little 
discussion throughout the year. The East Pakistani-based government, 
which came into power towards the end of the year, offered no significant 
economic proposals in its thirteen months of rule. The short tenure 
of the governments of this period is one reason for this neglect. 
Power was highly precarious. It was difficult enough surviving. 
But the point is that economic factors did not form the basis of the 
political battle. There were no substantial differences in economic 
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ideology between the main parties - except in terms of regional 
competition. The Assemblies were primarily concerned with the 
battle between East and West Pakistani politicians over the 
economic disparities between the two wings. But there is some 
evidence, as I have shown, that the concerns of the East Pakistani 
politicians were largely to do with elite and sub-elite job 
opportunities. This suggests that economic competition between 
the two wings was, at this level, largely of an intra-class nature. 
However, unlike in Nigeria, communal differences were not concerned 
with lower middle-class opportunities. Pakistan had a much more 
pronounced elite, and its interests were elite interests. 
As against this, one aspect of the economy which did receive 
significant attention, at least significantly more than in Nigeria, 
was the condition of the poor. Poverty, unemployment, and also 
labour, were not neglected, even if they were hardly dominant themes. 
This suggest a greater recognition than in Nigeria of class factors, 
and, indeed, there were certain mildly socialist elements in the 
Assembly. Inter-class conflict was at least of some, if very minimal, 
significance. It became completely irrelevant during the political 
wrangles of the final session, when poverty, unemployment and labour 
made negligible showings during debates. 
There is little in the proceedings of the above Assemblies that 
speaks strongly of particular class interests. The major conflict 
is entirely communal. But this communal antagonism is very different 
from that of Nigeria. It lacks the local element. It is not built 
up from small localities., through sub-tribes, to major tribes, and 
finally to the regions. The conflict, as expressed in the Assemblies 
at least, was between two major regional blocs -East and West 
Pakistan. Their leaders did not depend on communal support of a 
local nature. They represented their regions as a whole. They 
were cut off from the masses, acting as independent elites. And 
their elite interests are suggested by the nature of their complaints, 
about regional disparities, complaints which were centred primarily 
on job opportunities, in particular job opportunities of an elite 
and sub-elite nature. Though some of the general economic discussion 
touched upon the problems of poverty and unemployment, the East 
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Pakistanis were little concerned with this. Their interest was 
in the East-West disparity in high level career opportunities 
rather than in the condition of the masses of the two wings. In 
fact, certain of the West Pakistani politicians showed more concern 
for the fundamental problems of the country. 
7.7. Conclusion 
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn on the nature of 
Pakistan's political-economy from the above account of Pakistan's 
'first period' (its political but non-democratic period). The 
battle over scarce resources was as powerful in Pakistan as it 
was in Nigeria, and initially at least it was communal in nature. 
The communal strife between Moslems and Hindus upto and around 
the time of partition was quite savage. The fight over who should 
get what was clearly based on this major religious distinction. 
(There were other religions and ethnic elements too, of course). 
This receded after partition, but is still a powerful factor in 
many parts of the sub-continent. It was certainly a factor in 
Pakistan. The distinction between East and West Pakistanis (or 
Bengalis and non-Bengalis) was crucial to Pakistan's political 
history. 
It is not possible to deny the communal element of this 
confrontation. But Pakistan was acquiring an increasingly class 
based social structure. It had a quite substantial professional 
group and a fairly well established land-owning elite; the business 
class grew rapidly; and it also had a powerful bureaucracy. However, 
these could hardly be taken to comprise a clear part of an established 
modern class structure. They were merely class fragments (except 
for the land-owning class, a powerful relic of a more feudal age). 
There were considerable differences of interest between them, and 
none of them by themselves could hope to dominate the power structure. 
The political history of Pakistan has been largely one of intra-class 
conflict between these various groups. But, as one of these elites 
(the professional politicians of East Pakistan) was ethnically 
different from the other (West Pakistani) elites, this also had a 
powerful communal element. 
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There were particular reasons for the socio-economic 
differences between the elites of the two wings. In West Pakistan 
the lack of foreign control over industrial and commercial assets 
meant that there was vast opportunity for West Pakistani businessmen 
to profit out of economic development (not as in Nigeria). In East 
Pakistan Hindus dominated the business sector. The land-owning 
class in West Pakistan was not in competition with these businessmen; 
in fact it had everything to gain from cooperation with them. It 
needed an industrial base to process its cash crops. (Eventually, 
these land owner-politicians became directly involved in industry 
themselves). In East Pakistan there were ho opportunities of 
profit on the land, land-ownership being much more fragmented. 
The Western wing also had certain inherent economic advantages. 
For these reasons opportunities for advancement were very 
limited in East Pakistan. The elite, based on the professions, 
could only hope to progress through gaining power and altering the 
structure of rewards by fiat. What this elite wanted was the 
right to exploit its own people (the Bengalis) and not let this be 
done by outsiders (West Pakistanis or Biharis). I do not believe 
West Pakistan was exploiting East Pakistan. Land-owners and 
industrialists joined hands to exploit the masses in both wings 
of the country, but East Pakistan had no significant land-owning 
or business class to join in the exploitation, so the exploitation 
appeared to be by West Pakistan of its Eastenmcounterpart. 
One of the elites which gained out of Pakistan's development 
policies was the business elite. It was, in fact, the newest of 
the elites, positively jacked into that position by decision of 
the government, which desperately needed rapid industrial expansion 
but lacked the initial wherewithal to play a significant direct 
role in this. Eventually all the West Pakistani elites gained 
from this industrial and commercial expansion - all became directly 
or indirectly involved in it. But the East Pakistani elite found 
itself left out of the picture; lacking a power-base of its own 
this elite sought communal backing in its competition against the 
elites of West Pakistan. As there was no significant local or 
minority communal backing to be found (though the Awami League 
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sought and obtained the support of the Hindu elite), the lowest- 
level communal boundary that could be used as a 'defence' against 
opposed class fragments was that of the region. The actual 
nature of the conflict between these class fragments, and the 
effect of the communal element and of the intrusion of inter-class 
elements on this conflict, will be described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT :A DELICATE POLITICAL BALANCE 
So far I have described the economic background to Pakistan's 
major crisis, and the interest groups who had different things to 
gain from development but lacked either solid communal backing or 
a solid class backing to support their claims. In the West the 
landlord politicians had some traditional influence and authority 
but lacked any united communal support. They were a powerful 
class from an earlier age facing' increasing competition from 
various middle-class fragments. In the East the elite was a tiny 
class fragment with no strong class basis, but it eventually managed 
to build up powerful communal support. In this chapter I shall 
examine the conflicts that arose when the delicate balance in which 
the above groups figured broke down. However, I have not described 
all the forces involved in this, such as religious groups or the 
'lumpen proletariat'. Most developing countries are highly fragmented 
not only economically but socially. 
Most developing countries are also delicately balanced systems. 
It takes only a small force, whatever its nature, to upset the balance 
and set in motion a chain of events which might culminate in major 
conflict. The religious fanatics in Pakistan have twice played 
such a role. In seeking to bring down a secular government they 
created religious disturbances, which brought down the government 
but did not change its secular nature. This event, the climax of 
which was the rioting in the Punjab against the Ahmediya sect, also 
helped strengthen the hand of the Governor-General and the bureaucracy 
against the Prime Minister and the politicians. With such a delicate 
balance of forces such indirect effects are inevitable. Islamic 
fundamentalists played a big role in the downfall of Bhutto. The 
military regime which followed then proceeded to Islamicise the 
constitution. 
Pakistan's history has been a series of crises of ever-increasing 
magnitude. One crisis has generated the next. The death of Jinnah 
and the assassination of his successor Liaquat All Khan, both occurring 
early on in Pakistan's history, were not such crises. They were merely 
misfortunes which removed the only people who could perhaps have 
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maintained some initial stability. The first real crisis where 
a conspicuous clash between rival social forces can be discerned, 
and which significantly affected the balance of social forces, 
was the anti-Qadiani (or änti-Ahmediya) riots of 1953. But these 
(and other) disturbances, had no radical effect on the social 
structure. Revolutions are rare. Lesser movements, though, 
often lead to a change of regime, and are more common. Such 
disturbances tend to be urban and are often manned largely by 
middle-class people (or people with middle-class aspirations), 
particularly students. Often the particular cause of the 
disturbances is peripheral both to the underlying motivations of 
those involved and to the final outcome. 
In this chapter I shall describe a number of serious disturbances 
including the period of the civil war. In the case of four of these 
the disturbances were sufficiently great to lead to a break-down 
of the political balance, resulting in a change of regime, a change 
in the type of regime, or, in the case of the civil war, in the 
break-up of the country. In the case of one- of these, the 
anti-Ahmediya riots, I shall spend little time in description as 
it has already been well reported. The riots occurred in early 
1953. The Ahmediyas (or Qadianis) are a minority sect which 
orthodox Moslems consider to be heretical. The movement, which 
was aimed at persuading the government to support the claim that 
the Ahmediya sect was not a part of the Moslem faith, was a very 
powerful one, and it was used by various political factions, both 
within the ruling Muslim League and outside it, for their own purposes. 
The Muslim League Chief Minister of the Punjab, Daultana, is said 
to have given the rioters implicit support, at least at the start. 
Certainly those within the Muslim League opposed to the Prime Ministership 
of Khwaja Nazimuddin hoped to see him toppled by the disturbances. 
This is in fact what happened. The death toll mounted and it 
became increasingly clear that the secularly inclined central 
government did not know whether to support or act against the 
fundamentalists. Eventually it called in the army to quell the 
riots, but both Daultana and Nazimuddin were forced to resign. 
Nazimuddin was simply replaced by another Muslim League man. These 
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were not the only heads that should have rolled. A number of 
religious leaders (including the famous Maulana Maudoodi) were 
sentenced to death for their part in the riots, but the fear of 
further disturbances was so great that these sentences were later 
rescinded. Though the fundamentalists failed to usher in a new 
Islamic government (one of their underlying aims) they had shown 
that they could upset the political balance. 
8.1. The Karachi Disturbances of January, 1953 
These disturbances started just a month before the anti-Ahmediya 
troubles. 
. 
They are the only example that I shall discuss where 
no change of regime occurred as a result. Yet the ingredients were 
essentially the same. The disturbances started very simply, with 
a demonstration by local students in support of improved facilities, 
and it ended with eleven deaths, 80 demonstrators and 163 policemen 
hurt, and 400 arrests. 
1 Rioting lasted three days, during which 
time the army was called in, but only after the police had killed 
a number of people. Though specifically a student matter to start 
off with, other interests became closely involved as the disturbance 
escalated. Protest demonstrations also occurred in Lahore and 
Dacca, in sympathy with the dead of Karachi. One report puts the 
number of participants in the Lahore demonstration at 10,000, and 
the number in Dacca at 20,000, though there was no violence in 
either case. 
2 
The Chief Commissioner of Karachi blamed student communist 
elements for the disturbances. That 'other elements' were involved 
seems likely especially from the fact that only two of the eleven 
killed were students. But that the riot was not a communist student 
plot seems clear from the fact that certain right-wing elements 
stated afterwards that they were either themselves involved in the 
student demonstration from the start, or that they supported it 
once it had started. The Islami Jamiat Tuleba (IST), a right-wing 
Islamic student organisation, itself explicitly denied the 
Commissioner's claim. It firmly linked itself to the student 
cause per se, as the following statement issued by the IST, makes 
clear. 
1 Dawn newspaper, Karachi (11 and 12/1/53) 
2 Dawn (11.1.53) 
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"The very fact that the workers of the Islami Jamiat 
Tuleba (an opponent of both Capitalism and Communism) 
braved the repression of the police shoulder to shoulder 
with other students is sufficient to convince that there 
was nothing Communist about the students' demands. "1 
Furthermore, the students received verbal support from a number 
of Centre and Right-wing politicians, including some from the 
ruling Muslim League, and more significantly perhaps, Maulana 
Maudoodi, Pakistan's leading Islamic fundamentalist (and who was 
to play an important role in the anti-Ahmediya riots). 
One final bit of evidence on the right-wing contribution to 
the disturbances comes from the nature of some of the damage done. 
Several wine stores were looted, with many bottles of alcohol 
being either removed or destroyed. The Commissioner implied, 
but could not confirm, a possible connection with the Islamic 
fundamentalists. No doubt some of the looting was nothing more 
than looting. But four wine stores were wrecked or partially 
wrecked, one had its furniture burnt, and in the case of three 
shops much alcohol was deliberately poured away; in the case of 
the burning, alcohol was used to set fire to the furniture. 
2 This 
strongly suggests an Islamic element in the disturbances. In fact, 
the shooting was supposed to have started when rioters refused to 
let the fire-brigade put out the fire in the one liquor store which 
was burnt. The first death occurred during this incident and it 
was from this point that the struggle escalated. 
The co-operation of Islamic, right-wing elements does not mean 
that left-wing elements were absent. Far from it. The students 
also had the support of the left-wing newspaper publisher and 
Member of Parliament, Mian Iftikharuddin, who had left the Muslim 
League to form his own party. The government was certainly concerned 
at the left-wing involvement in the riots as it subsequently arrested 
a number of trade union activists. 
I have already implied that there was some political involvement 
in the disturbances too. Both Mian Iftikharuddin and Maulana 
Maudoodi, from opposite sides of the political spectrum, gave 
1 Dawn (13.1.53) 
2 Dawn (11.1.53) 
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verbal support to the students, the former becoming somewhat more 
directly involved. Apparently eighteen members of the Jinnah Awami 
League resigned from the party because, according to them, party 
workers had infiltrated the student demonstration in order to 
"create trouble". 
l Eye-witnesses also apparently said people from 
a number of political parties were in the crowd. 
Other support came from groups having a close (middle-class) 
link with the students; namely journalists and the legal profession. 
The journalistic contribution came from the fairly extensive reporting 
of the riots and of its causes, as well as from editorial condemnation 
in more than one paper of the actions of the police and the attitude 
of the authorities. The following is from a Dawn editorial. 
"The state of education in Karachi has been chronically 
disgraceful. In the editorial and correspondence columns 
of this newspaper we have repeatedly dealt with the subject. 
The students were justified in seeking to ventilate their 
grievances in a spectacular manner...., 
2 
The other group which supported the students after the event 
was the legal profession. The President of the Bar Association 
put out the following statement after the initial violence. 
"After a thorough inquiry into the facts and the circumstances 
leading to the incidents of today's firing, I am confident 
that the action of the firing was most inopportune, uncalled 
for, and illegal. It betrays a hopeless state of affairs 
on the part of those who were at the helm of the affairs... 
I have gone through the demands of the students and I am 
convinced that they are genuine and cannot be denied by any 
right thinking man. "3 
The importance of such support is the prestige it confers on the 
actions of the students and the 'professional' nature of its 
condemnation of the government. 
An important, more direct impetus was provided by local 'ruffians', 
the lumpenproletariat of Karachi and jobless migrants, etc. 
- 
what 
are simply called 'goondas' (trouble-makers) in Pakistan. There 
is no doubt that these played a significant part in the disturbance. 
1 Dawn (14.1.53) 
2 Dawn (9.1.53) 
3 Dawn (9.1.53) 
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It does not help that all those arrested were officially labelled 
as 'goondas' by the police, but undoubtedly many of them were of 
the sort I have described; not many of those arrested were students, 
and only eighteen students remained in police custody after the 
riots. 
1 
It is the presence of this volatile lumpenproletariat, and 
of a number of disaffected groups, including political elements 
trying to turn things their way, that make such disturbances so 
significant. The students themselves are a very important force, 
as they have proved in many developing countries. The conflict, 
though, was not of a class nature; the wide variety of very 
different groups participating in or reacting to the riots makes 
this clear enough. Some were students, some jobless migrants, 
some were from right-wing some from left-wing parties, some were 
Islamic fundamentalists, some from the liberal professions. Nor 
were the disturbances part of a concerted movement against the 
government. They were too haphazard, and too many different groups 
were involved, for that to have been the case. There were numerous 
different motivations and levels of spontaneity. Some groups 
joined the disturbances with foresight, some joined spontaneously, 
but all tried to make capital out of them by airing their particular 
grievances. 
Three groups I have laid particular stress on - students, lawyers, 
and journalists - have in common a middle-class background, liberal 
beliefs, and professional aspirations. There is a certain element 
of bourgeois elitism implicit here. This is quite well exemplified 
by the editor of Dawn in another editorial on the subject. 
"On the proper education of the future leaders and 
administrators of this country depends the well-being of 
Pakistan much more than even industrialisation and economic 
progress. "2 
This extraordinary statement helps reveal the strength of the class 
connection between the students, journalists and lawyers. The 
students are seen (by both of the latter groups in fact) as the 
future 'professionals' of the country. What the country needs, 
apparently, is professional leadership, not radical political, 
economic and social policies. 
1 Dawn (15.1.53) 
2 Dawn (11.1.53) 
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This would-be triumvirate is important, and was especially 
so in the early period of democratic (or semi-democratic) rule. 
It is of great significance that the government was very quick to 
concedethe students' demands (or most of them) after the disturbances, 
even during them. Early on in the trouble-period Karachi's Islamia 
College announced a 15% cut in tuition fees. This is interesting 
as Islamia Colleges, responsible for Quranic instruction, were not 
part of the liberal establishment of higher education in general. 
But the class connection was strong. The founder of the College 
said that he was 
"convinced that most of the grievances of the students 
are correct and I am sorry to find that the educational 
authorities have treated them not as students but as mill-hands. "' 
It would be interesting to know how he thought mill-hands should be 
treated. Later in Pakistan's history, other groups were to be of 
more importance than the middle-class 'triumvirate' of students, 
lawyers and journalists - in particular the military. The role of 
another group, the Islamic fundamentalists, who participated in the 
above disturbances, was to be of great significance during the anti- 
Ahmediya riots, already described. 
The above descriptions of two major disturbances in Pakistan 
I hope indicate the delicate balance of forces which characterised 
Pakistani society at that time. What they above all show is the 
importance of urban conflict in affecting the polity. In both 
cases disturbances in one urban centre triggered off either protests 
or further disturbances in other urban centres, thus putting more 
strain on the political system. The urban nature of these conflicts 
is very important. Groups opposed to the government do not need to 
appeal to rural interests, which are very difficult to invoke, in 
order to bring down the regime. In all big cities in developing 
countries there are many disaffected groups, including many unemployed 
(often migrants from other parts of the country). Various political 
and other interests latch on to disturbances which become inflamed 
by the involvement of the above disaffected groups (even if they 
are not involved at the start). The political parties hope, by 
contributing to the activity, to trigger off something bigger. 
1 Dawn (9.1.53) 
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The interests involved might be revolutionary, they might be 
reactionary. Frequently both are involved. 
The situation is, thus, very complicated, and urban disturbances 
in the Third World can have very unpredictable effects. In Pakistan 
there were a very large number of interests which might contribute 
to such disturbances, but it is possible to discern two very general 
categories: on the one hand there are the more conservative forces, 
including the religious mullahs, reactionary political parties 
(either right-wing or religious), certain right-wing student bodies 
and a large part of the poorer urban population (often migrants 
from rural areas: conservative, uneducated, and deeply religious). 
On the other hand there are the 'liberals' - most students, the 
professional groups such as lawyers and journalists, and the other 
political parties. 
These latter groups also contain strong left-wing and right-wing 
elements, but the liberal strain predominates by far, and this to 
some extent cuts across the left and right wing boundaries. 
Religious students and right-wing newspapermen might still see 
themselves primarily as students and journalists, and stand for the 
generally accepted interests of these groups (e. g. demands for 
better job prospects for students, or freedom of the press for 
journalists). But the basic antagonism is between religious/right- 
wing forces and liberal/left-wing groups. It is extremely interesting 
that in the case of the two democratic (or at least political) 
regimes ultimately brought down by disturbances (the early Nazimuddin 
regime and Bhutto's government) the main opposition forces were 
religious and right-wing. In the case of the downfall of Ayub Khan's 
essentially military regime, the liberal/left-wing (but mostly liberal) 
'triumvirate' of students, lawyers and journalists, was the most 
important force. It is this event I shall describe next. 
-ý 8.2. The Rise and Fall of Ayub Khan 
So far I have discussed the first 'political' (but not democratic) 
period. From 1958-on the functionary groups became increasingly 
powerful. Uptil 1958 the bureaucracy had been extremely influential 
behind the scenes, managing to influence policy, even political events, 
in its favour for some time. From 1958 the military became the J 
-287, - 
pre-eminent power. Most of the military's actionscan be seen 
in terms of struggle against the politicians; it was a struggle 
between two types of elite, essentially an intra-class struggle. 
Both groups had in the past stemmed mainly from the land-owning 
class, but had become increasingly middle-class in origin, especially 
the military. Though the influence of the still significant 
number of landlord-politicians appeared to bring in an inter-class 
element, their interests as landlords were never seriously damaged 
by the regime. It was far more interested in breaking the 
political parties per se. In other words the military was acting 
as a class fragment and saw opposition primarily in intra rather 
than inter-class terms. The politicians' power-base was the 
professional class and the landlord class. Ayub, the military 
leader, tried to by-pass both, but he hurt the urban professional 
people most. It was they who in the end brought him down. 
It is not possible to see the military intrusion, or opposition 
to it, in inter-class terms. Nor is it possible to view it in 
ethnic terms. The military coup was not aimed, as many argue, at 
the suppression of East Pakistan. Ayub did a lot to help East 
Pakistan economically (vastly increasing rural aid to the area and 
doing much to encourage industrial investment). It was in the 
political sphere that he kept East Pakistani interests down. What 
he damaged was not East Pakistan but the East Pakistani professional 
elite and its political representatives. The conflict was intra- 
class in nature, representing differences between a functional 
group and the professional segment of the middle-class. As I shall 
show, it was the whole professional middle-class which brought Ayub 
down, not just the East Pakistani segment of it. The professional 
middle class in both wings suffered. But the East Pakistani elite 
considered itself to be more hard done by as East Pakistan did not 
contain an elite with an economic base in either agriculture or 
industry; it thus saw most of the fruits of development going to 
West Pakistani elites. 
8.2.1. The Rise of Ayub 
I have so far concentrated (except in the purely economic 
discussion) on Pakistan's first political period. In 1958 came 
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the first military coup, a totally peaceful affair, which saw 
the military in power (in the later stages in the guise of a 
political party) for a decade. The coup was the culmination 
of a process of gradual elimination of the power of the politicians. 
The bureaucrats had been gaining more and more influence which 
emerged, by a fairly natural extension, into military rule. The 
military period ended in fiasco, with the break-up of Pakistan, 
but it started promisingly, with a clamp-down on corruption and 
the formation, for the first time, of a concrete economic plan. 
The regime provided political stability in order to obtain economic 
development. Ayub also introduced some land reforms, and increased 
the allocation of funds to East Pakistan in an attempt to reduce 
inter-wing disparities. Finally, he established an entirely new 
political system based on indirect elections. 
The purge against corruption in the bureaucracy was initiated 
in 1959 through the establishment of scru tinising committees. The 
task took less than six months, by the end of which 1,662 Central 
Government officials, of all ranks, were found guilty of misconduct 
of varying degrees of culpability) Some were compulsorily retired, 
some merely admonished. The land reforms concerned only West 
Pakistan, which had a much more unequal distribution of land-ownership 
than East Pakistan. The reforms were a qualified attack on the 
political, land-owning class. In all about 5% of West Pakistan's 
total cultivable area was surrendered; less than half of this had 
been redistributed by March 1964, five years after the institution 
of the reforms. 
2 Many of the big land-owners wielded enormous 
local power and considerable national influence. 
"The political implications were weighty and, although by 
no means extinguished as a class, the great landed magnates 
no longer represented the same vast and sometimes inert 
agglomerations of power. "3 
Nevertheless, the effects were clearly by no means radical. Ayub 
himself is quoted as saying, in 1964, that "We did not want punitive 
land reforms...., 
4 
1 Feldman (1967), p. 74 
2 Ibid, pp. 57-60 
3 Ibid, p. 60 
4 Quoted in Ibid, p. 62 
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Ayub's final major reform was in the political sphere. 
Clearly the land reforms affected the politicians to some extent, 
as many of them were big land-owners. They suffered too from 
the screenings for corruption (under separate legislation from 
public servants). 
The politicians were certainly hit by these measures, but 
they were far more drastically affected by the main plank of 
Ayub's military reforms - the introduction of the Basic Democracies. 
The intention of these, according to Ayub, was to make those elected 
more genuinely representative of the people than the previous 
oligarchical politicians had been. The way to do this, he claimed, 
was to have very tiny constituencies so that candidates would be 
closer to the people who elected them, and then have several tiers 
of electoral colleges, each tier forming the basis for the next tier 
up (and each level up representing a wider geographical area). 
There are several additional factors to take into account. 
Firstly, political parties were banned. Secondly, each council, 
at whatever level, had at least some function as government and 
was responsible, directly or indirectly, for the spending of local 
development funds which were fed down through the system from the 
central government. Thirdly, each level of administration had a 
number of nominated -officials which increased in proportion higher 
up the scale. 
Ayub believed that with this scheme he had created a more truly 
representative system. But equally, he was hoping through this 
system to completely by-pass the power of the old politicians, both 
urban and rural. " Essentially he was appealing to the 'small man' 
in rural areas for support against the big land-owning politicians 
and the lawyer-politicians of the towns. The linking of development 
funds with the system (power filtered up through it and money filtered 
down) ensured considerable patronage for those Basic Democrats (the 
politicians at the lowest level, the basis of the whole system) who 
would toe the line. The intrusion of nominated officials at each 
level also ensured considerable official control. The old politicians 
themselves would have no time for the system 
- 
to get anywhere they 
would have to-become lowly Basic Democrats as only these, by becoming 
- 
290 
- 
Chairmen of their local councils, could go up to higher levels. 
This new system was clearly a powerful attack on the 
political elite. (Ayub did not hide his contempt for the 
politicians). At the same time it gave legitimacy to the new 
military regime. This is not to deny that the system itself 
might have had considerable inherent value. However, looking 
at the rural side alone for a moment, while it cut out the big 
land-owners from politics, it brought in a whole new level of 
small and medium land-owners. Between one-third and one-half 
of the members of the first National Assembly elected under the 
new system by the 80,000 Basic Democrats were landlords. 
1 
The politicians did not give in easily. Ayub was under a 
lot of pressure to allow the re-introduction of political parties. 
When he relented the politicians and other wealthy or influential 
people found it worthwhile to try and 'work' the system. A big 
inducement was the control of development funds that union council 
membership, or membership of higher level councils, would provide. 
In its first year there was little interest in the new system. 
"By 1964, however, the situation had changed. The tremendous 
economic and political patronage of the Basic Democracies had 
been clearly demonstrated. Elections in 1964, therefore, 
were keenly contested, and traditional political alliances 
and methods were involved, ,2 
However, this still did not mean the return to influence of the 
old political elite. 
"Though the 1964 elections saw the return to power of a 
higher income group, the new rural elite was different from 
the past elite in one significant way. While the old elite 
had been the landed aristocracy 
- 
the zamindars (landlords) 
and talukdars (petty landlords) 
- 
the Basic Democrats were 
generally from non-traditional nouveau riche families. They 
were rich farmers, not landlords. "3 
The new system also affected the politicians of the urban areas. 
New groups took their chance to enter the system, to the detriment 
of the old. The following, referring explicitly to East Pakistan, 
1 Siddiqui (1972), p. 104 
2 Jahan (1973), p. 122 
3 Ibid, p. 122 
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also applies broadly to the Western wing. 
"The Basic Democracies system alienated nearly every powerful 
group in East Pakistan. First, it alienated the urban groups 
(the intelligentsia, the students and the urban salaried 
workers) which prior to 1958 had played a leading role in East 
Pakistan political movements. Making the Basic Democracies 
the electoral college meant limiting the political participation 
of these groups.... In the 1964 elections, 73.61% of the urban 
Basic Democrats were businessmen and contractors. The old 
middle class therefore felt threatened and isolated under the 
Basic Democracies system. "' 
It was, in particular, the urban 'professional' middle class which 
lost out. The implications of intra-class conflict are very clear 
here. 
The effects of these changes on the National Assembly itself 
(this having been elected through an indirect electoral system of 
which the Basic Democrats were the foundation) were also quite 
significant. Comparison with Table 7.6 shows that the role of both 
lawyers and land-owners in the main legislature had declined considerably 
over the last 10 years. 
Table 8.1: Backgrounds of Members of the National Assembly, 1965 (%) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Lawyers 19.7 7.2 
Businessmen 13.2 6.6 
Landholders 4.6 21.1 
Miscellaneous 12.5 11.8 
Unknown 1.3 2.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Rashiduzzaman (1969), pp. 489/90. 
Nevertheless, they were easily still the two most prominent groups and 
the distinction between the two wings (land-owners from the West, lawyers 
from the East) was as clear as ever. But neither group was now in a 
position to dominate. 
1 Ibid, p. 124 
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The army itself, of course, represented particular interests, 
which I have so far not discussed. I have described how the 
government's economic strategy developed quite consistently despite 
numerous changes of regime and, eventually, the advent of a military 
dictatorship. The latter intensified but did not substantially 
change the previous economic policies. In adopting this strategy 
it does not seem, to me at least, to have been representing the 
interests of any particular class. The coup itself does not appear 
to have had anything to do with class. The industrial strategy of 
the country had already been set and the military did not oppose this. 
Nor did it seem to be in any danger from opposition from elsewhere. 
It seems unlikely that the military was representing the interests 
of the land-owners, as even if they only had a moderate effect, there 
was no need to institute the land reforms. 
It is possible that the coup reflected the interests of the 
Punjab 
- 
the largest, richest area of West Pakistan, and the main 
supplier of military personnel - both rank and file. There is no 
doubt that East Pakistan, with its larger population, was in the 1950s 
becoming a political threat and it did seem possible that East Pakistani 
politicians might win the first general elections, which were forth- 
coming. However, there are several reasons for thinking that the 
coup was not simply aimed at keeping the Eastern wing down. The new 
regime did make significant attempts to remove the disparities between 
the two wings (attempts that were partly vitiated by other policies). 
Such a notion also implies collusion between Pakistani landlords etc. 
and the military (the latter acting in the interests of West Pakistan, 
or of the Punjab, at the request of the landlords, when the East 
Pakistani danger reared its head). 
Such self-sacrifice by these landlords is very unlikely. They 
were politically powerful. They would not barter their freedom and 
power merely to keep out a possible rather than probable Bengali-based 
central government. After all, they had suffered one such government 
already without great loss. And, anyway, any such government was 
bound to be weak and temporary, while the military government was far 
from that. 
-793. - 
If the army acted as an 'interest' it did so as a 'functionary 
group'. It had plenty to gain from taking control of the country, 
and the means to do so easily. It was, unlike the Indian army, a 
fairly united force - all Moslem, and predominantly Punjabi. There 
was no strong political force to oppose it (again, not as in the 
Indian case). No-one would miss the squabbling unrepresentative 
political factions which, so the army reasoned, were almost asking 
to be swept aside. The benefits - control of the economy, of the 
resources to be allocated to the military, of patronage - were 
enormous. Had the army waited until after the forthcoming general 
elections the political system would have been permanently established 
and intervention much harder. Why should the military have represented 
the interests of a class or a region when its own interests were so 
apparent? 
So far I have concentrated on only one functionary group - the 
military. Politicians are just as scathing about the bureaucracy, 
accusing it, especially the CSP, of continued plots against the 
existence of democracy. The CSP is very much a bureaucratic elite, 
comprising a mere 0.07% of the total bureaucratic population of 
Pakistan in 19691. However, Burki has put some arguments against 
this thesis of bureaucratic conspiracy. In the first place, it was 
only political weakness that enabled the bureaucrats to increase their 
power. The political chaos of the 1950s allowed the CSP to assert 
itself. 
"However, the Service was not able to gather enough strength 
to directly challenge the politicians. This task was left 
to another highly organised group, the army. "2 
Nevertheless, an alliance between these two functionary groups did not 
occur immediately. In fact, the first military coup was detrimental 
to the civil service. It removed the political weakness the bureaucracy 
had so far relied upon, and the army was strong enough to charge the 
civil service with corruption, as well as initiate a substantial purge. 
Moreover, military men took over senior administrative posts. In 
fact, the regime attempted significant reform of the service. However, 
despite this, the CSP eventually persuaded Ayub of its value, and he 
became more reliant on it. 
1 Burki (1969), p. 239 
2 Ibid, p. 247 
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8.2.2. The Fall of Ayub 
The imposition of military rule drastically altered the balance 
of power and seriously affected the well-being of various groups. 
Basically there had been a shift in power from the 'professional 
middle-class fragments' to 'functionary group middle-class fragments'. 
The landlords survived broadly intact, though they lost much of 
their political power. Those that suffered most were the middle-class, 
professional, urban politicians and their supporters (the professional 
element of the urban bourgeoisie). The politicians suffered directly. 
Lawyers suffered through the introduction of military orders and edicts, 
supported by administrative justice and military tribunals. Furthermore, 
Ayub had even transferred some of their influence to the Basic Democrats, 
allowing them to try local disputes. The legal profession "felt the 
President had betrayed them by devising a system which denied them 
their 'day-in-court "'. 
l The foundation of the legal profession was 
in danger. Rigid press laws and the introduction of the National 
Press Trust (which instituted indirect government control over a number 
of newspapers) did much the same to the journalists. Furthermore, all 
these urban groups suffered from the swing of influence to the rural 
areas. 
All in all, under Ayub, while the professional middle class lost 
out and the landlord class was left broadly unharmed, the military, 
the industrialists, and the rural sub-elite all gained. In fact, as 
regards the latter, the army seemed to be trying to establish a sort 
of rural "middle class". Ayub himself said he expected his policies 
to antagonise most of all the intellectuals, politicians, landlords, 
and "religious obscurantists". 
2 (The latter he had no time for). 
He wanted an efficient, middle-class society, but with this class in 
the countryside. He believed that both concentrated land-ownership 
and radical land redistribution were wrong. 
"And this notion that everybody must own land just does not 
make sense. We do not have enough land to give to everybody. 
You can broaden the base of ownership but you must have a 
class of people interested in investing in land and working it 
on a sound economic and progressive basis. If you destroy 
this class you are just killing the goose..... "3 
1 Ziring (1971), p. 181 
2 Khan, Ayub, (1967), p. 203 
3 Ibid, p. 92 
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But it was necessary, too, to eliminate absentee landlords. 
"The disintegration of large land-holdings would tend to 
consolidate the smaller holdings of the new middle-class 
and this would be an incentive to better farming and higher 
production. "1 (My emphasis) 
It is dangerous to alienate urban areas. Burki, who supports 
his arguments with figures of numbers of arrests (per 1,000 people), 
argues that the anti-Ayub troubles started in small towns and then 
shifted to the cities. The latter had gained some industry, and 
the rural areas some material and political benefits, but the rural 
towns, in particular their middle-class residents, had seen these 
benefits pass them by. 
"This is why the towns played such a prominent role in the 
anti-Ayub Khan movement. The towns that had not participated 
in the province's rapid industrialisation and had large numbers 
of students and lawyers became vortices of political unrest. 
... 
The middle-class residents of the towns of West Pakistan 
were the real victims of the cyclical pattern of economic 
growth registered by West Pakistan., 
2 
Newspaper reports confirm that the troubles started in the smaller 
towns. 
The 'professional' middle class was, thus, suffering particularly 
badly under Ayub, and students are the foundation of this class. It 
was amongst the students of Karachi that the anti-Ayub disturbances 
started, spontaneously, in October 1968. What was simply a local 
student protest spread to Lahore and other West Pakistani cities. 
The protests were inflamed by the arrest of Bhutto, who Ayub believed 
to be stirring the students against him. When a student was killed 
by police in Rawalpindi the protests turned into a violent movement. 
Muneer Abmad is the only person to have given detailed study to 
the composition of the protesting groups. The student protest, much 
like the one in Karachi fifteen years before, was specifically concerned 
with student matters (though including demands for greater academic 
freedom). One of the most significant groups involved in the protests 
was the lawyers. After the shooting of the student in Rawalpindi in 
1 Ibid, p. 90 
2 Burki, (1972), p. 211 
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November 1968, thirteen politicians supporting the students were 
arrested. This seems to have triggered off the lawyers, with 
whom the politicians have a close connection. 
"The lawyers' procession in Lahore on November 15 (two days 
after the political arrests) led by some of the most prominent 
jurists of the country, undoubtedly saved the mass movement 
from withering away. "1 
Moreover, district Bar Associations invited politicians to address 
them as a way of evading the government's ban on public meetings. 
Students, politicians and lawyers were joined in the second 
month by journalists (demanding freedom of the press). At the 
same time religious leaders (Ulema) called for the introduction of 
laws based on Islam. In the third month came professional groups 
in government employment (doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. ) 
demanding improved salaries and promotion prospects. They were 
joined in the fourth month by low-paid government employees also 
seeking more money, and by high-level civil servants, with their 
own career grievances. Finally, in the same month, industrial 
workers demanded the repeal of anti-union laws, more money, and 
security of employment. Over the five month period of the movement 
the number of demands increased. A greater militancy and radicalism 
crept in, though there were also further demands in tune with the 
various groups' own particular interests. Some of the industrial 
unions, including some who were in government employment (e. g. that 
of the railway workers), were more consistently radical in their 
demands 
- going beyond their immediate economic interests - than 
most of the professional groups. The Railway Workers' Union, for 
example, called for the end of capitalism and feudalism, the 
nationalisation of agriculture (and the formation of a united front 
of workers, farmers, students and the middle class! ) 2 
One last protesting group not yet mentioned but of special 
significance to this thesis, a group which liked to consider itself 
one of the professions, was the journalists. The Pakistan Federal 
Union of Journalists organised demonstrations to demand freedom of 
the press. They were supported in this by a number of other 
agitating groups, in particular the students. As several newspaper 
1 Ahmad, M. (1978), p. 12 
2 Ibid, pp. 32/3 
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proprietors and virtually the entire journalistic profession 
(including the editors) opposed the regime (largely because of 
its control of the press), several agitating groups found the 
press increasingly active on their behalf. There was, thus, 
reciprocal support between the journalistic profession and these 
other groups, especially the students and the politicians. 
Though the latter contained bitterly opposed elements, together 
they represented freedom - and that is what the middle-class 
professional groups, and the students, were seeking. The demand 
for freedom of the press was not confined to the journalists. 
"Freedom of the press was the fourth most important demand 
of agitating groups. The politicians had all along 
complained of Government control of the press. "' 
There were, thus, strong connections between the individual 
professional groups and between these, the students, and the 
politicians. 
The various middle-class groups discussed above played a vital 
role in initiating and sustaining the movement, but it could not 
have reached the intensity it achieved without the addition of the 
workers, and, probably more significant, the 'lumpenproletariat' - 
the very poor, jobless, often migrant, people living on the economic 
margins of the major cities, whom I discussed when describing the 
Karachi disturbances of 1953. The extent of the violence is 
sunmarised in the following table, at least as regards deaths. 
Table 8.2: Pattern of Violence in Anti-Government Agitation 
in Pakistan, November 1968 
- 
March 1969 
West Pakistan East Pakistan Total 
Killed by police firing 
IItilled in mob violence 
411 
2 
882 
1083 
129 
110 
Total 43 196 239 
Notes: 1 Mainly students and labourers from Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore 
2 Primarily students in Dacca 
3 Mostly elected local government officials closely identified 
with the regime, but including five policemen. 
1 Ibid, p. 16 
2 Ibid, p. 14 
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This violence was initiated and maintained by the professional 
middle class of both wings, but particularly that of West Pakistan 
as the West Pakistani segment of this class was larger than its 
East Pakistani counterpart; also, as most business, landlord and 
military interests were in West Pakistan, the professional middle class 
felt the rivalry of these other groups more keenly. Ayub's attempt 
to establish his own rural 'middle class' fragment had failed. 
8.3. The Civil War 
8.3.1. The Social and Political Background 
In the face of rapidly escalating social unrest, in February 
1969 Ayub announced his resignation. Shortly afterwards he handed 
over power back to the army. Yahya Khan was the new ruler of the 
country. He immediately announced that his regime would only be 
temporary, and that Pakistan's first general election with universal 
suffrage would be held under his auspices. He was true to his word. 
Though Ayub had continued the earlier regimes' economic policies 
(only with greater intensity) he had changed the economic balance of 
power, pushing to the fore-front what he called a rural 'middle class' 
and, in the cities, a new business elite. Politically speaking the 
functionary groups had become the dominant force. They now, with 
the military in the lead, held absolute sway. The main group to 
have lost out is what I have called the middle-class 'triumvirate' 
(lawyers, journalists and students) with their general support in 
the professional sector of the middle class and also with their 
political representatives. Religious fundamentalists, socially very 
influential (as has been seen), were waiting in the wings as ever. 
But, though numerous groups were involved, the main actor in the 
movement against Ayub was the middle-class 'triumvirate'. Its 
power-base in the political parties having been in effect removed, 
it took to the streets. 
It was, in fact, in West Pakistan that this group started the 
movement which toppled Ayub, though it became highly active in both 
wings. With the change-over to Yahya and with a clear promise of 
a general election, it was the turn of the East Pakistani middle-class 
'triumvirate' to take over. It had similar grievances to its 
counterpart in West Pakistan in that it greatly resented the power 
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of the military and the growth in economic power of the industrialists, 
but it more particularly objected to the fact that both of these groups 
were based primarily in West Pakistan. The promise of a general 
election (to be Pakistan's first) opened up the chance for the East 
Pakistani elite to achieve power through use of its natural power-base, 
the electorate; lacking a military or industrialist elite, this East 
Pakistani middle-class group could only hope to promote its interests 
through politics. The election at last gave this middle-class fragment 
its chance. 
It is wrong, I have argued, to view the East-West Pakistani 
relationship as simply one of exploitation. Rather, various West 
Pakistan middle-class fragments had gradually acquired power (taking 
over from the previous landlordly class) and gained a rapacious hold 
on both wings of the country. But the East Pakistani elite had not 
had a share in this. The West Pakistani-based government had for 
long been aware of this, and had tried to induct this elite into the 
sphere of influence, to make this East Pakistani middle-class fragment 
economically powerful in its own right (though this attempt was 
resented by other parts of the West Pakistani power structure). So 
economically weak was this elite that the government had to support 
it through the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (EPIDC). 
"it is essential to note that EPIDC became a prime instrument 
of the government policy to create a class of big capitalists 
or bourgeoisie from amongst the Bengali petty bourgeoisie 
traders. "1 
In fact, the EPIDC and other government institutions went out of 
their way to help this group, primarily through joint ventures. 
Sobhan and Ahmad give as one such example of aid to a Bengali 
the following data: 2 
Rs. (million) 
i) cost of project 20 
ii) loans from financial institutions (banks etc. ) 15 
iii) EPIDC investment (50% of equity) 2.5 
iv) Bengali owner's equity share 2.5 
v) Black market value of convecting 7.5% of 
machinery cost at 100% premium on official 
rate (i. e. overstating costs and selling 
extra foreign exchange) 2.5 
1 Sobhan and Ahmad (1977), pp. 57/8 
2 Ibid, p. 58 
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This means that the businessman had to provide a mere Rs. 2.5 million 
out of the Rs. 20 million needed, and even this was made up by a clear 
Rs. 2.5 million to be made by selling foreign exchange on the black 
market. The same goes for disinvestment of public companies. The 
EPIDC did not find it easy to get Bengali buyers. It therefore 
made things easy for whatever potential Bengali buyers there were. 
When the government sold the Muslim Cotton Mills (500 looms) to a 
Bengali for Rs. 24.7 million, the buyer put up less than Rs. 5 million 
of the finance. 
' 
It would not seem, then, that Bengalis were being excluded from 
East Pakistan's industrial and commercial expansion, though the 
process of inclusion was a slow one. 
"By the early 1960s, however, some Bengalis began to show 
entrepreneurial interest... They had very limited financial 
resources and managerial abilities. But the EPIDC vigorously 
encouraged and supported them. ,2 
With EPIDC assistance these men began to make headway. By the time 
of Liberation Bengalis owned about 34% of the fixed assets of the- 
jute industry and 53% of those of the cotton industry. They owned 
about 20% of the assets of the smaller-scale industries. Public 
ownership, which was mostly in heavy industries, was about 36%. 
3 
This means that most industrial assets in East Pakistan were in the 
hands either of private East Pakistani citizens or of East Pakistan 
government agencies. 
The small, somewhat weak East Pakistani elite found it rather 
hard to get on even with the support it (or a part of it) was getting. 
Far greater openings lay through political control, with which the 
whole East Pakistani economy would be within its command. It is 
not surprising that the Awami League (AL) under its leader Mujibur 
Rahman (often called Mujib), opted for secession. Only then could 
typical AL members - teachers, lawyers, small businessmen 
- 
have a 
real hold over the commercial economy. Thus the bourgeoisie 
"backed Mujib to the extent that he could give them more resources 
and power through the pressure of his mass movement" 
. 
1t That the AL 
was a middle-class party, coming particularly from the professional 
1 Ibid, p. 62 
2 Q. K. Ahmad (1978), p. 390 
3 Ibid, pp. 390-396 
4 Sobhan and Abmad (1977), p. 126 
- 
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sector of that class, is clear from the following tablet This 
compares the backgrounds of 155 AL candidates in the 1970 general 
elections (there were 162 candidates, 160 of whom won seats 
- all 
in East Pakistan) with 70 Executive Committee members of a more 
left-wing party, the East Pakistan National Awami Party. (The 
difference between candidates and Executive Committee members was 
not of great significance). 
Table 8.3: Occupational Backgrounds of EPNAP Executive Committee 
Members (1968) and AL Election Candidates 1970) in % 
EPNAP AL 
Lawyers 30.0 49.7 
Doctors 2.9 4.5 
Journalists/writers 10.0 3.2 
Lecturers/teachers 15.7 10.3 
Civil servants/military - 3.9 
Businessmen 12.9 20.0 
Trade union workers 10.0 0.6 
Peasant leaders 14.3 
- 
Student leaders 
- 
1.9 
Other 4.2 5.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Number 70 1551 
Note: 1 Maniruzzaman gave the total wrongly as 162 and calculated 
the percentages from this figure. I have given the individual 
totals as pecentages of 155. 
About half of the AL's candidates were lawyers while less than 
one-third of the EPNAP sample were. 67.7% of the AL were in the 
professions (the first four categories), compared to 58.6% of the 
EPNAP. In addition, 20% of the AL were businessmen, while less 
than 13% of the EPNAP were. While no AL member had lower class 
origins, 24.3% of the NAP were either trade union workers or peasant 
leaders. It would seem, then, that the AL was a solidly middle- 
class party, while the NAP contained a considerable lower class 
element. (However, the differences in education were much smaller: 
both parties had a remarkably high proportion of graduates - the AL 
81% and the NAP 76%. Clearly both parties were educationally a 
part of the elite). 
1 Re-arranged from Maniruzzaman (1975), pp. 19 and 40 
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The 1970 election was won by the Awami League (AL) under 
the leadership of Mujibur Rahman (or 'Mujib'). All the 160 seats 
the AL won were in East Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) under Bhutto came second with 81 seats. Though the AL did 
not get a single seat in West Pakistan (it did not try to) it 
gained an absolute majority (53.3% of the seats). Once the 
result was known Yahya Khan asked Mujib to negotiate with Bhutto 
on the formulation of a new constitution (which he was, in fact, 
entitled to do). Mujib demanded to be left in supreme and 
unqualified control of the country and of the creation of a new 
constitution. There is little doubt that Bhutto was making it 
very difficult for Yahya to accept Mujib's demands, by threatening 
trouble if he did. There is equally little doubt in my mind that 
Mujib was angling for an excuse to secede. It seems to me that 
Yahya, however foolishly he went about it, was trying to reconcile 
a number of highly antagonistic forces (including his own more 
hawkish military colleagues). The delays were sufficient to 
give Mujib his excuse. He in effect seceded. Yahya responded 
with savage military repression, which gave India the excuse it had 
been seeking to intervene. India gave Bangladesh the freedom its 
nationalist movement had failed to gain for itself. In fact, the 
nationalist movement in exile in India was really a rather paltry 
affair. As I have just said, AL members came from a fairly narrow 
range of backgrounds. Possibly this applied even more to the 
leadership of the AL forced into exile in India after Yahya's 
military crack-down in East Pakistan. 18 of the 32 members of 
the exiled leadership were from the professions. Most of its 
supporters in exile were academics or students. 
' 
The restricted nature of the backgrounds of AL members and 
direct supporters has led some writers to view the motives of the 
AL-led secession movement with skepticism. There are two basic 
theories concerning this movement. According to the standard 
nationalist theories (and I myself have in Part One treated nationalism 
with-some skepticism) Mujib was an Arch-autonomist - fighting 
against a West Pakistani military regime, intent on keeping East Pakistan 
1 Rashiduzzaman (1972), pp. 188/9 
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as a sort of colony. The other major theory says that Mujib 
did not represent the interests of East Pakistan as a whole, but 
simply of the East Pakistani bourgeoisie. According to this 
theory, the military were prepared to sacrifice some control over 
East Pakistan in order to keep the left-wing (Bhutto and the PPP 
in West Pakistan, Bhashani and the EPNAP in East Pakistan) out of 
power. 
The proponents of the first theory say that there was a 
conspiracy to keep Mujib out of power. According to this theory 
the military had expected an unclear electoral result, enabling 
them either to remain on the political scene as a presiding force, 
or to cobble up a government made up of parties which were to its 
liking. When the AL, apparently unexpectedly, won the elections 
by an overwhelming margin, the military delayed handing over power, 
pushing Mujib into an extreme position which would justify his 
removal by force. According to Choudhury, a government adviser 
who was at the centre of things (but who nevertheless is a severe 
critic of both Yahya, whomhe calls a "grotesque mediocrity"l, and 
of the army actions in East Pakistan)#there was no such conspiracy. 
"I became convinced that he intended a genuine political 
settlement between two parts of Pakistan by giving the 
Bengalis a real share in the decision-making process within 
a loose federal or even a confederal system. "2 
Yahya not only allowed Mujib a lot of freedom, but he could 
have manipulated any other party of his liking into power if he had 
wished, or at least tried to. The actual election results show 
that he did not even attempt such a manipulation. Why, after all, 
go through an elaborate general election, openly and fairly conducted 
(and with a good deal of international publicity), with Mujib and 
the Awami League from quite early on tipped to win (if not by as 
substantial a margin as proved to be the case) if all along Yahya 
intended to disregard the results should they not suit him? 
Proponents of the second theory in fact argue that the government 
wanted Mujib to win, the reason being the government's desire to 
1 Choudhury, (1974), p. 47 
2 Ibid, p. 84 
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keep out the left-wingers. According to Siddiqui 
"By mid March 1969 the uprising against Ayub Khan had turned 
into a full-scale revolutionary situation in which the urban 
industrial workers, the white-collar workers, the peasants, 
and the dissatisfied intellectuals were in revolt against 
the entire bourgeoisie. "1 
Siddiqui reports that even in this period the country was riven 
by industrial strikes. He went through the Sind Industrial Trading 
Estate in Karachi in August 1969 and found twenty factories shut 
by strikes or lock-outs. He also went to the Karnaphuli Industrial 
complex near Chittagong in East Pakistan in February 1970, and found 
that 10,000 jute workers had been on strike for two weeks. 2 
According to this theory Mujib and his advisers were part of 
the "affluent bourgeoisie". 
"Their economics was more relevant to a Hampstead set than 
to the actual needs of East Pakistan... The Awami League's 
predominant interest was to wrest power from the military 
and to prevent it from passing to the Left. Mujib used the 
standard bourgeois tactics of identifying an easily 
identifiable 'out-group' as the enemy. "3 
Siddiqui's description of the motives of Mujib and the rest of 
the Bengali leadership exactly fits the sort of motives that I argued, 
in Part One, are frequently part of the impulse behind nationalist 
movements. 
"All he was seeking was the fruits of office, patronage, and 
opportunities for the Bengali bourgeoisie which it had been 
denied by the West Pakistani elite. The struggle for 'regional 
autonomy' for East Pakistan was a struggle to replace the 
non-Bengali middle-class with a Bengali middle-class. "4 
This was a case, then, of intra-class struggle. 
It is at this point, however, that Siddiqui's argument becomes 
somewhat contrived. According to him, the labour unrest and general 
discontent in Pakistan was likely to bring Bhashani to power in 
the East and Bhutto to power in the West. Both were socialists 
(at least in name). Mujib asked Yahya for time in order to gain 
1 Siddiqui (1972), p. 129 
2 Ibid, p. 132 
3 Ibid, p. 136 
4 Ibid, p. 137 
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the chance to work up nationalist feeling in East Pakistan which 
he could then use to overwhelm the appeal of Bhashani's socialism. 
Siddiqui then argues that it was only the intensity of this rivalry 
which induced Mujib to go as far as he did in the cause of 
nationalism. 
Though this intra-nationalist rivalry agrees with my theoretical 
argument in Part One (Bhashani was a Bengali nationalist too), 
Siddiqui's argument makes the typical Marxist mistake of underplaying 
the genuineness of nationalism by virtually ignoring it, and considerably 
overplaying the extent of class conflict. There is no doubting the 
surge of Bengali nationalism of the time (or even the intensity of 
Mujib's own nationalism). This widespread national feeling was not 
simply something created by Mujib out of thin air. At the same time 
Siddiqui exaggerates the popularity of Bhashani.. No-one seriously 
predicted a possible victory for him. The eighty-year-old Bhashani 
had been more successful in inspiring local agitation than in building 
an organised party with a solid, mass following. Siddiqui also 
underestimates the sanity of Yahya and his advisers. Would they in 
effect encourage Mujib in a campaign of disaffection against West 
Pakistan, and even the danger of the break-up of the country, in 
order to avert the mere possibility of a socialist state? That 
there was labour unrest was one thing - there was unrest everywhere - 
but to assume an imminent socialist take-over or revolution, is 
fanciful. Such a thing the military could easily have coped with 
- 
the working-class was small and very weak. A violent nationalist 
campaign by a vast mass of people in the East wing, a thousand miles 
from the rest of Pakistan, would be an entirely different kettle of 
fish. 
It is not fanciful, though, to suppose that Mujib, undoubtedly 
a nationalist, had in mind the interests of the Bengali elite, rather 
than those of the Bengali masses, in his campaign for regional 
autonomy 
- 
as Siddiqui suggests in the first half of his theory. 
Other writers, for instance Rounaq Jahan, also see the Awami League 
as largely a middle class concern (as has been shown) with distinct 
interests of its own. 
- 
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The desire of a member of the Bengali elite to replace a West 
Pakistani in an elite position would appear both to him and to 
the people as a nationalist desire. The fact that the people 
themselves were largely irrelevant in the thinking of the Bengali 
elite does not alter this fact. 
It is impossible to doubt the depth of hatred between the 
various ethnic groups on the Indian sub-continent. There was 
certainly considerable antagonism in East Pakistan between Bengalis 
and non-Bengalis. (The latter were called Biharis). As in Nigeria 
the resentment was based on fear of economic competition. The 
political conflict with West Pakistan was skillfully converted into 
hatred of all 'Biharis' by the AL. The 'Biharis' were the Jews 
of Germany or the Ibos of Northern Nigeria. 
There is no doubt that the civil war was fundamentally ethnic. 
Hence (as in Biafra) the AL were only too keen to accuse West Pakistan 
of genocide during the clamp-down. There is no doubt that the 
military action was very severe, something many Pakistanis are still 
ashamed of, but we will never know the exact truth: victory in war 
is followed by victory in propaganda. What I suspect occurred was 
in fact an extremely unpleasant war with much brutality on both sides. 
Brutality on one side inspires brutality on the other. It seems 
to be the case that the first massacres were by Bengalis of non-Bengalis, 
before the army arrived. There is also evidence that those most 
responsible for the counter-massacres were not the well-trained 
Pakistani army (though I am not saying it was not involved) but the 
'Bihari' irregular recruits (Razakars). These, living in East Pakistan, 
were rather like the Ibos in Northern Nigeria 
-a successful but 
insecure minority. When Bengalis saw the chance they began to murder 
these 'Biharis' who, inducted into the forces, took their revenge. 
Much of the more brutal killing, then, was probably caused by 
ethnic rivalry. The Pakistani s claim that many thousands of Biharis 
and West Pakistanis were killed between the time Mujib declared East 
Pakistan 'independent' and the war (though the killing occurred during 
and after the war too). It is claimed that 'slaughter houses' were 
set up for this purpose, and that in Chittagong alone 10,000 to 12,000 
non-Bengalis were killed in this way in March 1971. Less spectacular 
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claims were of seventeen West Pakistani workers tortured and 
killed at a glass-works on 27th March, about 150 workers burnt 
to death in a jute-mill on 27th April, and 3,000 to 5,000 Biharis 
killed by rebel East Pakistani Rifles personnel at Jessore on 
29th/30th March. In all, West Pakistan claims that 72,000 to 
78,000 non-Bengalis were killed in March and April 1971, as well 
as making accusations of torture and rape. 
' 
It is impossible to test the validity of these claims. However, 
I cannot see that they are necessarily less likely to be true than 
the obviously exaggerated claims put forward by the Awami League 
and India, at the time of the war, of huge Pakistani atrocities. 
The following account is from a Minority Rights Group report on 
the post-war condition of Biharis in Bangladesh and the background 
to this. The MRG is an independent British Charity. 
"After Yahya Khan on 1 March 1971 postponed the promised 
National Assembly, Bengalis turned on the Biharis as Urdu- 
speaking targets that were readily available as symbols of 
the Pakistani domination. Over 300 of them were killed by 
extremist mobs at Chittagong in early March 1971. There 
were other attacks at Jessore, Khulna, Rangpur, and Saidpur. 
A further slaughter at Mymensingh caused a large influx of 
Biharis into the Mirpur suburb of Dacca. The Urdu-speaking 
community claim that in all several thousand of their people 
were killed by pro-Bengali supporters of secession prior to 
(My emphasis) the Pakistani army's ruthless intervention on 
25 March, 1971. Further reprisals against the Biharis 
followed when Yahya Khan arrested Sheikh Mujib and outlawed 
the Awami League.... when civil bloodshed broke out on a large 
scale in 1971 there is no doubt that numbers of the Razakar 
Biharis seized the opportunity to take their revenge on the 
Bengalis., 2 
The ethnic element in the secession was of some significance. 
The Biharis had already been the victims of ethnic hatred as most 
of them had fled from India to East Pakistan during the Hindu Muslim 
massacres around the time of partition of India. Forming a 
I Rushbrook Williams (1972), pp. 133-140 
2 The Biharis in Bangladesh, p. 8. 
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Muslim minority in Bihar (in India) tens of thousands of them 
were massacred at this time. But in East Pakistan, though Muslims, 
they were now an Urdu-speaking minority in a Bengali country. In 
fact all Urdu-speaking refugees, and other immigrants, were called 
Biharis by Bengalis. To them they were simply non-Bengalis. 
. 
After the civil war 'Biharis' in Bangladesh were either 
isolated in ghettoes or put into camps. They were an unwanted 
minority, and in constant danger. In the Mohammadpur camp 
"There was almost an average of one incident reported daily 
of a Bihari being attacked or robbed, and few Biharis had 
the courage to venture outside even to contact the authorities. 
.... 
At Mirpur Awami League members seized many Bihari homes, 
and there were continued subsequent reports of looting and 
harassment. "' 
There were also reports of killing and abduction of women. The 
worst case was a reported massacre of over 1,000 Biharis at Khulna 
on 10th March 1972.2 
The role of ethnic rivalry and hatred seems then to have been 
of considerable significance. But it is very important to note 
that the actual objects of Bengali resentment were less West Pakistanis 
than migrants from India. The total number of Biharis believed to 
be in enclaves in Bangladesh in 1972 was about 735,000. Yet a census 
by the International Red Cross showed that only 25,000 of these came 
from, or had close ties with, West Pakistan. The crux of my argument 
is that the secession movement was fundamentally an ethnic affair. 
It was not fuelled by common resentment of central government control 
residing in West Pakistan but by hatred of ethnic outsiders, and few 
of these outsiders were West Pakistanis. Secession for the Awami 
League and its supporters meant the dispossession of Biharis of their 
jobs and business opportunities. 
It seems clear to me from accounts of the time that Mujib had 
decided to try and secede (with Indian help) quite early on. It is 
also possible he only used the elections to gain public support for 
the attempt. But, why secede when power over the whole of Pakistan 
was in the offing? Mujib made no attempt to see if the immediate 
1 Ibid, pp. 13/14 
2 Ibid, p. 16 
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delays in the handing-over of power were temporary. The reason, 
I think, is quite simple. In Nigeria there had always been a 
strong ambivalence between the desire for regional autonomy and 
for central control. Gradually the parties decided that control 
of the centre was a worthwhile goal. This was because there 
were very few possibilities of gaining wealth outside politics. 
Most industry and commerce was foreign-owned. Wealth could only 
be acquired through politics - it gave access to patronage. In 
Pakistan foreign business interests were minimal. But in East 
Pakistan 'foreign' 
- 
i. e. West Pakistani or 'Bihari' business 
interests were powerful. By declining power at the centre, the 
Bengali elite was rejecting the greatly increased power over 
patronage this would have offered (elite jobs at the federal level 
for Bengalis), but it could totally displace the 'foreign' business 
interests if it gained independence for East Pakistan. It could 
also then set up its own efitirely"independent patronage system - 
a whole new government, a greatly expanded administration, a new 
set of quasi-government bodies, and a new diplomatic staff. 
Furthermore, as power at the centre could not offer any control 
over West Pakistan - it was too strong - and as there was always 
the danger of another military coup, the secession strategy must 
have been very tempting. 
8.3.2. Summary 
Ever since 1954, when the (East Pakistani) United Front beat 
the Muslim League in provincial elections in East Pakistan by 210 
seats to nine, gaining 64% of the vote to the League's 27%1, it was 
clear that the regionalist political leaders had mass support for 
their demands for greater autonomy. Nevertheless, I have tried to 
show that the relationship between the two wings was not intrinsically 
exploitative. For a start, it is difficult to doubt East Pakistan's 
greater inherent weakness. 
"As a result of its dense population and the amount of land 
under jute cultivation, East Bengal is a food deficit area, 
and in general the standard of living is lower than that in 
West Pakistan., 2 
The Pakistani's claimed with some justice (in defence of their 
policies at the time of the secession crisis) that 
1 Rashiduzzaman (1970), p. 577 
2 Lambert (1959), p. 52 
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"with the best will in the world and all the resources 
of nature you cannot undo in a decade or two the neglect 
of centuries. "1 
I doubt there was "the best will in the world" but significant 
attempts were made to reduce disparities. But how far should 
this go? Should West Pakistan slow down its own growth in order 
to raise East Pakistan's? Such problems have no obvious solution. 
But under Ayub, and even before him, clear efforts were made to 
increase development spending in East Pakistan relative to West 
Pakistan. The same applied to East Pakistani representation in 
the civil service elite, which was virtually nil at independence 
(obviously through no fault of West Pakistan). 
"In 1957, ten years after independence, 65 of the 267 officers 
in the Civil Service of Pakistan were from East Pakistan. 
The proportion of East Pakistanis, then, was 24.3%. By 1967, 
this had increased to 139 out of 467 serving officers, or 34.1%. 
This increase was made possible by the recruitment of servants 
according to a 'quota system' adopted in 1949, which provided 
that 20% of all vacancies in the CSP be filled on merit as a 
result of the Central Superior Services Competition Examination. 
Of the remaining vacancies, half were to be filled by East 
Pakistanis and half by West Pakistanis. This system was 
changed in 1967 to allow even more East Pakistanis to join 
"2 the Service. 
There is even some evidence that some members of the West Pakistani 
elite believed the secession of East Pakistan would be the best thing 
for them; they feared the Western wing would end up subsidising East 
Pakistan (as, in fact, it had done over a number of years in the case 
of food supplies). I have already given figures showing the gradual 
decline in relative importance of the East Pakistani market to West 
Pakistani manufacturers. Pakistan's economic performance after the 
break-away of Bangladesh, which was much superior to that of the latter 
country, confirms the significance of this. 
"The export sector's performance in 1972/3 was significant for 
two reasons. It demonstrated that the health of the Pakistani 
1 Ali, Chapter 2. 
2 Burki (1969), p. 253 
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economy was not dependent on the markets that had been 
lost in Bangladesh; in fact, it could now be argued that 
during the latter part of the 1960s the Eastern wing had 
become an economic burden for the Western wing. "1 
I do not believe that West Pakistan was exploiting East Pakistan 
as such, at least certainly not as much as is claimed. Nor do I 
believe Mujib was forced to secede. He did so because he represented 
a professional middle-class fragment that could gain only from total 
political support. Mujib represented neither a class nor an ethnic 
group, but an ethnically based class fragment. 
8.4. Bangladesh After the Secession: Nothing Altered 
I will ague in the final two sections that the civil war did 
nothing to alter the fundamentals of the political-economies of the 
areas that had been West and East Pakistan. Most of the elements 
of the delicate political balance remained. The immediate post- 
Liberation period in Bangladesh also tells us something about the 
motivations behind the leadership of the secession movement. The 
proof of the pudding, we are often told, is in the eating. What 
the Awami League did once in government and what happened in Bangladesh 
under the League tells us something about the secession itself. 
8.4.1. The Meaning of the Secession for Bangladesh 
With secession Bangladesh swapped an inferior (but decreasingly 
so) relationship with Pakistan for a markedly inferior relationship 
with India. The economies of Bangladesh and India become much closer 
together; indeed, for a while the former became India's client state. 
One of the major advantages for East and West Pakistan in 1947 had 
been that they had complementary economies (both producing different 
things), whereas before 1947 these areas had been dependent on India 
for the processing o£theirraw materials, while India also competed 
with them in the production of these raw materials (mainly jute and 
cotton). 
That theIndian and Bangladeshi economies are competitive is 
obvious enough. This was especially so in the case of jute, on 
which Bangladesh was greatly dependent. In 1969/70 India produced 
936,000 tons of jute goods to Bangladesh's 561,000. The effects of 
1 Burki, (1980), p. 111 
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the civil war pushed production in Bangladesh down to 315,000 
tons in 1971/2. This loss was nearly all made up by India, whose 
production went up to 1,120,000 tons. By 1973/4, when Bangladesh 
was producing 500,000 tons, it did so at India's expense; India's 
production in that year fell to 921,000 tons. 
l Yet, despite the 
earlier complaints of the unequal trade relationship between East 
and West Pakistan, Bangladesh, once tradc reopened with Pakistan, 
retained a pronounced deficit in its trade with Pakistan, as the 
following table shows. These two economies were complementary. 
Table 8.4: Bangladesh's Trade with Pakistan (million taka) 
1974/5 1975/6 1976/7 
Exports to Pakistan 
Imports from Pakista 
0.1 
111.5 
99.1 
242.4 
- 
83.4 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), Dacca, p. 270. 
It is widely acknowledged that India, as soon as it had helped 
free Bangladesh, rapidly formed an exploitative relationship with 
the new country. Many Bangladeshis consider the relationship of 
their country to India to have been of a "semi-colonial status". 
2 
This exploitation extended from straightforward plunder by the 
Indian army during its stay in Bangladesh to the formulation "of 
unequal treaties, to allow penetration of Indian monopoly capital 
through trade and other channels. "3 
Bangladesh's misfortunes do not seem to have diminished since 
the secession. This is not altogether surprising considering the 
enormous problems the country started with, in particular those 
stemming from the war. 
"These losses cannot be expected to be made up overnight". 
4 
Immediately after Liberation real per capital income, not surprisingly, 
fell. It appears to have risen significantly after a few years. 
Taking the index of real income as 100 in 1969/70, in 1972/3 it was 
87, but by 1975/6 it was 107.5 This improvement seems to have been 
largely due to an increase in agricultural output. The performance 
of industry was very poor. Given indices for agricultural and 
industrial output in 1969/70 of 100 by 1975/6 these were 104 for 
agriculture and 83 for industry. 
6 As can be seen from the followin3 
1 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), p. 240 
2 Alamgir (1978), p. 81 
3 Ibid, p. 81 5 Alamgir (1978), p. 7 
4 Ranis (1974), p. 855 6 Ibid, p. 10 
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table the position of the poor had improved somewhat during the 
1960s (even if the improvement had been greater in West Pakistan) 
but after Liberation it plummeted drastically. 
Table 8.5: Index of Real Wage Earnings of Unskilled 
Agricultural and Urban Labourers in Bangladeshi 
Agricultural Labourers Unskilled Urban Workers 
1958 101.7 n. a. 
1962 113.4 96.2 
1966 100.0 100.0 
1970 122.4 104.3 
1972 96.1 59.2 
1973 93.4 55.1 
1974 91.0 50.3 
1975 85.7 43.8 
(Naturally these figures, given the problems with the collection of 
data in that part of the world, must be treated with a certain 
skepticism, but they are likely to be very broadly correct). The 
earlier inferiority of East Pakistan to West Pakistan had not been 
the result of exploitation. The inferiority of the economy of 
Bangladesh relative to Pakistan's continued even after Liberation, 
and the situation of the bulk of the people declined absolutely. 
This was exacerbated by dreadful mismanagement of the economy. 
In the agricultural sphere, strangely enough, there was little 
departure from the policies of the previous central government in 
Pakistan. 2 There were further land reforms but, as only a small 
proportion of land in Bangladesh is held in large holdings, they 
had little impact. 3 The new government's industrial policy was, 
on the face of it, more radical than its agricultural policy. The 
government very quickly nationalised 67 jute mills, 64 cotton mills 
and 15 sugar mills. 
4 
Not much later all indigenous banks were 
nationalised. By 1974 about 85% of industrial assets were under 
public ownership or management. 
5 (Though even by 1978 the 
manufacturing sector contributed only a little over 102 to GDP, and 
absorbed a mere 6% of the labour force6). What was the purpose 
of the post-Liberation nationalisation programme? One of the motives 
was negative in character. Many industrial enterprises - 725 in fact? - 
1 Ibid, p. 12 
2 Abdullah (1976, Vol. IV, No. 1) 
3 Abdullah et al (1976, Vol. IV, No. 2), p. 216 
4 Ahmad, K. (1978), p. 104 5 Abmad, Q. (1974), p. 677 
6 Ahmad, Q (1978), p. 385 7 Sobhan & Ahmad (1977), p. 151 
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had been abandoned by non-Bengalis during the war. Someone had 
to do something with these, and quickly. Of necessity, the 
government took them over, formally only to manage them but in 
effect bringing them into state ownership. But the level of 
nationalisation was never reduced thereafter, and, in fact, has 
been extended greatly. 
Left-wing critics of the Awami League regime, surprised at 
the extent of the nationalisation undertaken by this 'petty bourgeois' 
government, put it down to left-wing elements who joined the AL 
during the civil war period and subsequently forced the government 
to a more socialist programme than it really wished to adopt. Yet 
it is noticeable that even with the military coup of 1975 no 
fundamental change in industrial policy occurred. There are other 
motives behind nationalisation than socialist ones. Moreover, 
Mujibur Rahman, the AL leader, was immensely popular -a nationalist 
hero (the "father of the nation"). He was not riding on the back 
of a repressed socialist revolution, even if socialists formed a 
significant part of the nationalist movement. 
The point is that nationalisation is not socialism. There 
were at first simply not enough Bangladeshis with sufficient private 
resources and business experience to take over the industries 
abandoned by non-Bengalis. (I have described in an earlier section 
the vain attempts of the Ayub regime to find private Bengali businessmen 
to take over industry in East Pakistan). Awami League members and 
supporters did not, in general, have the resources and experience to 
take over and run large businesses. I have shown the backgrounds 
of AL members before Liberation in Table 8.3. The nature of the AL 
after Liberation can be seen from the following data collected by 
Rounaq Jahan at Dacca University, which is on 283 M. Ps. elected in 
1973 (most of whom were from the AL). 1 
These M. Ps'. family and own occupational backgrounds lie in the 
professions, business and in land. The businessmen were perforce 
rather small-scale, and most of those primarily dependent on the 
land were farmers rather than land-owners. Most M. Ps. owned some 
land, but only 10.12 owned over 40 acres. 24.7% of the M. Ps. owned 
less than 6.5 acres. (Most Bangladeshis have some land-holdings, 
however small). 
1 Jahan, undated paper presented at Dacca University 
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Table 8.6: Occupational Background of Bangladeshi M. Ps. 1973 (%) 
Fathers M. Ps. 
Lawyers 5.0 26.5 
Teachers 7.5 9.9 
Doctors 2.5 5.3 
Civil servants 15.0 0.7 
Businessmen 14.6 23.7 
Land-owners 18.2 2.8 
Cultivators 35.7 14.8 
Politicians 0.7 12.4 
Other 0.7 3.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Number 280 283 
Comparison with their fathers' occupations shows a considerable 
move away from land as a source of income to the professions 
(primarily), to politics as a full-time job, and to business. 
The M. Ps. were more urban, more bourgeois. In terms of income 
the M. Ps. were comfortable but not many could be considered to be 
rich. About 36% of them had incomes of over T. 30,000 p. a. (about 
£1,050), less than one-third of these having an income of over 
T. 50,000 (£1,750). 32.1% had an income of between T. 14,000 and 
T. 20,000 (£490-£700). These men were considerably better-off than 
their fathers, less than one-half of whom had incomes of over 
T10,000 (T350). 
This data indicates that the moderately well-to-do sought and 
achieved progress through politics. The M. Ps. themselves were 
better-off than their fathers, so politics also, perhaps, provided 
a means of advancement. Politicians were not the scions of rich 
families. But nor were they from lowly backgrounds. Yet, though 
from an educational elite, by comparison with many of the earlier 
politicians of Pakistan (in particular West Pakistan) they were 
relatively 'small' men. It is also interesting to note that, by 
this time, businessmen had almost caught up lawyers. Comparison 
with Tables 7.6 and 8.3 shows that this had been a gradual process. 
This is a very significant trend, indicating the value of a political 
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career to business. Where resources are scarce attachment to 
power is often the best means of gaining at least some access to 
these resources. 
Awami League members were relatively 'small' men with, in 
general, insufficient resources (and experience) to take over and 
run large businesses. They had wanted to eliminate West Pakistani 
(or Bihari) competition, but did not have the means to take up the 
latter's assets once abandoned. The government, it should be added, 
was not opposed to disinvestment should suitable candidates appear 
from the private sector. In fact, a requirement was made that 
nationalised firms with assets below a certain level (taka 1.5 million) 
should be sold to the private sector. This level was quite low 
and the amount of denationalisation was very slight. 
"Nationalisation of industries in such a situation will 
only enable the bourgeois national government to strengthen 
its position by distributing p atronages. "1 
As I argued in Part One, access to positions of economic control in 
developing countries is often the main path to personal fortune. 
Where there are few opportunities to become rich, because there is 
little in the way of profit to be made on the land 
. 
(the case in 
Nigeria and in Bangladesh), because industry is highly undeveloped 
and/or is foreign-owned (the Nigerian case), or because the individual 
resources of the up-and-coming are limited (as was the case in 
Bangladesh), the main access to resources must be through the state. 
The Awami League, in particular, represented the middle-class 'have-nots', 
part of the educational elite which had not made it economically. 
"The essential feature of the Awami League however was that 
it had been excluded from power since 1957. This meant that 
the special benefits of patronage which served to single out 
elements in various tiers of the petty bourgeoisie and enable 
them to enjoy a life-style above their class without necessarily 
graduating beyond the confines of the class was denied most 
members of the Awami League. To this end, within their peer 
group, they were have-nots. "2 
Especially interesting in the above statement is the sense of a class 
fragment trying to reach beyond the confines of its related class 
1 Almmad, K. (1978), intro. p. xii 
2 Sobhan and Ahmad (1977), p. 122 
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fragments. They did this partly by becoming what Alamgir seems 
to call "bureaucratic capitalists". 
"These individuals who had been brought in, through political 
manoeuvering, to manage nationalised industries were usually 
inexperienced and performed poorly. Many of them added to 
their fortunes through pilferage and misappropriation of 
funds. Again, political patronage helped many to accumulate 
assets in various forms.... "1 
8.4.2. The Return of the Military 
The hold of the party and its supporters over the economy 
increased until Mujib tried to make this total with the formation 
in 1975 of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh 
Peasants', Workers' and Peoples' League) - BAKSAL. With this new 
organisation he not only made Bangladesh a one-party state, but 
made the party, through enforced association, the 'spokesman' for 
a multitude of interests, indeed, the whole population. BAKSAL 
had a labour front, a students' league, etc. Apart from this, 
politicians, managers, union leaders, journalists, even civil 
servants, 'voluntarily' joined the new party. Mujib was now a 
de facto dictator. However, this attempt to bolster what was a 
dying regime did not'last long as not many months later (in August 
1975) Mujib and his family were murdered in an army coup. But 
this did not happen before he had succeeded 
"in carrying out a large number of political murders, 
imprisoning thousands without trial, and forcing many 
to go underground. "2 
This coup, and the later coups, had nothing to do with class conflict. 
The difference between the various disgruntled groups was one of 
function rather than class, though underlying all was a deep frustration 
with Bangladesh's continuing economic iminiseration, and also with 
the total control of political power and economic resources by the 
Awami League. Two of these groups 
- 
the bureaucracy and the 
military - are constant opponents of political regimes. They are 
primarily 'functionary groups' rather than representatives of a 
particular class. This is especially so in Bangladesh, where 
class differences between the different elite groups are virtually 
non-existent. These two groups opposed the regime partly because 
1 Alamgir (1978), p. 83 
2 Ibid, pp. 81/2 
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their functions had been undermined, partly because the rewards 
they expected to derive from these functions had been limited, 
severelyso in comparison with the beneficiaries of political 
patronage. 
The military had a number of reasons for intervening, the 
most pressing one being the abyssmal economic and social decline 
of the country in the hands of the Awami League. But the military 
also stood to improve its own economic and social position. What 
the military gained from the coup can perhaps be inferred from an 
observaticn of the progress of defence expenditure over the period, 
which I have compared to spending on certain other sectors. 
Table 8.7: Government Spending on the Military & Other Sectors 
Revenue Expenditure (Taka mill of ns) 
1972/3 1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 1976/7 1977/8 % Increase 
Gen. admin 172.9 322.1 351.4 246.5 506.3 424.0 145 
Defence 201.6 419.6 708.5 1109.3 1702.2 2001.2 893 
Education 450.5 648.2 822.1 834.5 1020.9 1352.8 200 
Health 108.8 153.1 181.4 273.0 311.3 436.9 302 
Agriculture 29.8 36.5 50.5 56.8 48.1 63.2 112 
Industry 5.1 5.9 7.8 7.2 7.9 18.1 255 
Development Expenditure 
1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 1976/7 1977/8 % Increase 
Education 184.1 206.2 353.3 438.5 555.6 202 
Health 140.0 169.1 361.1 377.1 476.4 240 
Agriculture 359.2 491.2 1065.3 1270.2 1584.2 341 
Industry 201.9 643.8 662.1 1055.6 1341.5 564 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), pp. 300 and 302. 
I have shown development expenditure (the lower table) as well as 
current expenditure (for those sectors which had development spending) 
in order to get a proper comparison. As can be seen, in 1977/8, defence 
had the highest expenditure of all the above sectors, even including 
development spending; it also showed the greatest rate of increase 
over the period 1972/3 - 1977/8. Just before the coup, in 1974/5 it 
received less funds than education and not much more than industry. 
By 1977/8 it had easily outstripped them. In fact about one-tenth 
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of total government speading that year was on defence (though 
some of the figures of government expenditure were doubtful, being 
estimates rather than actuals). 
While the military certainly improved its own well-being after 
the coup, it did not make substantial alterations in the socio- 
economic structure. Above all, it did not initiate a programme 
of denationalisation, despite strong demands from businessmen, now 
willing to expand their assets, for such a programme. The coup, 
then, had nothing to do with the structure of ownership. Control 
over public assets was as useful to the new military regime, in 
every respect, as it had been to the Awami League regime. Limited 
denationalisation was considered in 1980 (in textiles and jute, and 
possibly banking and insurance) 1 but little was done about it. 
Like Ayub over ten years earlier, General Ziaur Rahman, the 
new leader, thought he could strengthen his tenuous position and 
increase political stability, if he formed a new party. This party, 
the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), as far as I know, has not been 
the subject of study as have the earlier major parties. However, 
while in Bangladesh I interviewed a BNP M. P., Naziur Kamran Choudhury, 
who spoke frankly, and at length, on the party. Roughly one-third 
of BNP members were new to politics. It also seems that its 
composition was different from that of other parties. Upto one-third 
of them were businessmen, many of these being those new to political 
life. The presidents of the three main chambers of commerce were 
BNP M. Ps. For the first time in a party in that part of the world 
there appear to have been more businessmen than lawyers - which were 
the next most numerous group. The trend towards this position, 
starting from 1947, has already been noted. (This predominance of 
businessmen was confirmed to me by an ex-BNP minister, Enayatullah 
Khan). However, despite the predominance of businessmen (mostly 
small businessmen), they were less concerned with possible denationalisation 
than with gaining from their place in the patron-client network. 
Ziaur Rhaman did a good job in providing political stability for 
Bangladesh and the basis for a measure of economic improvement. But 
even this did not last. In 1979 there were reports of famine (on 
a small scale) in the north of Bangladesh. In 1980 there were 
1 The Guardian (16.6.80). 
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widespread strikes by low-paid government employees. Over 500,000 
went on indefinite strike in support of a large number of demands. 
I 
Eventually Ziaur Rahman himself was killed by a small number of army 
officers. Apparently there were 14 coups and counter-coups in the 
ranks of the army in the three years after Mujib's assassination 2 
a clear case of intra-class conflict. The various conflicts that 
have occurred in Bangladesh since Liberation reflected the same 
processes that occurred in Pakistan before Liberation: the struggle 
between the military and the politicians continues, as does the 
struggle within the military itself. These conflicts have continued 
also since Ziaur Rahman's death. Liberation made no difference to 
the intra-class conflict, only to its geographical distribution. 
8.5. Pakistan After the Secession: The Delicate Political 
Balance Remains 
8.5.1. The Economy 
Bhutto, head of the new Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government, 
called himself a socialist and his programme 'Islamic Socialism'. 
His slogan 'roti, kapra, mekan' (bread, clothes, housing) had a radical 
ring and populist appeal. For the first time a political platform 
was apparently being built on the needs of the masses. However, 
Bhutto's socialism became increasingly limited towards the end of 
his regime. The party, on the face of it, was unlikely to be a 
radical force anyway. Bhutto himself was a rich landlord, as were 
many of the party's leaders. 
The nature of Pakistan's industrial policy was broadly similar 
to that of Bangladesh. The public sector was chosen as the prime 
medium. Over the years there was a substantial amount of nationalisation. 
The extent of the growth of the public sector can be gauged from the 
fact that while 46Z of new industrial investment in 1973/4 came from 
the public sector, this was the source of 77Z of new investment in 
1976/7. Public investment grew six-fold in this period; private 
investment actually fell. 
3 
It is clear, as it was in Bangladesh, that nationalisation was 
a prime source of patronage. The largest of the public groups was 
BIM Enterprises. Though some of the firms within this were quite 
profitable, overall profitability was low. One of the reasons for 
this was overmanning. In 1972/3 BIM employed 40,817 staff. By 
1 The Guardian (24.3.80) 
2 The Guardian (1.12.78) 
3 Waseem (1978), p. 78 (There were errors in addition, or printing 
errors, in his table; I corrected these to get the 
above totals). 
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1976/7 this was 61,731. Waseem estimates, very crudely, that 
perhaps half of this 50% increase was unnecessary. 
1 According 
to the White Paper put out by Zia's regime on the performance of 
the economy under Bhutto 
"The selection of ineffective, inefficient and unqualified 
management and over-staffing of enterprises was done purely 
for political expediency., 
2 
In agriculture change was sought through land reform. In 
this respect too Pakistan's path was similar to that of Bangladesh. 
The 1972 reforms were hardly radical, at least in effect. 
"The actual reforms which the government carried out... by 
being applicable to individual rather than family holdings 
meant that little land was in fact resumed and that which 
might have been available had already been transferred to 
other members of the family since most people knew that 
the reform was forthcoming. ,3 
Furthermore, there were so many permissible exemptions that only a 
very small minority of those formally owning too much land actually 
had to surrender land. However, further reforms in 1977 did more 
to reduce rural inequalities. 
General economic performance under Bhutto was reasonably, if 
not particularly, impressive. GDP grew by 4% per annum from 1972/3 
to 1976/7. Industrial output grew by 2.9% p. a. Furthermore the 
position of the industrial worker, to whom the PPP had a political 
commitment (which they to some extent honoured), improved. This 
was the first time the workers had received such benefits. 
Table 8.8: Index of Real Wa es in Large-Scale Manufacturing 
(1959/60 
- 
100 
1954 103 
1959/60 100 
1964/65 108 
1967/68 102 
1969/70 124 
1972/73 143 
1973/74 163 
1974/75 159 
I Ibid, p. 97 
2 Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Performance of 
the Bhutto Regime (1979), Vol. IV, p. 43 
3 Amjad (1978), pp. 10/11 
4 Ibid, p. 21 
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Real wages increased most from 1969/70. 
"This increase is mainly due to the introduction of the 
minimum wage in 1969 and the February 1972 reforms which 
extended workers' participation in management, made 
compulsory the payment of annual bonus, and set minimum 
standards of education, life insurance, and medical benefits. "' 
There was little, but some, reduction in inequality in the public 
sector. For instance, while the difference between the lowest and 
highest paid civil servants in 1959/60 had been 22: 1, by 1975/6 
it had fallen to 15: 1.2 
This review of economic management and of the economic welfare 
of the people during the period of PPP rule suggests that some 
moderate improvement was made, especially in the position of the 
industrial workers. At the same time the economic power of the 
industrialists, built up by Ayub, was broken. But political power 
also allowed groups access to patronage which had been blocked by 
the military for a decade. 
8.5.2. The Political Balance Breaks Down Again 
Broadly speaking, three types of group resented the PPP. First 
of all there was the class Bhutto had been trying to eliminate - the 
big industrialists and their allies in the lower reaches of business. 
Included here were the small businessmen in cities and small rural 
towns affected by recent nationalisations of certain 'agro-industries' 
(industries processing agricultural products): ghee (cooking oil) 
production, cotton ginning, rice husking, and flour milling. The 
important thing about these industries is that they were fragmented 
into small units and controlled by a myriad of small businessmen, 
not by a tiny elite of rich industrialists. Nearly 3,000 units 
were taken over. In doing so, then, Bhutto antagonised a large 
segment of the 'petty bourgeoisie'. More important than this, the 
nationalisations created widespread fear amongst small businessmen 
of all sorts that Bhutto was about to take them over too. They were 
encouraged to think this, and even pressurised into action, by the 
big industrialists who had already been dispossessed by Bhutto. 
3 
Urban retailers -a substantial element throughout Pakistan's towns 
and cities - were a significant element in the disturbances that 
brought down the PPP government. 
1 Ibid, p. 23 
2 Qureshi and Bilquees (1977), p. 331 
3 Personal interview with Hamid Mehmood, a senior PPP man. 
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Bhutto was, thus, strongly opposed by the 'business middle class'. 
The second group to oppose him was the professional sector of the 
middle class. This had been Bhutto's main source of support in his 
opposition to Ayub and his subsequent rise to power, but his growing 
policy of political repression seriously alienated large sections 
of this class. (His take-over of small industries also upset many 
of these people as this threatened to obstruct the business aspirations 
that many of them had 
l). 
In power the PPP had become increasingly 
like the functionary groups (both the army and the civil service) 
they had set out to control. One of the professional groups to 
turn against Bhutto was the lawyers. They had gained under Bhutto 
and had a close connection with the PPP, as they generally do with 
political parties. This connection between politics and lawyers, 
which I have often referred to, has been well described by the White 
Paper, 
"In the agitation that toppled the Ayub regime at the turn 
of the decade, and in which Mr. Z. A. Bhutto himself played an 
effective role, the community of lawyers took an active part. 
Another reason why some of the people in power were keen to 
ensure a submissive Bar was that a large element in national 
politics was drawn largely from the lawyers community and 
elections'to the various Bar Associations tended to influence 
parliamentary elections. The regime, therefore, sought to 
win over members of the Bar through the vast patronage that 
it enjoyed, and to punish and victimise those who did not toe 
the line, through the enormous power that it commanded., 
2 
Lawyers were important for two reasons: firstly, for their 
strength in political recruitment, secondly because their cooperation 
would be needed for the constitutional changes Bhutto was seeking 
(to strengthen his power). But these measures backfired to some 
extent. Those lawyers supporting other parties or, possibly more 
important, not gaining out of the patronage system (or not wanting to), 
were alienated. Competent lawyers saw less competent lawyers 
progressing beyond them. The lawyers became increasingly politicised 
and polarised. A similar process occurred with the journalists as 
he maintained close control over the press and victimised a number 
1 Personal interview with Bhutto's daughter, Benazir. 
2 Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Performance of 
the Bhutto Regime (1979), Vol. II, p. 99 
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of journalists. Both groups helped inflame the disturbances of 
1977, just as they had both helped to topple Ayub. Bhutto also 
significantly affected the educational sector by taking over a large 
number of private schools and colleges (education. having until then 
been largely in the private sector). The aim was to help the poor 
and to improve education, but in doing so he also affected the pay 
and job prospects of teachers. 
"Therefore, while Bhutto regarded the educational reforms 
as one of the finest accomplishments of his regime, 
dissatisfaction with them was one of the several reasons 
that brought the urban middle-classes out in the streets 
in such large numbers in the 1977 agitation against his 
regime. "' 
The third main group which had suffered under Bhutto was, of 
course, the military, which had been kept out of power by the 
growing strength of the PPP (which showed no signs of diminishing) 
for nearly six years. (The civil service had also suffered from 
PPP manipulation of the service). Though the military did not start 
the disturbances it certainly took advantage of them. The disturbances 
were deliberately and overtly started by the parties in opposition to 
the PPP, temporarily joined together under a united front which called 
itself the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Firmly shut out of power 
for a considerable time by the results of the 1977 elections (which 
gave the. PPP 155 National Assembly seats to 36 for the PNA), these 
parties saw no future for themselves unless they did something drastic. 
The PNA claimed that the elections were rigged and demanded a completely 
new round of elections. Bhutto offered to negotiate but the PNA 
decided to take to the streets, knowing it could not win otherwise. 
The agitation started in Karachi and spread from there to Lahore and 
other cities. Bhutto called in the army which created the stability 
needed for negotiations to make progress. The army then took the 
chance it had been waiting for, ousting Bhutto and keeping power for 
itself. 
The subsequent promises by the military regime to hold elections, 
its continued recession from these promises, the juridically doubtful 
conviction of Bhutto for the murder of a political rival, and his 
1 Burki (1980), p. 129 
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subsequent execution, are too well known to require elaboration. 
The result of these proceedings was simply that a military regime 
has remained in power with no known political or economic programme, 
(apart from its reactionary attempt to turn Pakistan into an Islamic 
state) for mazy years. The PNA who initiated Bhutto's downfall 
have, after a temporary flirtation with the military government, 
gained nothing but the death of their rival. 
Why was the PNA able to create so much agitation on the streets? 
The election results, even with some rigging, indicated that the 
government still had a great measure of popular support. The reason 
is that, as I have stated before, cities in Third World countries 
always contain large numbers of discontented people. In this case 
even supporters of the government had their grievances, and some of 
these, after going on the streets to protest against the PPP government, 
later supported the PPP when the military had forced it into the 
position of an underdog. It only takes a few disgruntled groups, 
with the ever present, wretched lumpenproletariat, to ignite the cities. 
The disturbances themselves exacerbate urban discontent, impelling 
others into the melee, who thus aggravate the problem yet further. 
"With the participation of students and labourers who were 
most affected by the closure of educational institutions and 
disruption of civic and economic life, the PNA's struggle 
entered into a decisive phase. "1 
The most significant factor in the disturbances, however, was 
probably religious. The Islamic leaders of Pakistan had never had 
political power, but religion was a very potent force - more powerful 
on the streets (witness the Karachi disturbances and the Ahmediya 
riots described above, and similar anti-Ahmediya violence during 
Bhutto's reign) than in the election booths. In this case the 
religious reaction was based on propaganda, put out by the PNA and 
transmitted through the 'ulema' in the mosques and through the anti- 
Bhutto press, that Bhutto was a 'kafir' - an infidel. The propaganda 
claimed that Bhutto drank and gambled and that because of this Pakistan 
was becoming increasingly westernised and un-Islamic. The reaction 
this caused was different only in scale from the religious and anti- 
western disturbances that were to topple the Shah in Iran. The 
1 All, Mehrunuiza (1977), p. 84 
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power of the religious factor induced Bhutto to suddenly introduce, 
while the disturbances were still going on, certain Islamic laws, 
especially the banning of the sale of alcohol in Pakistan, which he 
hoped would pre-empt further trouble. But it was too late. 
The same actors that had appeared in earlier disturbances here 
reappeared to dislodge Bhutto, but included was a substantial section 
of the 'business' middle class, brought into the fray through fear 
of Bhutto's socialist policies. At the head of the insurrection 
were the two main branches of the middle class: the business element 
and the professional element. These two middle-class fragments are 
usually antagonistic to each other. While the former always opposed 
Bhutto's socialism, the latter were initially Bhutto's main ally. 
But his increasingly oppressive regime made him more and more like 
the functionary groups (the army and the civil service) he had either 
displaced or weakened, and so the professional middle class began 
to oppose him; their own liberties had been too much curtailed. 
But the disturbances did not really become insurmountable until the 
religious element and the urban 'lumpenproletariat' became involved. 
Like Ayub, Bhutto was toppled in the melting-pot of urban 
discontent. The mixture was slightly different but the principle 
the same. The result of this opportunity of numerous groups to 
express their dissatisfaction was a movement of considerable proportions. 
"The magnitude of the movement is discernible from the 
number of protest rallies and casualties during the period 
from 14 March to 27 May 1977. According to the official 
figures placed before the Supreme Court by the then Attorney- 
General, 4,653 processions were taken out by the public 
including 248 by women, 92 by advocates, 18 by 'ulema', 
248 by students and 57 by boys and children. The figures 
relating to the destruction of property were 1,622 vehicles 
on the road (excluding those burnt in the Republic Motors, 
Karachi), 18 installations, 74 shops, 58 banks, 7 hotels, 
11 cinemas, 56 offices, and 27 railways. "1 
Hundreds of people died and thousands were injured during the 
disturbances. 
1 Ibid, p. 92 
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Who gained from the coup? Only the military. The Islamic 
politicians have gained the death of Bhutto and the Islamicisation 
of the country, but no political power for themselves. Pakistan's 
businessmen have gained the elimination of a 'socialist' regime, but 
as in Bangladesh, the military have not denationalised substantially, 
though they seem less unwilling to do so than the Bangladeshi regime. 
The fifth five-year plan (1978-83) promised to limit the public 
sector to a number of large, basic industries such as steel and 
ship-building, and also the possibility of minority private share- 
holdings in these; ' but this programme of even partial denationalisation 
has not yet been fulfilled, and Pakistan's businessmen continue to 
invest heavily abroad. There is a clear difference of interest 
between the military and the businessmen on this question. If the 
government denationalises it loses significant economic power and 
a vast amount of its total patronage system, including lucrative 
jobs for current and retired military personnel. In retaining most 
nationalised industries the military was acting not as an ally of 
the business class, but as a functionary group. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In Chapter Seven I described the various class fragments that 
have been involved in and either gained or lost from Pakistan's 
economic development. In this Chapter I have shown how conflicts 
between these have resulted in considerable political instability. 
But, at the same time, political changes have not been determined 
simply by these conflicts. Pakistani society is even more fragmented 
than the discussion in Chapter Seven indicated. There are many 
social groups that may have their own grievances (and an interest 
in political change) apart from the various elites that chapter is 
taken up with. Particularly important are what I have called the 
'middle-class triumvirate' of students, lawyers, and journalists; 
the religious fundamentalists; and the 'lumpenproletariat'. All 
these came together in the cities and disturbances initiated by any 
group, for whatever reason, however harmless on the face of it, can 
become so inflamed as to lead to the toppling of a regime. 
All sorts of conflicting interests are represented in these 
disturbances 
- 
so much so that it is not possible to say they are 
structured on any clear class or ethnic lines. The results 
1 Bagai (1979), p. 20 
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of these disturbances are, at the most, changes in regime; being 
fragmented and no more than briefly exlosive affairs they do not 
bring in their wake any major restructuring of the political-economy. 
However, it is possible to discern two broad groups: one liberal/leftist, 
the other religious/rightist. These can either separately or jointly 
bring down any regime, whether political or military. But these are 
just general urban forces and are not a central part of intra-class 
conflict, though they affect its outcome considerably. 
The class fragments which head this conflict are the 'professional 
middle class', the 'business middle class' and the functionary groups. 
(The latter are also mostly middle-class). It is no use treating 
these groups in inter-class terms. They had no solid class foundation. 
They were different groups that coalesced into makeshift alliances 
for the sake of convenience. Mujibur Rahman had the support of certain 
big West Pakistani businessmen, supposedly his sworn enemies. Bhutto 
also had the support of some big businessmen and land-owners, at the 
same time as gaining much from the support of professional groups and 
from industrial workers and peasants. His political enemies allied 
with the military in bringing him down, while before, in 1969, these 
political groups had all come together in order to bring down the 
military! In the same way land-owners had actively aided an industrial 
elite through the former's political control of the economy in order 
to get its raw materials processed. 
There is some sort of patterned connection between the confusing 
melee of social forces involved in urban disturbances and the class 
fragments that head the major conflicts. The professional middle 
class tends to seek the support of the liberal/leftist forces, and 
usually seeks advancement through the expansion of political processes; 
the business middle class tends to seek support from religious/rightist 
forces, and it often allies with the functionary groups in pursuit of 
stability and the restriction of political processes. But these are 
only very broad alliances; the urban hotch-potch is so mixed that 
conflagrations often include all groups and usually have unpredictable 
results, as well as being unpredictable in themselves. Nevertheless, 
the pattern just described is just about discernible: the main groups 
responsible for bringing down political regimes (those of Nazimuddin 
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and Bhutto) were religious and rightist, while the 'professional 
middle class', with its student and political allies, were mainly 
responsible for bringing down Ayub's essentially military regime 
(and most opposition to Zia's current military regime comes from 
just these forces). 
All of the conflicts described in this chapter can be seen 
in intra-class terms. Even the fundamentally ethnic conflict 
between East and West Pakistan had a powerful intra-class element. 
More important than any flow of exploitation there might have been 
from the Western to the Eastern wing, the elite in the latter, 
lacking any strong foundation in land, business, administration, 
or the military, saw itself pitted against the landed, industrialist, 
administrative and military elites of West Pakistan; while all 
these had gained from the fruits of development (through direct 
profit or patronage) the weak East Pakistani elite had been left 
behind. Its only chance of progress was through politics and 
the only power-base it had was its own ethnic group, by far the 
largest in Pakistan. The activities of this elite once in power 
in Bangladesh confirm the intra-class nature of its interests. It 
concentrated on boosting both its power and its sources of patronage. 
Little it did before or after Liberation indicated a concern for 
the condition of the Bengali masses; after Liberation it presided 
over a radical decline in their well-being. 
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PART FOUR : OVERVIEW 
At around the time of partition in 1947 conflict in the 
Indian sub-continent was primarily ethnic in nature. This was 
reflected in savage war between Hindus and Moslems. Ethnic 
confrontation continued in Pakistan, reaching its greatest 
intensity in conflict between East and West Pakistan and 
culminating in the civil war of 1971. Since then, though 
ethnic conflict has continued in West Pakistan between the tribal 
areas of NWFP and Baluchistan and the central government (comprising 
people mainly from the Punjab but also from Sind), it is enormously 
subdued compared to earlier ethnic conflicts. In other words, 
ethnic simplification (through secession or increased central 
control) has proceeded far enough to make ethnic conflict in that 
part of the world a much less significant factor. Bangladesh 
itself is particularly fortunate in that it contains little ethnic 
differentiation. 
I have argued in the last two Chapters that conflict in Pakistan 
has not been in any important sense inter-class in nature. Initially 
it was ethnic but it has subsequently developed into intra-class 
conflict. It has often been argued that the rise to economic power 
and political influence of the West Pakistani industrialists was an 
aspect of class domination. This was not the case. I have shown 
that this industrialist elite was virtually the creation of those in 
political power, and it was created out- of what was considered to be 
economic and nationalist necessity. Politics and power have always 
been primary. Businessmen have depended on government favour rather 
than created it. Furthermore, as I have shown, there was little 
in the way of either class or geographical linkage between the three 
elites involved in Pakistan's industrialisation: the industrialists 
themselves, the politicians, and the civil servants. It took some 
time for some coalescence to occur, and even then politics always 
determined economics rather than the other way round. 
It is impossible to talk of solid classes in the Western sense. 
For instance, the middle class contains two major elements which 
often choose different political options. The business sector allies 
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with the functionary groups, the professional segment with the 
politicians. The land-owners 
-a powerful but diminishing political 
force 
- 
hover between the two. Both the business/functionary and 
professional/political alliances try to restrict the power of the 
land-owners through land reforms, while avoiding antagonising them 
excessively by keeping the reforms at moderate levels. 
These alliances are necessarily fragmentary, uncertain and weak. 
Both sections of the middle class lose out. The businessmen lose 
out when the'functionary groups' interest in them fades, and they 
do not get the denationalisation they had hoped for; the functionary 
groups are too concerned with the benefits they themselves can gain 
from control over state resources. The professional group loses 
out because it becomes increasingly hedged in by the powerful functionary 
groups. And the politicians, many of whom are allies of the professional 
middle class themselves, start to act like a functionary group when 
in power. Because of endemic political instability they try to 
develop a dictatorial, one-party system whose function is government 
rather than representation. 
It is difficult, then, to talk of distinctive class differences. 
This is even more the case when, realising its weakness, the professional 
middle class seeks support from the lower classes in its battle against 
the functionary groups. This is another example of 'cross-class' 
alliance, now at the other end of the scale from the earlier alliance 
between land-owners and businessmen. My basic point is that these 
alliances are fluid and uncertain, and this is itself the result of a 
society made of class fragments rather than of powerful and united 
classes. What we have, then, is a continued, muddled, intra-class 
conflict which, as I have shown, takes place in the heat of the cities. 
Even the civil war, which was overtly ethnic in nature, can be seen 
in intra-class terms. The professional middle class of East Pakistan, 
which was an elite if a rather weak one in its own province, found 
itself embattled with the various elites of West Pakistan to gain from 
the fruits of development. Much of the nationalist movement, and of 
subsequent events in Bangladesh, can be explained by this fact. 
The main type of conflicts in Pakistan since 1947 and in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh since 1971 has been intra-class in nature. Essentially 
this represented a struggle between various middle-class fragments 
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for the right to gain most of the fruits of development (i. e. the 
right to gain most from the squeeze of the rural poor). First of 
all these middle-class fragments fought against the land-owners 
for a share of these rights, but, as the land-owning class has 
declined and the middle-class fragments become more distinctive, 
the struggle has increasingly been between the latter fragments. 
However, with the rise of certain socialist elements (which has 
occurred partly because fragments of the middle class have needed 
lower-class support in their mutual struggle) and the growing 
absorption of businessmen into politics (a trend I have pointed 
out, but one which so far still shows the primacy of politics), 
the beginnings of an industrial class system on the Western model 
can be seen. But these are only beginnings. 
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PART FIVE : CLASS AND COMMUNICATION IN PAKISTAN 
In Part Four I argued that conflict in Pakistan is broadly 
intra-class in nature. It culminates in a struggle between a 
number of different elites: the professional middle class, the 
business middle class, the functionary groups, and the politicians. 
The functionary groups are largely middle-class in origin, but 
the politicians represent a variety of interests - those of the 
professions, of business, and of the big land-owners. However, 
there is a strong traditional link between politics and the 
professions. Furthermore, for professional people who lack the 
substantial means to economic advancement with which businessmen 
and land-owners are favoured, politics provides the only real 
economic opening. The conflict between these various elites is 
therefore largely between different segments of the middle class. 
The press generally reflects these various clashes of interest, 
if not directly (in content) then indirectly (within the 
organisation of the press). These clashes can be represented 
as conflicts between the various press orientations discussed in 
Part One: partisanship, government-orientation and market-orientation. 
I hope to show in the following chapters that the press in 
Pakistan is essentially a middle-class affair, reflecting primarily 
intra-class conflict. It represents professional, business, 
political and governmental influences. None of these predominate 
absolutely, but the political element is-certainly the weakest. 
It is, in fact, overwbtlmed by the other factors: government 
control and commercial interest. The latter is an aspect of 
market-orientation but an equally important part of the latter 
is the journalists' sense of professionalism. 'Professional' 
journalists refer to the market rather than to government or to 
political patronage. The press in Pakistan is therefore divided 
between government and market-orientation, while partisanship 
declines in influence. It is these processes that I shall be 
describing in the next two chapters. 
I showed in Parts Two and Three that in Nigeria conflict is 
largely ethnic and that the press reflects this conflict. It 
is a highly partisan press. Conflict in Pakistan is primarily 
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intra-class, between various segments of the middle class. 
The press in Pakistan reflects these antagonisms, but in a 
different way from the Nigerian press - less directly. The 
conflict is contained in a battle over the nature of the press 
between forces leading to government-orientation and those 
leading to market-orientation. These forces represent 
different sections of the middle class. They are caught 
in a struggle not so much over the content of newspapers but 
over the very nature of the press. 
In what follows, though, I shall of course be referring to 
pre-civil war Pakistan as Pakistan and to the post-war countries 
as Pakistan and Bangladesh, some confusion is inevitable - as 
for instance, in the title to this part, which refers to both 
periods. However, this is only a minor problem. It should 
be borne in mind that journalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh 
has the same origins and traditions. I shall in effect be 
treating the press in these two countries as a whole. 
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CHAPTER NINE : THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE PRESS 
In this chapter I shall start off by showing that the press 
in Pakistan is a limited affair. It reaches a very small 
proportion of the potential market and the central core of this, 
the educated elite, is even smaller. The press now depends 
largely either on government subsidy or on the market (both sales 
and advertising). The continuing existence of the English- 
language press, despite the tiny number of English-speaking in 
the country shows the strength of the elite market. The press 
in Pakistan is essentially a 'middle-class' matter, though it 
is gaining wider acceptance. 
Despite its limitations the press, as I shall go on to show, 
is not dependent on partisanship. The strength of the middle 
class in Pakistan means that the press has received substantial 
advertising and this has helped it develop. However, partisanship 
still exists. The press in Pakistan is not strong: neither 
government, nor the market, nor the political parties, have 
control of the press, but the latter are clearly in the weakest 
position. The government is, of course, in a position to 
command, but the market has played a strong countervailing role; 
so, too, have the professional inclinations of the journalists, 
who in general oppose both government control and political 
influence. This tendency is very powerful. The journalists 
see themselves as a liberal profession, and as part of the 
professional middle class. I shall conclude this chapter by 
indicating the power of this professional inclination and showing 
how (albeit with the unwanted assistance of government controls) 
it has pushed political partisanship into a clearly inferior role. 
9.1. The Economic Foundations of the Press 
The press in Pakistan before the civil war and in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh since the war is a small-scale affair when compared 
to the press in developed countries, but it has expanded enormously, 
and also proliferated in variety, since its establishment. Though 
economically weak the press is a significant social force. However, 
its limitations mean that its influence has been confined largely 
to the middle class. 
- 
336 
- 
9.1.1. The Scope of the Press 
The history of the Pakistan press starts in 18th century 
India. The press in India developed largely through nationalist 
partisanship. But, as I have already emphasised, there was a 
great deal of intra-nationalist rivalry, or rivalry of groups 
with different nationalist aims. The strongest antagonism was 
between the Hindus and the Moslems. The press clearly reflected 
these nationalist divisions. The Hindu press was by far the 
strongest, but even by 1925 there were 220 Moslem newspapers. 
1 
By the 1960s West Pakistan had 78 dailies and 257 weeklies, 
East Pakistan 24 dailies and 78 weeklies. Eighteen of West 
" Pakistan's dailies were in Karachi, fourteen in Lahore. As for 
language, taking all periodicities together, West Pakistan had 
at this time 715 Urdu papers, and 448 English-language papers; 
East Pakistan had 410 Bengali and 108 English-language papers. 
The combined circulation of the Urdu dailies was about 250,000; 
it was 150,000 for the English-language dailies (in both wings) 
and 45,000 for the Bengali dailies. Total daily circulation 
was about 500,000 (of which Karachi had about 200,000). In 1980 
Pakistan had 115 dailies, 88 of them in Urdu, 12 in English, 
12 in Sindhi, 3 in other languages. Bangladesh had 30 dailies, 
24 in Bengali, 6 in English. 13 of these dailies were in Dacca 
7 in Chittagong. The total circulation of dailies in Pakistan 
was probably somewhat over one million in Bangladesh about 350,000. 
It should be added that all these figures are probably exaggerated. 
As regards numbers of newspapers, many papers officially registered 
are in fact 'dummies'. They do not actually function as newspapers 
but are kept open in order to remain on the register. Circulation 
figures are also unreliable, though the general picture is clear 
enough: total circulations are very small; most papers are tiny, 
while the greatest concentration of newspapers is in a few major 
cities. 
2 
There has not been a published audited estimate of individual 
circulations since the 1960s. More recent estimates rely, 
therefore, on the claims of the newspapers themselves. Below I 
give figures for papers in Pakistan before the secession of the 
1 Kurian (1982), p. 707 
2 The above information is extracted from Al-Mujahid (1956); 
Ali, Amjad (1963); Wilbur (1964); Pakistan Publications 
(1967); Government of Pakistan (1980); and Kurian (1982). 
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Eastern wing, and in Pakistan and Bangladesh since secession. 
The 1959 and 1965 figures are government figures. Others I 
have assessed from a variety of sources, but mostly the claims 
of editors and management staff whom I interviewed in 1979. 
I have tried to filter out the least reliable estimates by 
comparing them to estimates I gained from other sources. All 
in all, I think the English language figures are the most reliable. 
They indicate only moderate growth over the years, so exaggeration 
is unlikely. The Urdu circulations are, I think, somewhat 
excessive. The least reliable are those of the political papers, 
Musawaat, Amn and Elan. But they, were certainly popular in 1979 
during the early period of military rule. The Bengali figures 
are, I think, fairly reliable. 
Table 9.1: Individual Newspaper Circulations 
Ownership Circulations 
1959 1965 1979 
Pakistan 
Dawn Private 36,655 38,632 60,000 
Pakistan Times Government 35,470 42,311 65,0001 
Morning News if 18,882 39,074 18,000 
, 
-, 
The Moslem Private - - 14,000 
Jang (Urdu) " 49,889 158,477 325,0002 
Nawa-I-Waqt " 16,307 50,000 175,0002 
Mashriq " Government - 63,554 100,0002 
Imroze It is 17,124 26,101 60,0001 
Musawaat to Political pt - - 70,0001 
Amn if Private 
- - 
45,000 
Elan it " - - 18,000 
Bangladesh 
Pakistan/Bangladesh 
Observer3 Government 11,129 19,119 51,000 
Bangladesh Times of 
- 
- 
24,000 
Ittefaq (Bengali) Private 
- 
- 
97,000 
Sangbad '- " is - - 27,000 
Dainik Bangla " Government - - 38,000 
All Pakistani papers 1979 - 950,000 
All Bangladeshi papers 1979 - 237,000 
All English-language papers 1979 - 232,000 
All Vernacular papers 1979 - 955,000 
Notes: 1 Two editions 2 Three editions 
3 The Pakistan Observer (and privately owned) until 
the secession of Bangladesh. 
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This table shows only the more important dailies but the 
total circulation of all dailies (which I have already given) 
was not much greater. The figures for the three political 
papers Muses awaat, Ami and ElM (the latter two were privately 
owned but closely connected with a political party) are the 
least meaningful. They sold well in 1979 because of the 
recent execution of Bhutto whom they supported. To a certain 
extent these were 'windfall' sales. 
The table shows that the total circulation of the major 
daily papers of both countries combined in 1979 was less than 
11 million. Taking the seven papers for which there are 
circulation figures for 1959 and 1979, which together show a 
growth in circulation from 185,000 in 1959 to 754,000 in 1979, 
if this is representative of the press as a whole, then it 
would seem circulation growth has been substantial; nevertheless, 
in absolute terms the figures are still very small. Most of 
the growth has been in the vernacular press. Jang's circulation 
especially does just about put it in the 'mass circulation' range. 
However, in 1959 the major English.. language papers were at least 
the equal in circulation terms of the larger vernaculars. Though 
they have lost out to the rapidly growing vernacular press, the 
circulation of the top four English papers doubled in twenty 
years; considering that most if not all of their readers can 
also read a vernacular paper (and probably do) this indicates 
a very significant element of westernisation and elitism in the 
newspaper-buying market. 
The buying public, though, is much smaller than the reading 
public. Naturally, this is not something that can be estimated 
with any degree of certainty, but four readers for each English- 
language paper sold and five for each vernacular would seem to 
be in line with most estimates. 
Table 9.2: Overall Newspaper Readership 
All Pakistani papers 4,600,000 
All Bangladeshi papers 1,110,000 
All English-language papers 928,000 
All vernacular papers 4,775,000 
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These figures are clearly very rough. The circulation 
figures themselves are unreliable. Above all, the figures 
exclude minor papers and papers of other periodicities. Some 
of these are quite significant. Nevertheless, one thing is 
very clear: the level of readership is well below the level 
of literacy in both countries. There are roughly 22 million 
literates in Bangladesh and 18 million in Pakistan1 (though 
these must also be unreliable figures). 
The scope of the press in Pakistan is limited in another 
sense. Examination of the distribution of places of origin 
of letters and classified advertisements in the papers I have 
used in my content analysis suggests (with all the previous 
qualifications on the reliability of such data) a strong dependence 
of newspapers on the cities of publication. Most newspapermen 
confirm that this is broadly so; though the larger newspapers 
sell throughout Pakistan the bulk of their circulations is in 
or near their towns of publication. 
The geographical distribution of content, obtained by analysis 
of 15 issues of each newspaper, indicates the reverse of the above. 
In terms of content the papers are hardly local at all. For 
instance, Dawn in 1951 had only 17% of its domestic news on its 
town of publication, Karachi, or on the areas near Karachi. 60% 
of its content was devoted to national news. In the Morning 
News in 1968,13% of domestic coverage was on the town of publication, 
Dacca, or its environs. However, the paper was more parochial 
than Dawn. It devoted exactly the same amount of its domestic 
coverage (41%) to news about East Pakistan as it did to national 
news. Very broadly, all the main papers are economically local, 
but in terms of coverage they have much greater provincial or 
national ambitions. 
Though even the vernacular papers have a very small circulation, 
it is not unreasonable to suppose that the relatively large difference 
in circulation between the two types of paper makes the English.. 
language press the equivalent of the 'quality' press in the U. K., 
and the vernacular papers the equivalent of the popular press. 
This is in fact broadly the case. The vernacular papers are 
1 Kurian (1982), pp. 133 and 707 
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read mostly by poorer, less educated people. But this parallel 
requires some qualification: Pakistan and Bangladesh are socially 
conservative countries. Papers do not deal in sexual scandal 
or in any sensationalism, as do the popular papers in the West. 
The English-language papers are more elitist than our quality 
press, the vernacular papers more sober than our popular press. 
There is a big difference between the English-language papers 
and vernaculars in terms of types of readership, but there is 
also significant variation within the latter. The English-language 
papers are the preserve of the elite, but some of the more respectable 
vernaculars achieve a similarly respectable readership. The 
editor of Imroze (sister paper to the Pakistan Times), for instance, 
described his readers as 'teachers, trade unionists, intellectuals, 
liberals, advocates'. The editor of Hurriyet, sister paper to 
Dawn, claimed 'intellectuals, labour leaders, and political workers. 
Dainik Bangla in Bangladesh is similar. Lower down (but with a 
higher circulation) comes Mashriq, a popular-style but government- 
owned paper, which apparently appeals to such people as small 
shop-keepers. Lower down still come the political papers. 
Musawaat the official organ of the PPP, described its readers as 
of 'low income' - for example, very small shop or stall-keepers, 
and low government servants 
. 
Jesaret, the organ of the Islamic 
party, Jamaat-E-Islami, has a more general but much smaller 
readership than Musawaat's. The left-wing paper, Amten (smaller 
than Musawaat), appealed to the 'less-educated working-class'. 
The editor of Elan, a similar paper, claimed the same. However, 
going right across the board, were the big three vernacular papers: 
Jang and Nawa-I-Wagtin Pakistan and Ittefa in Bangladesh. 
These, combining a popular style with soberness of content, are 
read by all classes. 
This rough and ready 'market analysis' indicates big 
differences in types of readership for the various papers. At 
the top end of the scale is the English-language press. The 
vernacular sister-papers to English-language papers come next. 
These papers are, perhaps, the 'quality' vernaculars. At the 
bottom of the social scale are the political papers - small, with 
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a very limited range of information, and a simple style of appeal. 
Going right across the social spectrum are the three big independent 
vernaculars (Jang, Nawa-I-Wagt and Ittefa 
. 
Many who read an 
English-language paper also read one of the latter. 
9.1.2. The Funding of the Press 
Seeing how the press is funded is central to an understanding 
of the social and political nature of the press. There are four 
ways a newspaper can fund itself: through sales revenue, through 
selling advertising space, through public subsidy, or through 
private subsidy (or, of course, any combination of these). 
Survival of sales and advertising with no subsidy indicates a 
successfully market-oriented paper. Public subsidy implies 
government-orientation. Private subsidy is usually associated 
with political partisanship (in developing countries). The 
different types of paper discussed above are funded in different 
ways, but the power of the market is primary. The press is by 
and large a commercial enterprise, even where government is the 
owner. 
The following table shows the percentage of total space taken 
up by advertisements in Pakistan's main papers. The 1963 figures 
are from Amjad Ali's content analysis', the figures for other 
years from my own. 
rab1e 9.3: Percentage of Newspaper Space taken by Advertising 
Dawn 1951 Dawn 1953 Morning News 1968 (Dacca) 
34.4 22.9 25.3 
1963 
Dawn Pakistan Times PakistanObserver Jang Nawa-I-Wagt Ittefag 
32.8 27.5 18.9 20.7 16.1 16.9 
1970 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News (Dacca) 
35.8 30.4 25.4 
It can be seen that, in terms of volume at least, most of 
Pakistan's papers received a substantial amount of advertising. 
The average amount of space taken up by advertising in the Pakistani 
press in 1980 is about one-third, but in Dawn the proportion is 
now apparently up to nearly 47% and in Pakistan Times up to 44%. 
2 
1 Amjad Ali (1963), p. 16 
2 Kurian (1982), p. 710 
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It is clear that the English.. language papers in general got 
considerably more advertising than the vernacular papers. 
Overall, even from the early 1950s the commercial nature of 
Pakistan's main papers has been very solid. 
The difference between the vernacular and English language 
papers is even greater when advertising revenue is taken into 
account. The latter are much more dependent on advertising 
revenue than the vernaculars, which rely mostly on sales revenue. 
In this economic sense the language-split does follow the 
quality-popular split in the U. K. The following table gives 
figures I obtained from newspaper organisations in 1979 (few 
papers, though, could give me precise figures), as well as 
some earlier government figures. Also shown is the proportion 
of advertising revenue which came from government or government 
agencies and companies. 
Table 9.4: Advertising Revenues 
% Revenue from ad's. % ad's. revenue 
from overnment 
19621 1979 1979 
Pakistan 
Morning News 16.8 75 60 
Dawn 38.9 75-80 39.42 
Pakistan Times 30.4 65.42 
Moslem Over 50 None 
Jang 15.2 40 30 
Nawa-I-Waqt 46 Over 50 
Hurriyet About 50 
Imroze 34 
Musawaat 5-10 None 
Amn Negligib le of 
Elan if if 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Times 75 
Bangladesh Observer 70-80 Over 50 
.. 
Ittefaq 60 Less than 50 
Dainik Bangla 60 Over 50 
Sangbad 40 
The increase in dependency on advertising between 1962 and 
1979 is a sign of increasing market-orientation. This applies 
even to government papers, but much of their advertising revenue 
1 Pakistan Publications (1967) 
2 Kurian (1982), p. 710 
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comes from government itself (as can be seen from Pakistan Times' 
and Morning News). The political papers (Musawaat, Amn and Elan), 
by contrast, hardly get any advertising. Most important of all 
is the clear difference in dependency on advertising revenue on 
the basis of language. The English-language papers live off 
advertising, the vernaculars are far more dependent on sales alone. 
Even where the circulations of English and vernacular papers are 
about equal, as is the case with Dawn and Imroze, there is a big 
difference in sources of income. In 1979 these papers both had 
a circulation of roughly 60,000, yet Imroze got 34% of its revenue 
from advertising, while the figure for Dawn was 75-80%. 
The cause of this clearly lies in differences in advertising 
rates. The English-language papers get much more money per column 
inch of advertising than vernaculars. One figure quoted was a 
ratio of ten to one! This might be an exaggeration but certainly 
the difference is substantial, stemming both from the nature of 
the reader (a member of the elite in the case of the English-language 
papers) and of the advertiser. The editor of Dawn, for example, 
said that while Jang relied mostly on toothpaste (or similar) 
advertisements, his paper gets big, quality advertisements which 
are very expensive (e. g. from airlines). This difference in 
advertising rates is another parallel of the economic quality/ 
popular distinction in Britain. The English-language, as do our 
'quality' papers, appeal to a small, highly educated well-off 
sector of society. While this limits their circulation, this 
is more than made up by the high advertising rates they can charge 
to companies who can, through these papers, reach those with money. 
Commerce therefore plays an important role in maintaining the 
elitist English-language press. 
Also conspicuous in the above table is the strong dependence 
of some papers on government advertising (including advertisements 
from various government agencies and the nationalised industries). 
It is generally acknowledged that in many cases as much as 70-80% 
of advertising revenue comes directly or indirectly from government. 
In the late 1970s government accounted for over 30% of the advertising 
revenue going to the press. 
1 This obviously gives the government 
an enormous amount of indirect power over the press, which it can 
1 Kurian (1982), p. 710 
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use without resort to overtly repressive measures. The bigger 
independent papers are the most able to avoid excessive 
dependence on this source of finance. (The political papers 
have no choice when 'in opposition'). 
It is possible to reconstruct the economic nature of some 
of the main Pakistani newspapers by using the above, and further, 
data. Very crude estimates can be made of sales revenue by 
multiplying circulations by the prices of the newspapers, with 
some qualifications. An example of the calculations that 
can be made is shown by the following instance of the Pakistan 
Times using information given to me by the paper. In 1979 
this paper cost 60 paisa a copy. 25-30% of this went to the 
selling agents (street hawkers, etc. ). The Lahore circulation 
was roughly 50,000 (at its maximum I should think), of which 
5,000 were wasted copies (free copies, returns, etc. ). So, 
daily income from sales was roughly Rs. 20,250 (about £1,100). 
Advertising revenue can be worked out using data already given. 
I shall use the Pakistan Times agency and wastage percentages 
for all four papers in my example. 
The table below uses data from different years. Firstly, 
I shall use Amjad Ali's figures for total newspaper space and 
space taken up by advertisements, which date from 1963. Figures 
for advertising rates, circulations, and newspapers prices 
refer to 1979. However, I do not think this is a crucial 
problem as I am interested in the relative differences between 
the papers, in particular, between the English language and 
vernacular papers. I am not interested in the economic state 
of the press, or of any paper, in a particular year. (One 
factor to note is that this table only applies to the main 
edition of each newspaper). 
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Table 9.5: Hypothesised Finances of Four Major Newspapers 
Dawn 
Lahore 
Pak. Times 
Karachi 
Jang 
Lahore 
Nawa-i-Waqt 
Col. inches per page 164 168 168.6 133 
Col. inches ad's. per page 53.9 46.2 34.9 21.4 
Govt. ad's. as proportion of 
ad's. 20% 20% 30% 50% 
Col. inches govt. ad's. per page 10. $ 9.2 10.5 10.7 
Govt. ad's. revenue per page' 410.4 349.6 399 406.6 
Col. inches commercial ad's. 
per page 43.1 37 24.4 10.7 
Commercial ad's. revenue 
per page2 4,310 3,700 976 428 
Total ad's. revenue per page 4,720. 4 4,049. 6 1,375 834.6 
Number of pages per issue 12 12 10 8 
Total ad's. revenue per issue 56,645 48.595 13,750 6,677 
Price per issue 75p 60p 75p 75p 
Circulations 60,000 50,000 150,000 100,000 
Sales Revenue per issue3(Rs) 28,350 18,900 70,875 47,250 
Total Revenue per issue (Rs) 184,995 , 67,495 84,625 , 53,927 
Notes: 1 At Rs. 38 per column inch 
2 At Rs. 100 per column inch for English language and 
Rs. 20 for vernacular papers 
3 Allowing for 30% loss of sale price to agents and 
10% wastage of copies. 
Both the Karachi papers do somewhat better than the Lahore 
papers, being based in a bigger more commercial city. But the 
biggest difference is between the English and the Urdu papers, 
with their very distinct revenue structures. We see Jans with 
a circulation for its Karachi edition over twice as great as 
Dawn's, earning a revenue per issue not much greater than Dawn's. 
Dawn is certainly one of Pakistan's most profitable papers, and 
it has been claimed that it is the most profitable. 
1 Circulations 
are so important to vernacular papers that eventually they approach 
saturation point in their own cities and can only increase 
1 Kurian (1982), p. 709 
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by founding new editions elsewhere. In 1979 Nawa-I Wagt had 
four editions, Jan& three (now four) and Musawaat two. The 
Pakistan Times was the only English-language paper to have two 
editions, the second of which ran at a loss. By increasing 
the number of editions, fixed costs rise substantially, so 
smaller extra editions are unlikely to be all that profitable, 
and they often make losses. The English-language papers do 
not gain so much from an increase in sales. They are virtually 
forced to remain elitist, and in fact gain from being so. For 
many years it had been predicted that the English-language press 
would disappear. This prediction took no account of the elite 
readership of the English-language papers, and the advertising 
revenue this could generate. 
The English-language papers have a considerable advantage 
over vernacular papers in advertising revenue. They have a 
further advantage in that the vernaculars suffer important costs 
which the English-language papers are not subject to. The Urdu 
papers have high calligraphy costs. Urdu news is not type-set 
but written by hand and then photo-printed. In Jesaret I was 
told that one calligrapher can write at most 45 inches a day. 
These papers thus need a large number of calligraphers. In 
1979 Amn and Jesaret both employed about 40, Imrose 65. Urdu 
papers also have high translation costs as all news coming 
through the news agencies arrives in English. Many of the 
sub-editors in the Urdu papers are really translators. 
The great dependence of the press on the private sector 
makes radicalism extremely unlikely; as one editor said "newspapers 
can't flourish without the private sector". Papers that benefit 
from no (or hardly any) advertising subsidy are the political 
papers. On the other hand, they can gain enormously from their 
partisanship in times of political conflict. At such times 
it is possible they are profitable. In 1979 the circulations 
of these papers was very large (for political reasons). At the 
same time they keep costs to a minimum. In 1979 Musawaat, AM 
and Elan each charged 75 paisa per issue, yet provided only 
four pages each, compared to ten or so for Jang and Nawa-I-Waqt 
(the number of pages varies considerably) for the same price. 
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Whereas these last two papers had about 90 journalistic staff 
for three editions, Hurriyet forty for one edition, and Imp oze 
even more than this for one edition, Amn had twelve and Elan 15. 
Whereas Imroze has 25 reporters, Amn had only four. Musawaat 
is the only one of the political papers that cannot be considered 
to be a 'shoe-string' affair. Though it too had then only four 
pages and charged 75 paisa, the main edition at Lahore had 28 
journalists. (This paper is the PPPs official organ). However, 
all these papers were housed in ramshackle buildings while the 
editors of Amn and Elan did not even have offices to themselves. 
All in all, it would not appear that the political papers 
are generally profitable. Elan certainly was not. Amn usually 
broke even, but sometimes made a small loss, while Musawaat more 
often than not made losses. (I am using the past tense as the 
current government has closed down two of these papers). Yet 
many journalists, from a variety of papers, insisted that these 
'dissenting' papers existed for commercial reasons. The 
explanation, I think, is fairly simple. In times of political 
turmoil, political news is very valuable. All papers can benefit 
from this by purveying such news. The market-oriented papers 
that give a balanced, but probably dry and certainly uncommitted 
account of current events, benefit moderately. Government papers 
do badly. Those that support the popular parties do the best. 
Political papers blossom at such times. There are many papers 
in Pakistan which grow and die within a few months, all trying 
to thrive in the heat of politics. They are not viable in the 
long-term because of the strength of the market-oriented press 
and because of government controls. If they oppose the government 
they become popular but the government bans them. If they support 
government they lose their popularity. When their own party 
comes to power, they become routine, government-oriented affairs, 
and the same thing happens. 
Though there are big differences between the different types 
of newspaper so far described, all the papers suffer to some extent 
from a lack of resources. Even the biggest has not exactly a 
huge circulation. For this reason the actual journalistic 
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activity of the papers is rather limited. Their full-time 
reporting staffs are small and they rely heavily on agency 
material, hand-outs from parties and other organisations. 
They also have a large number of 'stringers' (correspondents 
not in the full-time employ of the papers). For these 
reasons, while the papers have few reporters, they do employ 
a large number of sub-editors. These are the people who edit 
the incoming material (under supervision) 
-a routine, rather 
bureaucratic job. 
The information I was given on staffing was occasionally 
sketchy, but the following less sketchy examples give a 
reasonable picture for 1979. This shows that there is a 
strong stress on the sub-editing role and the editorial/feature 
writing/columnist role. The day-to-day reporter is a relatively 
minor figure. Of course, within the organisation as a whole, 
all journalists are relatively minor The Moslem had a 
journalistic staff of 26, out of a total staff of 210 (printers, 
proof-readers, administrators, etc. ). For ttefa it was 
apparently 58 out of 450. 
Table 9.6: Distribution of Journalistic Staff in 
Certain Newspapers 
Reporters Sub-editors Features/ 
Editorial- 
Other Total 
Pakistan 
Dawn 9 16 10 2 37 
Moslem 6 14 6 2 28 
Nawa 
-I-Wagt2 18 72 5 - 95 
Imroze (Lahore)1976 10 13 11 3 37 
Bangladesh I 
Bangladesh Observer 20 25 18 
- 
63 
Bangladesh Times 12 21 9 3 45 
Ittefaq 12 16 30 
- 
58 
Dainik Bangla 22 21 27 
- 
70 
Notes: 1 Usually photographers 
2 For all four editions 
3 Staff in Dacca only 
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If the reporter is rather a minor figure he is partially 
substituted by the news agencies. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the agencies have comparatively large total journalistic staffs 
(reporters, sub-editors, editors, etc. ), as well as a large 
number of stringers. The two news agencies in Pakistan had 
between them 200 full-time journalists in 1979, while the 
largest ten newspapers (three of them with several editions) 
had only 452. In Bangladesh the two agencies had 127, the 
top five papers 301 full-time journalists. 
It can be seen directly from newspapers content that the 
papers are very dependent on agencies. Below is given a 
break-down of the main types of news and features in the Morn in 
News of 1968 (a sample of fifteen issues spread over one year) 
in terms of agency items and items from the paper's own reporters 
(at least as attributed in the paper). The figures are for 
total items over the 15 issues, and include all agency items, 
i. e. foreign ones too. As can be seen, the paper's own 
reporters are left largely with local and crime news. 
Table 9.7: Amount of Agency News in the Morning News 1968 
Political Social/ Crime/ Local Other nternationall 
Economic Disaster Domestic 
Agencies 45 67 18 53 110 533 
Own reporters 24 27 44 175 150 2 
Note 'Including foreign relations. 188 of these items were 
of the 'soft' news variety - mostly foreign features. 
The editors of a number of papers categorically stated that 
they were very dependent on agency news. Dainik Bangla had made 
an estimate of this dependence, and put it at 60% of all their 
news content. In Nawa-I-Wagt, according to its owner, 40% of 
domestic news (and virtually all international news) comes from 
agencies. The staff of one of the two agencies in Pakistan, PPI, 
made a count of all agency material used in one month (August 1979) 
for a number of papers. This shows that all types of paper, 
whatever their language or ownership, make considerable use of 
the agencies. Even a party paper like Jesaret, which one might 
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think would wish to rely largely on independently acquired 
material, uses a great deal of agency material. BSS claimed 
that at least 60% of newspaper material in Bangladesh comes 
from that agency. 
Not only, as the above shows, does agency material take 
up a substantial proportion of newspaper space, but the take-up 
of the total amount of stuff the agencies send out is also quite 
high. In Pakistan APP claimed to put out 30 to 40 thousand 
words a day, of which two-thirds is used. PPI claimed that 
over 50% of its items were used. That it pays newspapers to 
make good use of agency material is fairly obvious. But, to 
prove it, APP charged (in 1979) Rs. 6,000-7,000 per month to 
"A" class papers (Dawn, Jang, etc. ) 
- 
the cost of about three 
journalists (with allowances); any amount of material can be 
used for this cost. (These rates, in all cases, are fixed by 
government). Moreover, actually getting payment for the service 
is not, it seems, easy. APP claimed only 25% of newspapers pay 
its bills. All the agencies make a financial loss. Much of 
the loss even for the private agencies is probably made up by 
government (whether directly or indirectly), or other organisations 
wanting favourable coverage. The result is that in both countries 
the agencies subsidise the newspapers. They represent a cheap 
way of 'pooling' information for an industry which cannot really 
afford to rely mostly on its own resources, and much of the cost 
of this is subsidised by government. 
9.1.3. The Economics of the Press : Concluding Comments 
The press in both Pakistan and Bangladesh is a small-scale 
affair. It developed through partisanship but, though most papers 
are small, locally limited, and unprofitable, the bulk of the press 
is now oriented to the market. The press in these two countries 
contains a good deal of variety (at least until this is suppressed 
by government), which reflects different motives, markets and 
sources of finance. All papers, though, suffer from some economic 
weakness, and this limits their journalistic capacity. 
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Financial losses are made up by individual owners seeking 
prestige or political influence, or by government, which owns 
a large number of papers in both countries. The largest papers 
though tend to be private, market-oriented, and broadly profitable. 
So the press is oriented both to the market and to government, 
but even some papers owned by government are distinctly market- 
oriented. Orientation to the market is exemplified particularly 
well by the continued existence of the English-language press, 
which is very much dependent on prestige advertising. Nothing 
can be more geared to the market than advertising. The large 
sales of the vernacular papers are the other side of market- 
orientation. It should be fairly clear from this that the 
English-language and the vernacular papers are not in competition. 
They appeal to different types of market (with only some overlap) 
and, as I have shown, are differently financed. The market, 
in particular the elite market, plays an important role in the 
economics of the press. 
9.2. The Politicäl Pbundations of the Press 
At the end of the last section I made brief references to 
the different political backgrounds of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
newspapers and showed these were connected with different economic 
structures. Government papers, confident of subsidy and therefore 
not reliant on the market, are different from fully market-oriented 
= papers. But the primary difference is between both these types 
of paper and the political press. I argued that in both countries 
partisan papers are now neither economically nor politically viable. 
But some of the major papers had their origins in partisanship. 
The most important papers of the pre-Independence period were 
partisan 
- often the organs of political parties. Two of Pakistan's 
most important papers, Dawn and Nawa-I-Wagt, were founded with 
Muslim League encouragement in order to promote the Moslem cause 
in the run-up to Independence. Dawn was actually founded by 
the Muslim League's leader, Jinnah. The origins and development 
of the press are closely connected with politics. 
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9.2.1. The Press and Political Conflict 
In the case of Nigeria I showed that the press became very 
much a part of the violent environment which preceded the civil 
war, and possibly played some part in the escalation of the 
conflict. In Pakistan this was not the case. The press - 
almost deliberately one could say - stood outside the conflict. 
This is not to say that it has had no connection with conflict; 
given the nearly constant presence (or threat) of conflict, 
this is not surprising. The press can hardly avoid becoming 
involved with it. This violence has been mostly communal in 
nature. 
The first major instance involved Hindus and Moslems and 
an international boundary. In December 1949, a minor communal 
clash occurred in East Pakistan involving the police. One 
policeman was killed. This was reported one month later in 
Calcutta by a newspaper (Amrita Bazar Patrika) in terms of 
'police atrocities'. 
' Disturbances occurred in Calcutta as 
a result. These were then reported in highly exaggerated form 
in East Pakistan. Both rumour and the press aggravated the 
conflict until it reached awful dimensions. This was added to 
by official radio. Altogether, on both sides of the border, 
several hundred people were killed (Hindus in East Pakistan, 
Moslems in India). 
"The Pakistan Radio announced that 10,000 Muslims 
had been killed in Calcutta; the official Indian 
version was 23 deaths and 123 injuries. 'Official 
sources' in India were quoted as estimating 3,500 
killings in East Bengal; Pakistani estimates are 
229... Meanwhile, the press on both sides continued 
to report as fresh news details of events which usually 
turned out to have occurred a month or more previously., 
2 
Peace was eventually obtained through negotiations between the two 
governments. 
The above conflict was exacerbated by the international 
dimension; truth crosses international boundaries less well 
than other boundaries. But serious communal disturbances based 
1 Lambert (1950), pp. 320/1 
2 Lambert (1950), pp. 323/4 
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on provincial differences, in which the press has played a role, 
have also occurred. When the Muslim League government refused 
to accept Bengali as a national language, riots broke out in East 
Pakistan. The Language Movement there received support from 
certain newspapers, for instance, from the Pakistan Observer. 
During the movement, in which a number of Bengalis were killed, 
the Morning News was burned down for speaking against Bengali, 
and Azad, another Muslim League paper, was stoned. Eventually, 
Bengali was accepted, but this period was a significant step in 
the deterioration of the relationship between East and West 
Pakistan. Papers in West Pakistan, including Jang and Nawa-I Waat, 
promoted the cause of Urdu. 
The most famous example of partisanship, and of the ability 
of the press to actually contribute to political conflict, is 
that of the anti-Ahmediya riots in Punjab Province in 1953 
(already described in Part Four). According to the Court of 
Inquiry called to investigate the troubles, four Urdu dailies 
(none of the major ones) were partially responsible for fomenting 
the disturbances. They were banned for one year. It was also 
revealed that the Punjab government had given 203,000 rupees to 
these papers out of an Adult Literacy Fund in excess of the 
objects of the fund. 1 
The above are examples of direct partisanship, but not all 
instances of press involvement in situations of conflict reflect 
partisanship. As I shall be showing in the rest of the chapter 
the Pakistani press contains a powerful tendency towards 
professionalism and market-orientation. Conflict continues to 
exist in abundance, though. There is a difference between a 
partisan and a political press. Though there are only a few 
overtly partisan papers remaining in Pakistan which are of any 
significance, the press as a whole is highly geared towards 
politics. Most papers might report on politics in a professional 
market-oriented way, but there is no doubt that politics are 
their life-blood. This is so much the case that it is impossible, 
in my view, for the press in Pakistan to have no effect on the 
political situation, even given rigid attitudes to professional 
impartiality. 
1 Dß(7.8.53) 
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This is exemplified well by the Morning News in the period 
leading up to the civil war. This was a National Press Trust 
(i. e. goverrent)paper. However, the government under Yahya 
Khan allowed the press considerable freedom in the build-up to 
the 1970 elections. The Morning News could freely support 
the cause of East Pakistan, if it wished to do so. In one 
issue just before the election, the News devoted about 100 column 
inches, most of its party coverage in that issue, to Mujib and 
the Awami League. 
-Half of this consisted of a statement given 
at a press conference in which Mujib virtually called for the 
creation of Bangladesh. Most of what he said, some of it very 
emotional and provocative, was reported verbatum. Coverage of 
Mujib and his party took up about one-fifth of total space (i. e. 
excluding advertisements) in that issue. 
It is possible that the Morning News played a significant 
role during this period in building up support for the Awami 
League. Especially important in this respect might have been 
a series of articles by an outside contributor attempted to 
prove that peasant support for Pakistan in the years preceding 
Indian independence was based on economic need, not on the peasants' 
belief in Islam (they were being exploited by Hindus). This same 
precedence of economic necessity over Islamic fervour still 
existed, the writer argued (with obvious implications for Pakistan, 
whose uniting force was Islam). This intellectual argument 
culminated, at the end of the series, in pure propaganda. 
"The 1968-69 movement against Ayub regime is yet another 
instance of the rebellious character of the Bengali 
Muslim peasantry. There was practically no official 
government, the people organised themselves into 
committees and performed summary justice, killed the 
local oppressors in broad daylight with great relish. 
But all the same the 1968-69 movement... only due to 
absence of organised leadership.... failed to become 
a revolution. The manner of deliverance of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman from Ayub's prison can be compared with 
the breaking of. the walls of the Bastille. "1 
1 Morning News (23.11.70) 
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It is hard to believe that the mixture of fact, pseudo- 
fact, and nationalist fervour in these articles could have had 
no effect on the readers (especially students) of the Morning 
News. The reference in the above quotation to killing "with 
great relish" is echoed in the following report of an East 
Pakistan student League meeting attended by the Vice-President 
of the Awami League, in which the President of the former body 
"told his audience that the blood of the martyrs 
was haunting the people to carry on the struggle for 
the elevation of the sufferings of the common masses. 
We all owe blood debts to the martyrs, and we must 
repay them on December 7 (election day), he remarked. "1 
This does not mean the paper had become the mouthpiece of the 
Awami League. Its party coverage, as I shall show, was possibly 
the fairest of the three major English-language dailies. It 
reported whatever was said, regardless of what it was, without 
comment or alteration. 
The use the Awami League made of communal prejudice and 
hatred is obvious enough. The dreadful cyclone and tidal wave 
of 1970 in the Bay of Bengal, one of the world's worst natural 
disasters, was also used for this purpose. The Awami League 
promoted the idea that West Pakistan had happily left East 
Pakistan to the mercy of the cyclone and its aftermath. Thus, 
at a famous press conference, Mujibur Rahman asked. 
"Aren't you ashamed of yourselves that friends from 
foreign lands should come to bury our dead while 
we stand and stare? "2 
All papers reported these denunciations, but not all accepted 
them at face-value. The Pakistan Times, while reporting Mujib's 
speech, also pointed out that a huge number of events (including 
a great number of programmes on the government-run radio service) 
were devoted to rousing "our people to make an all-out effort 
for providing relief and sustenance to the survivors of this 
calamity". 
3 Surrounded by devastation and hundreds of thousands 
of dead and injured, it is impossible to think that the welter 
1 Morning News (11.11.70) 
2 Pakistan Times (27.11.70) 
3 Pakistan Times (3.12.70) 
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of emotive denunciations of the "callous" behaviour of the 
central government in West Pakistan callously and calculatedly 
made by numerous East Pakistan politicians, and printed by most 
newspapers without qualification or comment, could have had 
no effect on the population of East Pakistan. 
Politics was violent in both speech and action. By 
transmitting news of this in unadulterated form the press, not 
just the Morning News and not just in East Pakistan, helped 
generate tension. In West Pakistan, for instance, the Jamaat- 
e-Islami (an Islamic party) claimed 
"that the killings of innocent human lives and 
shedding of blood of the poor labourers had become 
the object of beastly pleasure to the Awami Leaguers". 1 
It is difficult to believe this could have had no effect on the 
fears and prejudices of the conservative and deeply committed 
supporters of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Bhutto harped continuously 
on violent topics, as he did throughout his political career. 
The following are a few excerpts from a television broadcast 
of his as reported in the press. (Each party leader was 
allowed one broadcast during the 1970 election campaign). 
"riots and tension... chaotic conditions... We stand 
on the edge of catastrophe... tormented generation... 
fratricidal carnage... reform or annihilation. " 
The press has possibly also had an effect in conflict where there 
was no communal element. It probably played a part in the 
disturbances which brought down Ayub and Bhutto, though in 
neither case a leading one. Certainly many journalists I spoke 
to believed this to have been so. In the case of Ayub the effect 
was general: simply by giving expression to antagonism and 
violence - by letting people in one part of the country know 
that violent opposition to Ayub had occurred in other parts - 
the press facilitated and possibly amplified the disturbances. 
In the case of Bhutto a number of the more conservative papers 
played a deliberately inflammatory role, promoting the image of 
Bhutto as an un-Islamic, westernised, play-boy. The religious 
a x(18.11.70) I Dawn 
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element in the disturbances was pronounced. Bhutto himself, 
writing in prison, said that Nawa-I-Wagt, for instance, "was 
fanning the flames of agitation, calling for'jihad'(holywar) 
against the 'kafirs' (pagans). "1 
In all these cases the circulations of particular newspapers 
rose enormously. The Pakistan Observer achieved it highest 
ever circulation, about 65,000, during the anti-Ayub disturbances. 
A few years earlier, in 1965, the circulation had been 19,000. 
An ex-news editor and the current editor (in 1979) of Dainik 
Ban la both claimed the paper reached its highest circulation 
(100,000) during the cyclone period. Hurriyet achieved its 
biggest sales opposing Bhutto while Jang, which did not overtly 
oppose him until the anti-PPP disturbances were well under way, 
declined. The political papers, in particular, are highly 
dependent on the existence of political conflict. They decline 
when their party is in power (becoming excessively government- 
oriented) and blossom in opposition. The circulation of the 
Lahore edition of Musawaat has fluctuated from 80,000 down to 
5,000 and then up to 100,000 or more, according to political 
circumstances. 
9.2.2. The Decline of Partisanship 
Partisanship still exists in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but 
in much more limited form than in 1947. More important than 
partisanship is a general connection with politics. This is 
inevitable in societies riven by political conflict. The 
influence of politics in the press (not on the press) in the 
early period is examined closely in a study of five papers - 
Dawn, Pakistan Times, Morning News, Pakistan Observer, and 
Nawa-I Wagt 
- 
from 1947 to 1958, by Inamur Rehuran. In this he 
analyses, qualitatively, coverage of a number of crucial political 
issues and events. The Pakistan Times, Nawa-I-Waqt and Pakistan 
Observer could be termed opposition papers, the latter two also 
representing provincial interests (the Punjab and East Pakistan 
respectively). The Morning News was also an East Pakistani 
paper but was owned by a Muslim League politician. Dawn was 
political centrist, the Pakistan Times somewhat to the left, 
Nawa-I-Waqt to the right. 
1 Bhutto (1979), p. 41 
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The political issues examined by Rehman were all concerned with 
different aspects of constitutional development, recently discussed 
in an Interim Report on the future constitution. on certain questions 
the papers were more-or-less unanimous. They strongly opposed the 
ideas of presidential rule, strong central government (at the expense 
of regional autonomy), and of a constitution based on Islam. Only 
Dawngave some favour to the option of a strong centre and Nawa-I-Wagt 
to an Islamic constitution. In other words, these papers wanted a 
directly elected parliament with no interference either from a president 
or from the mullahs. 
Rehmants analysis was only of editorials and was, therefore, rather 
limited and certainly highly qualitative. Nevertheless, certain 
responses stood out clearly. For instance, as regards suggestions 
for the curtailment of regional autonomy and for far greater emergency 
powers to be given to the Head of State, the Pakistan Times said these 
would allow 
"the virtual abolition of provincial autonomy, the creation 
of conditions for a dictatorship of the political party in 
control of the Executive and the absense of sufficient 
guarantees to safeguard the liberty of the citizen". 
' 
Nawa-I-Waqt said the Head of State would have a status "higher than 
that of Caesar and the Czar". 
2 
Presidential rule eventually came into 'de facto' if not into 
'de jure' existence. The Governor-General (later to become the 
President) simply began to assert power (with the implicit support 
of the bureaucracy and military). The very uncertain legal and 
political tussle between parliament and the Governor-General was a 
problem for the press. It supported democracy but the Constituent 
Assembly was undemocratic. When the Governor-General dissolved the 
Constituent Assembly (in October 1954), all papers but Dawn gave him 
enthusiastic support. The Pakistan Observer called his act "a triumph 
of the democratic forces". 
3 Yet when the Governor-General failed to 
institute more democratic processes (despite a great deal of legal 
pressure from the Courts), and then took extra emergency powers, the 
papers began to turn against him. The Pakistan Times said the 
Governor-General had "virtually assumed the powers of an absolute 
1 Rehman, I. (1976), p. 76. 
2 Ibid, p. 78 
3 Ibid, p. 259 
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ruler and the Government over which he presides is responsible to 
nobody". 
l There followed a strong campaign by the political parties, 
courts, and newspapers against the dissolution. This mixture of 
legal, political, and journalistic pressure 
-a combination I have 
laid great stress on in earlier chapters - got the Constituent Assembly 
restored within seven months. 
All of the papers Rehman examined were strong proponents of 
democracy and the liberal cause, whatever their political leanings. 
Some papers, in particular Dawn, even found themselves acting against 
their own political allegiances. In Rebman's view 
"News coverage was extensive; editorial comment was intelligent, 
free, mostly unbiased, patriotic, bold and unsparing. The 
approach was mostly national., 
2 
The sence of professionalism and market-orientation was strong even 
in these early days. More important than partisanship was political 
freedom and the right to report on politics freely. 
9.2.3. conflict between Partisanship and Orientation to 
Government or the Market 
There are party papers, government papers, and private commercial 
papers in Pakistan. There are only a few party papers of any significance. 
The bulk of the press is either government or market-oriented. These 
forces are perhaps equally powerful. The government has ultimate 
control but the market cannot be ignored; it is difficult to force 
people to read newspapers. The extent of commercial influence can 
be seen in the amount of advertising in the press, in the growth of 
newspaper chains (Dawn, for instance, is one of several papers in a 
larger group), and in the proliferation of editions of particular papers 
in separate towns. However, even government papers are strongly 
influenced by the market, as I have indicated. Some of these are 
also organised in larger groups which put out other, purely commercial 
papers. One government-owned group, for instance, puts out a sporting 
publication as well as important daily newspapers (Pakistan Times and 
Imroze, each in two editions). 
The press in both Pakistan and Bangladesh contains elements of 
partisanship, and both government and market-orientation. No element 
is dominant, though partisanship has taken second place to the power 
1 Ibid, p. 279 
2 Ibid, p. 411 
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of government and of the market. Politics, government, and the 
market exert a complex set of influences on the press. Each is 
still struggling to take the lead in directing which way the press 
will go. Though the owner of Dawn strongly opposed Bhutto's 
government and Bhutto reacted by cutting government advertising 
in Dawn, it was believed in Dawn that Bhutto would not have dared 
close the. paper down. In doing so he would have offended a large 
section of his middle-class support. He did, however, jail the 
editor of Dawn's Urdu sister-paper Hurriyet (described to me by 
the same editor as being "largely for businessmen"). 
The owner of Dawn is himself a politician (ex Muslim League 
and also having served in Zia's government), but the editors of 
both Dawn and Hurriyet firmly claim that he does not try to use 
the papers as a political mouthpiece. He did oppose Bhutto but 
eventually a 'modus vivendi' was reached with him. The owner, 
Haroon, does however lay down broad policy guidelines. The 
papers are really there to provide him with prestige, some political 
influence, and profits. He interferes with the papers less than 
the government in which he serves. Both papers are very much 
market-oriented (the market being the elite). The owner of the 
newest English-language daily, the Moslem, probably has similar 
motivations to Haroon. A businessman, he wanted, in his own words, 
to "get involved in political expression". The paper is slightly 
to the left as are its journalists, but the owner has no specific 
political allegiance. His motives appear to be profits and prestige, 
and the distant possibility of a future in politics. 
The above cases indicate the uncertain relationship between 
market and government-orientation. This is even clearer in the 
case of gang, Pakistan's biggest vernacular. Jang never criticises 
a government until it is down; in the words of a number of journalists 
it "goes with the wind". This policy of voluntary attachment to 
government has allowed the owner, who was once a stenographer, to 
build up the paper from its pre-1947 state of four tiny pages with 
war news taken from the radio (Jang means war") to one of the 
biggest papers on the whole sub-continent. The paper supports 
government whatever its colour. 
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Though Jan is undoubtedly conservative it even gave support 
to the socialist government of Bhutto. From 1972/3 to 1976/7 
Tang got Rs. 14,097,488 in advertising from the government, compared 
to Dawn's Rs. 8,639,244 and Rs. 4,209,662 for Nawa-I-Wagtl (which 
strongly opposed Bhutto). Clearly Jang must have done little to 
incur the government's displeasure, despite the owner's intense 
dislike of the Bhutto regime. Jang is the most commercial paper 
in Pakistan. Both the owner and his son expatiate on the commercial 
merits of their paper - its variety, speed of operation, willingness 
to innovate, broad appeal, etc. The owner now has extensive 
business interests outside journalism. Jang's support of government 
is clearly related to is strategy of market-orientation. 
The case of Jang and its support of Bhutto suggests that the 
application of the distinction 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' to the 
press in Pakistan might not be very useful. Nawa-I-Wagt is 
another example of the difficulty of classification. It is a 
conservative paper which is supposed to support the army and 
bureaucracy; yet its owner-editor, Majid Nizami, in answer to my 
question, "What, in your view, has been the main cause of the past 
problems of Pakistan? ", gave as the cause the "utter failure of 
political leadership due to intrigues by white collar and khaki 
bureaucracy". Perhaps the paper's 'right-wing' nature comes out 
more in Mr. Nizami's description to me of the editorial policy of 
his paper. 
"Nawa-I-Wagt has always been able to pursue an independent 
nationalistic line. It believes in the ideology of 
Pakistan, and alone ideology of Pakistan, which includes 
Islamic way of life, Islamic system of government and 
Islamic social justice. " 
Nawa-I-Waqt is a conservative, nationalist paper with strong 
Islamic tendencies. The owner's individualistic views have put 
the paper in opposition to all types of government - those prior 
to Ayub, Ayub's military government, and Bhutto's socialist 
government. Bhutto found the paper a lot of trouble. 
1 Government of Pakistan White Paper on Misuse of Media, 
Annexure 40. 
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"This newspaper has done our Government the greatest 
damage and yet it gets the maximum advertisements 
from the Government both Provincial and Federal, BIM, 
Banks, and the whole lot. What is the logic behind 
this brutal discrimination...? 
If we can deal with Jesaret, Outlook and some others, 
why is it not possible to deal with Nawa-I-Wagt? Who 
is protecting this arsenal of the Opposition? Is it 
out of simplicity or are the motives deeper? We must 
have a clear-cut policy. The policy of appeasement 
and inducement has failed. "1 
This continuous oppositional role of Nawa-I-Wagt gives the 
paper a certain air of radicalism despite its obvious conservative 
tendencies. In Pakistan opposition to government often brings 
popularity even while it courts danger. Nawa-I-Waqt is a market- 
oriented paper with a strong political direction though no political 
affiliation. (It supports the current government, however). 
Nawa-I-Waqt is not a party paper, nor even unequivocally partisan. 
It takes much account of the market, and that is how it has 
survived. The party papers have much more varied fortunes. 'In 
power' they decline enormously in popularity, but gain from government 
support. According to staff in the Lahore edition of Musawaat 
the circulation of the paper went as low as 5,000 during Bhutto's 
period of rule. But it received very substantial financial support 
- according to Zia's White Paper over Rs. 12 million in government 
advertising from 1972/3 to 1976/7, second only to Jang's Rs. 14 million. 
2 
In terms of popularity the switch from partisanship to government- 
orientation does not do party papers much good. Close government 
control might even in itself do harm. There are numerous instances 
of clashes between parties and the papers that support them. This 
is another instance of the uncertainties the press faces in respect 
of its three possible orientations - political parties, the market 
and government. In 1973 the PPP government caused 16 journalists 
to be sacked from its own paper, Musawaat. According to the editor 
of that time this was the result of internal rivalries and differences 
1 Ibid, pp. 17/18 
2 Ibid, Annexure 40. 
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of opinion. The result was a long and bitter campaign for 
reinstatement on the part of the journalists' union. Over 
100 journalists were arrested (though very briefly) before part 
of the apparent injustice was righted. Other papers which 
supported the PPP government, and benefitted from its patronage, 
though they were not party papers, sometimes opposed the PPP. 
Amn, for instance, criticised the PPP regime for not going far 
enough with land reforms, as a result of which the editor was 
jailed and the paper deprived of government advertising. 
None of the papers in Pakistan has been able to devote 
itself wholeheartedly to the market, to government, or to a party. 
The press is sufficiently strong to prevent the government taking 
total control, but the government is sufficiently strong to 
prevent the press from devoting itself solely to the market. 
The parties, when in opposition, are the weakest of all, and 
even their relationship with their own papers is not wholly 
determinate. 
The Pakistani press, if allowed by the government, contains 
a great deal of variety, as the above account has indicated. 
Bangladesh also has a varied press, if a much smaller one. The 
government owns both major English-language dailies and one of 
the vernaculars. The other vernaculars are privately owned, 
the largest one, Ittefac, by a wealthy man with strong political 
inclinations, and the other, Sangbad, by a politician. Both 
owners also edit their papers. There are a number of other 
political papers but they are weeklies. 
Sangbad is an example of a paper which had found it difficult 
maintaining itself as a partisan paper and had, as a consequence, 
gradually gone for a wider market. It is a 'progressive' paper 
belonging to a politician but not to a political party. The 
owner is an independent M. P. The paper's market-oriented policy 
increased the circulation from 5,000 in 1961 to 27,000 in 1979. 
The paper now breaks even whereas before it had made losses. 
Though the paper has leftist tendencies the owner, Atmmed Ul-Khabil, 
is a businessman who says he believes in a mixed economy. He 
does not try to use his paper as a political mouthpiece, though 
he is critical of government. His views are not necessarily 
shared by his journalists. 
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Sangbad. then, is an independent, politically sensitive 
paper, which is gradually climbing out of the relatively narrow 
market provided by political partisanship through offering a 
more balanced output. It is run by its politician-owner, but 
not being a 'big politician' he uses the paper more as a source 
of political prestige than as a political mouthpiece. Ittefag's 
history is similar to Sangbad's in some respects, though at all 
stages on a larger scale. The founder was the leftist leader, 
Maulana Bhashani. It had a long association with the Awami 
League, giving the party valuable support during difficult times 
- 
for which reason it was closed by Ayub for two years. The 
paper is now Bangladesh's largest. It is a successful market- 
oriented paper with strong political leanings. The weakness 
of its partisanship can be seen from the paper's eventual break 
from the Awami League, made when the party began to take on 
dictatorial tendencies, and also to follow policies the paper 
did not like. 
Like the owners of Jan& and Nawa-I-Waqt, the owner of Ittefaq, 
Anwar Hussain (who again like the former two also edits his paper), 
has expanded from the newspaper world into other fields of business. 
Ittefa is a conservative paper. It represents the interests of 
Bengali businessmen. When Mujib nationalised a large number of 
industries Ittef aac turned against him. It opposed the military 
regime of Ziaur Rahman for the same reason. As with Nawa-I-Wagt 
such opposition can give an air of radicalism, however conservative 
its intentions. It takes courage to oppose a dictatorial regime. 
Anwar Hussain in fact promotes two clear policies through his pages 
- 
the return to private enterprise and the restoration of a true 
democracy. "We want a liberal society based on a democratic system" 
i. e. 'laissez-faire'. 
This paradox, which highlights the difficulties posed by the 
simple distinction between right and left-wing, was stated quite 
openly by Anwar's brother, Mainu Hussain. He had been an Awami 
League M. P., but, like his brother, had turned against the party. 
He started a weekly paper called New Nation in order to promote 
the same twin beliefs in democracy and denationalisation. Mainu, 
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while calling himself a 'rightist', said his anti-government 
stance gave him the appearance of being progressive - even (in 
his words) a 'leftist'. As I have often argued, nationalisation 
in developing countries is often only a means of increasing the 
economic power of a party. In Mainu's view nationalised industries 
in Bangladesh are not agencies of socialism, but sources of power 
and of funds for the government (and its incumbents). 
Ittefaa has opposed the pseudo-leftist Awami League and the 
subsequent, more conservative military regime. In doing so it 
has even joined hands with the more genuinely left-wing Sangbad. 
During my stay in Bangladesh in 1979 there were reports of deaths 
from starvation in the north of the country. The press expanded 
what were initially just rumours until the government found itself 
faced with a crisis. Sangbad reported a minister as saying that 
there had been no deaths through starvation, but there "might have 
been some deaths due to malnutrition". 
' Ittý then printed a 
statement by a professor saying that starvation and malnutrition 
are the same thing. Two days later both Ittefag and Sangbad 
reported 15 dead of hunger in Mymensingh. On 12 October Ittef ag 
printed the addresses of eight others who were said to have died 
of starvation. In the same issue were reported the deaths of 188 
people from cholera in Sylhet. 
2 
The campaign came to a head when 
Ittef aq sent a correspondent to Rangpur, from where he reported 
that one or two people were dying from hunger every day, and that 
people were selling land to buy food. 
a 
A photograph was also shown 
of the bodies of an adult and child who had supposedly died of 
starvation, and had been found by the correspondent. 
The press having given the lead, the politicians then joined 
in. By reporting what the politicians said the papers augmented 
the campaign. In the issue of 14 October was a report from the 
paper's correspondent, now in Mymensingh, of a statement by the 
local M. P. that nine people had recently died of starvation in 
one area. Three days later Ittefaq aq reported another five deaths. 
In the sane issue the paper's editor-owner discussed the famine 
and the government's reaction to it in a signed editorial, concluding 
by praying for a leadership to emerge which could "tell the nation 
1 Sangbad (9.10.79) 
2 Ittef aq (12.10.79) 
3 Ibid (13.10.79) 
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boldly about realities". 
1 Sangbad, meanwhile, had reported 
320 deaths from diarrhoeal diseases in North Bangladesh2. On 
19 October it reported the chief of the Muslim League as saying 
that when the hungry people rose against Zia "nothing would be 
able to keep him in powers 
These extracts show how the press can build up an effective, 
even explosive, campaign against the government. Two papers with 
very strongly opposed political outlooks cooperated in this 
campaign, along with other papers and a number of different parties. 
These papers printed statements from parties they could hardly 
be sympathetic to (e. g. Sangbad and the Muslim League) in order 
to augment the campaign. Though both papers are broadly market- 
oriented, they both have strong political tendencies. These are 
more overt in the case of Sangbad. Anwar Hussain is careful to 
ensure that Ittefaq remains a broad source of information and that 
commentary is restricted to editorials. That does not inhibit 
Ittefaq from being a powerful political influence. 
Far less inhibited though, are the weekly newspapers like 
New Nation (part of the Ittef aq organisation). These are often 
overtly political, concentrating on analysis rather than reportage. 
The most famous of these is Holiday - another paper edited by a 
politician (but not owned by a political party). The name Holiday, 
rather as with the Moslem, was invented to belie the political 
commitments of the paper, which now has a strongly leftist reputation. 
Holiday was founded in 1965 by the current editor Enayatullah Khan. 
It has always had a clear political line, supporting pro-China 
left-wing groups (whereas Sangbad is pro Moscow), in particular 
Bhashani's NAP. It has strongly opposed the influence of India 
and the U. S. S. R. in Bangladesh. 
The political nature of the paper can be seen from the number 
of times it was closed - three times in four years (in 1971,1973, 
and 1975); for long the paper only broke even and often makes a 
loss. The circulation has never been high, never above 25,000. 
In 1979 it was only 15,000. With a consistent left-wing stance 
it does not get much advertising. However, the paper has become 
much more commercial in its approach and also currently supports 
1 Ibid (17.10.79) 
2 Sangt d (15.10.79) 
3 Ibid. (19.10.79) 
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the government, making it more attractive for both government 
and private advertising. Of course, choosing to publish in 
English is a restriction - and it is interesting that Mainu 
Hussain also chose to publish his new weekly in English (though 
Mr. Khan hoped to be starting a Bengali weekly soon). Weeklies 
of this sort are intellectual, analytical papers. They appeal 
to educated people, especially students. Printing in Bengali 
and attempting to expand circulation means aiming at a less 
educated public. Of course, it could be equally intellectual 
in Bengali, but on the whole sub-continent there is a strong 
tradition of writing for the masses in the vernacular and for 
the most educated in English. Though Holiday is a radical paper, 
its radicalism is of an elitist nature. 
The most concrete expression of the paper's policies has 
been opposition to the Awami League. To stand against the Awami 
League, a party which had achieved a genuine mass support and 
which was headed by a popular, charismatic leader, not only took 
courage, but could hardly be politically profitable, except in 
the long term. Right from the start the paper had seen that 
there was little behind the party's nationalism - no socio-economic 
policy that would offer the poor of Bangladesh real hope. 
"Supposing that these six points have been realised, 
is there any guarantee that vested interests under a 
different garb will not again strangulate the economic 
and political life of the people of East Pakistan? "1 
Holiday retained this courageous stance even at the height of 
Mujib's popularity. 
"The struggling masses should keep in mind that they 
have a very strong adversary in those who have of late 
coined the term 'Bengali Nationalism'to grind their 
own axe and who are represented very forcefully by 
the new Fuehrer of Chauv eni. sm. "2 
Despite the overwhelming popularity which swept Mujib to 
power, within one year of this Holiday was talking of 'flames 
of fascism sweeping Bangladesh'3, and of the use of terror to 
wipe out all opposition. Mujibism was a new religion, devoted 
1 Holiday (20.2.66) 
2 Ibid. (14.9.69) 
3 Ibid. (11.2.73) 
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to "God (Mujib) and his revelations". ' However, on the 
economic side, Holiday could not accuse the AL of seeking to 
expropriate Bangladesh's industry for the would-be entrepreneurs 
in its ranks, as most industries were nationalised. Instead, 
they were accused of corruption and smuggling - i. e. using 
their power over these industries to make profits, rather than 
ownership of them. After Mujib's downfall Holiday claimed 
that the "public sector industries lost 5,500 million takas 
during 1974-5 in terms of production due to managerial inefficiency 
and corruption". 
2 
Ho liday was unusually bold, but it became less so when it 
began to support the BNP (in whose government Enayatullah Khan 
served as a minister). The BNP, which was anti-Awami League, 
anti-India and anti-Russia, answered some of Holiday's demands. 
But the BNP can hardly be considered to have been radical. 
9.2.4. The Political Foundations: Concluding Comments 
The origins of the press in Pakistan lie in partisanship. 
The Pakistani press has had a strong association with political 
conflict and there are a number of instances of involvement of 
the press in violent conflict. Politics is still very much the 
life-blood of the Pakistani press, but it has been gradually 
moving away from partisanship; however, partisanship is still 
of significance. The forces that have pushed in this direction 
are the power of government control and the temptations of the 
market. The latter includes not only sales and advertising but 
the market for 'professional' competence, and all the rewards 
that people who consider themselves as part of a profession deem 
they deserve. The result of this development is a conflict 
between two orientations: government and market/professionalism. 
'Professional' journalists, a part of the 'professional middle 
class', demand political and editorial freedom; they support 
democracy and freedom of the press. The government demands support. 
The result of this is that the government is the primary 
determining influence over the press, but that this is limited by 
the professional middle class, strong enough to significantly 
qualify government control but not strong enough to become the 
primary influence itself. There is also the further influence 
1 Ibid. (6.5.73) 
2 Ibid. (18.1.76) 
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of party political journalism. The result, it could be said, 
is a 'mixed press' -a parallel perhaps to Pakistan's mixed 
economy. This is not necessarily a disadvantage for the 
government. Just as leaving part of the economy in the private 
sector helps the government (by reducing the burden on it, and 
allowing an outlet for those with money), a 'mixed press' also 
has advantages from the government's point of view. It has 
direct control over part of the press, while control over its 
totality would result in a considerable strain on government 
funds, and on public credibility. Better to allow private 
ownership, but to keep this under broad control. The outcome 
is a mixture of ownership - governmental, commercial and political. 
Government involvement in the press is certainly restrictive, but 
it has led to a new type of competition rather than to its 
elimination. 
9.3. The Rise of Professionalism 
I have argued that the press in Pakistan was at one time much 
more partisan than it is now. There is a core of partisanship 
in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, but it has declined considerably 
since 1947. In its place has come government control and general 
market demand. Associated with the latter is a strong sense of 
professionalism. (I am only saying sense of professionalism; I 
am therefore using the word 'profession' loosely, not wishing to 
get embroiled in the question of what is a profession and what is 
not, a question which is not relevant here). Partisanship was 
quite pronounced before 1947 and during the 1950s, but even then 
it was already countered by a strong sense of professionalism. 
Both partisanship and the professional instinct were crushed by 
the military coup, but have revived since. 
I have discussed the Pakistani press as a whole, both past 
and present. I have laid great stress on the journalists' growing 
sense of professionalism (of their role, as they see it, as part 
of the professional middle class). This reaches its epitome in 
the journalism of the English language newspapers. This does not 
mean, of course, that the English language press seeks mass appeal. 
Its market is a narrow one, consisting of the educated and well-to-do. 
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It is an elitist market. Because the English-language market 
is middle-class - comprising in large measure professional people, 
administrators, and other members of the intelligentsia, such 
a press is never likely to be radical as long as middle-class 
interests are not threatened. This press seeks stability that 
stops well short of tyranny, and freedom that stops well short 
of equality. There has never been any danger in Pakistan of a 
proletarian or peasant revolution. 
The press is manned by the professional part of the middle 
class. If this group has an enemy it is dictatorship - control 
by the functionary groups. As the latter are themselves essentially 
middle-class the conflict is fundamentally of an intra-class nature. 
The 'professional middle class' seeks freedom - political, journalistic, 
and educational. Ranged against this are the rest of the middle 
class: businessmen (who seek stability rather than freedom, government 
support rather than laissez-faire), administrators, and the military. 
The upper class (land-owners) can live with any non-radical middle- 
class rule, but prefer the stability of the military to the 
uncertainties of democracy. The conflict is, thus, between liberal 
democracy and authoritarianism. It is not between economic classes 
but between different segments of the same class - the professional 
sector which has no specific vested interest, and those who have - 
businessmen and the functionary groups (supported in some measure 
by the land-owners). 
The English-language press reflects this broad conflict. it 
supports democracy at all times, but does not get involved in class 
antagonisms. It seeks stability, but not through autocratic rule. 
It is more interested in supporting political processes per se 
rather than any particular party (hardly any of which had a significant 
class basis). The only parties it clearly opposed were the illiberal, 
right-wing Islamic parties. The professional middle-class has no 
time for the 'mullahs'. 
9.3.1. Political Coverage in the 1950s. 
These general attitudes stand out clearly in Pakistan's 
(historically) most important English-language paper, Dawn. For 
long considered just a mouthpiece of the Muslim League, it can be 
seen on closer analysis that it was really (and increasingly so) 
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a mouthpiece of the professional middle class. In its early 
days Dawn certainly gave most of its party coverage to the 
Muslim League (and most of this was favourable). In one 1942 
issue of 12 pages five whole pages were taken up with speeches 
by Jinnah. But, even then, it upheld the right to criticise 
the Muslim League government, as the following editorial statement 
(from 1951) shows. 
"We invite the attention of the Prime Minister, and 
indeed the Central Cabinet, to an article from a special 
correspondent which appears elsewhere on this page. 
It discloses a very serious state of affairs in the 
Central Government's accounts... Usually governments 
are prone to react unfavourably to public disclosures 
of this kind which put them on their defensive. It 
is to be hoped, however, that a more responsible view 
will be taken and a serious attempt made to discover where 
the fault lies. "1 
The biggest clash between Dawn and the Muslim League occurred 
in 1953. The conflict started with Dawn's impatience with the 
desultory investigation of the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan's 
first Prime Minister). He had been assassinated in 1951. The 
assassin had been set upon by those present at the murder and 
killed. over a year after this Dawn began a campaign to speed 
up the investigation - principally by calling for the involvement 
of Scotland Yard. The assassination itself, the instant killing 
of the assassin, and the subsequent lack of success in finding who 
or what might have been behind the murder, together gave the event 
a very murky appearance. 
The government was very unhappy about Dawn's insistence that 
it was not doing enough to find the plotters, and various political 
parties were taking advantage of Dawn's campaign to discredit the 
Muslim League government. The latter's reaction was inspired by 
a number of articles by Dawn on the affair from one of which the 
following is an extract. 
"The few persons, who are opposing the popular demand 
(for Scotland Yard), are only trying to deceive the 
I D`ß(1.1.51) 
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people... Let them face the people in public meetings 
and free popular elections and they shall soon see where 
they stand... The rising tide of popular feelings shall 
soon sweep them away.... "1 
The government took action against Dawn (and a smaller paper, 
the Evening Star) through various indirect measures, the worst of 
which was the withdrawal of government advertising. What followed 
was a remarkable publicity campaign by Dawn against the government's 
action, and a flood of support for Dawn from opposition parties, 
other organisations, and other newspapers (including some from 
East Pakistan), many of which did not normally see eye-to-eye with 
Dawn. That Dawn was prepared to seek out such support is remarkable, 
because it shows the paper was willing to turn to the opponents of 
the party with which it was associated, and also to rival newspapers, 
in order to retain its freedom. Its professional concerns came 
above partisanship. 
In its new campaign for freedom from government action Dawn 
solicited letters from the public, as well as statements from the 
various bodies just mentioned. It gave huge coverage (often 
front-page) to these letters and statements. The following, an 
example of how Dawn utilised this support, is a quotation printed 
in Dawn from a leader of one of the Islamic parties. 
"The whole nation is indebted to Dawn for the able 
championing of the cause of the people in opposition 
to a few persons who seem anxious to make Pakistan a 
police or Nazi State defying all canons of democracy, 
justice, Quran and Sunnah. THE BATTLE OF DAWN IS 
THE BATTLE OF DEMOCRACY. "2 
This support is especially interesting as Dawn had consistently 
opposed such Islamic parties, holding them to be reactionary and 
undemocratic. 
The following is an example of support from a major politically 
opposed newspaper, the Pakistan Times. 
"the three-pronged Government attack on Dawn and its 
associate is in our opinion both undemocratic and 
1 Ibid (10.11.53) 
2 Ibid (18.11.53) 
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ill-advised... nor can our differences with Dawn - 
which include that newspapers hostile attitude towards 
the victims of executive action under an earlier regime 
- persuade us to condone what amounts to restriction 
of press freedom by executive fiat". 
' 
It is of note that Dawi did not try to excise those parts critical 
of it. 
Though this conflict brought sane political and journalistic 
unity in support of Dawn, it also gave opposition parties a chance 
to exploit a propaganda advantage over the government, and certain 
newspapers a chance to favour their particular Muslim League 
faction. This is indicated clearly in the same Pakistan Times 
editorial quoted above and reprinted in Dawn. The editorial 
emphatically denounces overt or excessive partisanship. 
"But when vitriolic abuse and wild defammatory 
allegations replace arguments and facts, when newspaper 
editors intrigue against one another on the lowest possible 
level, when public meetings are sponsored by them and 
copies of newspapers are 
--eremoniouslyburnt by rival 
factions, the newspapers concerned may be said to have 
abdicated their proper function., 
2 
This not only suggests the extent of partisanship in the Pakistani 
press, and its direct political importance, but shows how the 
major English-language papers wished to turn their backs on such 
behaviour. 
As I have mentioned, in addition to normal news coverage and 
editorials, Dawn also used letters-to-the-editor as a means of 
attacking the government. Whereas these letters might normally 
occupy from fifteen to thirty column inches of space, in certain 
editions during this period it was boosted to several times this 
amount. In one issue there were 105 inches of letters critical 
of the government. Below is represented the overall coverage 
of central government in Dawn in the 1953 sample. 
1 Ibid. (18.11.53) 
2 Ibid. (18.11.53) 
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Table 9.8: ' Coverage of Central Government (Average Daily 
Column Inches 
Favourable Neutral Unfavourable 
News 4.4. 81.5 44.4 
Editorial 1.1 2.6 3.7 
Letters 0.7 
- 
20.1 
Total 6.2 84.1 68.2 
This represents a considerable attack on the government. In 
the end Dawn won. The Prime Minister issued an order (from his 
sick-bed) rescinding the measures taken against the two papers. 
It seems clear from this episode that Dawn put its own 
well-being and its belief in democracy and the freedom of the 
press before support of its party. It painted itself in rather 
heroic terms. There was a certain element of melodrama in this 
as, compared to what might happen in many other developing countries, 
the measures the government took were mild. But Dawn was comparing 
itself to Western, not to Third World, newspapers. 
The initial sensitivity of the government to Dawn's criticism 
(over the murder investigation) indicates, perhaps, a degree of 
autocracy. Yet is is remarkable that the government did not try 
to directly stop Dawn's campaign against it, and that it tried to 
publicly justify its arbitrary (and possibly illicit) actions 
against Dawn. This implies two things: firstly the government 
was senstive to (middle-class) public opinion, which Dawn was very 
quick to arouse; secondly, the government itself, however 
undemocratic its power base, did not envisage totalitarian rule 
for itself. It merely wanted to restrict criticism. 
It had introduced certain restrictive measures against the press 
in 1951, but had not gone far up that road. Totalitarianism would 
come with the military. 
Dawn's wishes were different from those of the government. 
It wanted a Muslim League government, but it wanted it to be democratic. 
With every change of regime Dawn welcomed the incoming government 
as a breath of fresh air, as a sign of a new democratic order. 
But disillusion followed fast. The press, in general, saw social 
conflict more in terms of government against the people than of 
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struggle between different sectors of the people. The 
disillusion of Dawn. found its acutest expression in March 1954, 
with the total defeat of the Muslim League in East Pakistan. 
"The Province's erstwhile leaders, and also the Central 
League leadership, were completely out of touch with 
the current sentiments of the people in East Pakistan. 
... 
If those persons still remain wedded to their selfish 
ambitions and continue to exploit the League for their 
personal or factional ends, the League will soon be 
repudiated in West Pakistan in the same way as it has 
been repudiated in East Pakistan. "1 
The headline of the article is 'The Awful Majesty of the People's 
Will'. 
Dawn saw the Muslim League dissolving in factionalism, greed, 
and power-seeking. Above all it feared the end of democracy 
and the imposition of a dictatorship on the part of the President. 
It seemed to prefer the total demise of the Muslim League whose 
weakness was allowing the President to gain in strength, to this 
latter possibility. Apart from anything else, there were dangers 
to the press in a dictatorship. This became clear in October 1954, 
when the President interfered yet more deeply in the political system 
by dissolving the Constituent Assembly, declaring a State of 
Emergency, and instituting pre-censorship of the press. Dawn 
managed to make the following rapid editorial response. 
"What we write now is our considered honest opinion and 
the truth, and if this passes censorship, our readers 
will see it in print... power, long exercised without 
effective democratic checks 
, 
gradually corrupted most 
Muslim Leaguers in office.. 
. 
"2 
This love of democracy and the 'people' did not comprehend 
any notion of division of the people by class. Dawn saw on one 
hand an apparently homogeneous people and, on the other, an 
autocratic elite which did not have the interests of the people 
at heart. Ultimately, with its loss of faith in the Muslim League, 
it hoped for a broadly based coalition, whichever parties were 
incorporated in it. 
1 Ibid. (18.3.54) 
2 Ibid (27.10.54) 
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"Nothing would please the overwhelming majority of 
the people of the country better than to see the 
Muslim League become again what it once was -a truly 
national organisation functioning freely and 
democratically. But it cannot become so if it 
remains continually in the pockets of the great... 
To say today that the Muslim Leaguers alone are 
the only true representatives of the nation and the 
only true patriots, is itself an untruth and an 
affront to other parties who are no less representative 
and patriotic. "1 
Dawn did not represent particular vested interests, whether 
based on class or ethnicity. It never spoke for the business 
community, but nor did it speak against it. It rarely involved 
itself with the problem of unequal land-ownership. It did not 
support West Pakistani interests against those of East Pakistan. 
In fact, it spoke up for East Pakistan. For instance, it welcomed 
the participation of the East Pakistani parties in central government 
and it positively lauded the defeat of the Muslim League in East 
Pakistan. In November 1954, when it was agreed that East and West 
Pakistan would have electoral parity (thus reducing East Pakistan's 
natural majority, by virtue of its larger population, in favour 
of West Pakistan), awn demanded that this should be accompanied 
by the "equal distribution of the country's total wealth and resources", 
equal distribution of foreign aid and government spending between the 
two wings. 
2 
The above makes clear, I think, Dawn's consistent and committed 
belief in freedom and democracy and, at the same time, its lack of 
understanding of the underlying economic structure of the country. 
It envisaged a cohesive, classless society, which it believed 
could be created solely through the extension of democracy. But 
its liberalism and its optimism could not stand up to the encroaching 
power of conservatism. It was a weak voice, which, in its appeal 
to liberal middle-class opinion had its moments of glory. But 
the small, liberal intelligentßia, in which Dawn placed so much 
faith, was a hopelessly weak power-base. 
1 Ibid. (24.6.54) 
2 Ibid. (12.11.54) 
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Dawn was not the only paper that put democracy and the 
freedom of the 'professional' journalist above allegiance to 
government or party (as the discussion in section 9.2.2 has 
already hinted). I shall exemplify these points more concretely 
in the remainder of this section through content analysis of 
political reporting in the English-language press during the 
1950s, during the period of political rule in the 1960s and, 
finally, during the crucial election campaign of 1970. 
In this content analysis, I have represented the categories 
as percentages of space after subtraction of advertising, or in 
average daily column inches. Coverage of both parties and 
government is divided into 'favourable, 'neutral' and 'unfavourable' 
(using the same criteria as in my analysis of the Nigerian press), 
and refers to news coverage (excluding editorials, for instance). 
In all cases the samples are of 15 issues spread over a year or 
over the period of an election campaign. 
Coverage of government is, in general, rather neutral. Insofar 
as it was rarely very critical it can be said to have been government- 
oriented, but it was not excessively so. In 1951 83% of Dawn's 
coverage of the central government could be considered to have 
been 'neutral' (i. e. not laudatory in any way). Though 64% of 
its reporting on government was on the central regime it also 
reported on the five provincial governments. Exactly the same 
proportion (83%) of its coverage of these governments (taken 
together) was neutral. Most of the remainder was favourable, 
in all cases. In 1953, because of the quarrel between Dawn and 
the central government which I have already described, the picture 
was a little different. Only 62% of the paper's coverage of central 
government was neutral, while as much as 44% was unfavourable. 
Furthermore, 77% of its entire governmental coverage was on the 
central regime. As in 1951 exactly 83% of its reporting on the 
provincial governments was neutral. In general, then, Dawn's 
reporting on government in the early days was dry, matter-of-fact, 
and not excessively government-oriented. The paper could even be 
strongly critical of government especially in the cause of political 
and professional freedom. 
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In the case of parties I have less stringent criteria for 
defining 'favourable' news than in the case of governments. 
A government can expect its own announcements to be publicised; 
whether propaganda or not what it says and does needs to be 
part of public knowledge. Coverage therefore needs to be 
especially laudatory to be considered favourable rather than 
neutral. A party cannot automatically expect what it says to 
appear in the press, so any expression of a party view in the 
press is implicitly favourable to it. In 1951 Dawn had a daily 
average of a mere 27 column inches (height multiplied by width 
of column) on the parties, compared to 104 inches on government. 
Its own party, the Muslim League, was in government. Dawn 
treated it, the Muslim League, as a government rather than as a 
party; to this extent it was certainly partisan. Moreover, 
72% of its party coverage was on the Muslim League, and 84% of 
this was favourable to the party. The paper was at that time 
clearly partisan. But it is of note that partisanship was 
limited to positive support of the Muslim League. There was 
negligible unfavourable coverage of the eight other parties 
reported on. They simply got individually very little coverage, 
though this was, for what it was worth, fairly distributed between 
them. 
By 1953 the Muslim League's share of party reportage is down 
to 63% and only 39% is favourable. Another 35% was concerned with 
factional divisions within the League; this 'washing of its dirty 
linen in public' can hardly be considered to have been favourable 
to it. Dawn's partisan foundations were dissolving in front of 
its very eyes, leaving it in a difficult, uncertain position. 
Again, hardly any coverage of the other parties was unfavourable, 
and what there was was distributed fairly evenly between the ten 
other parties mentioned. Naturally most of these parties got 
very little coverage but the two given most prominence after the 
Muslim League between them got 20% of party reporting. 
It has to be added that reporting of politics as a whole in 
these years was rather limited. This is indicated in the table 
below. Even in the election campaign of 1970 (the 1970 sample 
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was taken solely from that period) political reporting, and 
especially that part of it explicitly on the parties, was quite 
limited 
- 
certainly very much underplayed in comparison with 
party reporting in the Nigerian press. 
Table 9.9: Dawn's Total Political Coverage (Average Dail 
% 
_Space 
less ads. 
1951 1953 1970 
Political parties 2.4. 2.9 12.1 
Political analysis 0.4 0.1 0.1 
Other political 3.6 4.8 6.0 
Total 6.4 7.8 18.2 
In all years, but amazingly most of all in the year of the election, 
the amount of political analysis /commentary (excluding editorials) 
is negligible. The preference is for other, more neutral political 
reporting. All in all, the neutral (and sometimes unfavourable) 
coverage of government, the limited space given over to politics 
(especially the parties), the avoidance of political analysis or 
commentary within the news, and the decline in the Muslim League's 
share of party coverage (as well as the division of some of this 
between various Muslim League factions), together suggest that 
Dawn was a partisan paper at best only in a very limited sense. 
9.3.2. Political Reporting under Military Rule 
With the military coup of 1958 by Ayub Khan came avert 
government control of the press. A number of papers were also 
taken over by a government-inspired organisation, the National 
Press Trust (NPT). Amjad Ali has analysed the content of every 
issue of a number of daily papers for a whole month (July 1963), 
in the period of Ayub Khan's rule. These were Dawn, the Pakistan 
Times, Jang, Nawa-I Wagt, the Pakistan Observer, and Ittef aq. 
The last two were East Pakistan papers. The Pakistan Times was 
an NPT paper. Ali calculated the distribution of content without 
first subtracting space taken by advertisements. In order to 
make his categories compatible with mine I have re-calculated them 
as percentages of space after subtraction of advertisements. The 
table below represents a selection from and also combination of 
a large number of categories, again in order to make them broadly 
compatible to mine. 
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Table 9.10: Coverage of Government and Politics in 1963 
Dawn Times Observer Jang Nawa-I-Wa t Ittefaq 
Government 7.3 7.3 4.0 4.3 3.9 5.6 
Assemblies 10.4 15.8 3.0 2.3 8.9 7.0 
Politics 2.6 2.8 5.5 4.9 3.5 14.9 
It can be seen from this table that coverage of government 
was not a particularly dominating factor in these papers even 
during a period of government rule. All does not describe the 
nature of this coverage, but excessive government-orientation 
does not stand out in his figures. At the same time there is 
not a great deal of reporting on politics, except in Ittef a, 
which is highly political. There was, by contrast, considerable 
coverage of the proceedings of the provincial and national 
assemblies. This concentration on official political channels 
suggests a 'safe' approach to political reporting. The overall 
impression is one of cautious, broadly routine coverage of politics 
and government, avoiding both excessive government-orientation 
and any distinct sign of partisanship - except in the case of the 
highly political Ittefaq. 
One important paper Ali did not analyse was the Morning News. 
I analysed a sample of this from near the end of Ayub's reign, in 
1968; unlike All I broke down coverage into 'favourable', 'neutral', 
and 'unfavourable' categories. At this time there was a daily 
average of 365 column inches on the central and provincial governments- 
in percentage terms far smaller than in Ali's 1963 samples of other 
papers, but quite a lot greater than in the 1950s sample of Dawn. 
Nearly all this governmental coverage was on the central government 
but only 6% of all governmental coverage was on President Ayub 
himself. Though all of this personal coverage was favourable, 
this rather discreet handling of Pakistan's first dictator suggests 
he did not make much use of the press to build up a charismatic 
image '1 la Nkrumah'. Moreover, 78% of all reporting on government 
I rated as neutral in tone. This paper, however matter-of-fact 
and restricted in its ability to criticise, does not seem to have 
been very significantly and directly government-oriented. Most 
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coverage of government is routine, neutral stuff. The government 
was not as dictatorial as it could have been; it shied away from 
total control of the press, however resentful journalists now feel 
about Ayub. According to Ayub's ex-head of information, Altaf 
Gauhar, newspapers could criticise the government and individual 
departments, and Ayub might act on this, but they could not criticise 
him. However, minor government people were often able to seek 
protection against the press under the overall umbrella of control. 
' 
Journalists probably resented such abuses most of all. 
Coverage of the political parties is similar to that of the 
1950s. Dawn samples discussed above. The party of government gets 
by far the most attention (this party being a faction of the Muslim 
League Ayub adopted in order to strengthen his political support), 
while coverage of the other parties is equally distributed and is 
either favourable or neutral; only a negligible amount of reporting 
on the other parties was unfavourable to them. By this time, 
however, these principles have been taken further. The Muslim 
League got 72% of total party coverage in 1951,63% in 1953. In 
the Morning News of 1968 Ayub's Muslim League got 59%. Thus all 
the other parties got as much as 41% of party reportage between 
them, but as there were nine of these the amount of space they 
each got was very limited. 
The overall impression given by these facts is that the Pakistani 
press, even under military rule (whatever its political dressing), 
had a strong sense of 'fair' reporting, but that this was undermined 
by the requirement to over-report the party of government. This 
'professional' sense of impartiality even began to show itself in 
Dawn in the 1950s, when it was essentially a party paper. The 
party connected with the paper is given most attention but all other 
parties are reported, fairly equally, and with little unfavourable 
coverage. Moreover, the amount of attention given to the main party 
seems to decline over time. Though coverage of other parties 
remained highly fragmented, taking them in their entirety as 
opposition to government the amount of such opposition given 
expression in these papers became more and more considerable. 
1 Personal interview 
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9.3.3. Coverage of the General Election of 1970 
Prior to the civil war there was only one general election 
in Pakistan based on universal suffrage. How the papers covered 
the campaign(quantitatively) is given below - for three major 
English-language papers - Dawn, the Pakistan Times, and the 
Morning News. There are two very special factors to take into 
account in this case. Firstly, the government was not itself 
directly involved in the elections, and made no show of taking 
sides. It was a 'caretaker' army government handing over power 
to whichever party won. Secondly, largely due no doubt to the 
above fact, the press was perhaps freer than it had ever been. 
The papers were free to report the parties as they wished. 
Table 9.11: Party Coverage. Election Campaign of 19700%) 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News 
Awami League 10.9 6.1 20.4 
Pakistan People's Party 10.9 12.1 3.9 
Muslim League (Council) 15.2 20.5 9.9 
Pakistan Muslim League 4.6 1.4 6.0 
Quayyum Muslim League 10.0 8.4 4.7 
Pakistan Democratic Party 5.5 8.5 9.6 
National Awami Party (Wali) 7.8 5.2 6.7 
National Awami Party (Bhashani) 5.3 8.2 11.7 
Tehrik-e-Istiqlal 6.7 5.3 5.7 
Jamaat-e-Islami 16.3 15.7 
{ 
10.3 
Others (7) 6.8 8.6 11.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 9.11 shows the distribution of news-space between the 
various parties reported on in the last five weeks of the election 
campaign. The next table shows the distribution of this, in 
overall terms only, between favourable, neutral and unfavourable 
coverage. 
Table 9.12: Favourability of Party Coverage, 1970 (Ave. dail 
col. inches 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News 
Favourable 287 271 266 
Neutral 5 8 8 
Unfavourable 11 26 5 
Total 303 305 279 
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These two tables reveal a remarkably different picture from 
that given by the previous samples. 17 parties are given coverage 
and this is very widely spread. No party gets more than about 
one-fifth of a paper's party coverage. Thus, given the chance 
to report the parties as they like, the papers choose to be balanced, 
impartial, without showing excessive support to any particular 
party. In other words, in the right conditions, partisanship 
apparently has no place in the English-language newspapers of 
Pakistan. This balanced reporting is the sort to be expected 
in a market-oriented press. 
There are two other noticeable facts: firstly, the tiny 
amount of neutral and unfavourable coverage. This does not mean 
the papers lacked neutrality; they showed an excessive amount 
of it. As I defined 'favourable' reporting as that which tells 
what the party wants the public to hear, it is clear that the 
papers did just that - acting as notice-boards, as it were, for 
public statements issued by the parties. Secondly, the table 
shows a remarkable similarity between the papers in overall 
coverage. Each, in fact, gave nearly the same amount of space, 
in absolute terms, to the parties as a whole. Each spread this 
coverage over a wide number of parties, according some extraordinarily 
similar amounts of coverage. 
The similarity does not stop there. The distribution of 
political coverage between party reporting, political analysis, 
and other political coverage, is broadly the same in all three 
cases. 
Table 9.13: Total Political Coverage (% total space less ad's. ) 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News 
Political parties 12.1 10.7 11.9 
Political analysis 0.1 1.8 0.5 
Other political 6.0 4.0 3.0 
Total 18.2 16.5 15.4 
The space devoted to the parties is small when compared to electoral 
coverage in the Nigerian press. Furthermore, 'other political' 
news is relatively large - half. the size of party news in the case 
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of Dawn. In Nigeria in election times 'other political' news 
went down and 'political analysis/commentary' went up. In 
these Pakistani papers the amount of political analysis was 
negligible. There is, then, a very big difference between 
these papers and the intensely partisan press of Nigeria during 
a similar period. 
This approach to political reporting 
-, the balanced coverage, 
the avoidance of commentary - seems less 'proper' than 'prim and 
proper'. Pakistan editors seem to have taken their first real 
opportunity to report a general election - one of extreme 
importance 
- 
as an occasion to stay in the background, to inform 
rather than influence and, some might say, to be passive rather 
than positive. Some journalists I spoke to considered this to 
be the result of poor and negative journalism. Others put it 
down to ingrained fear of the authorities. The latter is not 
a convincing explanation (while the former is not an explanation 
at all). Certainly Ayub's ten-year rule had had a depressing 
effect on journalism in Pakistan. But, towards the end of this 
decade, when the Ayub regime showed signs of crumbling, the press 
had shown considerably more aggressionand verve than it did in 
this election campaign, when the army was not involved, showed no 
political preference, and when no contending party had any particular 
power or influence it could bring to bear on the newspapers. This 
was the ideal opportunity, after so many years of government control, 
for the press to weigh in on the political scene. A number of 
journalists I spoke to, -in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, admitted 
the press was unusually free at this time. One called it the 
"golden period of the Pakistan press". Clearly, fear of government 
could not have been a factor in inducing the papers to try and 
spread their political coverage over all the parties; nor can it 
explain the virtually non-existent amount of political analysis, 
which did not in any way need to be critical of government, or in 
any way upset it. That the press chose to 'stay out of politics', 
was due to a professional ethos of neutrality on the part of those 
responsible within the press. It was not considered 'cricket' 
to try to influence the political process. 
- 
385 
- 
If the editors and other journalists of the above newspapers 
split their coverage of the parties widely and in a broadly 
balanced fashion, was this done in a random fashion, or on the 
basis of certain implicit criteria? There are obviously many 
factors which influence newspapers in this regard - their perceptions 
of the real importance of individual parties, the popularity of 
the various leaders, historical factors, etc. One factor which 
I consider might more consistently influence a newspaper's 
electoral coverage was party size, i. e. that they might give 
larger coverage to the larger parties. In testing this hypothesis 
I took as a criterion of size the number of candidates the parties 
were putting up for election. From the newspapers' point of view, 
any parties which are prepared to go to the trouble and expense 
of putting up candidates for all seats, might be considered worthy 
of reasonable coverage. Nevertheless, I would expect only a 
moderate correlation between party size and press coverage. 
Undoubtedly, other factors - such as individual perceptions of a 
party's likely success, the popularity of the leaders, and the 
preferences of the papers, must have some effect. The question 
is, how much? 
I correlated the percentage share of party news each party 
received with each party's percentage share of total candidates 
in the election. Using simple regression analysis I obtained the 
following results. 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News 
0.35 0.41 0.66 
This indicates that, on average, the number of candidates a party 
was putting up in the election weighed about as heavily as other 
factors in the newspapers' decisions on party coverage. This was 
least so for Dawn, explaining only about a-third of the paper's 
party coverage; but it seems to explain about two-thirds of the 
coverage of the Morning News. 
It seems unlikely that newspapers had any conscious intention 
of allocating space according to party size in any absolute sense. 
It is far more likely that the link was more inexact, i. e. that 
papers might have simply ranked the parties in some rough hierarchy 
of importance according to their apparent prominence (in terms of 
the number of candidates put up for election). The best measure 
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of this is Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, which 
correlates rankings rather than specific values. This means, 
in this case, that a party which put up twice as many candidates 
as another would not necessarily get twice as much space, but 
simply more space than the smaller party. The results of this 
correlation were as follows. 
Dawn Pakistan Times Morning News 
0.56 0.56 0.52 
It would seem, then, that the papers were more concerned with 
using size to determine a rough hierarchy of importance as a 
basis for the distribution of space, than with deliberately 
allocating space in proportion to party size. 
I said above that other factors apart from party size must 
have been important, and that only moderate correlations could 
be expected. In fact, the correlations turned out to be larger 
than I had expected. It would seem that editors and other 
journalists had a pronounced sense of 'fairness', and that they 
were guided by this. Certain biases and preferences had an 
effect, but they did not substantially determine the nature of 
coverage. Given the chance, unusual in a developing country, 
to act freely and politically, the newspapermen chose to be free 
but not political. 
9.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to show how the Pakistani press, 
in particular the English-language press, has moved from partisanship 
to market-orientation. This has reached the stage where it attempts 
to treat politics 'from the outside', as an onlooker only, 
scrupulously avoiding getting directly involved. It has a liberal, 
laissez-faire attitude to the relationship between politics and the 
press. It believes in democracy and the free flow of information, 
and seems to think that if these two conditions alone are met, then 
the country's problems would begin to recede. It looks at problems 
and solutions in political rather than economic terms. It hopes, 
by contributing to the free flow of information, to help people 
find a rational political solution to the country's problems. 
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Its liberalism is possibly admirable, but it is irrelevant to 
Pakistan's crushing social problems. In the struggle of the 
press to guide itself from partisanship towards the market and 
away from government control can be seen the journalists'strong 
sense of 'professionalism'. This will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TEN: PROFESSIONALISM IN THE PRESS 
In the last chapter, I described the political and economic 
nature of the press in what was Pakistan (and is now Pakistan and 
Bangladesh). I argued that the press there had changed from a 
broadly partisan press to one subject to pressures from several 
sources: parties, government, and the general market. I also 
argued that the latter two now predominate and that there is 
considerable conflict between these two orientations. The 
emphasis is on appeal to the general market and this is associated 
with a sense of professionalism which eschews both political 
partisanship and government control (though in the latter case 
it has no choice of course). The strength of the ethic of 
professionalism derives from the position the journalists feel 
they occupy in society, i. e. as part of the professional middle 
class. Their understanding of the nature of their role is itself 
derived in part from their conception of the nature of the profession 
of journalism in the West. These ideas will be given support in 
this chapter. 
10.1 The Professional Attitudes of the Journalists 
In what follows, at the same time as looking into the journalists' 
sense of themselves as a profession, I shall be giving support to 
the findings of the content analysis. One of the major problems 
with content analysis is that the results say nothing about the 
motivations of the journalists. Content analysis by itself is not 
enough. It is necessary to try to get 'behind' the content and 
ask those directly responsible for it questions related to their 
profession. For this reason I submitted a questionnaire to a 
sample of journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and interviewed 
a number of editors and others involved in the media. This research 
was undertaken in the last quarter of 1979. I obtained 51 completed 
questionnaires: 23 in Bangladesh and 28 in Pakistan. This is a 
fairly reasonable sample from what is a small population (full-time 
journalists on the major papers of both countries). The questionnaire 
responses were in general very consistent. The results of these, 
of the interviews, the content analysis and other material, all 
seem to 'hang together'. 
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10.1.1. The Personal Backgrounds of the Journalists 
It is worth noting first of all (from the table below) that 
over two-thirds of the total sample were aged over 30 (and exactly 
one-third were over 40). The majority, then, one could expect 
to be fairly well established in their careers, or at least 
beginning to be so. Most of the journalists had had a substantial 
education; over four-fifths had been educated beyond the age of 
20. (The question referred only to full-time education). 17 of 
the Bangladeshi sample had been to university (Dacca University in 
all but one case) and another five to various colleges. 18 of the 
Pakistani sample had been to university (mostly Karachi and Punjab 
Universities), and another eight to various colleges. Many of 
those who had been to Karachi University had M. As. in journalism. 
After finishing with their full-time education (some continued 
with part-time study) most of the sample (35 out of 51) went into 
journalism without entering any other full-time job. This was 
especially so in Bangladesh, where eighteen out of 23 had had no 
other career. It is possible that Pakistan, being more unbanised 
and having a major commercial centre in Karachi, had wider employment 
prospects. Nevertheless, even there, three of those who had 
started work outside journalism had been involved with other media, 
and another four directly related to the media through jobs in 
government information departments. Most journalists had entered 
their journalistic careers by the time they were 25 years old (38 
out of 51), and all but three by the time they were 30. These 
facts make it clear that for most journalists journalism was their 
entire career. Few had had much experience outside journalism, 
or the general field of the mass media, and most had been in 
journalism for some time. In many cases this early involvement 
with journalism had not been full-time, but started when the 
respondents were still students, or possibly in other jobs. Some 
had started as stringers. That eleven of the sample had had such 
an association with the profession by the time they were twenty, 
and another 27 by the age of 25, suggests`that these people had 
a considerable career commitment to journalism. 
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Table 10.1: The Backgrounds of Journalists in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh 
PAKISTAN BANGLADESH TOTAL 
AGE IN 1979 
Under 25 7 6 13 
Over 25 21 17 38 
AGE COMPLETED EDUCATION 
20 or less 6 2 8 
21 
- 
25 18 20 38 
26 
- 
30 4 1 5 
AGE STARTED IN JOURNALISM 
20 or less 7 4 11 
21 
- 
25 16 11 27 
26 
- 
40 5 8 13 
PREVIOUS OCCUPATION 
None outside journalis m 17 18 35 
Other media 3 - 3 
Public relations' 4 - 4 
Teaching 3 2 5 
Other 1 3 4 
FATHERS' OCCUPATION2 
Lawyers 4 1 5 
Teachers 2 3 5 
Journalists 3 1 4 
Other professions 2 - 2 
Government employees 9 11 20 
Businessmen 3 3 6 
Agriculture 2 4 6 
Army 2 
- 
2 
SAMPLE 28 23 51 
Notes 1 All four were government posts 
2 One unknown (in the Pakistan sample) 
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From the nature of their fathers' careers and their own 
early careers it would seem that most journalists have a middle- 
class background, though probably lower middle-class. The 
fathers came from a variety of largely middle-class occupations, 
especially the professions and government service. Many of 
those from the latter had, though, been in relatively lowly jobs, 
or in the less prestigious areas of the service such as the 
railways. Few of the fathers had been in business, politics, 
or journalism itself. Very few had a rural background (and 
then they were small-scale farmers rather than big land-owners). 
None of the journalists had what could be described as either 
a working-class or upper-class background. Few of the journalists 
had moved to journalism from a job either lower or higher in 
prestige than their current one. Most had simply moved 
horizontally, from one media institution to another (though 
they might have been climbing the journalistic career ladder at 
the same time). In fact, many had worked for several newspapers 
by the time they had come to work for their current one. 
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, as for India and many other Third 
World countries, the middle class is thirsty for opportunities, 
which are expanding at only a slow rate. The sons of these 
lower middle-class fathers were in fact widening the range of 
middle-class careers, if at the lower end of the range, by moving 
into journalism. The family backgrounds, education and career 
patterns of the journalists all support this general conclusion. 
10.1.2. The Editors' Backgrounds 
I interviewed nearly all the editors of the major Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi daily papers. Some of the editors I interviewed 
were also the proprietors of their papers. Another owner-editor, 
whom I was unable to see in Pakistan, allowed me to 'interview' 
him through the post, by means of a fairly lengthy questionnaire. 
In addition, I interviewed in a less structured manner three 
union-leaders, several other journalists, the editor of the 
London edition of Jan,, a few people involved with other media, 
and some people with a finger in both politics and journalism 
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(including the. ex-head of Information under Ayub Khan). Some 
of the editors (in particular the editor-owners) had strong 
political connection or had even been (or still were) politicians. 
The editors were different from the other journalists in a 
number of respects. A greater proportion of the editors were 
born in India (no doubt because they were older). Exactly 
half of the Pakistani journalists were indigenous to Pakistan; 
only two Bangladesh journalists had their origins in India. 
11 out of 14 Pakistani editors came from India; two had been 
born in Pakistan and one in Beirut. Five out of the six Bangladeshi 
editors were indigenous to the country. All the editors had been 
to university whereas about one-sixth of the journalists had not. 
Eight out of the fourteen Pakistani editors had had no previous 
career outside journalism; for the Bangladeshi editors it was 
two out of seven. Thus a higher proportion of editors had had 
jobs outside journalism than of the journalists. Below is given 
the occupations of the editors' fathers and, underneath this, the 
previous occupations of those editors who had at one time worked 
outside journalism. 
Table 10.2: Occupations of Some Editors' Fathers 
Pakistan Bangladesh 
Three senior civil servants Post-master (middle-ranking civil 
servant) 
District Judge Doctor 
Post-master Lawyer/politician 
Two teachers Journalist/newspaper-owner 
Low ranking railway official Businessmen (book publisher) 
Engineer 
Two minor commercial employees 
Total 5 
Soap manufacturer 
Journalist/newspaper-owner 
Total 13 
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Table 10.3: Previous Occupations of Some Editors 
Pakistan Bangladesh 
Commercial employee/school admin. Government PRO 
Stenographer Civil servant/writer 
Teacher Politics (M. P. ) 
Middle-ranking civil servant Teacher 
(Information dept. ) 
Low-ranking civil servant Total 4 (Information dept. ) 
PRO/Company labour officer 
Total 6 
The most common previous occupations of the editors - 
government service and PRO 
- makes them similar to the journalists. 
But they seem to have a slightly higher family background than 
the bulk of journalists. A number of them had fathers in 
relatively high occupations, especially in the civil service. 
In both cases, journalists and editors, a large proportion of 
fathers were or had been in the civil service (where most of the 
early pre-Independence career opportunities had been), but in the 
former case they were middle or low-ranking, in the latter mostly 
middle or high-ranking. 
A number of the editors, then, seem to have a higher socio- 
economic background than the journalists. However, all the 
editors who did not own papers had worked their way up in journalism, 
mostly fairly slowly. None joined as editor, though in some cases 
they entered as assistant editors or columnists. Even those 
working on the political (left-wing) papers were journalists of 
long-standing and had worked on a variety of newspapers, some 
conservative, some leftist. The editor of Elan, for instance, 
had worked on four papers: Nawa-I Wagt, a Lang weekly, Musawaat, 
and Meyar (a progressive weekly). Even the owner-editors had 
to some extent worked their way up. Khalil-Ur-Rahman started 
his paper from very little indeed, and at first ran it virtually 
single-handed. Before this he had worked on a student paper 
and then become a stenographer. Majid Nizami started on his 
brother's paper Nawa-I Wagt in 1950 as a columnist, becoming editor 
in 1962. 
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There is certainly, then, no evidence of direct outside 
'intrusions' into editorship of Pakistani newspapers, but the 
Bangladeshi editors had less journalistic experience. Only 
one of the editors had worked on more than one other newspaper, 
whereas several Pakistani editors had worked on a number of 
papers. Fewer of the Bangladeshi editors had worked their 
way up in journalism too. Not only were three of them editor- 
owners, but some of the others had joined high up. Two editors 
had joined as editors, another as joint-editor. One more had 
started in his organisation as an assistant editor. The 
politician-editor and editor-owners had also come into journalism 
at the top level. The important role of political connections, 
and the sparser journalistic experience of the Bangladeshi editors, 
suggest a somewhat weaker professional background than that which 
had moulded editorship in Pakistan. But, apart from this, 
journalists in both countries appear to have both a strong 
middle-class and largely professional background. 
10.1.3. Attitudes to Journalism 
The content analysis showed that the Pakistani press has 
apparently been replacing its early partisanship with an orientation 
to the market. When able to it has become liberal, 'stand-offish', 
committed not to a particular party but to freedom and democracy. 
It has been constrained from following its principles by government 
controls. Underneath these constraints would appear to be a 
belief in a type of journalism, and a political environment 
appropriate for this, which journalists perceive to be the sort 
that exists in the West, and which in Pakistan flowers momentarily 
in times of relative freedom (as in the general election campaign 
of 1970). The journalists apparently have a strong professional 
attitude to their job (in the sense of seeing this job as a 
profession). The questionnaire goes some way to support the 
conclusion I reached from the content analysis by inference. 
The table below shows that journalists in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh fairly consistently supported the liberal notions of 
impartiality and objectivity. 
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Table 10.4: Journalists' Attitudes to News Reporting 
PAKISTAN BANGLADESH TOTAL 
Discuss facts 4 7 11 
A Report facts as they are 17 15 32 
Intermediate position. 7 1 8 
Express different party vie ws 1 - 1 
B Several party views 24 22 46 
Intermediate position 3 1 4 
Criticism in report 8 8 16 
C Criticism in editorial 15 15 30 
Intermediate position 4 
- 
4 
SAMPLE 28 23 51 
Taking B first, virtually all the journalists (46 out of 51) 
said they believed that each paper should express several party 
views, not a single party's views. Four opted for an intermediate 
position (not allowed for in the questionnaire). Only one 
journalist, therefore, held the reverse attitude to the majority. 
This evinces a clear rejection by the journalists of partisanship 
in the press, i. e. of political journalism. 
This evidence is reinforced by the answers to-the two questions 
on attitudes to styles of journalism. 32 of the 51 journalists 
said that journalists should not 'discuss the facts' but should 
report them as they are. Eight chose an intermediate position, 
while eleven opted for 'discussion of the facts'. This suggests 
a fairly strong belief in objectivity, or 'stand-offishness'. 
Most journalists believe that the facts should be left alone. 
That this represents a very specific viewpoint can be seen from 
the equally tenable possibility that facts are meaningless unless 
they are analysed or explained by the reporter. Three-fifths 
of the journalists also believed that criticism of government 
should be left entirely to the editor rather than be broached in 
the news columns themselves. Most Pakistani journalists, therefore, 
have rigid views on the separation of news from comment. 
These views were even more strongly held by the editors. 
15 out of 17 emphasised, even explicitly favoured, the reporting 
of facts alone. One of them, for instance, said 'I want nothing 
but facts'. Asked whether criticism of government should appear 
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in the text of a newspaper article or be left to the editorial, 
12 out of 14 (I did not ask this of agency editors as it was 
irrelevant to them) stressed editorials in varying degrees. 
All in all, then, editors have an even more restricted view 
of the 'correct' style of journalism than do journalists 
themselves. 
Such attitudes are not the only cause of the 'notice-board' 
effect I discussed in Chapter Nine. Another major cause is 
the poverty of the press. The result of this combination of 
factors is that the journalist becomes a sort of clerical 
figure, doing a daily routine which requires little skill, while 
the real journalism is left to the editorial staff. Newspapers 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot afford much in the way of 
actual journalism. A large proportion of their material comes 
from agencies, and the agencies themselves, based on Reuters, 
have a strict sense of impartiality. But they too have poor 
resources, and most of what they do is to distribute statements 
they have obtained from various organisations. Often a reporter's 
work is simply to collect statements from particular organisations. 
Much of a sub-editor's work is the sifting, editing or translation 
of statements sent in to the paper. 
Poor resources are certainly a major factor in limiting the 
role of journalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Connected with 
the newspapers' poor resources and the routine nature of journalism 
is a strong lack of specialisation. Very few papers have any 
specialist reporters at all. In all cases reporters cover several 
'beats', so that a reporter could be covering a political meeting 
in the morning, a-crime story mid-day, and a burst sewer in the 
evening. (Rarely, however, is life so eventful). Even the 
bigger papers cannot afford to have journalists covering a single 
field. In Nawa-I Wagt, for instance, there is no specialisation 
at all. There, in the owner's words, "reporters change subject 
by rotation". Not one daily non-specialist newspaper has an 
economic correspondent. 
Another important factor ensuring the dependence of the papers 
in these countries on the straight-forward printing of statements 
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is their weak political position. One editor said he "can't 
refuse" statements. Even people not in government who want 
something printed in the press might have a friend in government. 
The papers do not like to turn anyone influential down (though 
many journalists also accept money from their 'clients' for 
providing such a service). In one newspaper I saw a sub-editor 
sifting through a mass of statements sent in to the paper by 
various organisations. Some of these had circulation lists 
with the names of several newspapers on. One started simply 
by saying "Would you please print the attached statement in 
your newspaper". A journalist on this newspaper told me it 
does not print all the statements it receives - it does not have 
room! Statements from outside sources usually only receive 
sufficient alteration to make them sound journalistic. As I 
have said, many of these statements come via the agencies. The 
editor of the news-agency PPI said 75% of the material PPI sends 
out is in the form of statements. More than one agency editor 
said the items they send out are printed in the papers with very 
little alteration. 
Many newspaper editors were aware of this problem (some said 
that as much as 60-90% of news printed in their papers consisted 
of little more than other people's statements), but did not believe 
they had the right to refuse a statement. They saw their papers 
as impartial vehicles for the flow of information. Any analytical 
or critical writing should be left solely to the editorial staff 
(and some outside contributors). These normative beliefs are 
very strong but there are journalists who resent it. In an 
article in a souvenir pamphlet put out by the Department of 
Journalism and Mass Communication, Dacca University, the contributor 
complains of "shirt-front type of objective news writing". The 
writer would like a more interpretative journalism but, for reasons 
of tradition, political control, and lack of resources, the press 
in Bangladesh cannot achieve this. It merely prints statements. 
"if a reporter is to provide the needed flesh and blood 
to a news event he must write what the readers ordinarily 
do not see. It is here that a journalist can hardly 
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say things in truer perspective if they remain 
glued to objectivity in a puritan way.... But in 
a developing country like ours, even objective news 
writing is a far cry. Most of the journalists 
are given to deal with canned information. And 
canned information is full of redundancy. " 
The result of the split between the creativity and responsibility 
of senior journalists and the routine, hum-drum world of the average 
journalists is a major one. It is far greater than it is in the 
West, though it is similar to the 19th century distinction in the 
U. K. between Oxbridge editors/leader writers and reporters who were 
simply shorthand note-takers of speeches. The implication is that 
reporting itself is a minor occupation. If journalism is essentially 
the printing of statements then there is little need of reporters. 
They are little more than clerks doing a routine job of ferrying 
"canned information". They are limited not only by the economic 
and political weakness of the press, but by rigid norms of 
'professional' behaviour. The distinction between creative, 
responsible journalists and the rest of the journalists (the bulk 
of them) is reminiscent of Braverman's1 description of the control 
of labour in developed countries. 
10.1.4. Attitudes to Politics 
I have emphasised in the above discussion the liberal, professional 
attitude of journalists to the nature of their work. Few of them 
would appear to have a more radical stance with respect to their 
role. The same seems to broadly apply to their political attitudes. 
I asked the journalists to rank certain national goals in order of 
importance (i. e. in accordance with their own views of their relative 
importance). Three of these goals were purely political in nature, 
three economic. The three political goals were political stability, 
freedom of the individual, and democratic political participation. 
The three economic ones were rapid industrialisation, rural development, 
and greater economic equality. 
1 Braverman (1974) 
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Table 10.5: Journalists' Ranking of National Goals 
PAKISTAN BANGLADESH TOTAL 
Political stability 7 12 19 
Individual freedom 4 1 5 
Democracy 6 2 8 
Total political 17 15 32 
Industrialisation 
-" - - 
Rural development 3 5 8 
Equality 6 3 9 
Total economic 9 8 17 
Sample: 50 (one failed to answer correctly) 
Apart from wishing to see which single goal most journalists 
would give primacy to, I was hoping to see if there would be any 
significant difference between political and economic goals in 
terms of importance allocated. It is impossible to note any goal 
in the Pakistani sample which has any clear primacy. One goal is 
certainly accorded little importance - rapid industrialisation. 
it gets no first places; the same applies to Bangladesh. Both 
countries are still predominantly rural (especially Bangladesh), 
which is why politicians feel rapid industrialisation is necessary. 
It is interesting that the journalists do not agree with this 
national priority. Not only did less than one-third of the 
journalists in both countries (14 out of 50) put this goal in the 
top three places but 17, more than for any other goal, put it last. 
While the Pakistani journalists showed no-preference for any 
single goal, the Bangladeshi journalists did. Twelve of the 23 
put political stability first -a very clear preference. When 
we come to look at the overall distinction between political and 
economic goals, we find a clearer picture in the case of Pakistan 
than before, and this time the result is very similar to that for 
Bangladesh. In both cases, nearly twice as many journalists put 
political rather than economic goals first (in total, 32 against 17). 
Finally, comparison of various possible 'alternative' polities 
shows one or two distinctive results. In Pakistan some preference 
is shown for political stability over individual freedom, and rural 
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development receives more favour than rapid industrialisation. 
This contrast is significantly more pronounced in the case of 
Bangladesh: 19 journalists put rural development in the first 
three places, only five rated rapid industrialisation so high. 
ý. All in all, the replies to this question imply a belief 
in the precedence of political over economic variables. This 
does not suggest satisfaction with politics in these countries 
of course. Only five of the journalists (all in Pakistan), in 
answer to the question 'How well do you think the political 
parties reflect the full range of public attitudes in Pakistan/ 
Bangladesh? ' -answered 'Very well'. 16 said 'Moderately Well', 
29 said 'Not very well'. Though political goals were accorded 
priority over economic goals no particular ideology is apparent 
in the above answers; they evince, rather, a practical concern 
with political stability, especially in Bangladesh. This, 
considering the country's past (and continuing) political turmoil 
is not that surprising, but it does suggest a non-ideological, 
non-radical attitude to the problem of how to tackle the country's 
problems. In the view of the journalists, it would seem a 
prerequisite of any development is political stability. 
I also asked the journalists to choose one of four possible 
causes of the problems of their country: political instability, 
economic inequality, Western interference, non-Western interference. 
It is interesting that few availed themselves of the latter options. 
Only six of the 50 that responded to this question chose 'Western 
interference', while no more than one in each country selected 
'non-Western interference'. The latter result is surprising in 
view of the intense economic, political and military rivalry 
between India and Pakistan, let alone the role India played in 
breaking up Pakistan. 
The journalists plump unequivocally for internal causes, and, 
in particular, economic inequality. 22 chose this (about half 
from each country), compared to 13 for political instability (again 
about half from each country). Seven journalists chose two or 
more causes. Thus, though political goals are ranked highly 
there is a strong awareness of the underlying importance of 
economic inequality. 
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I also asked a question concerning public ownership. In 
Pakistan 16 preferred public to private ownership of industry, 
10 private ownership. (Two chose an intermediate position not 
allowed for, in fact not at all needed as I had structured the 
question round the words 'mostly private' and 'mostly public'). 
In Bangladesh 8 journalists preferred public, 15 private ownership. 
This indicates, perhaps, somewhat more socialist leanings amongst 
the Pakistani journalists. When certain data from all three of 
the above questions are tabulated together a somewhat clearer 
picture emerges, at least as regards comparisons between the two 
countries. 
Table 10.6: Journalists' Overall Attitudes to National Priorities 
Pakistan Bangladesh_ Total 
GOALS 
Political stability (1s t) 7 12 19 
Economic equality (1st) 6 3 9 
CAUSES 
Political instability 6 7 13 
Economic inequality 12 10 22 
INDUSTRY 
Private ownership 10 15 25 
Public ownership 16 8 24 
Pakistan's journalists appear somewhat more radical than those in 
Bangladesh. The latter overwhelmingly support political stability 
rather than economic inequality as a prime national goal, while 
Pakistani journalists are equally divided on this. The difference 
between the two countries on causes of national problems are too 
slight to be of significance, but a far larger proportion of Pakistani 
than of Bangladeshi journalists would prefer public to private 
ownership. The difference there is quite distinct. One Pakistani 
journalist described private enterprise as "broad day-light robbery". 
To sum up this section on political attitudes, the only 
conclusions I am prepared to reach are based on those aspects of 
the data which stand out clearly. The most important of these 
is the distinct lack of radicalism, especially in the case of Bangladesh. 
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The very strong support evinced by Bangladeshi journalists for 
political stability can hardly be construed as radical. Only 
one of those who put political stability first placed economic 
equality second. The support for political stability, rural 
development (however valid) and for private ownership of industry, 
suggests a somewhat conservative or at least cautious and 
practical approach to politics. Only one Bangladeshi journalist 
gave consistently radical responses, i. e. by putting down economic 
equality as an important goal (in the first two places), blaming 
economic inequality for the problems of the country, and opting 
for public ownership of industry. 
The Pakistani journalists appear to be slightly more radical; 
many are infused with a mixture of liberal and socialist ideas, 
giving more support to the value of individual freedom and to 
public ownership of industry than Bangladeshi journalists. They 
seem slightly more concerned with economic equality and less 
concerned with rural development. The Bangladeshi concern for 
rural development is practical and realistic rather than ideological. 
The more urban and professional background of the Pakistani 
journalists is likely to make them less interested in rural matters. 
Finally, there is a noticeably larger number of consistently radical 
journalists in the Pakistani sample. As I have said, only one 
Bangladeshi journalist put economic equality as one of the top two 
goals, inequality as a cause of his country's problems, and preferred 
public to private industrial ownership. The figure for Pakistan 
was eight. 
The editors were possibly more conservative than the rest of 
the journalists. Out of 21 editors (all those I interviewed) only 
one preferred public ownership of industry to private. 11 wanted 
private ownership, nine a mixed economy. But there was still a 
strong liberal streak. Out of 17 editors ten said they thought 
democracy was more important to their country than political stability. 
Only one or two editors were consistently radical, while the core 
of conservatism was quite pronounced. The majority of editors 
are a mixture of conservatism and liberalism, while the majority 
of other journalists combine more left-wing (but not often radical) 
tendencies with their liberalism. 
- 
403 
- 
10.1.5. The Journalists Speak for Themselves 
I asked the journalists to comment on certain professional 
as well as political matters. They were very free with their 
comments and many wrote substantial replies. Their comments in 
general bear out the above discussion. There seemed to be no 
difference between the comments (nor indeed the answers to the 
questions that were not open-ended) of journalists on vernacular 
and English-language papers, or between journalists on partisan 
and non-partisan papers (though the number of the former was 
very small, there not being a large number of party paper journalists 
in either country). 
The comments revealed a substantial amount of idealism, 
especially to the question 'Why did you become a journalist? ' 
A small number lacked any idealistic motivation. One put the 
reason down to 'chance'. One took up journalism 'as a hobby', 
even though he believed it was a 'tedious, almost a killing job'. 
One said he joined because his father was a journalist. Only a 
few were entirely dismissive. One said 'I really don't know; 
The other two said there was no reasonable alternative: 'There 
was no worthwhile job to go for and I landed up in journalism by 
accident'. 'Journalism was the only field available'. The 
latter is interesting in view of what I have said about an expanding 
press opening up the number of middle-class jobs available to those 
who are unable to make it into the very restricted area of prestige 
middle-class jobs. Only one (in Pakistan) 
-a journalist on 
Jesaret, a Jamaat-E-Islami Islamic paper 
- 
mentioned a partisan 
cause. 
"In my student life I came close to an ideological party... 
and being an ideological worker I thought that by this 
profession I can work for my cause in a better way. " 
The other comments varied in their degree of idealism. Most 
reflect powerful liberal ideals. The following are typical 
examples: 
a) Pakistan 
i) "An urge to speak the truth. " 
ii) "To guide nation towards peace, progress and prosperity, 
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and to try to establish a just society free from 
all sorts of exploitation. " 
iii) "To effectively participate in national development. " 
b) Bangladesh 
i) "I have chosen this profession with a missionary zeal 
-a minion to serve the people. In an under-developed 
country like ours problems are huge, grievances are 
manifold and these are mostly left with no outlets. 
To project the grievances of the mute mass and problems 
of the nation I have chosen the profession, so that I 
can be of any help. " 
ii) "It is the realisation of school-days' dream of becoming 
either a teacher or a journalist. Later, as a Freedom 
Fighter, I thought that I shall continue to fight for 
the cause of the people through press. " 
iii) "To serve the society and the nation as well. I consider 
this profession as one of the noblest professions. " 
iv) "I was destined for it. " 
A chance to generalise their comments in the final question 
on the form, in which I asked the journalists to describe what 
they believed the press could realistically achieve in a developing 
country, accentuated the idealistic component. 
a) Pakistan 
i) "Press can educate the public. Press can guide the 
citizens of an underdeveloped country. Press can 
prepare the public minds for any emergency or bad days. " 
ii) "In it lies the panacea of all ills. " 
iii) "Transformation from pre-history to modern society. 
Rapid economic growth. Democratisation of society 
in the global content of imperialism and neo-colonialism. " 
iv) "The Press should strive to promote national solidarity 
and progress. It should project a progressive outlook 
while guiding the people to solve their social and 
economic problems. It should also do its best to remove 
economic disparity which tends to undermine national 
unity and cohesion. " 
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b) Bangladesh 
"It can play as an effective instrument to bridge 
the communication gap between the people and the 
government. Free flow of unbiased and impartial 
information will help the people to be aware about 
happenings in the country. This will in turn help 
them in formulating their own courses of action. " 
Much of the idealism in the above responses has, of course, 
slipped from answering what the press "could realistically" do 
to what the journalists would like the press to do. In reality 
the press has little power. Some, possibly more realistic 
journalists openly acknowledge the ambiguity. 
a) Pakistan 
i) "The Press should reflect the thinking and the hopes 
and aspirations of the people. It should lie above 
all threats and must grow as a respectable institution 
which, unfortunately, it is not. " 
ii) "I believe free Press can always safeguard the basic 
human rights. But unfortunately our colonial masters 
on their departure gave us a gift of a Bonapartist 
but well trained army. This institution has destroyed 
each and every institution in which a real democratic 
and free society is established... Now our Press has 
become subservient to the Armed Forces. " 
b) Bangladesh 
"The press could act as a watch-dog. Pin-pointing 
government lapses and suggesting alternatives. Press 
can also mobilize public opinion against or for issues 
of national importance. But since the percentage of 
literacy is alarmingly poor in most of the developing 
countries the press is not as effective as it should be. 
Press in most of the developing countries enjoys no 
freedom, or restricted freedom, giving them little 
opportunity to play their assigned role. " 
It is only one step from saying what the press should do, if 
it were allowed and had the ability, to a position of open pessimism. 
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This bitterness is paralleled by a few strongly radical responses, 
more in the case of Pakistan than Bangladesh. 
a) Pakistan 
i) "I don't think the press has any worthwhile role in 
a developing country. It always assumes the role 
of an instrument which helps perpetuate the people 
in power. The role of press as conceived in the West 
is perhaps alien to our conditions. The idea of an 
independent Press has been forlornly lost in Asiatic 
topography. " 
ii) "Very little. Options lie in the field of political 
action. Besides, newspapers are owned by vested 
interests. " 
iii) "Realistic is a relative term. In the first place 
the press has to be free in a developing country in 
order to give full expression to dissenting views. 
But, it is as important who the dissenters are. 
Depends on who is in power. If the country's 
development is not serving the interest of the vast 
majority (especially working class, peasants, 
intelligentsia) but leading to growing economic 
inequality, corruption and social degeneration (as 
in the case in most developing countries) then the 
Press should be free to convey the dissatisfaction 
and discontentment of the masses and actually act as 
a powerful pressure on the ruling classes. " 
b) Bangladesh 
i) "I believe that in the present context of reliance 
on super-powers and developed countries in the 
implementation of economic programmes there could 
be no genuine neutrality in the journalism of developing 
countries. " 
ii) "To arouse public consciousness against economic 
inequality and external domination. " 
iii) "To expose the character of governments -a shared 
sovereignty of bureaucrat-monopoly capital backed 
by imperialism and neo-colonialism. " 
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iv) "To motivate people to wage struggle for establishment 
of real peoples power. " 
Nearly all of the above responses contain a strong element 
of liberalism. Though all the journalists deeply desire a free, 
purposeful press, some of them (but not many) demand that this 
be linked to socialist aims. Most journalists have a powerful 
belief in the potential of the press to take on the role of the 
'Fourth Estate', and this belief is only to a limited extent 
coloured by particular political beliefs. The following, from 
a Bangladeshi journalist, is typical of this liberalism. 
"Our people are ignorant. They are groping in the 
dark. Press may come forward with light and illuminate 
the whole thing. " 
But the following statement, from a Pakistani journalist, contains 
most of the elements discussed above: liberalism, idealism 
(disillusioned) and cynicism. 
"After ten years in this profession, I repent having 
done so in the first place. I was overwhelmed with 
the notion that a press could make or disband a nation. 
But this is only possible when the press is free. The 
disintegration of a country takes place when the press 
is curbed and prevented from playing its correct role. 
Ours is a decaying society and I blame newspaper editors 
in this country for this unfortunate state of affairs. 
All that they are interested in is keeping their low-paid 
jobs intact. One can't expect a better performance 
from the editor's subordinates. Our papers could have 
educated and enlightened the people in this country on 
their rights. They failed in it, miserably. Through 
foolishness and prospects of personal gains very much 
in their mind, our editors have reduced their newspapers 
and magazines to the frightening status of sanitary towels. 
They have lost credibility. Our newspapers are read only 
for bullion rates, cinema ad's. and situation vacant 
columns. The only way we can salvage our newspapers 
and preserve fair and impartial journalism in this country 
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is to send all our editors on a compulsory apprenticeship 
with the Times of India. If TOI refuses to train our 
'learned men', 'PLAYBOY' may be contacted. Compared to 
my newspaper that sexy magazine has far better editorial 
content. " 
10.2. A Westernised Profession 
In its approach to political reporting and in its apparent 
belief in particular professional ethics the press in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh would seem to be heavily influenced by the West. 
This influence extends beyond political reporting, and it is this 
more general orientation to the West that I wish to examine in 
this section. As it is the elites of these countries that are 
most westernised, such an orientation is likely to be bound up 
with a certain elitism. First of all it is necessary to see how 
far these elements are reflected in the content of the newspapers. 
10.2.1. Westernised Content 
In the case of Dawn in 1951, if sensationalist news is considered 
Western in origin, then this paper was not westernised in that sense. 
Two of the main types of sensationalist news - crime and disasters - 
are quite minor in its reporting, together taking up only 2.2% of 
its non-advertising space. Moreoever, its international coverage 
does not show an especial bias to the West. Coverage of Third World 
countries took up half of its international news. Less than 40% 
of the latter was on Western countries - not large, considering the 
dependence of. Third World newspapers on Western news agencies for 
their foreign news. Western features (either about or from the 
West), too, are considerably less significant than non-Western features. 
Some editors specifically stated that their papers were modelled 
on British papers - the Pakistan Times and the Moslem (even in lay-out) 
on the. Guardian, the Morning News on the Telegraph. APP and PPI 
are closely modelled on Reuters. Though Dawn is clearly modelled 
on Western quality papers such as the Times, the context is less 
one of westernisation than of elitism. The rejection of sensationalism 
- and Dawn is very staid - reflects the rejection of the 'popular' 
in favour of the 'quality' model. The emphasis on international 
news which, if foreign relations are included, takes up 39% of all 
news space, indicates the sort of people who read the paper -a 
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highly educated elite. If all 'hard' news is split up between 
domestic, foreign, and those elements which concerned Pakistan's 
relations with the outside world (foreign relations, Kashmir, 
international trade and aid) the following result is obtained. 
Domestic 21.0% 
International/domestic 15.3% 
International 25.5% 
This absorption with international affairs bore little 
relevance to the social and development problems of Pakistan. 
Only 12.7% of news was on domestic social or economic affairs. 
This concern for international news bears a rather comic comparison 
with coverage of local affairs which were unable to get more than 
3.4% of Dawn's news space. The paper gave negligible space to 
the expression of local problems, in a sense specifically 'denying' 
the local nature of the paper. On a necessarily rather crude 
analysis the reporting of national social and economic problems 
took up a daily average of somewhat less than 55 column inches 
of space in the sample, while local problems took up a mere 0.3 
inches. 
The connection with an elite readership is borne out by the 
large amount of advertising (aimed mainly at the well-off) the 
paper received. Advertisements took up 34.4% of total space. 
Much of it was paid for by Western firms, or subsidiaries or agents 
of these (between one-third and one-half). Considering the tiny 
readership of the paper this represents a substantial amount of 
advertising, which was clearly aimed at a westernised elite. 
Another aspect of the paper that directly reflected the westernisation 
element of elitism was the surprisingly small amount of space given 
to Islam. This is extraordinary in view of the immensely powerful 
role Islam plays in Pakistan. However, the newspapers main readers, 
the professional middle class, are probably the most secularised 
segment in Pakistani society. The Muslim League itself had been 
far more concerned with the economic and political freedom of 
Moslems from the Hindus rather than in the Islamic faith 'per se'. 
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Dawn in 1951 was a very 'serious' paper of interest only to 
highly educated people, and it has not changed much since. Nor 
is it substantially different from the other major English-language 
dailies. I analysed three papers from the latter part of 1970: 
Day, the Pakistan Times and the Morning News. These were not 
typical samples because of the dreadful cyclone and tidal wave in 
the Bay of Bengal, already referred to, and the general election. 
The former had a drastic effect on the press. Newspapers were 
saturated with news of the calamity: huge photos (sometimes taking 
up several pages and appearing every day during the crisis) of the 
floods, of dead bodies bloated by the water, of mass burials; 
examination of the causes of the calamity and what went wrong with 
the early-warning system; accounts of previous natural disasters in 
Bengal; innumerable public appeals, and news of donations to help 
those left destitute in East Pakistan. The period of the sample 
did not coincide exactly with the period of the cyclone. In the 
period of my sample cyclone-coverage took up between 12% and 16% of 
space after subtraction of advertising, but otherwise it sometimes 
took up as much as between one-third and one-half of non-advertising 
space. 
The staid quality of these papers can be gauged from the 
proportion of space taken up by what can be called 'hard' news' 
(politics, economics, international news, etc. ). In Dawn this 
takes up 62% of non-advertising space. For the Times it is 60% 
and for the News 53%. This seriousness cannot be explained solely 
by the unusual events of the cyclone and the elections. News on 
the political parties took up an average of 11% of non-advertising 
space, the cyclone an average of 14%. In fact the rather low 
proportion of space taken up by politics of all sorts during the 
election campaign (an average of 17% of non-advertising space), 
indicates the sobriety of these Pakistani papers well enough, 
-especially when compared to the Nigerian papers. 
The generally serious, rather aloof tone of the papers can be 
seen in other respects. As in Dawn of 1951, these papers pay very 
little attention to local news, which takes up three or four percent 
of non-advertising space. The vernaculars pay far more attention 
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to local news, which, in Nawa-I-Wagt for instance, takes up about 
15% of space. Disasters and crime together absorb the same amount 
of space as local news in these three papers. However, in some 
respects the papers are different from the earlier Dam sample. 
The coverage of religion (not all Islam) is greater, taking up 
between five and seven percent of space. International news 
(affected to some extent by the extra coverage required by the 
cyclone and the elections) is much lower, taking up 10.5% of non- 
advertising space in Dawn, 13.9% in the Times and 7.7% in the News. 
Within this itself the bias of the West is even less than it was 
before, Western countries receiving only about one quarter of all 
international coverage. These last facts possibly suggest that 
the English-language press was now taking a more realistic account 
of the real nature of Pakistani society. Dawn is now a somewhat 
more general paper, with broader coverage and slightly less elitist 
appeal than before. The other papers are similar to it. Coverage 
of the cyclone alone brought these papers closer to the people. 
It is in overall style rather than particular coverage that 
these papers are heavily westernised; they are clearly based on 
the Western 'quality' newspaper. In one respect, though, the West 
does have a direct influence in content. This is in the area of 
features. Features take up a significant amount of space in the 
News. They take up less in the other two papers. However, in 
the case of Dawn nearly two-thirds of these are 'Western' (i. e. either 
originating from the West or about the West); for the Times it is 
somewhat over one-third. In the News the proportion of space taken 
up by Western features is very large indeed - three-fifths of all 
features are Western. In all over 10% of the News' total non-advertising 
space is taken up by Western features - more than international news 
receives and nearly as much as the political parties get. Most of 
these features were regular items, including such things as syndicated 
bridge columns, cross-words, and horoscopes. These articles continued 
despite the coverage given to the cyclone (and to politics). It was 
international news that was cut back, including news of the West, 
rather than light features from the West. 
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The extent of westernisation in features can sometimes reach 
silly proportions. For instance, a fashion article announcing a 
fur coat available in Selfridges for £601, or a clue in a cross-word 
asking for a 'former Prime Minister' (6 letters). The answer? 
Not Jinnah, but Attlee. Dawn carried a regular Osbert Lancaster 
cartoon. Two clerics appear in one, in which one of them says 
to the other "I say, Vicar, I've just thought of a wizard leg-pull - 
I'm going to write a MADLY left-wing letter to my M. P. and sign it 
Hewlett Johnson 1,, 2 I have no idea what Pakistanis made of that; 
probably no more than I can now. In another issue an article 
announced that "the Battle of the smog-masks gripped London last 
night as its famouns fogs began to creep along the murky streets 
where Sherlock Holmes once tracked master criminals"3. This piece 
of 'news' naturally came via an American agency (UPA). The Pakistan 
Observer had regular Dr. Kildare and Rip Kirby cartoons. In one 
of the latter Rip Kirby is in a fantasy world with Aphrodite, Ares, 
etc. Kirby is dressed in Roman attire and glasses. Artemis, 
with huge breasts, blondehair and a skirt of extreme shortness, 
fires an arrow at him (which just misses). Kirby remarks: "Great 
Scott! That was close 1,, 
4 
There is no doubt that such material was considered to be 
popular, even if there were also economic reasons for its use. 
The following announcement in Dawn makes it fairly clear that 
editors and owners thought they were supplying a public want. 
"It is announced for the information of readers that 
arrangements have been made with the New York Herald 
Tribune as a result of which the well-known columns and 
features which appear in the Herald Tribune will also 
appear in Dawn. These include regular columns by Walter 
Lipmann, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, David Lawrence, Art 
Buchwald, Roscoe Drummond, and others. Besides these, 
articles and features on Sports, Bridge, Fashions, 
Photography, Gardening, Cinema, Stamps, Art, Business, 
Aviation, Science, Theatre, etc. will appear in magazine 
and regular columns. "5 
1 Morning News (3.12.70) 
2 Dawn (2.4.51) 
3 Ibid (2.11.53) 
4 Pakistan Observer (4.11.70) 
5 Dawn (24.2.55) 
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There is a degree of elitism in this westernisation. Both were 
explicitly combined in many of the paper's advertisements. One, 
for instance, a Pan-Am advertisement, advertising its more expensive 
fares, described the advantages it offered in its flights to Europe 
as follows: a lounge, sleeperettes, cuisine by 'Maxims of Paris' 
and a bar service. The picture showed stewardesses serving drinks 
in the lounge where elegant Western women are to be seen. The 
advert invited the readers "after the pageantry of London to include 
Germany in your programme". 
1 It also mentioned Germany's national 
wines. It was not put off from doing this, or advertising its bar 
service, by the fact that it was addressing mostly a Moslem readership. 
10.2.2. The Editors' Comments on Westernised Content 
Though the papers in 1970 gave significant coverage to international 
affairs (compared to many Third World papers), this coverage was not 
as great as in Dawn of 1951 (in proportional terms; in absolute terms 
it was considerably larger). However, if the effects of the cyclone 
were discounted the space taken up by international news would be 
somewhat greater - by between two and three percent of total news space. 
This means that the Morning News would have had 10% of space on 
international affairs, Dawn 13%, and the Pakistan Times 16%. In 
a non-electoral period the proportion would have been slightly higher 
again. 
Below are given the proportions of non-advertising space taken 
up by international news over several years, using Amjad Ali's 
analysis2 and my own. (Ali's analysis was of total space; I have 
recalculated it in terms of total space less advertising, in order 
to make it comparable to my own). The 1970 figures discount the 
effects of the cyclone. 
Table 10.7: International News as a Proportion of Total News Space 
1951 
Dawn 
25.5 
1963 
Dawn Pak. Times Pak. Observer Jans Nawa-I-Wagt Ittefa 
17.1 16.2 20.2 7.6 6.6 11.9 
1970 
Dawn Pak. Times Morning News 
13.0 16.0 10.0 
1 Ibid (18.1.53) 
2 Ali, Amjad (1963), pp. 12/13 
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Two things are of note here: i) the very big difference 
between the English-language papers and the vernaculars, ii) an 
apparent decline of international news in the former. over time. 
Even with this decline the elitism of the English-language papers 
in comparison with the vernacular papers is quite clear. 
All the editors of English-language papers that I spoke to, 
in both countries, believed that international news was an important 
selling-point for their newspapers. The editors of the more 
'respectable' vernacular papers sided with the English-language 
editors in considering international news to be a significant 
element in demand for their papers. Other vernaculars did not 
rate international news highly, while the political papers did 
not consider such news to be of any importance to their readers 
at all. -Of course, I am talking here of the editors' conceptions 
of public attitudes, and these could be misconceptions. I also 
asked editors why Western features were so prominent in their 
newspapers. With some of the English-language papers this prominence 
is quite deliberate, as they have a regular supply of features and 
news articles from various Western news organisations. For example, 
the Pakistan Times has the Observer service, the Moslem the Guardian 
service, and Dawn the New York Times service; Dawn has a regular 
Art Buchwald column. 
Why is this so? I have considered two possibilities: i) popular 
demand by a westernised public; ii) the usefulness of such features 
as (relatively) cheap and easy space-fillers. (This is related to 
a general lack of resources within the press). The answers given 
by the editors indicate that both explanations are valid. The 
editor of the Morning News said 75% of his features material was 
foreign. It was of interest to readers but Pakistan lacked journalists 
experienced in writing that sort of material. The editor of Dawn 
thought traditional reliance on foreign ideas, and a related lack 
of creative journalism, were primary. Public demand and cheapness 
are secondary factors. The editor of the Pakistan Times in Lahore 
did not think there was a demand for foreign features. They are 
"space-fillers". Pakistani papers he said, are often short of 
local material and 'impose' foreign matter on their readers. 
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However, the editor of the Rawalpindi edition of the Pakistan Times 
believed there was a demand for Western features. 
The editor of the Moslem said the dependence on Western media 
was necessary given the poor facilities of the media in the Third 
World. He claimed that foreign material was cheap. The oslem 
then paid Rs. 20,000 p. a. (about £1,000) for the Guardian service. 
This includes all sorts of material but it is largely a features/ 
background service. The Rs. 20,000 could not be considered expensive. 
A simple calculation can show this. Senior journalists such as 
leader writers and columnists got up to Rs. 3,500 per month in the 
Moslem. As the paper used one or two Guardian articles per day 
it seems certain that it would take two journalists at least to 
replace the service, without regard to quality. Even if one 
journalist could do it (and he certainly could not compete with 
the range of Guardian material from which the Moslem would select 
its one or two daily articles), he would be receiving a salary of 
Rs. 42,000 
- 
doublethe cost of the features service. The editor 
also said that popular demand for such features is a very important 
part of the motivation for having them. 
In sum, there seems to be no clear policy regarding the use 
of foreign feature material. It is the result of a long tradition 
of Western influence. That the tradition has remained is in part 
due to the economic advantage foreign media have and the related 
fact that Pakistani newspapers do not have sufficient journalists 
with the right sort of experience to replace foreign sources. 
Westernisation itself exists both in the public and in the newspapers 
themselves. They are, perhaps, mutually reinforcing. 
10.2.3. Westernisation amongst the Journalists 
There is little doubt that the journalists are, in a professional 
sense at least, strongly oriented to the West. However, this cannot 
be taken for granted. I tried to get an impression of the precise 
nature of this westernisation from the journalists themselves. The 
editors of the English-language papers had had considerable contact 
with the West. Two had worked in London for a period. Only one 
out of 19 editors in the two countries (a Pakistani) had never been 
to the West. Several had been over to the West many times - one 
over 18 times; another had been to the U. K. alone 25 times! Only 
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one, though, had had some education in the West. All the editors, 
of course, were familiar with the Western media directly through 
their work, but, in addition, one had worked in London for Reuters 
and several contributed articles to Western newspapers. Virtually 
all of the editors admitted that the papers and news agencies of 
their country were modelled on the Western press, but only two 
criticised the press of their country for being too westernised. 
Both of these were editors of vernacular papers. 
The difference between the vernacular and the English-language 
papers seem also to apply to religion. Most vernacular editors 
considered coverage of Islam to be important to their readers (but 
not in Bangladesh). Only one English-language editor was of this 
view. This difference seems to apply to religious attitudes as 
well. Four out of nine Pakistani editors had performed Hajj (been 
to Mecca for the religious ceremonies as required by Islam). This 
does not necessarily indicate piety; prestige is equally important 
in motivating people to perform Hajj (while poverty is an obstruction). 
At least two of these editors regularly observe Ramazan (involving 
extensive fasting; this indicates a more certain sign of piety), 
as did one other who had not performed Hajj. This fairly high 
religious observance applies mostly to vernacular editors. My 
interview with the owner-editor of Jang, a weathly man familiar 
with the West, was interrupted so that he could offer his prayers 
at the religiously required time. Only one English-language editor 
I spoke to was self-confessedly pious. Only one editor in Bangladesh 
showed any overt piety. 
Not surprisingly, a smaller proportion of journalists than of 
editors had been to the West. Nevertheless exactly one-third of 
them had paid such a visit (either to Europe or the U. S. A. ) - the 
same proportion for both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Three of these 
had also studied in the West. Nearly all the Pakistani journalists, 
and two-thirds of the Bangladeshi journalists, regularly read Western 
newspapers. Two-thirds of the journalists from both countries (34 
out of 51) did not think the English-language papers of their country 
were too westernised. Another ten (five in each country) were 
ambivalent. Only six considered that the English-language papers 
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of their country were too westernised. This attitude contrasts 
strongly with their attitudes to the influence of the West on 
their societies. 46 out of the 51 considered their societies 
to be excessively westernised. Journalists in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh seem to wish to follow the style and ethics of Western 
journalism, while resenting the general influence of the West 
on their societies. 
Only 15 out of the 51 journalists regularly observed Ramazan, 
while four had performed Hajj. These are not especially low 
figures-after all, a month-long fast during day-light hours is 
not an appealing prospect, and going to Mecca is expensive 
- 
but 
they certainly indicate a higher degree of secularisation than in 
society at large. In Pakistan it is not uncommon to see people 
praying in the street, and the mosques are well attended at the 
required times. The journalists lack of enthusiasm for reading 
the regular religious articles in the press reinforces this 
implication of relative secularisation. Only three of the 51 
journalists read such articles thoroughly. 25 hardly read them 
at all. When asked whether they would like religious articles 
to concentrate on traditional Islam or on interpreting it in 
accordance with modern needs, only five out of 51 chose the former. 
Bangladeshi journalists were less interested in religious 
articles, especially those of a 'traditionally Islamic' nature. 
Several Bangladeshi journalists indicated to me personally, or on 
the questionnaires, their amazement that I should think of asking 
silly questions about religious beliefs - not seeing that a negative 
response is as academically significant as a positive response. 
Some Pakistani journalists showed equal antagonism to Islam. To 
the question, 'Have you ever performed Hajj'? one respondent replied 
'Hell! No! ' To the question, 'Do you regularly observe Ramazan? ' 
he quipped 'We are already a starving people! ' He was intensely 
liberal, believing very strongly in freedom of the individual and 
freedom of the press. He was also highly westernised, as this 
implies. In response to the question 'Do you think that certain 
sectors of your society are too much influenced by Western culture' 
he wrote 'I wish they were! ' It is possible that secularisation 
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amongst the journalists it related to a significant degree of 
westernisation. 
To conclude this section, the above data seems to indicate 
a set of journalists with considerable experience of the West, 
either directly or indirectly, who read Western newspapers and 
apparently hold these up as a model (as their comments, given 
below, will show even more). Editors were explicit about this 
modelling effect. These responses and the relative secularisation 
of the journalists indicate a considerable degree of westernisation, 
though this influence in their societies was not accepted without 
some resentment. Westernisation was most acute amongst the 
journalists on the English-language papers. 
10.2.4. The Journalists' Opinions on the Western Press 
So far I have not talked directly about the journalists' 
opinions on the Western press, though it is clear enough that 
they are familiar with it and also seem to accept it as a broad 
model. When I asked them to state what they considered to be 
the good and bad points in Western journalism, the journalists' 
replies were, remarkably consistent. As far as the bad points 
are concerned nearly all journalists, with great justification, 
put narrow, biased, or excessively limited coverage of developing 
countries as the main criticism. As the following examples show, 
the responses were very similar. 
a) Pakistan 
i) "Almost all Western newspapers display prejudice against 
under-developed countries and their inhabitants, particularly 
if they are Muslims. " 
ii) "All the Western papes ignore the causes of poverty and 
injustice, and serving their own ends, doing nothing for 
humanity. " 
iii) "It is racially biased, also politically, closing its eyes 
to the emerging forces that do not suit their traditional 
set-up. " 
b) Bangladesh 
i) "Inadequate coverage of Third World countries. " 
ii) "Sensationalism in reporting events in developing countries. 
Lack of knowledge about real economic situation in developing 
countries. " 
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iii) "In matters of Asian coverage they are guided by 
their own interests and priorities. " 
I have quoted these criticisms at such length, before 
discussing the journalists' more general views on the good and 
bad points of the Western press, in order to counterbalance any 
impression that might have been gained so far that these journalists 
wholeheartedly admire the Western press. That is far from the 
case. They accept the broad principles of Western journalism 
as a basic model, but bitterly resent its ethnocentrism. All 
these journalists, indeed all journalists in this part of the 
world, believe that they get a raw deal in the Western press; 
and they do. 
The journalists' views on the good points of the Western press 
were quite consistent. In the main they recommended its apparent 
objectivity, comprehensiveness, in-depth analysis. The following 
examples give some idea of this. 
i) "It is a free press. " 
ii) "Outspokeness. " 
iii) "Lots of original and analytical writing. " 
iv) "Reportage is detailed and englightened. " 
v) "Boldness and direct style. " 
A number of these journalists also mentioned the technical or purely 
professional superiority of Western journalism. 
i) "Prompt and detailed coverage. Good news-worthy photographs. " 
ii) "Impressive lay-out, good news-pictures, human-interest 
stories. " 
iii) "Good presentation. " 
Admiration for the Western press in general reached an extreme in 
the case of three respondents who, when considering the bad points, 
said they could not think of any. One of these went as far as to 
say he believed the Western press played a role in educating the 
world's masses. 
Despite the above points of praise, some journalists were not 
short on criticism either, apart from those made about coverage of 
developing countries. Some of them pointed a finger at scandal- 
mongering and sensationalism. 
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i) "They highlight scandals. Crime reports are given 
preference over other reports. " 
ii) "Too much emphasis on scandals. " 
iii) "Blackmailing. " 
Some of the criticisms apparently reversed the general belief that 
the Western press is objective. 
i) "Not objective as posed. " 
ii) "Slant and bias. Ill-informed views. Tilt in 
editorial comment. " 
iii) "Slant. Preaching. Disproportionate exposure. " 
This apparent conflict of views on the Western press, I think, 
reflects a good deal of consistency. The above criticisms do not 
indicate rejection of the nature of Western journalism. This is 
clear enough from the fact that the three respondents just quoted 
all had favourable things to say under "good points". Furthermore, 
eight of the nine (from both countries) who criticised the Western 
press for lack of impartiality said that they believed the English- 
language papers in Pakistan were "not enought like Western newspapers". 
It would seem, then, that the journalists fully believe in Western 
journalistic values (whether these values really exist or not) and 
are, indeed, so imbued with these values that they use them to 
pin-point failures in the Western press itself. In other words, 
Western journalism does not live up to the high standards of Pakistani 
journalists, even though these are strongly influenced by the West. 
Pakistani journalists have a rigorous belief in total objectivity. 
These responses fit in well with the other results of the questionnaire, 
as well as with the content analysis, all of which showed a strong 
sense of 'professionalism' and attachment to rigid 'professional' 
norms of objectivity. 
10.2.5. Television 
Westernisation reaches its apogee in television. Television 
was introduced by Ayub, first in West Pakistan, then four years later 
in the Eastern wing. When, in 1968, it was established in Dacca, 
Ayub himself said on television: 
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"I was quite clear in my mind that television was not 
a luxury... We want to use this medium for the purpose 
of amusement to a certain extent but basically for making 
people aware of our problems and pointing out the solutions 
to them, and also for the purpose of spreading education 
as much as possible. "1 
This did not prevent the Nippon Electric Co. Ltd., who were doing 
the work, from stating in a Morning News advertisement: 
"On completion the new Dacca T. V. station will have a 
450 foot high antenna and tower 
- one of the highest 
in Asia, and the most sophisticated equipment to bring 
the best in T. V. entertainment to millions of Pakistanis., 
2 
Television in Pakistan, of course, has not been used for 
educational purposes. As one executive in Pakistan Television (PTV) 
told me, there is a "limited demand for educational programmes. " 
The following table shows the breakdown of T. V. programmes for 
1980/81. 
Table 10.8: Break-down of Television Programming 1980/1 (%) 
Foreign films and serials 22.7 
News and current affairs 17.8 
Pakistani films and plays 11.6 
Music and shows 9.6 
Religious programmes 8.8 
'General' programmes (e. g. festivals) 3.9 
Sport 3.7 
Childrens' programmes 3.5 
Regional language programmes 4.7 
Educational Television Division 0.8 
Miscellaneous 6.1 
Commercials 6.7 
Total 100.0 
The largest category is clearly foreign films and serials. 
Though this comes to about 23% of all programming, I was told that 
about 30% of total programming is imported. 3 News and current 
affairs rank quite highly but specifically educational programmes, 
1 Morning News (26.9.68) 
2 Ibid (25.9.68) 
3 Government of Pakistan; Pakistan: An Official Handbook, 1978/81. 
- 
422 
- 
put out by the Educational Television Division (ETD) take up only 
0.8% of broadcasting time. The ETD was set up in 1973 to broadcast 
literacy programmes, etc. It can also be seen that the regional 
languages, of which there are quite a number, hardly get a look in. 
(Colour was introduced in 1976 in Pakistan, in 1981 in Bangladesh). 
About 40% of programming in Bangladesh is in English. 
Television in Bangladesh is heavily government financed. 
Pakistan Television (PTV) is primarily a commercial system, though 
it is government-owned. In 1979/80 28% of revenue came from 
advertising, 37% from licences, and 25% from government subsidy, 
(the rest from other sources). PTV has been quite successful in 
getting advertising revenue, which has climbed rapidly. 
Table 10.9: PTV's Percentage Increase in Advertisý, ng Revenue (over previous years)` 
1975/6 43.8 
1976/7 6.8 
1977/8 22.1 
It has been claimed that broadcasting now gets 60% of all advertising 
revenue (including radio which has 10%). Whether the figures is 
that large or not it is firmly believed by journalists that the 
broadcasting media have harmed the financial position of the press. 
In Bangladesh there is only one production station (in Dacca). 
In 1982 there were an estimated 150,000 television sets. There are 
five broadcasting centres in Pakistan, but most T. V. sets are in 
the Karachi and Lahore areas. The estimated number of sets in 
these two areas (licensed sets plus 25%) in 1978 was about 560,000. 
They now have over two-thirds of Pakistan's estimated 750,000 sets. 
By comparison, Baluchistan had only 5,000 sets (all in Quetta). 
Only about 10% of households have a T. V. set. T. V. is still largely 
a luxury of the elite in Pakistan. Perhaps the popularity of the 
medium with advertisers follows from this. There is, as I have 
said, considerable westernisation apparent in the programming; it 
is of note that most of the main advertisers are Western companies, 
or their subsidiaries, agents, or licensees. Below are given, 
in descending order, the top 12 advertisers on PTV. 
3 
1 PTV Facts and Figures 1981 
2 PTV Facts for Advertisers, 1979 
3 Ibid. 
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Table 10.10: The Main Advertisers on PTV. 1979 
National Bank of Pakistan (nationalised) 
Glaxo Laboratories Pakistan Ltd. 
Lever Brothers it 
Brooke Bond 
Kohinoor Soap and Detergents Ltd. 
Reckitt and Colman Pakistan Ltd. 
English Biscuits Manufacturers Ltd. 
Ceylon Tea Bureau 
Phillips Electrical Company of Pakistan Ltd. 
Burque Corporation 
Beecham Pakistan Ltd. 
Lipton if 11 
Western programming is important to PTV for two reasons: 
i) it is cheap, ii) it is popular. While it costs PTV Rs. 25,000 
to make an hour of programming (scripting, acting, transport, 
sets, make-up), excluding technical costs (which might double 
programming costs), PTV pays only Rs. 5,000 or so ($500)for an hour 
of foreign programming 
1 (usually American). Given this fact, 
the role of imported material is hardly likely to diminish. 
I saw a considerable amount of television while I was in 
Pakistan in 1979 (also in 1973). Some of the imported material 
was abysmal, some very good, e. g. Washington Behind, Closed Doors. 
Apart from the latter (and the earlier series of The Ascent of Man) 
most imported material is popular entertainment stuff like Bionic 
Woman. However worthwhile Washington Behind Closed Doors might 
have been, it could clearly only appeal to a highly westernised 
elite. But even some well-educated English-speaking Pakistanis 
I spoke to could only understand parts of the programme. Some 
imported material was, in a different sense, beyond understanding 
- e. g. American boxing matches from the 1950s - filler material 
at its worst. 
Most of the prestige indigenous programmes are highly westernised. 
Indeed, they have so little to do with the reality of Pakistan that 
they might as well be imported at a fraction of the cost. The most 
prestigious of these are T. V. films, which are professionally 
1 Interview with PTV executives. 
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produced, and very expensive. They are nearly always about 
rich people, and always concern a love affair. In one I saw, 
the love affair concerned a divorced couple (divorce is rare 
in Pakistan). The ex-wife has just returned to Pakistan from 
London. Her son whines that he wants to go back to London 
(Pakistan was 'too hot'). London is often mentioned, almost 
as if it is a second home. In Pakistan they stay at an expensive 
hotel (acknowledged at the end as the Holiday Inn in Rawalpindi). 
The shots go from the airport to the hotel to an expensive 
restaurant (where the boy eats fish and chips) to a pleasant, 
solitary countryside scene, back to the hotel, etc. - carefully 
cutting out even the tiniest glimpse of the poverty to be seen 
everywhere in real life. The man wore a suit and the wqian was 
extremely fair (most women in such programmes seem to be made up 
to look very fair; the 'hero's' second wife was a blonde). The 
protagonists often speak in English, especially, it seems, at 
climaxes: "time will heal it, time may also finish it". "I 
couldn't ask anything more from God. " The divorcees fall in love 
again, but it is too late. Interestingly, PTV people I spoke to 
(including an actor who had appeared in such a T. V. film) spoke 
of these programmes with pride. one or two journalists I discussed 
such productions with spoke of them with contempt. 
This particular T. V. film was sponsored by Vespa scooters. 
In the advertisements inserted into the programme a group of clearly 
well-off youths, all dressed in Western clothes, are seen zooming 
round on scooters. The ad. was almost undoubtedly filmed abroad 
- possibly in Italy. A number of advertisements (e. g. Coke) were 
imported 
- 
these stand out, being overtly Western and much more 
expensive and professional. But even some of the Pakistani ad's. 
are westernised. In a Lux advertisement the Western girl shown 
on the packet becomes, in front of your eyes, a Pakistani girl, 
and speaks in Urdu. A dishwashing liquid is advertised, in English, 
not to scratch the designs "on your more expensive china" (a problem 
that could only be of concern to the elite). A number of ad's., 
in fact, are in English. In a Macleans advertisement the speaker, 
despite his Pakistani accent, describes 'Macleans teeth' as "hwite" 
rather than "white". 
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10.2.6. Concluding Comments: Professionalism and Westernisation 
I have shown that journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh hold 
strong beliefs on the nature of their profession and that these 
appear to influence them in their day-to-day work. These 'professional' 
norms also seem to derive in part from conceptions journalists hold 
on the nature of the press in the West. Their model is western 
journalism. Westernisation, however, goes wider than that. The 
most westernised (and the most elitist) medium is television. 
Despite receiving very large government subsidies, television is 
still mainly a luxury of the elite in both countries, and has so 
far not been applied to educational uses to any significant degree. 
Television might epitomise these themes, but they apply to the media 
in general. The English-language press in particular is a continuing 
testament to the strength of professional norms, of westernisation, 
of elitism, and of the connection between these things. 
10.3. The Organisation of the Journalists: Politics or 
Professionalism? 
I have spent considerable time in discussing the professional 
ethics of journalists in Pakistan and how these affect the newspapers' 
approach to politics. The relationship between professionalism 
and politics is a subtle one, and one that varies throughout the 
press. I have shown the political differences between different 
types of paper, but I have hardly touched upon differences between 
different functional segments of the press, i. e. between editors, 
owners, other journalists, etc. The relationship between professionalism 
and politics is brought out more acutely when the organisation of 
the press is considered. There is more to the journalists' sense 
of professionalism than its dependence on westernisation. It is 
related also to their conceptions of their own status and of the 
role of journalism in society. 
All those involved in journalism in Pakistan are involved in 
occupational or professional organisations relevant to their work 
and positions. The working journalists are organised in the 
Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ). This looks after 
the journalists' interests but also acts as a spokesman for them 
in making known their views on the role of the press in Pakistan, 
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i. e. it has a political role too. Journalists become members 
of the PFUJ through membership of their own newspaper unions 
rather than as individuals; it is a federation of other unions. 
Editors can be admitted, but only if they lack the power to 
"hire and fire". The occupational significance of this 
qualification is clear enough. The editors are themselves 
organised in the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE). 
Very few are members of the PFUJ. The CPNE is concerned with 
journalistic (editorial) rather than occupational interests, 
unlike the PFUJ which concerns itself with both. The owners 
are represented by the All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS). 
This is more like the PFUJ than the CPNE. It deals with material 
matters and acts as a pressure-group, e. g. vis-a-vis the government. 
(However, as the government also owns newspapers it has membership 
in the APNS too). Some editor-owners are represented in both 
the CPNE and the APNS. 
In addition to the above groups there are all the individual 
newspaper unions (or unions representing groups of newspapers), 
which form the membership of the PFUJ, and the unions of non- 
journalist newspaper workers such as calligraphers and printers. 
Finally, embracing all workers in the press, is APNEC. This is 
a relatively new organisation designed to unite journalist and 
non-journalist employees in a single front; it is concerned only 
with the routine negotiation of wages and conditions of work. 
In Bangladesh there are the Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists 
the Editors' Council of Bangladesh, and the Newspaper Owners' 
Association. 
In the various conflicts in which the press has been concerned, 
involving government, proprietors, editors, journalists and their 
unions, political and economic factors are intermixed in a 
complicated way. All governments in the Third World tend to 
authoritarianism. They do not want to be troubled by opposition 
from the press; government therefore finds itself opposed to a 
number of proprietors and editors. Equally, though, it does not 
want trouble from the unions, whether in journalism or industry. 
Even a left-wing government that supports industrial unions (as 
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did Bhutto's government to a limited extent) wants an obedient 
press, and is therefore unlikely to support unionised journalism. 
Like the journalists themselves, the proprietors want press 
freedom; but they want it for themselves, not for their journalists. 
As proprietors they are ideologically opposed to their workers 
as well as having an economic interest in attempting to restrain 
their union power. Thus, even those proprietors who feel opposed 
to the government either politically or over the question of press 
freedom, tend to side with it in opposition to the journalists' 
unions. The editors' position is even more ambiguous. Some work 
for the government, some own newspapers, but most are fully 
professional journalists who, though they tend to have a higher 
socio-economic background than the bulk of journalists, have most 
in common with them. 
The journalists themselves feel opposed to all the above groups 
as they all, including the editors, represent authority. The unions 
which represent the journalists have two fundamental concerns: the 
professional interests of the journalists and their material interests. 
They are, in fact, connected, as a restricted press means less 
newspapers, less jobs, less opportunities to fight for improved pay 
and conditions, as well as less professional freedom. In this 
respect the journalists have some links with the editors, as all 
are working journalists seeking professional freedom and better 
working conditions. The journalists feel most opposed to the 
government and to the proprietors. The latter represent economic 
oppression, the government political oppression. The journalists 
face both but recognise that the two are inter-connected. Though 
the two types of oppression need not go together, and there is 
often political opposition between the government and the proprietors, 
they often reach a'modus vivendi'. The government wants peace. 
The proprietors want to stay in business. The journalists themselves 
seem to recognise that this is less a matter of conspiracy than 
of convenience. 
"The proprietors who started publishing newspapers in 
Pakistan after independence had no concept of the role 
of press and government - press relationship in a free 
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country. For them publishing a newspaper was an 
industry. And to make this enterprise profitable 
they needed government help and patronage. The 
government was too happy to treat newspaper publishing 
as an industry. In return for this help and patronage 
the proprietors surrendered the freedom of the press. "1 
Even this is a simplification, because the relationship between 
the government and the proprietors is at best an uneasy one. 
Sometimes it is a matter of ideology, but more often of convenience. 
10.3.1. The Journalists in Action 
In the 1950s it was the editors who had been the most important, 
or active element in the struggle for press freedom. They had 
more influence then; since the 1950s both the proprietors and the 
government have reduced their effect. Moreover, the influence the 
editors had was wielded mostly through cooperation rather than 
antagonism. Indeed, there was an element of conservatism in the 
nature of this cooperation. In part this was because it was 
defined by the elite background of both editors and government 
ministers. The cooperation was a formal affair. Through what was 
called a "Gentleman's agreement" with the government, press advisory 
committees were set up to advise the government on possible offences. 
The committees themselves were to be set up with the consultation,. 
of what was then called the Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference. 
(PNEC). 
The "Gentleman's agreement" and the advisory committees were 
a failure. They were a liberal pipe-dream. Some editors objected 
strongly to government cynicism in this regard. Altaf Husain, 
Dawn's editor, was strong-minded. When the Sind government did 
not form the Sind Advisory Committee in consultation with the PNEC 
he issued a statement saying that the PNEC "cannot possibly recognise 
(the advisory committee) as a properly constituted body. "2 Clearly 
the advisory committees had little real influence. 
The editors are now in a different position. Some have strong 
political commitments, some are themselves proprietors, some work 
for independent papers, some for government papers. They can never 
act strongly as a united entity. The editors are also very divided 
1 25 Years of Karachi Union of Journalists, p. 22. 
2 Dawn (26.1.51) 
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as to their attitudes to the PFUJ. On the one hand, for 
instance, there is Ahmed Ali Khan, editor of Dawn, one of 
Pakistan's most respected editors and an ex-official of the 
PFUJ. He recognises the weakness of his organisation, the 
CPNE, but believes the PFUJ does itself harm in not seeking 
the support of the independent editors. By contrast, Anwer 
Khalil, editor of Dawn's sister-paper, Hurrivet, is right-wing, 
highly anti-PFUJ, and believes the editors still have more 
influence (by being a part of the elite) than the PFUJ. 
The editors are not a unity, and for this reason whatever 
influence they might once have held as a body hab declined. 
The journalists' union, the PFUJ, has probably overtaken the 
CPNE in influence. It has certainly been more active. It 
is not usual for the press of any country to be as well unionised 
as it is in Pakistan. The press would not necessarily be very 
different without it, but it does represent the ideas and attitudes 
of a very significant number of journalists who are unable to see 
their ideas reflected in the press itself. It has also been 
strongly involved in matters of a political nature. It is not 
only a politicised body, but articulate and well organised. 
Founded in 1950 the PFUJ has been involved in a number of important 
disputes; even if these have been concerned on the surface with 
wages and conditions of work, many of these, because of the role 
of government in the press, have been essentially political disputes. 
The PFUJ, apart from representing the journalists' material 
interests, has taken upon itself the cause of the freedom of the 
press. In fact, as APNEC is responsible for routine negotiations, 
the PFUJ has become more concerned with such matters. This brings 
it in opposition to the newspaper proprietors, but also to 
government. However, this opposition is based largely on the 
PFUJ's concern for the profession. It does not get involved in 
politics per se. It does not support a political party (whatever 
the tendencies of most of its members) or comment on government 
policies which do not affect the press. Furthermore, all governments 
- 
the pre-coup regimes, the military governments, the Bhutto regime 
- 
have in some measure suppressed the freedom of the press. The 
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PFUJ's opposition to government has, thus, been constant. 
This commitment was largely fostered during the more repressive 
regime of Ayub Khan, but did not at that time evolve into 
anything very concrete. When Ayub brought in his repressive 
newspaper laws there was a general reaction in the press, and 
elsewhere, which persuaded the government to mitigate the 
measures to a limited extent; the journalists as an organised 
body were not a central part of the reaction, as they themselves 
admit. 
"But their campaigns against measures of far-reaching 
significance like take-over of PPL newspapers by the 
military regime in 1958, establishment of National 
Press Trust to expand official control on press, closure 
of radical journals, etc., have been of no consequence 
in respect of stopping the deadly process of muzzling 
the press. "1 
At that time elite influence was of more significance than union 
power. 
The PFUJ began to come into its own during Yahya's period of 
rule. But the first major action of the PFUJ was not over a 
political question; it was over money. The wages of journalists 
were determined by government through a very infrequently convened 
Wage Board. The first thing the PFUJ did when the new government 
took over was to persuade it to appoint a new Wage Board (the 
second) to revise the old rates of pay and fringe benefits set by 
the first Board. The second Board recommended new rates and an 
interim award. The government sanctioned this interim award 
but the proprietors, speaking through the APNS, decided not to 
pay it. The PFUJ then decided to call a strike, a demand which 
received support from 97% of the PFUJ's journalists when put to the 
vote. The PFUJ also demanded that the relief be awarded to the 
industry's non-journalist employees -a demand which the union 
called "historic", because it shifted the emphasis from middle-class 
professional demands to more worker-oriemted concerns. 
The APNS, in a difficult position because of the legal requirement 
upon them to pay the award, sought to get a stay of implementation 
1 25 Years of Karachi Union of Journalists, pp. 28 
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of the award through the courts. The petition was rejected. 
Despite a subsequent postponement of the strike by the PFUJ, 
the APNS refused to negotiate, arguing that it was wrong for 
such negotiations to take place between these two organisations. 
It wanted separate negotiations for each newspaper. The PFUJ 
saw this as an attempt to break its united stand and rejected 
the proposal. The strike went ahead. Only two papers, Mashriq 
and Nawa-I=Wagt, managed to continue during this period, but the 
agencies, through use of blackleg labour and hired hands, also 
continued to operate. Within ten days most of the newspapers 
had accepted the demands of the PFUJ. 
Though the press was freer in this period than at any time 
in the previous decade, the government, largely because of the 
recent trouble, decided to purge a large number of left-wing 
journalists, in both public and private papers. It seems that 
the initial pressure for this came from certain right-wing 
political groups associated with the government. The campaign 
of victimisation against the journalists brought a reaction from 
the PFUJ inevitably political in nature. The union claims that 
the purge was planned before the strike, though the latter could 
have been the deciding factor. The purge took a toll of 150 
workers, not all journalists. A rival union to the PFUJ was set 
up, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), to which the more 
right-wing journalists began to move. The PFUJ found that its 
statements received no coverage in the press and PFUJ members were 
hatrassedby the proprietors. The PFUJ reacted with a publicity 
campaign based on pamphlets, posters, and a 'Protest Day' of 
demonstrations (6 June, 1970). Six months later some members of 
the PPL Workers Union (from the Pakistan Times and Imroze)went 
on hunger strike. Despite police harrassment of the hunger-strikers 
21 employeers who had been sacked from PPL newspapers were re-instated. 
The conflict dissipated with the general election of December 1970 
and the subsequent break up of Pakistan. 
With the change-over to a democratically elected government 
(Bhutto's) 
- 
one that most journalists were probably sympathetic to - 
there was a hope within the press of a vastly different relationship 
between the government and the press. 
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"The Peoples' Party before coming to power swore by 
the aspirations of the masses and their fundamental 
interests and underlined the need for promoting democratic 
conditions including the need for a free and democratic 
press. "1 
It was not to be, however. Government attitudes to the press in 
developing countries are not affected by political beliefs, or its 
left or right-leaning policies; they are governed by the need to 
stay in power. The press becomes government-oriented in most 
developing countries, however radical the government's policies, 
and the PPP did not turn out to be especially radical. 
Things started well, with the government ensuring the re-instatement 
of nearly all the journalists and other newspaper employees who had 
previously been purged. But, contrary to the journalists' hopes, 
the government did not go on to repeal Ayub's Press and Publications 
Ordinance. Nor did it abolish the National Press Trust. Instead, 
it strengthened the NPT by making its chairman a government appointee. 
It also banned three minor newspapers and a more important one (the 
Karachi Sun), as well as taking lesser action against larger papers 
such as Nawa-I Wagt. It even acted against its own party paper, 
Mus awaat, as I have already briefly mentioned. This dispute, 
however, was essentially professional rather than political in nature. 
I spoke to two senior journalists who were fired in this period (one 
later re-instated), to the editor who fired them (himself later 
removed), as well as to union leaders involved in the movement. 
According to the editor of the time the problem started when he 
transferred three reporters to the news (sub-editing) section. 
The cause of the move was, he said, "political"; reporters had not 
accepted the authority of the Chief Reporter. When they refused 
to move they were fired. Thirteen others went on strike and they 
were fired too. The PFUJ then started a protest movement in 
Lahore, during which well over 100 journalists were arrested (many 
only very briefly). Eventually some of the journalists were 
re-instated. 
According to the Musawaat journalists the underlying problem 
was the use of the paper as a source of patronage. A new management 
1 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, pamphlet, 1973. 
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had been installed by the PPP government; funds were misappropriated 
and incompetent people put into key positions. This is almost 
undoubtedly why some journalists objected to the chief reporter. 
In addition, the facilities were very poor, and journalists had 
expected better from the PPP. "The offices of Daily Musawaat were 
housed in the ground floor of a small residential building... 
There was only one lavatory-for all workers. "1 It was little 
different when I visited the building in 1979. Fundamentally, then, 
the cause of the journalists' reaction was professional and material 
at heart. They objected to poor facilities, the use of their paper 
for patronage, and unprofessional supervision. On the other hand, 
some journalists claim that those purged were mainly left-wing, and 
the editor of the time admitted to me that he supported right-wing 
journalists. 
There is little doubt that most journalists support the PPP 
and did support it in its rise to power, but this did not stop the 
PFUJ from condemningthe PPP for its lack of liberalism when it came 
to power. 
"One promise after another has been thrown to the winds. 
The National Press Trust has not been disbanded. On the 
contrary, the government control on the Trust papers has 
been made more direct. The 'black laws' continue to 
adorn the statute, book and have been applied more frequently 
than ever before. Arbitrary closure of newspapers, 
cancellation of declarations, arrests and detention of 
journalists without trial, harrassment and intimidation 
are the order of the day, ,2 
Thus, Bhutto eventually found himself opposed not only by the 
newpaper proprietors, but by the journalists too. To the journalists, 
and their union, freedom of the press is the primary ideological 
consideration. Indeed, when Bhutto banned public political meetings, 
the Press Club (the home of the Karachi Union of Journalists) allowed 
PNA leaders to speak there. The government even called the club 
'PNA House'. Ministers were not allowed to use the club in this 
way. According to the Secretary of the Club, journalists are less 
radical than "anti-Establishment". 
1 Punjab Punch (May 26 
- 
June 2,1974) 
2 PFUJ Resolution (extract), Biennial Delegates Meeting, pamphlet, 1973. 
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It is difficult to detect in this constant opposition to 
government by the PFUJ the adoption of a particular political 
position. Also, it supported (if not equally) newspapers of 
different political colours and with different types of ownership, 
and it made few political statements on matters in which the press 
was not directly concerned. The union's real political commitment 
is reflected in its statements concerning freedom of the press. 
It has explicitly stated its views on this in a document called 
'Freedom of the Press: PFUJ's Case', produced during Bhutto's 
period of rule. In this the liberal commitment of the union 
comes out most clearly. 
"Curbs on the press flow from various sources. The 
biggest and the most oppressive of these is, of course, 
the Executive or the Establishment... The PFUJ has 
been opposing all such curbs consistently in a principled 
manner for over the last 25 years. It has done so 
irrespective of the consideration as to what persons or 
parties have been in power. The history of the PFUJ 
bears full testimony to this fact. Belonging to a 
noble profession which pertains to what has come to be 
known as the 'Fourth Estate', the working journalists 
are not fighting for an abstract cause. They are not 
crusading for a subjective notion. They are fighting 
for a cause vital to the survival of democracy. Failure 
to own it and practise it can prove disastrous to the 
well-being of a people and stability and solidarity of 
a country.... And what the PFUJ stands for is not a matter 
of controversy or partisan politics. "1 
The above discussion has given some idea of the political actions 
undertaken by the PFUJ, some of them extremely courageous. Yet they 
have been political to a large extent simply through chance. Given 
the role of the government in the organisation of the press, the 
union's struggle for freedom of the press, and even for improved 
conditions for journalists, inevitably becomes political in nature. 
Nevertheless, some journalists are extremely politically committed. 
The most important of these is Minhaj Birna, for long the leader 
1 Freedom of the Press: PFUJ's case, p. 2. 
- 
435 
- 
of the union movement and revered by the majority of Pakistan's 
journalists. He has also been in constant trouble with the 
authorities. He became a journalist in 1944 (in India), moved 
to Pakistan in 1949, and only five years later was arrested for 
the first time. In 1956 he joined Imroze, owned by the leftist 
Mian Iftikharuddin, in which paper Birna says he "felt at home". 
The paper was taken over by the government, Birna was labelled 
a communist and, six months after Ayub came to power, he was fired. 
Though he was then only head of a union chapel, fellow journalists 
created enough fuss about his removal for him to be re-instated. 
In 1963 he moved to the Pakistan Times bureau in Karachi, 
became secretary of the Karachi Union of Journalist (KUJ) in that 
year, rising to become KUJ President in 1966. When he led a strike, 
in that year, in the Daily Anjam (though he did not work on this 
paper) in protest against the firing for apparently economic reasons 
of five journalists from the paper, he was sent to Dacca as the 
Pakistan Times correspondent in East Pakistan "as a punishment". 
There he became Secretary-General of the PFUJ. Back in Lahore in 
1969, he organised the country-wide strike of the following year 
in support of the interim relief granted by the Wage Board, but 
which the proprietors had refused to pay. He was one of the many 
journalists fired in the subsequent purge. Re-instated by Bhutto 
in 1972, he was fired again five years later, this time for writing 
against the National Press Trust (the organisation which owned the 
Pakistan Times, for which he worked) in a non-NPT weekly. Again, 
a change of government led to his return to work. However, since 
Zia's arrival to power Birna has been in constant trouble - being 
either out of work or in jail. 
Other union activists also find life harder than they would if 
they were not union activists. KUJ secretary Habib Khan Ghori, who 
works for Hurriyet, under an'editor strongly opposed to the PFUJ, 
finds his promotion prospects blocked, or that his salary might be 
stopped for a while. Some union activists have like Birna found 
themselves in trouble with the authorities. For instance, a 
Musawaat journalist, Hamraz Ahsan, who is now in exile in London, 
suffered considerable persecution before finally leaving Pakistan. 
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In Yahya's period of rule Ahsan was actively involved in protest 
journalism writing about student movements, and other subjects 
unwelcome to the government, in the weekly press - as well as 
participating himself in the organisation of student demonstrations. 
For this he was arrested and, according to him, maltreated in 
prison. Released in 1970 (under an amnesty) he shortly after 
had to go into hiding for writing against the military action in 
East Pakistan. He was one of the journalists sacked from Musawaat 
during Bhutto's period of rule. After one and a half years, and 
a short period of jail, he was given alternative employment in 
Imroze. By this time he was Vice-President of the Punjab Union 
of Journalists. In 1978 he was jailed again, but released shortly 
after 
- 
jobless again. He claims he was later tortured during 
another brief spell ; off, imprisonment. He then started his own 
political weekly, which was banned by the government. He was soon 
after led to believe that the government was trying to implicate 
him in a fabricated bomb plot, and fled to London as a consequence. 
10.3.2. Politics or Professionalism? 
The commitment of the union is apparent from its activities, 
the particular careers of its leading members, and the imprisonments, 
sackings, and currently whippings, that journalists have suffered. 
But which is more important to the journalists: politics or their 
profession? There is no simple answer to this question, just as 
there is no simple answer to the question: what is the most important 
to the proprietors out of prestige, political influence and profits? 
All three play a role. Both politics and professionalism are of 
importance to the journalists. The point to note, though, is that 
they are inextricable. Journalists first and foremost see themselves 
as members of a profession, and view politics primarily through 
'professional' eyes: that is, their belief in democracy and freedom 
of the press is paramount. 
Though most journalists are 'liberal leftists' (a description 
supported by a number of journalists), they include adherents of 
all types of political belief; the right-wing/Islamic component is 
by no means inconsiderable. Until the government inspired the 
creation of a rival union to the PFUJ, which has drawn off a number 
of the more right-wing journalists, all journalists were united 
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within the PFUJ whatever their political beliefs. Even now the 
PFUJ, which is much bigger than its rival, includes journalists 
from all across the political spectrum. Moreover, only a small 
number of them work for political papers. Few want to, as life 
is more uncertain in such work, and the pay worse. Furthermore, 
political journalism tends not to be held in as high regard as 
journalism which lacks such overt bias. The questionnaire results 
give credence to this assessment which was, in fact, voiced 
individually by a number of journalists. Of more concrete 
significance is the fact that most journalists have worked on 
several papers, sometimes going from partisan to more market-oriented 
papers, occasionally in the reverse direction. Some even cross 
over political boundaries, in so doing going from right to left or 
left to right. When Nawa-I Wagt started a new edition in Karachi 
(at about the time I was in Pakistan), it drew journalists from 
most of Karachi's newspapers, including both Musawaat and Jesaret. 
Furthermore, few of the journalists working for either Jesaret or 
, 
Mus awaat are members of the party these papers represent. Membership 
of the Jamaat-I-Islami is extremely difficult to obtain and, so I 
was told, Musawaat journalists are not allowed to be members of the 
PPP. 
The complexities and contradictions so far described make an 
assessment purely in terms of class quite untenable. Certainly 
Birna and a number of other journalists are significantly to the 
left and the proprietors of the big newspapers are to the right. 
The union condemns this right-wing ownership of the press with 
considerable force. But this simple class antagonism is disturbed, 
indeed overwhelmed, by the existence of government. All components 
of the press, including the proprietors, fear the government; and, 
at times, all components have simultaneously opposed the government. 
This itself is not explicable in terms of class. Government might 
be right or left-wing; most proprietors are to the right but there 
are papers in both Pakistan and Bangladesh owned by leftists; and 
there are journalists from all parts of the political spectrum. 
The major conflict as regards the press is with the government. 
The struggle is waged against the holders of power, not against a 
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particular class. All the antagonisms mentioned so far are 
understandable in such terms. Indeed, much of the journalists' 
resentment against the proprietors (and the editors) stems not 
from the class background or leanings of the proprietors but the 
journalists' belief that the proprietors and the editors have 
betrayed the press by giving into government. And, of course, 
the government is the major proprietor. 
The journalists' primary interests are in the nature of their 
profession, particularly in the struggle for freedom of the press, 
and their own material concerns. In fact, there is little doubt 
that the latter are dominant. Mr. Ghori, General-Secretary of the 
KUJ, explicitly stated, if unwillingly, that the journalists' primary 
interest is in pay and conditions of work. Despite the movements 
launched by the PFUJ there is considerable apathy. Not only did 
Mr. Ghori complain of this to me but he even chose the opportunity 
provided by a preface to the KUJ Silver Jubilee souvenir to give 
vent to his feelings. Apathy extended even as far as not wishing 
to contribute to this special publication. 
"I had to literally beg for articles in order to complete 
. 
this task for an important occasion like Silver Jubilee 
of the Union. I came across fellow journalists who spent 
a lot of time in criticising the functioning of the Union, 
and extended 'golden' advice to improve it, but flatly 
refused to extend any kind of cooperation. Then, there 
were others who rejected trade-unionism for it is mere 
waste of time to them, but they are usually the first 
ones to rush for benefits whenever the Union succeeds 
in achieving material gains for the members. "1 
In all unions there are those who are fundamentally apathetic, 
who want the material benefits the unions earn, but do not want to 
do anything themselves to earn them. But, in this case, the apathy 
goes further; it is political apathy too. Many, probably most, 
journalists do not want the union to get involved in political 
matters, whatever their own political inclinations. In broad 
terms their interests seem to hold the following order of primacy: 
firstly, pay and conditions; secondly, freedom of the press; thirdly, 
1 25 Years of Karchi Union of Journalists, p. 13 
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democracy (and the various possible forms this might take, e. g. 
socialist democracy). This was explicitly stated by one of the 
more radical contributors to the KUJ pamphlet just mentioned. 
"The idealism for truthful writings has found its 
replacement. It is the idealism for successful 
career in journalism. " 
Indeed, this writer catches the central contradiction inherent 
in attempts to radicalise the union. 
"The free press movement has to be led by the PFUJ 
(because of collusion of proprietors with government 
and the weak position of the editors). But the PFUJ 
being a white-collared body and consisting of members 
belonging to the middle-class or petty bourgeois class, 
has its own limitations.... "1 
Though some journalists, notably Minhaj Birna, had begun to 
strike up links between journalists and other, non-journalist, 
newspaper employees (for which APNEC had been created), and even 
wished to link the PFUJ firmly in the industrial union movement 
as a whole, there is little general support for such moves. Many 
journalists resent the APNEC connection. Even Mr. Ghori, a leading 
unionist, was not enthusiastic about this, seeing the interests of 
the journalists as distinct from, and sometimes even opposed to, 
those of other newspaper employees such as calligraphers and printers 
who do not do "mental work". In other words, the PFUJ is as much 
a professional association as a trade union. 
In Bangladesh the unions have been much less active, but they 
did create sufficient pressure to persuade the government to establish 
a Wage Board in 1976, which would probably not otherwise have been 
established. The Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) 
has demonstrated against Bangladesh's own "black laws", if less 
vigorously than its counterpart in Pakistan. These laws, requiring 
government clearance for bringing out a newspaper, forcing journalists 
to disclose their sources of information if so needed, and allowing 
the government to close down papers, were introduced by Mujib. 
Though not used by Ziaur Rahnman, they have not been repealed (except 
for a partial annulment of one of the Acts). Over half of Dacca's 
1 Ibid, p. 29 
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500 journalists joined in the demonstration. As in Pakistan 
the journalists have demanded that government papers be handed 
over to separate trusts to be controlled by journalists, other 
newspaper workers, and intellectuals. They want neither 
government ownership nor private ownership - under the latter 
the journalists' economic prospects are particularly low. A 
few journalists described the political demands as lip service; 
others were not so cynical. It seems, though, that material 
demands have a clear primacy. 
According to Mr. Humayun, President of the BFUJ (in 1979), 
the union contains all shades of opinion - it is a "multi-party" 
union - though it has something of a leftist slant. Not many 
journalists are committed political workers; they are "fighting 
for bread and freedom". As in Pakistan attempts were made to 
split the union. This attempt was made by Mujib's Baksalites 
when many journalists lost their jobs and others were forced to 
join Baksal. Though there is a strong Baksalite contingent in 
the union, the BNP, Ziaur Rabman's party, also has many supporters. 
The union does not have good relations with other industrial 
unions, nor even with the non-journalist workers in the press. 
They are governed by different unions and there is considerable 
rivalry between them. The journalists want a separate Wage Board 
from non-journalists. 
There are many good reasons for the' journalist's emphasis 
on career and for his political apathy. One is fear. Another 
is a sense of futility (which comes to be self-justifying): the 
journalist is in a weak position. Editors, the proprietors, and 
the government (in that order) are much stronger. Yet the journalist 
is not badly off economically. He is provided with a reasonable 
salary (by the standards of most developing countries) and many 
fringe benefits such as travel allowances, free medical care, and 
pensions (at least in the bigger papers). 
"Today, the journalists are as prosperous as any other 
professional group. The government has given them wage 
awards and laws to protect their jobs. "1 
1 Ibid, p. 24. 
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This exaggerates their position; journalists in terms of both 
status and rewards are, on average, rather low down the professional 
scale. But they are certainly well inside it. Many editors said 
jobs in their papers are highly sought after. There are big 
differences within the profession, but the group overall is in a 
protected position. This protection offers advantages, but 
limitations too because it stems from government. It makes the 
average journalist, like the editors and the proprietors, to some 
extent dependent on the government (because it is the government 
that sets up the Wage Boards; journalists in both countries tend 
in fact to favour the use of-Wage Boards). 'Being good' guarantees 
a reasonably secure job with a reasonable if not wonderful salary, 
significant fringe benefits, 'professional' status, and, for some, 
extra benefits arising out of the corrupt system in which they live. 
In 1979 junior reporters in 'Class A' papers earned Rs. 800 
per month (about £40) plus Rs. 300 'conveyance allowance; and medical 
allowances. Junior sub-editors got the same, without the conveyance 
allowance. Most 'Class A' papers paid broadly this, with some 
differences 
- e. g. Dawn might pay a little more to attract better 
quality journalists. That this was not a bad starting salary 
(though hardly good either) can be seen from the fact that a 
junior lecturer also gets Rs. 800, but with fewer allowances. 
Though this starting salary seems small it does increase significantly 
up to Rs. 2,000 (about £100) for a senior reporter and Rs. 3,500 (about 
£175) for an assistant editor or leader writer (in the most prestigious 
papers). Dawn paid full medical cover and established pension and 
provident funds even before pensions were legally required. In 
Bangladesh journalists earned less. 
Table 10.11: Journalists' Pay-Scales in Bangladesh, 19771 (taka) 
Editor 2,200 
- 
3,000 take 
Assistant editor 1 1,500 
- 
2,100 
Senior reporter and 
sub-editor 1,100 - 1,640 
Junior reporter and 
sub-editor 750 
- 
1,270 
(In 1979 there were 40 taka to one pound). 
1 Bangladesh Gazette, Extra, Dacca (11.8.77) 
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Allowances, however, nearly doubled some of these rates. Again, 
there is a close parallel with the academic profession. At that 
time a professor earned 2,200 - 3,000 taka, with no allowances; a 
lecturer, grade one, earned 850 taka. For further comparison, 
an executive officer in the civil service earned 400-500 taka. 
It can be seen from this discussion that journalists in this 
part of the world are well inside professional pay scales. The 
professional nature of journalism was deliberately fostered by the 
first Wage Board (1960) which stated that all journalists lacking 
at least five years experience in journalism must have degrees. 
Thus all new journalists have degrees. The new Departments of 
Journalism have furthered the process. In Bangladesh about one 
in six journalists has an M. A. in Journalism. 
' Recently a Press 
Institute was founded to give more practical training to journalists 
who had started their careers. In 1978 it had 178 trainees (from 
all newspapers). 2 
The above pay-scales say nothing about extra funds which might 
come from absorption into the widespread corruption common in 
developing countries. Not surprisingly it is difficult to say anything 
precise about it, but it is a state of affairs openly acknowledged. 
It is also specifically mentioned in the PFUJs Code of Conduct: 
"Whether for publication or suppression the acceptance of a bribe 
by a journalist is one of the greatest professional offences., 
3 
The PFUJ condemned the practice in strong terms in a resolution 
dated October 1972. 
"This meeting of the FEC of the PFUJ expresses its grave 
concern at the recent disclosure in Sind Baluchistan High 
Court that several editors and senior journalists have been 
receiving money from the secret government fund administered 
by the Central Ministry of Information during the Ayub 
regime. The meeting believes that the practice of bribing 
newsmen and using them as informers and influencing their 
professional functions is contrary to journalistic ethics 
and democratic traditions. It is equally scandalous to 
know that there are among the journalist community elements 
who can sell their souls for petty benefits. "4 
1 Interview with Department of Journalism academic, Dacca University 
2 Interview with Press Institute Teacher, Dacca 
3 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, 1973 (pamphlet) 
4 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, 1973 (pamphlet) 
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This bribery in both Pakistan and Bangladesh applies at all 
levels of authority, from ministers to local policemen, and it 
extends outside to relations with businessmen and virtually anyone 
seeking good publicity or to prevent bad publicity. One editor 
of a major paper believed that as many as half of Pakistan's 
journalists are corrupt. However exaggerated this assessment 
might be it accurately reflects the cynicism that exists. Many 
journalists said bribery was widespread, and even that journalism 
was an attractive occupation to some for the 'extra' opportunities 
it offered. Such corruption, even the cynicism it engenders, has 
not necessarily anything to do with a lack of morality. It is a 
way of life, part of a system. It is an undesirable but natural 
outcome of a situation where there is great poverty and little 
effective accountability. Resources are scarce and corruption 
is one way of finding access to them. Journalism, like many 
bureaucratic occupations, is a field where it is possible to tap 
the system, if from its fringes. 
In view of the professional image the journalist has of himself, 
his qualifications (nearly all have degrees; 15-20% have M. As. in 
joüirnalism), his reasonable pay, his legitimate extra benefits and, 
for some, illegitimate ones, plus the fact that journalists live 
in a system they cannot oppose without great danger to themselves, 
it is not surprising that their material position might be of 
considerably more interest to them than the union's political activities. 
That some, such as Minhaj Birna, Habib Khan Ghori, and Hamraz Ahsan, 
open themselves up to constant trouble, is a sign that there is a 
core of deeply felt commitment. This, though, only engages a minority 
of journalists. To the journalists as a whole material benefits come 
first, the position of the profession (its freedom etc. ) second, more 
general political opposition third. 
10.4. Professionalism in the Press: Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that the journalists have a largely 
middle-class professional background, with editors in general coming 
from the upper reaches of this part of the social hierarchy. Most 
journalists are closely bound up with their profession. Most of them 
had started their careers as soon as they had finished their education, 
.1 
- 
444 
- 
and had always been involved in journalism or in a related field. 
This attachment to career is reflected in an equally strong 
attachment to a set of professional ethics which centre largely 
on a liberal belief in objectivity and a 'free' flow of information, 
a belief fundamentally influenced by Western traditions. Though 
it contains both radical and conservative elements, journalism 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh is essentially a liberal profession. 
The professional sense of liberalism underlies all other beliefs 
and is strong enough to counteract any inclinations towards 
partisanship which the political leanings of the journalists 
(whether radical or reactionary) might otherwise lead them to 
adopt. ' The strength of the profession of journalism is not only 
a powerful indication of market-orientation, but also reflects 
the fact that this occupation belongs firmly to the 'professional 
middle class'. 
It is the. strength of the professional middle-class component 
within the press which, aided by the market, has helped the press 
move away from partisanship as well as helping it steer clear of 
greater government control. This sense of liberal professionalism 
showed itself first of all in the 1950s when the editors tried as 
a body to limit government actions against the press in a fairly 
'polite' way. The editors' method of 'behind-the-scenes' influence 
has possibly been overtaken by more direct actions on the part of 
the journalists' union. But even this opposition by the journalists' 
union is informed above all by a profound belief in the journalists' 
role as one of the liberal professions. 
Though the press contains enormous divisions - between different 
political groupings, different types of newspaper, between owners, 
government and journalists - this sense of professionalism affects 
all elements to some degree. Journalists, and even some editors, 
have switched between political, government and independent papers 
quite freely. The PFUJ has demonstrated in favour of journalists 
in right-wing and left-wing papers (including both Jesaret and 
Musawaat). The editors have often acted as a body to try and 
protect individual newspapers. The CPNE, for instance, once 
remonstrated with the government after it had closed Musawaat, 
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allowing a compromise to be reached whereby the paper could re-open. 
The representatives of the CPNE at that time were the ex-unionist 
editor of Dawn, the anti-unionist editor of Hur rt and the 
editor-owner of Jam. 
The above indicates that there is some community of interest 
uniting the disparate elements of the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
though this is understandably fragile. There is undoubtedly 
considerable fragmentation: newspaper-owners oppose the union on 
commercial grounds but some oppose the government on political grounds; 
the unions sometimes support government but more often than not oppose 
it; editors are in an ambivalent position, caught between all three 
forces 
- 
the owners, the government and their professional colleagues, 
the working journalists. The result is an uneasy triangle made up 
of government control, commercialism and professional freedom. 
While it is clear enough that these three elements all clash, it 
is equally clear that, while government always has the greatest 
direct control over the press, none of these elements is overwhelmingly 
dominant. 
Commercialism and professionalism are both part of market-orientation, 
yet commercial interests often side with government in order to stay 
in business. The professional element in the press, though it 
actually depends on the strength of the market for its existence 
as a liberal force, finds itself opposed to both the government and 
to the newspaper-owners. It is for this reason that the leadership 
of the PFUJ has begun to adopt an increasingly radical stance. The 
editors, by contrast, are happy enough working in commercial enterprise, 
but strongly oppose government interference. Though editors and other 
journalists all have a strong affinity through being professional 
colleagues this difference between them is not an insignificant one. 
The professional middle-class component in the press is therefore 
not only embattled, caught up against the power of government and 
the ambivalence of commercialism, but is also fragmented. It still 
exists nevertheless, and is a continuing and powerful influence. 
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PART FIVE : OVERVIEW 
The indigenous press in the Indian sub-continent started 
off through partisanship. In Pakistan and Bangladesh it has 
gradually become less partisan and more government-oriented. 
At the same time, both as an occupation and as a business, it 
has been increasingly market-oriented. Leaving the partisan 
stage, it has fluctuated uncertainly between these two orientations, 
government and the market, but the market has not been able to 
make the press independent of government. This is clear enough 
from the single fact that the government is now the main advertiser. 
The other factor which has had some influence in protecting the 
press from total government control is the second side of market- 
orientation: the occupation of journalism. It is the journalists' 
very strong sense of the professional nature of their occupation 
that has prevented an outright government take-over of the press. 
It should be added that this also depends in part on the public, 
but not primarily as purchasers of newspapers (though this is 
important too, as a totally government-oriented press would lose 
public credibility). The journalists appeal to the educated, 
largely professional middle class, in particular the English-speaking 
elite, for support. Without a link with this influential group 
the journalists would feel far less secure against government 
intrusion. 
So, in effect, we have a partially market-oriented press 
reliant not on a mass market, but on a westernised, urban elite, 
and on business. These prevent the press becoming excessively 
government-oriented. But the relationship is uneasy. Business, 
for instance, is by no means opposed to government. It is, in 
fact, highly dependent on it. Not even under Bhutto did Pakistani 
business fail to achieve some 'modus vivendi' with the government. 
On the other hand, a simple class analysis equating business with 
government, and viewing the press as controlled jointly by them, 
would be highly inaccurate. Businessmen who own newspapers oppose 
government interference in their papers but achieve some sort of 
compromise (which certainly results in a conservative stance however). 
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These proprietors, and government, are opposed by the bulk of 
journalists. But this does not in any way make the latter 
representatives of the working class. They represent, in fact, 
the professional liberal elements of the middle class. As I 
have shown before, the business element of the middle class (in 
this case the newspaper owners) is often happy with strong 
government thus leaving the professional element to fend for 
itself. 
The prime conflict in the two countries is between those in 
power and those out of it. The prime stance of the bulk of the 
journalists, including editors, is not one of opposition to a 
particular class, but of opposition to government, more particularly, 
to rule (direct or indirect) by functionary groups. For them the 
conflict is not primarily one of class but of power. It is between 
democracy and rule by fiat. The journalists support democracy 
because of their liberal, middle-class background, because press 
freedom is dependent on democracy, and because politics brings life 
to journalism. The interest in politics is a professional one. 
It does not arise out of partisanship. The content analysis, the 
questionnaires, and the interviews all support the hypothesis that 
journalism in Pakistan is essentially (by no means solely) a 
professional, liberal, non-partisan affair. All elements of the 
press have striven for professional freedom. The PFUJ has been 
the most vociferous. Though sometimes political and somewhat to 
the left, it exemplifies above all the professional and career 
interests of the journalists. 
The primary struggle, then, is against the functionary groups, 
or political parties that try to become like them. Though the 
military and the bureaucracy (i. e. in the upper ranks) are largely 
middle-class in origin (and the politicians increasingly so) their 
class background is less important than their existence as functionary 
groups. This is so because resources in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
indeed in most developing countries, are structured through power. 
Access to this, either directly or indirectly, is the main avenue 
to individual economic well-being. These functionary groups are 
elites but they have, with most politicians, broadly the same class 
background. The professional middle class is also an elite, a 
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sub-class of the same class that the functionary groups come from. 
So the antagonism between government (military, bureaucratic, or 
political) and the press is essentially intra-class. It is between 
different sub-classes of the same class. 
The professional middle class is the weakest element in this 
set-up. It does not have the economic advantages of the business 
class, or the access to power of the military and the bureaucracy. 
Journalists also come from lower down in the middle class. The 
bulk of those who work in the press, therefore, tend to resent the 
unequalness of society. Sometimes this extends to concern for the 
really poor, but the journalists primarily resent the lowly position 
that they, the educated middle class, are contained in, seeing 
other segments of the middle class acquire positions of power and 
wealth. The journalists know that this can only change when the 
elitist nature of their society changes. Only if the elitist 
hold on society can be broken can the middle class take its rightful 
place, but what they view as the middle class is, of course, only 
that component of it made up by professional people. This is not 
simply a matter of concern for their own interests. Most journalists 
have a strong ideological belief in liberalism and the role of the 
professional middle class in society. 
- 
449 ;- 
PART SIX : CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CLASS, COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT 
11.1. Introduction 
Development, by definition, is concerned with scarce resources. 
Awareness of the need to develop resources signifies a necessary 
awareness of the limited means of achieving wealth. The scarcer 
these resources the greater the competition to gain access to them. 
Development is, thus, inevitably associated with conflict. This 
occurs even in the nationalist period, which is concerned simultaneously 
with both the struggle for national independence and a struggle 
between various indigenous groups for power (and, thereby, access 
to resources) after independence. With limited resources the 
ability to control them through power offers the main avenue to 
individual economic well-being. There is rarely a substantial 
class basis for this struggle. In most underdeveloped societies, 
the industrial class structure is not well developed while the 
developed traditional class structure becomes less and less relevant 
to the new, independent society. 
Far more important than either the incipient 'modern' classes 
or the remaining traditional classes is the factor of ethnicity. 
Indeed, communal differences of any nature are more powerful than 
class differences. Community offers a far deeper and stronger 
sense of identity. Ethnic (or other communal) groups, however 
deeply divided by class, usually unite better against other ethnic 
groups than do classes across ethnic barriers. 
In developing countries nationalism applies as much to ethnic 
groups within a state as to the state itself - usually more so. 
The state, as established by the colonial rulers prior to independence, 
is often an artificial creation. Ethnic groups within it are 
undecided on the benefits to them of inclusion in the state. These 
ethnic groups are not themselves homogeneous. They contain, if not 
classes, then numerous "class fragments". These find themselves 
in competition for power and resources primarily with similar class 
fragments in other ethnic groups. In other words similar class 
groups compete against each other on the basis of different ethnic 
identities. Though such conflict is ethnic in nature it can also 
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be seen as "intra-class". It is possible that ethnic divisions 
will become secondary as the state becomes more solidary, in 
which case, as classes are still not well developed, conflict 
will be primarily intra-class in nature. As classes become more 
established, conflict approaches the "inter-class" variety 
predicted by Marx. 
Communalism will always exist. If it takes its early form 
(in late colonial terms) as nationalism, it continues as sub- 
nationalism 
- 
the nationalism of various ethnic or linguistic 
communities within the new state. Nationalism is, thus, a 
continuous process. It is not a phase in a world-wide class 
struggle (against a world-dominant Western bourgeoisie) as some 
Marxists tend to claim. Class might be a related factor, but 
class and community are still clearly distinct affairs. Worsley 
and Kautsky argue that, in the nationalist process, various social 
groups unite against imperial domination. As the colonising 
countries are capitalist countries nationalism is, in effect, 
a revolt against foreign capitalist domination. In so arguing, 
these writers exaggerate the capitalist nature of colonialism. 
There has always been and always will be colonialism of some 
sort, whether it is by Britain over India or India over Bhutan. 
The capitalist nature of the colonising country is peripheral 
to this, and the reaction by the colonised is not surprisingly 
against foreign domination whatever its nature. 
Worsley and Kautsky also exaggerate the unifying effect of 
nationalism. Ethnic (or other communal) differences seem to 
be just wished away. Moreover, in their attempt to see class 
conflict in world terms (i. e. to ensure that the Western bourgeoisie 
becomes the villain of the piece), both writers assume that class 
divisions within the colonised countries themselves become irrelevant. 
Both writers describe the reasons different classes might have for 
becoming nationalists, and then ignore these differences, as if 
unity need be nothing more than a matter of convenience. Thus, 
paradoxically, these writers turn class analysis on its head. 
Smith and Kedoürie avoid these pitfalls by stressing psychological, 
cultural and ideological factors. This makes nationalism a much more 
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general thing (not restricted to a particular association with 
capitalism). However, both writers place too little emphasis 
on socio-economic factors; moreover, they concentrate too much 
on nationalist leadership. The socio-economic forces inducing 
substantial numbers to enter into the nationalist fray are given 
little attention. Though Kedourie (with great justification) 
allows that nationalism, rather than a unifying force, can be 
extremely divisive and destructive, while Smith allows of certain 
ideological divisions within nationalist movements, neither sees 
the possibility that nationalism can be, or can at least additionally 
be, a struggle between rival groups for power and access to resources. 
None of the above four writers allow for this. Nor are they 
prepared to see nationalism as a continuing principle. I have 
argued that nationalism fundamentally concerns any movements towards 
autonomy or group coherence on the part of any cultural group with 
territorial pretensions. It thus concerns movement for freedom 
from colonial control as well as movements by cultural groups 
within the independent state for their own, individual autonomy. 
There is no essential difference between nationalism and "sub- 
nationalism". It is a continuous process. 
Though nationalism depends on cultural differences, it is 
concerned with concrete economic and social conditions - usually 
resulting in competition for control over resources by particular 
groups (more especially, by their leaderships). But this struggle 
for access to scarce resources is political, as the state has 
strongest control over resources and their accumulation. This 
struggle for political power, for reasons already given, is likely 
to be communal in nature - based on ethnicity, language, religion, 
region, even locality. Much of what happens in the so-called 
"development phase" is affected by this continuing divisiveness. 
This does not have to end in secession attempts; it can take 
place, equally, through a struggle for central control by the 
groups out of power. In fact, centripetal and centrifugal forces 
often work together, resulting in apparent ambiguity. In reality, 
though, the reason for these contradictory tendencies is clear 
enough; rival groups often attempt to gain central control, only 
turning to secession when 'this seems a hopeless cause. 
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Development and conflict seem to go together. The process 
of development is as much a matter of struggle for control over 
these resources as of the development of them itself. Theories, 
such as functionalism, which do not take this into account are 
in effect non-starters. Insofar as functionalism has tried to 
take account of conflict it has only succeeded in stabbing itself 
in the back. Little of functionalism has remained after such 
maulings that can give the theory any real meaning. Its central 
tenet offers no realistic foundation for the study of development. 
It is essentially a socio-political theory. It describes development 
primarily in social and political terms (stability, representativeness, 
etc. ). Economic factors are apparently secondary. Functionalists 
do not see that it is impossible to talk in terms of stability and 
representativeness without taking as primary the economic factors 
surrounding these. If genuine stability is to be achieved, then, 
somehow a balance of economic forces has to be reached. In a 
situation of scarce resources this is hardly likely. If a system 
is to be representative, how does it become so when one man's fish 
(power and access to resources) is another man's poison (exclusion 
from these)? Power for one is loss of economic advancement for 
another. 
Functionalism ignores both socio-economic factors and the 
conflict associated with these. Huntington progresses far beyond 
functionalism by emphasising the frequency of political conflict. 
He describes the conditions that might allow a stable, representative 
political system to develop, but considers them to be very difficult 
to achieve. Though giving a realistic assessment of the nature 
of political conflict, Huntington, like the functionalists, ignores 
underlying economic factors. 
The theorists who make much of the patron-client system in 
developing countries go some way to introducing economic factors 
directly into the polity. The political system is also, in fact, 
an economic system. It is at the same time a way of building 
political support and of dispensing economic rewards 
. 
These 
processes are different sides of the same coin. Because resources 
are scarce such systems tend to be fragile; conflict is, therefore, 
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a common factor. These theories are vague though. Patron- 
client systems can exist in all sorts of political and socio- 
economic structures. The theories look only at the channels 
through which resources flow; they describe the water-works 
of the building but not the building itself. 
Marxism at least describes a structure, though it is a 
structure that is imposed on a multiplicity of different types 
of society. The Procrustean nature of the theory is one of 
its main faults. However, Marxists are increasingly acknowledging 
that the class structure in developing countries is fragmentary, 
that the nature of these societies is radically different from 
those of the West (even 19th century ones), and that traditional 
class analysis is inadequate for their study. Nevertheless, 
Marxists ignore the great power of ethnic and other communal 
divisions, which are without doubt generally of far greater power 
than class divisions; they are too much concerned with the 
international class structure, at the expense of realising that 
internal socio-economic differences will exist and be exploitative 
even without the international factor (though I do not wish to 
deny the importance of colonialism and neo-colonialism); finally, 
they underestimate the power of politics. Power is not a reflection 
of class; in fact, the reverse is the case. Wealth is achieved 
through power, not power through wealth. But Marxists do stress 
the one thing that is primary: conflict. Moreover, if they ignore 
the political nature of this, they are aware of the underlying 
socio-economic factors (of which, I believe, class it only one). 
What I wish to argue is that power is central to the development 
process. It is not merely a part of the super-structure, dependent 
on underlying economic factors; it is an economic force itself. 
In a situation of scarce resources the state is the main means of 
capital accumulation. Control of economic resources becomes more 
important than their ownership. Thus, economic and political factors 
are inseparable. As communal divisions tend to be more powerful 
than class divisions, the struggle for political power is primarily 
between groups with different cultural (ethnic, linguistic, religious) 
or territorial identities. Such conflicts, as I have already 
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suggested, are really a form of nationalism. However, these 
ethnic groups are themselves divided. Different class fragments 
within them compete with equivalent class fragments in other 
cultural groups for power and access to resources. If one 
cultural group achieves independence (or overwhelming control 
of the state), or if cultural divisions recede in importance 
for other reasons, then the class fragments tend to come in 
competition with others regardless of cultural differences. 
Furthermore, as the class structure is undeveloped and the 
means of achieving significant rewards very limited, the conflict 
is between roughly equivalent class fragments, i. e. it is intra- 
class. 
It is the 'bourgeoisie' which becomes central to this struggle 
over power and access to scarce resources. The working-class is 
usually very small, and also weak. The peasantry tends to be 
quiescent. Peasant protests tend to be sporadic and limited in 
range. The landed gentry tends to give way to the bourgeoisie 
with its near-monopoly of educational opportunities. Nevertheless, 
the bourgeoisie, or what I have often (for the sake of convenience) 
called the'middle class', is in reality only an agglomeration of 
class fragments. There are not enough resources, in particular 
power resources, to satisfy them all. They therefore compete 
for control against each other. Intra-class conflict often 
centres on the 'middle class'. 
The main middle-class groups are professional people, business- 
men, and 'functionary groups', i. e. the bureaucracy and the military 
- 
those with the functional ability to control the state. The first 
of these middle-class groups includes lawyers, journalists, teachers, 
doctors, etc. Most students hope to join the professional class, 
and so this professional, liberal group has a natural reservoir of 
support in the student community (though there are certainly radical 
and reactionary students too). This group can only hope to secure 
power and influence through political process. An open, democratic 
system gives the intelligentsia the best chance of personal 
advancement. It has no control over economic sources as have 
businessmen, or of a power-base as have the functionary groups. 
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Businessmen, on the other hand, tend to prefer military and 
bureaucratic power (for stability, secure contracts, etc. ), 
but they often have political links with other conservative 
groups. The functionary groups (i. e. their leaderships) 
themselves might be initially based mostly on the land, but 
they become increasingly middle-class, and therefore represent 
another aspect of intra-class conflict. In developing countries 
the functionary groups are likely to be dominant (the bureaucracy 
less overtly so, and more in terms of a constant presence in the 
power structure); they have, the military in particular, the 
strongest power-base. 
There is thus a very broad divide between the professional 
middle class and the middle-class functionary groups. The former 
seek influence through politics, the latter through its suppression. 
The division between these class fragments is as great as the 
division between entire classes in the West. A different type 
of class analysis is therefore needed. All these class fragments, 
being small, seek alliances. The landed class might ally with 
the functionary groups; businessmen often do. The professional 
middle class might ally with the workers against these (or with 
a rival 'middle class' against the landlords), and then turn 
against them once in power. Of the two types of conflict, just 
discussed 
- communal and intra-class conflict - the former has 
been of most significance in Nigeria, the latter in Pakistan. 
Though the different types of conflict described above do 
not together form a necessary sequence of stages in which each 
type excludes any other sort of conflict, the following scheme 
is probably broadly true. Most developing countries will have 
intense ethnic struggles; if these recede then intra-class struggle 
is likely to take over, and this might eventually develop into 
inter-class struggle. Nigeria has by-and-large been in the 
first stage but is beginning to reveal more and more intra-class 
conflict. The latter has predominated in Pakistan though there 
has been much ethnic conflict and signs of inter-class conflict. 
1 Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict) 
2 Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict) 
3 Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict). 
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All the conflicts so far described tend to be mostly urban. 
It is in urban centres that different ethnic groups become mixed 
and that different class fragments find themselves in open 
competition. There is often, too, a reservoir of poor, unemployed 
people willing to show their resentment in any form. Although 
such conflict can be intense, it is unlikely to bring radical 
change. It might bring a new regime into power, but not a new 
economic or political structure. 
11.2. Nigeria 
Nigeria is a good example of a country in which sub-nationalism 
overtook conventionally defined nationalism (the quest for freedom 
from colonial rule) even before Independence. All the major 
parties, which were based on the support of the dominant ethnic 
groups, rejected the possibility of a unitary state, each afraid 
that this would endanger its own regional power-base. The parties 
had no ideological differences over the nature of the country's 
future economic development. Their concern was entirely concentrated 
on the regional power battle. Ethnicity was the source of power 
and power was the source of economic advancement. There was no 
economic sector that could offer any indigenous group an avenue to 
wealth. Industry and trade were dominated by foreigners (mostly 
British), while land was fairly evenly distributed, there being no 
feudal class (not even in Northern Nigeria); what agricultural 
surplus there was was siphoned off through the regionally controlled 
Marketing Boards. Thus, the main access to resources was through 
political control - in particular control over the Marketing Board 
surpluses (but also over other sources of patronage). 
Nigerians generally only made their way in trade and industry 
in the small and medium-saale sectors, and the failure rate was high. 
Such activities seem to have been left to Nigerians of a somewhat 
lower socio-economic background than those who went into politics. 
Politics was big business. The socio-economic background of 
politicians was not high (they were members of the bourgeoisie, 
mostly lawyers, teachers, and Native Authority functionaries); 
but it was higher than that of most of Nigeria's businessmen, who 
had. a background in farming, petty trade, or the crafts. Power 
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became the source of wealth for the politicians. A large 
number of them entered into business or expanded their business, 
through the positions of power or influence they had acquired. 
The importance of the rewards that can be channeled through 
politics (both legitimately and illegitimately) can be seen not 
only directly, but also, through the expression of certain 
interests in the Houses of Assembly, indirectly. Concern over the 
M. Ps. ' own pay, fringe benefits, conditions of work, and in aspects 
of the patronage structure such as bureaucratic jobs and corruption 
(whatever the motivations for this interest) received significant 
expression in the Assemblies. The parties themselves received 
enormous funds through governmental control over banks and marketing 
boards. Even in general economic terms power was primary; 
government spending on emoluments was a strong growth sector in 
the Nigerian economy prior to the civil war, growing significantly 
faster than GDP. 
The bourgeoisie itself was little more than an agglomeration 
of disparate class fragments. By Western standards these could, 
in general, only be called "lower middle-class". Businessmen, 
civil servants and politicians were all what might be called 
"small" men. The prospects of the latter two groups were dependent 
on their educational advance over the rest of society - hence the 
great interest shown by M. Ps. in education (especially higher 
education). The bourgeoisie was not an economically dominant 
class which represented itself through the state. It became 
economically dominant through the state. Before its acquisition 
of power it was no more than an agglomeration of class fragments 
each made up, economically speaking, of rather "small" men. 
The political economy of Nigeria was not (and still is not) 
based on a class system. It was articulated not by class but 
by ethnic divisions. Poor and rich in the North, for instance, 
combined against the threat from the Ibo and Yoruba South (Hausa 
poor against Ibo and Yoruba poor, Hausa rich against Ibo and 
Yoruba rich). The struggle for power followed ethnic lines. 
The pinnacle of this ethnic competition was the struggle for power 
for, as I have said, power determined who would get what. There 
- 
458 
- 
were several layers of communal competition, and each became 
politically defined. First came purely local competition, then 
the much more intense struggle between ethnic minorities and 
the majority ethnic group of each region, and finally, between 
the major ethnic groups of the Federation. Each layer of 
competition has its own political representation. Small 
localities were represented by their M. Ps. who competed against 
each other in giving political support to the leadership and 
demanding local facilities in return. 
Minorities were often represented by their own parties, 
but these could achieve little against the parties of the major 
ethnic groups. 
The parties of the major ethnic groups became the governments 
of their respective regions. Each major ethnic group could 
then practise a "mini-imperialism" within its own region. It 
not only dominated the minority groups within its region, but 
could use this whole region, rather than simply its own territorial 
area, as a power base for its struggle against the other major 
ethnic groups; in a sense it "press-ganged" the minority groups 
in its region to support it. A single ethnic group could, by 
a logical extension of this process, dominate the Federation. 
Thus, the Hausa-Fulani, by dominating in total fashion the Northern 
Region, the largest by far of the three, could also dominate 
Nigeria as a whole. But this process occurred at all levels. 
The Tiv not only had to defend themselves as a minority against 
the Hausa but tried to dominate other small groups, such as the 
Birom, in the territory they shared. It can be seen that communal 
competition affected all levels of Nigerian society. 
"Internal colonialism", or ethnic aggrandisement within the 
federation, reached its height with the indirect take-over of the 
Western Region by the other two regions. The chaos this engendered 
led to the first military coup and to subsequent attempts to dispel 
ethnic conflict - first through unification, then through fragmentation 
(the creation of more states). Both these moves towards the 
limitation of regional autonomy (or, more precisely, the power 
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of the major ethnic groups), were resisted by these groups. 
Unification led to massacres of Ibos in the North by Hausa 
people afraid the change would diminsh their competitiveness 
(in terms of power and government jobs) against the Ibo. 
Further massacres, and the subsequent creation of more states, 
led to the Biafran secession attempt. This was ultimately 
as much an attempt to maintain Ibo domination over the minority 
ethnic groups in the Eastern Region as an attempt to avoid 
domination by the Hausa. 
The nature of the Nigerian political-economy was not affected 
by the changes between civilian and military regimes. Many 
aspects remained broadly intact - the nature of ethnic conflict, 
the extent of patronage, the powerful influence of foreign commercial 
interests in the internal economy. All the changes brought were 
alterations in the balance of advantage and disadvantage between 
various class fragments. Such changes did, though, reflect a 
growth in intra-class conflict. Though ethnic conflict still 
exists, with the terrors of the civil war and the effects of the 
creation of more and more states, it has declined. 
One class fragment that has gained above others is the 
leadership of the army. Its actions can be seen in terms of those 
to be expected from a functionary group. Initially the army was 
a crucial part in the escalation of ethnic conflict; it was itself 
divided severely by ethnic divisions. As ethnic conflict declined 
in intensity the army increasingly acted in its own interests. 
The size of the army, and its necessary reduction, have become 
a major political problem. The decline in the role of ethnicity 
and the increasing role of intra-class interests can also be seen 
in changes in the nature of the coups. The first two coups had 
clear ethnic associations; the second pair of coups were the result 
of resentment within certain sectors of the army over military 
competition or the unfair distribution of power and career 
possibilities within the army. 
The history of Nigeria's political-economy indicates the 
enormous primacy of ethnic conflict. This, however, has begun to 
decline, and is being replaced by intra-class conflict. Inter-class 
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conflict is not yet a significant factor, though there have been 
sporadic signs of it - occasional industrial strikes, and the 
peasant rebellion in the Western State in 1968/9. However, these 
actions have been limited, instrumental, brief, and aimed at 
government as much as at commercial employers. Though conflict 
is now primarily intra-class, i. e. between the various elites, 
there is a huge gap between these elites and thosebelow them, 
i. e. between the top civil servants and the lower orders, army 
officers and the ranks, the politicians, businessmen, etc. and 
the average urban population. As Nigeria develops it is likely 
that these gaps will cause increasing strain, that the elites will 
resemble less and less separte class fragments, and that they will 
unite as a class against the threat from lower down. 
11.3. Pakistan 
Pakistan's nationalist struggle, as did Nigeria's, reflected 
a struggle between different elites for power as much as a quest 
for freedom from colonial rule. Pakistan was itself the result 
of this Struggle; its creation was the consequence of a 'sub- 
nationalist' movement, one that was more concerned with freedom 
from Hindu domination than with freedom from the British. The 
quest for power, therefore, started well before independence. 
Though the communal origins of this struggle are clear enough 
the class factor was, and is, much stronger than it has been in 
Nigeria. Pakistan had at Independence a more developed middle 
class (both its business and professional elements), and a powerful 
land-owning class. Though communalism was a powerful factor, this 
was represented less by tribal than by religious and linguistic 
divisions. 
Because class is of some importance, power is not quite so 
desperately sought after as it is in Nigeria. Those who are in 
a comfortable class position, with considerable economic benefits, 
do not need power to become wealthy. They merely seek political 
alliances that will ensure the maintenance of their economic well-being. 
Thus, the landlords of Pakistan have not been toodisturbed at seeing 
their early political dominance eroded by new classes (in particular 
the professional class) that do need power; equally, Pakistan's 
businessmen have not sought any significant amount of direct 
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involvement in politics, being content to rely on a variety of 
conservative political alliances. In fact, the most intense 
power struggle has not involved these two groups, but other 
class fragments whose only means of benefitting economically 
is through power, such as the professional class and the military 
and bureaucratic elites. It is commonly argued that Pakistan 
is dominated by the business and landed classes and that the 
struggle for power has centred on this domination. In fact, 
these two groups have played secondary roles in the power struggle 
- as allies rather than as prime movers. 
Power is therefore important, but the fight for its acquisition 
has in the main been between class fragments which have no direct 
hold on the economy. While they do not own resources to any 
large extent, they can benefit greatly from their control. For 
this they need power. The primary antagonism has been between 
the professional class and the functionary groups. This explains 
why there has been a large measure of economic stability (as far 
as policy is concerned), despite drastic political upheavals. 
Ayub's economic policy, for instance, incorporated greatly increased 
efforts both in industry and agriculture, but no radically new 
means for this were adopted. As a result of his policies an 
industrial elite rose to great heights of wealth and influence. 
But even this socio-economic change was a reflection of the nature 
of power. The industrialists were positively "jacked" into their 
elite position by the powers-that-be. It was necessary to Pakistan 
and Pakistani land-owners that indigenous facilities should be 
developed to process the country's raw materials. They encouraged 
Pakistan's businessmen to take on this role. The land-owners 
sacrificed a good deal of political influence in the process, but 
their economic interest came first. 
The first economic upheaval came with large-scale nationalisation 
(in both countries after the civil war). Even then power was more 
important than class. Once the businessmen had been dispossessed 
as they have been in large measure both in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
they remained dispossessed. They might have given implicit support 
to the functionary groups, but the latter have been in no hurry to 
divest themselves of their control over a large part of their 
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country's assets. For both civilian and military regimes the 
nationalised industries have become a part of the patronage 
structure. Nationalisation has not been an aspect of class 
struggle but of the power struggle. Power, then, is not so 
important as it is in Nigeria, but it is still the primary factor. 
It offers control of resources to those groups who cannot benefit 
from any direct class advantage. To a certain extent the 
monopoly of power of these latter groups has been resisted, 
according to circumstances, by those with direct class advantage 
- 
the businessmen and land-owners; but the primary conflict 
has been between the groups contending for power of necessity. 
The greatest clash is between the professional class and the 
functionary groups. 
Much of Pakistan's conflict has been intra-class in nature. 
But Pakistan also suffers from significant communal divisions, 
though they are based on language rather than tribe. The major 
linguistic division, that between the East and West Pakistan, 
was reinforced by the intervention of nearly a thousand miles 
of Indian territory. The relationship between the two wings 
became an exploitative one. This was the result neither of 
accident nor of conspiracy. It stemmed initially from the 
complementarity of two economies which were nevertheless unequal. 
Though East Pakistan had a valuable cash crop, its enormous 
density of population, climatic vulnerability, extremely poor 
infrastructure, and lack of indigenous (i. e. non-Hindu) businessmen 
and civil servants made it weaker economically than West Pakistan. 
Economic policy was so structured that exporters of primary 
producers were squeezed in favour of industrialisation. East 
Pakistan was the main exporter of primary produce and, right from 
the start, because of its initial economic and entrepreneurial 
lead, West Pakistan was the fastest industrialiser of the two wings. 
It seems fairly clear that this exploitation of primary producers 
was aimed not at East Pakistan itself, but at the primary sector 
'per se'. Primary producers in West Pakistan were also disadvantaged 
by these policies, while those in power in West Pakistan were 
prepared to share the fruits of this exploitation with the East 
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Pakistani elite; indeed, it encouraged the rise of East Pakistani 
businessmen 
- 
but with little success. However, because the 
Bengali elite - comprising mostly rather "small" men - was 
economically weak, it was really interested in power; being 
unable to compete directly and effectively in the economy, it 
realised that control of resources offered the best prospects 
of profits. It also had a big political advantage in having 
the support of the largest linguistic group in Pakistan - taking 
up over half of the total population of the country. The central 
government did much to reduce disparities in other sectors, such 
as the Administration, but the Bengali elite wanted more; it 
wanted to be able to control the distribution of elite jobs. 
The conflict was, in sum, the result of a struggle for power 
between various middle-class groups which needed power in order 
to get on - the professional classes in both West and East Pakistan 
and the functionary groups of West Pakistan. The East Pakistani 
professional class had the distinct advantage of substantial 
communal support for their claim. The conflict, therefore, was 
the result of a confusion of class and community antagonism. It 
is a distinct example of intra-class conflict, with a strong ethnic 
element. 
The reliance on the private sector in Pakistan's industrialisation 
was not a matter of class bias. It was initially the result of 
the very weak position of the Administration at Partition; it 
simply did not have the wherewithal to take on industrialisation 
itself. Moreover, it seems to be the case that industry was never 
taken seriously as a possible road to wealth by those in power; 
land and power itself were seen as the traditional avenues. Pakistan's 
businessmen were of a lower social standing than Pakistan's politicians 
and civil servants and had different regional origins from the former. 
It seems unlikely that the nature of Pakistan's industrialisation 
was a result of a "conspiracy". Rather as in the case of Nigeria, 
what was seen as being a rather "dirty" job was given to relatively 
lower-class businessmen as of necessity (so it seemed to the 
professional and landed classes). Only later was it realised that 
industry was a significant avenue to individual wealth. Pakistan 
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lacked the powerful foreign industrial competition which existed 
in Nigeria. Politicians, administrators and, later, military 
personnel, then started jumping on the band-wagon. The earlier 
rather minor links between the business and other classes (forged 
through the Muslim League prior to Partition) then developed 
into very substantial links. 
Although the, emphasis was on the private sector, it was not 
on 'laissez-faire'. The Government retained strong control 
over the country's industrialisation; businessmen were highly 
dependent on the government for favour. Though the government 
intervened directly in the economy in favour of private business 
(selling off state-owned assets once established, for instance), it 
took an increasingly direct hold on the economy. This culminated, 
of course, in widespread nationalisation both in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, since when there has been no substantial denationalisation. 
It seems then that the moment of the businessmen, however sweet, 
was brief; and it was achieved through political alliances in 
which the businessmen always played a secondary part. Those in 
power, whether political, bureaucratic, or military, soon saw their 
mistake, and have been careful to keep the country's economic strings 
firmly in their own hands. 
It seems that successive governments tried to limit the influence 
of the industrialists (even Ayub attempted this), and it was certainly 
the case that Ayub tried to limit their influence in East Pakistan 
- seeking Bengali businessmen to replace them and giving great 
support to the public sector in this wing. In fact, industry was 
never a very important part of the Pakistani economy, even that of 
West Pakistan. The disparities between the two wings were not due 
to the influence of West Pakistani businessmen but to West Pakistan's 
natural economic superiority and, crucially, its hold on power 
- 
(political, administrative and military). Power was the crucial 
element; industry was to a certain extent, a "red herring". It 
was power that the East Pakistani elite fought for, not ownership 
of industrial assets. These were nationalised after Liberation. 
Pakistan's political and economic history cannot be seen in 
terms of class conflict. At best there were simply a number of 
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class fragments which competed against each other for power, 
or allied with those in power or contending for power. Those 
that could achieve communal backing for their claims sought 
this; such backing existed at the regional level only. As 
the East Pakistani elite was the only group to have substantial 
communal backing, the major fissure occurred between the two 
wings of Pakistan. However, this was only one representation 
of the intra-class conflict between the professional class and 
the functionary groups. It must be remembered that the civil 
war followed shortly after the anti-Ayub movement. This latter 
movement reflected intra-class conflict directly. The civil 
war reflected a later development of this 
- 
the use by the East 
Pakistani professional middle class of its communal support in 
pursuit of its own interests. 
Conflict in Pakistan, then, has been fundamentally intra-class 
but with a strong communal element. Inter-class elements have 
played only a secondary role. Land-owners have always been 
powerful, but their influence has been declining, both economically 
(through land reforms) and politically (because of the rise of the 
middle class, in particular the functionary groups). In the 1970s the 
working classes were introduced into the political battle for the 
first time (by Bhutto) though their contribution so far has only 
been peripheral. The main conflict has been within the middle class: 
between the functionary groups, the businessmen and the professional 
class. The functionary groups are, in effect, elites or class 
fragments which lack any direct access to wealth; they can gain 
this by taking power and, with it, the right to control resources 
and dominate the patronage structure. In the struggle between the 
groups businessmen tend to ally with the functionary groups, the 
professional class with the politicians; but some of these are 
land-owners, some businessmen, some socialists. Political alliances 
against the functionary groups have therefore always been fragile 
affairs. The professional class might also seek the support of 
workers. Obviously these various alliances are likely to be 
highly unstable, and this is evinced well enough by Pakistan's 
political history. 
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The various forces together make up a very delicate political 
balance. This balance can be easily upset, and often is. The 
result is never revolution, merely a re-alignment of forces. This 
occurs through urban violence. Cities are melting-pots of a 
variety of different forces which participate in violence for a 
variety of different, even opposed, reasons: right and left-wing 
elements, religious forces, the 'lumpenproletariat', professional 
groups, politicians, and students. Particularly important is the 
middle-class "triumvirate" of students, lawyers and journalists, 
with the backing of politicians in whom the professional middle 
class places so much hope. This "triumvirate" played an important 
role in the Karachi disturbances of 1953 and the movement against 
Ayub. Right-wing and religious forces were predominant in the 
anti-Ahmediya riots (of 1953 and in Bhutto's time) and in the 
movement against Bhutto. Though these were the main actors in 
eachcase, these disturbances only became as powerful as they did 
because of the number of different forces that were involved in 
them. Though a highly repressive military regime is now in power, 
it would not have been able to achieve this without the disturbances 
against Bhutto in which a large number of social groups were involved. 
All these urban disturbances (except the Karachi ones of 1953) 
in Pakistan, both'before and since the civil war, resulted in 
changes of regime. They were, therefore, a part of intra-class 
conflict. The political changes that have occurred in Bangladesh 
have not been the result of urban violence, but of palace coups. 
The first, against Mujibur Rahman, was entirely out of disgust 
and of fear of growing chaos. The great nationalist leader had 
shown his true colours after Liberation, and brought the country 
new economic miseries as well as political repression. The 
subsequent conflicts have had little to do with class or community. 
(Bangladesh is relatively homogeneous in both respects). They 
have been the result of intra-class competition, between the 
politicians and the functionary groups, in particular the military, 
and between different sections of the military. 
Whereas Marx argues that socio-economic change reflects changes 
in class structure, I believe that in developing countries at least 
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it reflects changes in the type of group involved, of which class 
is only one. In, developing countries there are three main ways 
for groups lacking access to scarce resources to gain such access 
- 
through communal, intra-class, or inter-class conflict. Pakistan 
has seen a good deal of the first, more of the second, and also 
a little of the third. 
11.4. Conclusion 
In many respects Pakistan and Nigeria have had similar histories. 
Both have suffered major civil wars, considerable ethnic conflict, 
and alternation between civilian and military regimes. Yet the 
two countries have radically different socio-economic structures. 
Nigeria's is characterised largely by ethnic differences, Pakistan 
to some extent by these but also by greater class divisions. In 
terms of the above "schedule" of conflict outlined in the introduction 
to this chapter, Nigeria has for long been firmly entrenched in the 
first (ethnic) stage, but is now between this and the second (intra- 
class) stage. Pakistan is well established in the second stage 
but has begun to edge a little way towards inter-class conflict - 
the final stage. Nevertheless I should think true class conflict 
is still a very long way off. 
I have argued, as many others have argued, that traditional 
class analysis is not especially relevant to developing countries. 
There are class fragments, and possibly class "agglomerations", 
but there is rarely an established class structure in the proper 
Marxist sense. The class structure that exists in most Third 
World countries is not comparable to that of Western countries 
now, nor even to those of the 19th century. Third World societies 
are still fundamentally peasant economies, with a very small 
industrial base (and little capitalist or collective farming). 
Expansion occurs less in industry than in the export of primary 
produce, whether agricultural or mineral. Nor is it possible 
to interpret what clashes between various socio-economic groups 
do occur as 'incipient' class conflict. The conflict is, in 
fact, between various class fragments. These are all equally 
isolated. The difference between urban professional people and 
urban businessmen might be as great as that between either of 
these groups and the landed gentry. The upper reaches of Third 
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World societies are made up of a number of class fragments all 
vying for power, prestige and profit. They are disparate groups 
that meet in unstable alliances and then divide; together they 
form, at best, loose class clusters. ' 
I have described a schedule of development based on conflict, 
going from ethnic to intra-class, then on to inter-class conflict. 
At each stage the interests of the various forces - ethnic groups, 
class fragments, or entire classes - can be represented through 
political parties or functionary groups. Both functionary groups 
and political parties can be right or left-wing, or represent 
different ethnic interests. This, however, makes no essential 
difference. In societies where resources are very scarce, groups 
must be defined primarily in terms of power - or their position 
in the power structure. Central to this notion is the recognition 
that power is the supreme avenue to wealth. Various class fragments 
and ethnic groups (or their leaderships) seek power either through 
political representation or a functionary group. 
It has to be said that there is no essential difference between 
a political party and a functionary group. Often they become 
virtually the same thing. A party in power attempts to assume 
totalitarian control. It forgets the groups it had to wheedle 
and beg to support it in its rise to power, because they limit 
this power once it is established. A functionary group, by 
contrast, in seeking legitimacy often establishes itself as a 
political party. When a party replaces a functionary group, or 
vice versa, nothing vital changes. The result is merely the 
replacement of one patronage structure by another. With this 
change certain class fragments and ethnic groups will gain; others 
will lose. Treating functionary groups in this way - merely as 
different routes to power - helps in understanding their apparently 
arbitrary role in the political-economies of Third World societies. 
Functionary groups offer a more efficient route to power than the 
bargaining processes open to political parties; the latter, on 
the other hand, have the advantage of at least initial support 
and legitimacy. 
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Ethnic conflict tends to be of most significance in the 
early stages of development, though it is always important. 
As societies develop, various class fragments, always present, 
become more conspicuous. However, the difference between these 
two "stages" is only one of degree. In a period of ethnic 
conflict all social groups clash: workers, businessmen, 
professional people (and so on) of one ethnic group against 
workers, businessmen, professional people (and so on) of another 
ethnic group. As societies develop various middle-class 
fragments come to prominence. Though there is no middle class 
as such, these fragments together form a pivotal group. However, 
resources are scarce and, as the various fragments within this 
class "agglomeration" bekitý to burgeon, they compete against each 
other for power, firstly on the basis of ethnicity (if ethnic 
differences exist), but increasingly on the basis of their class 
fragmentation alone. Landed interests and workers can be 
involved at either end of the scale, and be of considerable 
importance, but the dynamic, pivotal role is played by the various 
middle-class groups. They might ally with workers or land-ownersq 
and they might compete through politics or through functionary 
groups, in their struggle against each other. 
There is no essential difference between functionary groups 
and political parties when considered in terms of power; nor 
is there any essential class difference. They are not, in fact, 
different types of group, merely different class fragments; 
increasingly they are becoming different middle-class fragments. 
A class fragment is such by virtue of its function. Professional 
people have professional functions, businessmen industrial and 
commercial functions. In this respect they are similar to the 
functionary groups, which have bureaucratic and military functions. 
Increasingly all these groups become basically middle-class. 
They are all fragments of the same class. The conflict between 
these class fragments is, therefore, based on occupational 
differentiation within a single class. This idea extends the 
Marxist conception of the division of labour by looking at the 
conflicts based on a 'division of labour' within a single class. 
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The bourgeoisie is the pivotal class in developing countries; 
conflict within it is, therefore, of primary significance. 
This concept also improves the suggestive but vague idea of 
the "circulation of elites", by considering the class background 
of the various elites. Each is an occupationally differentiated 
fragment of a broad middle-class clusters. 
The group that is in the weakest position is the professional 
class. Whereas businessmen have control over an industrial and 
commercial base, military leadership control over the forces, and 
top civil servants over the bureaucratic rank-and-file, the 
professional group has no power base. Their hopes lie in the 
political parties, but these are weak in comparison with the 
functionary groups and themselves fragmented between various 
interests (land-owners, businessmen, workers, etc. ). They hope 
to make the masses their power-base but have little chance to do 
this when the military have totalitarian control. This means 
the professional middle class can only bring the masses into the 
power struggle through violence. As it has little rural influence 
(it might have some in rural towns, but no further), and as it is 
difficult anyway to activate the rural population as a whole, 
this violence tends to occur in the cities. There all sorts of 
disgruntled groups are drawn into the picture. The result is 
sometimes a change in regime, but never revolution. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CLASS, COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICATION 
12.1. Introduction 
I believe that analysis of the professional group within the 
middle class to be of great importance. This group is the 
pivotal class fragment within the middle class, without which 
both functionary groups and businessmen would have much easier 
and greater domination. It is for this reason that I have 
undertaken study of one major professional group (the word 
'professional' being used very loosely) - that of the journalists. 
I consider two professional groups in particular - journalists 
and lawyers - to be of great significance. Not only are both 
intimately connected with politics, but they each play a major 
social role. The lawyers man the legal system which is 
indistinguishably bound up with social structure. As Marx 
asserted, class conflict inevitably incorporates the legal system 
within the struggle. However, in developing countries, as 
class conflict is primarily intra-class, this struggle is more 
complicated. The legal system is often manned by a different 
class fragment from that of the ruling elite. The two, therefore, 
often conflict. The same goes for the journalists. For Marx 
journalism is a reflection of class domination. But in developing 
countries journalists tend to oppose the ruling elite. Of course, 
both the press and the legal system are often controlled, directly 
or indirectly, by those in power, but there is often inherent 
conflict between those that hold power and the professional groups 
that man the legal system and the press. It is this inherent 
conflict that I have looked at in the case of journalism. 
Though I think Marxism is right to assert that there must be 
. 
some connection between social forces and media output, with the 
latter as the dependent variable, I do not think that the actual 
relationship is as supposed, certainly not in the case of developing 
countries, where power is of far greater significance than class. 
The press generally reflects the interest of government, whether 
there is a dominant economic class or not. The class structure 
is, anyway, far less developed than it is in the West. However, 
if the press does not reflect the interests of a dominant class 
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in any predictable way, nor does it reflect the interests of 
the 'whole of society', as functionalists seem to think. The 
media are not mass media but elite media, and the poor, illiterate, 
linguistically divided public they can appeal to generally has 
limited contact with the media. More important, if the media 
can carry messages having a uniting effect, they can also carry 
messages of a disuniting nature. In highly divided societies 
where intense conflict is very common - the case in most of the 
Third World 
- 
this is only too likely. The functionalist argument 
is nonsensical, while the psychological variables necessary for 
the (almost magical) distribution of 'modernism' through the 
media seem to be simply a part of American mythology (or, worse, 
propaganda). The media are in general a limited, elitist, and 
westernised affair, which become of wider social significance 
only in times of conflict. 
The press in the Third World does not necessarily reflect 
either the interests ofadominant class or of 'society as a whole', 
(whatever that would mean). In fact, to a certain extent, the 
press determines its own nature, though even this must be seen 
in the context of Third World conditions. It is necessary to be 
aware of the nature of the press itself before considering it as 
a part of the wider society. The primary factor to take into 
account is the general poverty of these countries. This makes it 
difficult for the press to survive; this problem is compounded 
by illiteracy, linguistic barriers, etc. Indeed, in any country 
the press has problems. Information is not a readily marketable 
commodity like sugar or potatoes. This is less the case in times 
of conflict. Information is then sought for, and is equally 
readily purveyed by interested factions. In fact, in all societies 
whether in the West or the Third World, the press has developed 
through partisanship. As societies change conflict occurs, and 
in these circumstances the press thrives. Conflict provides both 
demand and subsidy; the need on the part of interested parties 
for a public mouthpiece ensures the rise of the press. However, 
when one party achieves power it tries, for its own security, 
to control the press, which then changes from partisanship to 
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government-orientation. Later, as conflict subsides and 
the economy develops sufficiently to support papers (through 
sales and advertising) itself, the press becomes, or tends to 
become, market-oriented. However, in developing countries 
few newspapers achieve this; when it leaves the partisan stage 
the press tends to fluctuate between orientation to the government 
and to the market. 
Not only does the press depend on conflict for its development, 
but it might also contribute to its escalation. As I have often 
said, most violence in developing countries is in a few major 
urban centres, and it is in just these places, in fact only in 
these places, that the press is of any significance. Thus, while 
the press does not play a major role in society, either in terms 
of class conflict or of development and social integration, it 
does play a role in political instability, i. e. in the ethnic 
and intra-class conflicts described in detail above. In the 
case of ethnic conflict the relationship between a highly divided 
society and a partisan press is clear enough. In the case of 
intra-class conflict, the relationship is much more complicated, 
and involves the press as an institution - all aspects of it. 
The former case is represented by Nigeria, the latter by Pakistan. 
12.2 Nigeria 
The Nigerian press like that of most other countries developed 
through partisanship, but the power struggle this reflected was 
less between the nationalists and their colonial overlords than 
between various ethnic groups for control after independence. It 
was assumed that independence would eventually come. Indeed, the 
early indigenous press at times encouraged British expansion in 
Nigeria. The press did not become a major part of the nationalist 
movement which was, anyway, rather mild in nature. It became far 
more involved in the struggle for power between the major ethnic 
groups. It was a nationalist press in a different sense, representing 
ethnic rather than 'nation-state' nationalist causes. 
Nearly all papers in Nigeria started in association with 
political parties. Even tiny political factions had their newspaper 
representation. Analysis of newspaper content shows that the press 
was strongly political and that political reporting was overwhelmingly 
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partisan. This became so to an extreme degree in times of 
political crisis such as elections. Individual papers swing 
from partisanship to government-orientation (and back) according 
to the level of political crisis. Because of the nature of the 
federation, parties which were in government at the regional 
level opposed each other at the national level. The papers 
associated with these parties were, therefore, government-oriented 
and partisan at the same time. Only one paper, the Daily Times, 
was totally market-oriented. But even this was not a mass paper. 
It skimmed off readers from the nooks and crannies of a politically 
fragmented market. This paper was economically successful solely 
because it had the backing of a major British paper, of which it 
was a subsidiary. Even this, though, could not survive the 
political conflict of the 1960s. 
Nigeria is such a divided country that central power has 
always suffered from weakness; this has allowed the press to 
continue its partisanship. 
The causes of partisanship are two-fold. Firstly there is 
the intensity of political conflict; secondly, the economic 
weakness of the press, which makes it dependent upon political 
support. In fact, there would not be so many papers were it 
not for the number of political interests seeking a public mouthpiece. 
Even with them the press was small. Most papers, especially the 
most partisan, were bound to their towns of publication, in particular 
Lagos.. So great was this dependence on the commercial markets 
of the big towns that sometimes papers might be based in these, 
and have most of their sales there, even though their real "political 
constituencies" might be elsewhere. Lagos, in particular, by virtue 
of its population and commerce, ensured that a number of papers 
remained there even if their intended sphere of influence was in 
the regions. This split between the economic and political markets 
is a further indication of the weakness of the press. The economic 
weakness of the papers made them dependent on subsidy, but not even 
political parties could afford to keep substantial papers going 
indefinitely without access to government resources. In the two 
Southern regions especially, chains of papers associated with the 
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parties in government gained directly from funds coming from 
banks controlled by these governments. There were also strong 
personal links between government leaders and top personnel in 
the banks and the newspapers. In other words, these papers 
became part of the patronage structure. 
The split between the political and economic markets became 
more pronounced as the intensity of regional conflict increased. 
Because of their economic weakness papers could not expand out 
of Lagos as readily as had the political system. Nevertheless, 
the press did become a largely regional one, and this was reflected 
in the content of the papers, which paid a great deal of attention 
to their own region and virtually ignored the other regions. More 
important than this was the fact that the increasing partisanship 
of the press was associated with an increase in the regionalism, 
or tribalism, of its content. This was the basis of the newspapers' 
partisanship, just as tribalism (using the term loosely) was the 
basis of the political conflict. That the basis of this communal 
conflict was economic can be seen from the constant references in 
the newspapers' tribalist content to the economic advantage or 
disadvantage of various tribes; the Ibo, for instance, (this 
being a crucial instance)$were portrayed in the North and West 
as being out to grab all the top jobs and economic opportunities 
in these regions. However, neither the parties nor the papers 
were concerned with economics, or economic ideology, per se. The 
problem of economic distribution was seen entirely through communal 
eyes. 
It is difficult to say with certainty if the partisanship and 
tribalism of the newspapers of the 1950s and 1960s contributed to 
the escalation of conflict during this period, but it is equally 
difficult to deny the probability that it did. This could have 
occurred in the case of certain crucial events in which the press 
can be seen to have played a part, but it is probably in the raising 
of the general level of tension that the press played the greatest 
role. Though the total circulation of the papers was small 
readership was much greater than the number of sales, and mostly 
confined to a few cities. It is probable that most urban literates 
were being reached by the press, and it was only in a few cities 
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that the worst ethnic violence occurred. 
It was in times of crisis that the press became most important, 
i. e. when it was most likely that conflict would occur. Even 
papers which tried to avoid contributing to the conflict, such as 
the Times, probably could not avoid doing so. Merely by reporting 
what the parties said it incorporated violence and contradiction 
into its content; almost inevitably this contributed to the growing 
uncertainty and tension. It was for this reason that all the 
regions at one time or another banned the Times. But tribalism 
in newspaper content could only have had an effect if it had been 
founded on some real basis. The most rabidly tribalist paper, 
the Sketch, whose target was the Ibos, seems to have had little effect. 
The Yoruba who read the paper had little reason to fear economic 
competition from the Ibos. The slogan of "Ibo imperialism" had 
far more effect in the backward North where, for certain sectors 
of the population, the Ibos did represent an economic threat (or 
at least appeared to). 
With the end of the civil war, and with the substantial boost 
given to the economy by oil exports, the nature of the press has 
changed. Now the press shows significant signs of market-orientation. 
This is represented by one or two indigenous papers that attempt to 
appeal to as wide a market as possible, i. e. wider than that provided 
by partisanship. It is also reflected in an increase in journalistic 
professionalism 
- an essential part of market-orientation. A big 
change in the professional status of Nigeria's journalists has 
occurred over this period. In the early days journalism was 
inseparable from politics. A number of journalists became leading 
politicians. Now, with the decline of partisanship, journalism is 
more of a profession per se. It is concerned with the market, and 
with career. Journalists now resent both excessive partisanship 
and excessive interference from government. They want to be left 
to get on with doing the job of 'professionals'. They see their 
positions as the first stage of a professional career, not even 
necessarily in journalism or broadcasting. This does not mean 
that partisanship is dead. The press is still largely partisan, 
at least in terms of numbers of papers, and even broadcasting is 
still somewhat affected by regional rivalry. However, professionalism 
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is of increasing importance. 
Though journalists are now firmly a part of the professional 
middle class (and have a broadly middle-class family background) 
they are fairly low down in terms of overall professional status. 
A number of them have a farming background, few have degrees, and 
their salaries are poor relative to those obtainable in other 
professions. However, the top posts in journalism and broadcasting 
pay very well, and considerable status attaches to them. There 
are no longer only owner-editors, but two groups of journalists: 
on the one hand an elite editorial personnel, on the other a large 
number of rank-and-file journalists. The gap between them is 
large. As papers have grown in size and scope (i. e. begun to 
change from political outlets to fully market-oriented papers), 
journalists have been recruited to do the "donkey work", their 
jobs having a strong routine, almost clerical nature. The editors 
and their assistants, by contrast, have retained the elite status 
of the old editor-owners. The growth in professionalism, therefore, 
has been deeply affected by the elitism inherent in Nigerian society. 
Even in occupational terms the press is an elite medium. 
This elitism applies even more, of course, to newspaper content. 
Newspapers rarely contain references to unemployment or poverty. 
Education might receive more coverage than agriculture and industry 
combined, but most of this tends to be coverage of higher education. 
The ethnic tensions the papers tried to provoke were based not on 
the needs of the masses but on the ethnic distribution of elite jobs. 
Elitism is also indicated by the limited role of the vernacular 
press. The dominance of the English-language press is, of course, 
an aspect of westernisation, and this is clearly connected with the 
elitism of the press. Westernisation is apparent most of all in 
the large amount of Western features and sports items in Nigerian 
newspapers, but much western imagery is also conveyed through 
pictorial advertising. 
The combination of westernisation and elitism reaches its 
apogee in broadcasting. The Western Region of Nigeria had the 
first fully operational television service in Africa, even before 
it had a radio service. Most of the new states are seeking to 
have television services of their own, despite the fact that its 
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range is highly elitist, affecting only a very small percentage 
of the population. All the current T. V. services are very 
reliant on state subsidy, and absorb resources which could 
otherwise benefit radio, which has a much wider penetration. 
The poor economic basis for television in Nigeria means that 
it is heavily reliant on the West. Western companies have 
been, and are, heavily involved in the establishment of television 
in Nigeria, and the training of its personnel. Much of the 
programming also comes from the West, while few programmes are 
educational. The result is that the bulk of society is subsidising 
an expensive medium of entertainment for the elite. 
The press in Nigeria has had a strong connection with conflict, 
in particular ethnic conflict. It has become fully involved in 
the power struggle between the various ethnic elites. It has not 
been able to form a part of class conflict because it is, indeed 
all the media are, largely confined to the elite and sub-elite. 
Papers can neverbe class weapons until mass circulations are 
achieved. In Nigeria it has been largely an ethnic weapon. 
However, the press in Nigeria has had two main functions: the 
first and major one is political. The second is to sell (mostly 
Western) goods. The former represents the partisan impulse, the 
latter market-orientation. The first of these has declined in 
favour of the second; the commercial function has to some extent 
replaced the political function. This commercialism is associated 
with a good deal of westernisation and elitism. It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that the elite welcomes Western influence. 
Thus, if the press is coming increasingly under the sway of market- 
orientation, it is of a very particular kind. The media market 
.s largely an elite market, and the elite is highly westernised. 12.3 
Pakistan 
The press in Pakistan also has a small total circulation. It 
is economically weak, but its total circulation is greater than that 
of the Nigerian press and its advertising revenue is also greater. 
The reason for the greater circulation is the strength of the 
vernacular press, which can reach lower down the social scale than 
the English-language papers. However, the reason for the substantial 
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advertising revenue is the strength of the English-language 
press. Pakistan has a much richer middle class than has 
Nigeria; the English-language papers, because of their appeal 
to this broad elite, are able to command considerable advertising 
revenue. Elitism is still apparent, therefore. 
The Pakistani press is by-and-large an economically weak 
affair. Like the Nigerian press it developed through partisanship 
and, again like the Nigerian press, it was from an early time 
closely associated with 'sub-nationalism'. Before Independence, 
Moslem papers (only a few of which were in what was to become 
Pakistan) demanded a homeland on the sub-continent for Moslems 
(which Hindu papers then opposed). Now there are a number of 
political papers in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but few are attached 
to parties, and their overall role is of secondary significance. 
Partisanship is no longer very strong in Pakistan, though there 
are a number of instances, especially in the early days of Pakistan, 
when the press possibly did play an important role in the escalation 
of conflict. 
Partisan papers in Pakistan now are neither economically nor 
politically viable. No government allows a significant opposition 
press, while papers that are popular "in opposition" lose their 
popularity when "in power". The press has, therefore, changed 
over time. Until the army stepped in the press was fairly free 
to be partisan. With military rule it became strongly oriented 
to government. Now an orientation to the market is trying, despite 
government restrictiveness, to assert itself. The major owners 
are now government and businessmen. Though some of these businessmen 
are associated with politics, their papers are primarily business 
ventures 
-a fact apparent in their content and in their commercialism. 
In Pakistan even some of the government papers are strongly oriented 
to the market. 
The press in Pakistan contains partisan and government and 
market-oriented elements. Partisanship is now rather a minor 
factor, while adaptation to the market has become highly prominant. 
This is seen in the content of the papers, the relatively large 
sales of the vernaculars, the dependence of the English-language 
papers on advertising, and in the attitudes of the journalists. 
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Partisan papers find it hard to survive, though some continue 
to do so. Government papers also find things difficult if they 
become excessively government-oriented; their readership then 
declines drastically. They have to compete with the independent, 
market-oriented papers. Some government papers are hardly 
distinguishable from these; this is especially so as all papers, 
government-owned or not, have to tailor their content to avoid 
both extreme government-orientation and extreme government 
displeasure. 
Market-orientation, now a dominant factor, has always been 
present. Even when the press was forced to be strongly government- 
oriented, as under Ayub Khan, it consistently tried to report 
government in a neutral way. In election periods political 
reporting does not shoot up as it does in Nigeria. Moreover, 
there is very little political commentary, and political coverage 
is restricted entirely to news columns. This news is itself 
extremely balanced. In fact, there had been a trend tmards 
balanced reporting right from the beginning. In the elections 
of 1970 this trend reached its culmination. The press was free 
to report as it wished. That it did so in a rigidly impartial 
way seems to indicate a strong sense of professional ethics within 
the press. Editors and other. journalists felt they should not 
interfere with the political process. Their job was to enhance 
democratic processes by acting as a neutral vehicle for the flow 
of political information. 
The press was essentially a liberal affair. It believed in 
freedom and democracy. It seemed to have little understanding of 
underlying economic factors. The English-language press, especially, 
believed that good, open leadership was all the country needed to 
solve its political and economic problems. Its strong belief in 
democracy was not coloured by any economic ideology. It was the 
natural spokesman for the professional middle class. It opposed 
authoritarian government, in particular the functionary groups. 
It, therefore, formed a part of an intra-class struggle -a struggle 
between various middle-class fragments. Several class fragments 
are involved in the control of the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
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Firstly, there is the strong overall control of the functionary 
groups, or of political government acting like functionary groups. 
(As far as the press is concerned there is often little difference 
between them). Then there is a substantial involvement of business 
interests. A number of papers are owned either by businessmen or 
journalists who become businessmen. The pervasiveness of advertising 
and the great dependence of the press on this, is another indication 
of powerful business connections in the press. Also a number of 
political parties, or more frequently political individuals, also 
own or have an influence over some newspapers. Finally, there are 
the journalists themselves, who broadly reflect the interests of 
the professional middle class. 
The professional liberal nature of this class is apparent in 
newspaper content, over which the journalists themselves have the 
major determining influence. It is apparent also in the attitudes 
and practices of most journalists. The journalists of both Pakistan 
and Bangladesh strongly favour the balanced reporting of all parties, 
reporting facts exactly as they are and without comment. Furthermore, 
though a number of journalists, especially in Pakistan, have radical 
tendencies, only a small number seem to be consistently radical. 
Most journalists have a powerful belief in the ability of the press 
to play a role in development. Again, a certain radicalism is 
apparent in this, but this belief is essentially liberal in nature: 
the press can spread understanding and enlightenment, and speak for 
the "people" against arbitrary government. In general, thinking 
of the press in terms of left/right distinctions is only of limited 
use. The primary distinction is between support for an! opposition 
to government, whatever the nature of this government. 
From the above it is clear that the press in Pakistan is very 
different from that of Nigeria. It is a great deal more market- 
oriented. There are two aspects to this: a greater involvement 
of business interests in newspaper ownership and in the funding of 
the press (through advertising but also some subsidy), and a much 
stronger sense of professionalism amongst the journalists. The 
journalist in Pakistan and Bangladesh is very aware of his professional 
status, and the needs and ethnics of the profession. He seeks the 
rewards, prestige and freedom, that he believes his profession deserves. 
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He resents government interference, in general looks down upon 
papers controlled by parties, and is angered by collusion between 
the owners of newspapers and government, which occurs only at 
the expense of the freedom of the press. Most journalists are 
career journalists with good educational backgrounds; few have 
had previous jobs bearing no relation to the media. Their fathers 
have mostly had professional or administrative backgrounds. Even 
political editors are in general journalists of long standing, 
(somewhat less so in Bangladesh than Pakistan). In both countries 
journalists, editors, and owners each have their own professional 
associations, and in general these look after their own professional 
interests. The owners, for instance, use theirs primarily to 
negotiate advertising rates, etc. 
In Pakistan, the journalists' association, the PFUJ (Pakistan 
Federal Union of Journalists), is more political. It has been 
involved in substantial demonstrations, resulting in imprisonment, 
harrassment at work, and, more recently, lashings. The union 
leaders, in particular, have suffered consistent persecution. It 
should be added, however, that this persecution has only rarely 
reached an extreme degree. The press, and the journalists as a 
professional body, are treated with some circumspection by government. 
They prefer to try to win over this important segment of the professional 
middle class than to coerce it. Indeed, some newspapers seem now 
to wield sufficient public influence to inhibit the government from 
closing them down. Nevertheless, government is clearly a powerful 
restriction on press freedom, and most of the PFUJ's "political" 
actions have been aimed at trying to remove this restrictiveness. 
Even then, such action has been secondary to action in support of 
the journalists' material interests (pay, security, etc. ). Not a 
few journalists would even be willing to sacrifice their freedom 
for material benefits. The union, therefore, wages a constant 
struggle to prevent such "cooperation". 
Despite such temptations, the bulk of journalists are very 
much concerned with freedom for their 'profession', and their 
attitudes are revealed regardless of the nature of government. 
Though the union and probably most journalists were broadly 
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pro-PPP when this party was seeking power, they turned against it 
on several occasions when Bhutto's attempt to gain totalitarian 
control began to affect the press. The union has, in fact, opposed 
all governments, though always in the name of press freedom. The 
PFUJ is fundamentally liberal rather than radical. While some of 
its leaders have tried to establish links with other workers in 
journalism and outside it, other members have opposed this, arguing 
that journalists have little in common with other workers and should, 
therefore, look after their own ('professional') interests. 
Though newspaper-owners generally cooperate with government 
in order to stay in business, while editors do the same to keep 
their jobs 
- 
facts strongly resented by the union - there is a 
certain professional sense of community within the press as a whole. 
The union itself contains journalists from all newspapers, including 
opposed party organs, though the government-inspired rival union 
has drawn off some of the more right-wing journalists. A number 
of editors have old union links and retain union sympathies. There 
is considerable mobility between newspapers, so that many journalists 
and editors now working for different papers have worked together 
on other papers. Moreover, there have been a number of instances 
where each of the three professional bodies, or parts of them, have 
acted against their own immediate interests in favour of press 
freedom, and sometimes all have cooperated. Conservative owner- 
editors have negotiated for the re-opening of the PPP's paper Musawaat. 
The PFUJ has demonstrated to help conservative papers and editors. 
The editors, who continue to believe they have some elite influence 
with the government (which the union it skeptical of), have often 
tried to dissuade government from taking action against a newspaper, 
whatever the political colour of the paper. All journalists, editors, 
and owners strongly desire freedom of the press, whatever their 
political beliefs, and all acted together in 1963 to try to oppose 
the encroachment of government, in the person of Ayub Khan, on the 
press. 
The picture one gets from the above is an uneasy triangle of 
interests 
- 
government, owners, and journalists (including those 
editors who do not own newspapers). The government and the owners 
in general find an understanding. Neither wants trouble. On the 
- 
484 
- 
other hand they are frequently politically opposed, and so even 
this axis is an uneasy one. Journalists are in a weak position. 
They oppose the owners because of their collusion with government 
and because of their immediate opposition over material interests. 
They also strongly oppose government because of its control over 
their profession. On the other hand the government offers the 
journalists some material protection against the owners, and 
sometimes journalists favour the particular party in power (e. g. 
the PPP in Pakistan, and the Awami League in Bangladesh), even if 
such favour does not last long. Despite the strong divisions 
within the press as an institution there is some community of 
interests, and this has helped prevent total government control. 
Very broadly, the press has acted as a spokesman for the professional 
middle class, and with some moderate success. The press will never 
be a radical instrument. Most of those involved in the press have 
strong liberal beliefs. The journalist in Pakistan and Bangladesh 
is relatively well paid; he has some professional status and a 
strong sense of professionalism. He is unlikely to be radical. 
At the same time as acquiring some professional status and 
rewards, withinthe press the average journalist has been pushed into 
an increasingly minor position. As in Nigeria, but even more so, 
his occupation is rather clerical and routine. As market-orientation 
progresses, and papers become bigger and better, the press has been 
increasingly affected by a rigid division of labour. Partly for 
professional and partly for economic reasons newspapers become 
somewhat like notice-boards for powerful or prestigious interests. 
Most news consists of statements from parties, government, prestigious 
bodies, etc. Newspapers depend more on agencies than their own 
journalists, especially for national news. Reporters are left 
mainly with local and crime news. Moreover, newspapers have far 
more sub-editors than reporters, as most journalistic work consists 
of preparing (or translating) the incoming statements for publication. 
There are hardly any specialised reporters, most having several 
"beats". What specialist work is to be done is done by the editorial 
staff and outside contributors. As papers have become less political 
and more comprehensive, journalists have been pushed into the routine 
role of collecting prepared information. Elitism within the press 
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is even more pronounced than it is in Nigeria. 
The press as a whole is to a certain extent an elitist 
institution. The existence of the English-language press is 
a reminder of that. The English-language/vernacular division 
is fairly similar to the quality/popular division in the U. K. 
This is not so much so in terms of content, which in all papers 
is generally sober, but it is certainly so in terms of economic 
funding, readership, and prestige. It is because of this 
difference in appeal that the vernaculars depend mostly on sales, 
the English-language papers on the high advertising rates they 
can charge. It is in fact the elitist nature of these papers 
that helps them survive. These papers will survive as long as 
the English-speaking elite. 
As in Nigeria, this elitism is considerably bound up with 
westernisation. This, again, is obvious enough from the English- 
language papers. Apart from their use of English, these papers 
are very clearly modelled on Western ( in fact, British) newspapers. 
The news agencies ultimately stem from, and are modelled on, 
Reuters. Reliance on Western content is much greater in the 
features department. As in Nigeria, this often reaches ludicrous 
proportions (e. g. telling readers wherein Oxford Street they can 
buy fur coats). The reasons for this are partly cost, partly 
the westernisation of both the readers and the journalists. Many 
journalists, especially editors, had had strong contacts with the 
West, and wanted their papers to be like Western papers - in fact, 
more impartial and less sensationalist than Western papers - more 
like the Western press than the Western press itself. Television 
is the most elitist and westernised of all. It is not used for 
education. It is a highly commercial system used to entertain the 
elite. A large part of it is in English, and the main advertisers 
are Western firms or products. Many advertisements convey strongly 
elitist and westernised images. The most prestigious indigenous 
material is also highly westernised and elitist. It has little to 
do with reality in Pakistan. 
It is possible to perceive three middle-class fragments involved 
in control of the press - the professional middle class, the business 
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middle class, and the functionary groups (or political elites 
acting like them). The press reflects the conflicts between 
these. The journalists reflect the professional element, owners 
and advertisers the business element; the third corner of the 
triangle is represented by government. In Nigeria conflict in 
the press was reflected by opposition between papers of differuht 
political allegiance. In Pakistan it is not between papers of 
differentr allegiance but between different types of newspaper- 
orientation. Partisanship has declined in the face of market 
and government orientation, while market-orientation is in a 
continuous battle with government control. These conflicts 
affect the entire press, as an institution. The press in 
Pakistan is a middle-class affair and the various middle-class 
fragments within it are involved in an intra-class conflict. 
The press incorporates businessmen 
, 
government and some left-wing 
elements, but, above all, it is a liberal, professional, middle- 
class affair. With the rise of the functionary groups the press 
is subject to strong government control, but this is countered by 
the professional middle class, who need the freedom of the market. 
The conflict between these different press orientations, therefore, 
represents a struggle between those in power and those out of it, 
not a conflict between different classes. Class interests 
certainly exist, and are of importance, but power is more important. 
The press is essentially an elitist affair. It reveals little 
concern for the masses. Both in content and institutionally it 
reflects a struggle between different class fragments for power and 
access to resources. The professional middle class seeks to break 
the hold on power of a small elite. It therefore represents a 
liberal, progressive element, but not a radical one. In its view 
the middle class as a whole can gain through the institutionalisation 
of democracy; this would bring with it an expansion of political, 
social, and economic life. More specifically, the professional 
middle class, which lacks its own power-base, can only achieve 
control through democracy. It supports politics against control 
by functionary groups, but opposes parties in power which act like 
functionary groups and, by doing so, restrict professional middle-class 
opportunities. The business part of the middle class, by contrast, 
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gains directly from the economy and benefits by cooperating with 
the government and its patronage structure. Thus, the business 
element of the papers in general supports government, hence the 
antagonism towards it of the journalists. But the business class 
can turn against the government when the power of the latter becomes 
something to fear. Furthermore, the government's concern for the 
business class is secondary to is own concern for power and the 
access over resources this gives it. All these class fragments 
have opposed interests, at least at times, but convergence between 
them is possible in the long term should inter-class conflict come 
to be of greater significance. At the moment, however, the press 
in Pakistan has little to do with the masses, and little to fear 
from them. 
12.4. Conclusion: Class, Comunity, Conflict & Communication 
I have tried to show in this thesis that development is 
fundamentally a matter of struggle over access to scarce resources. 
This affects the whole of society and follows the lines of social 
division which are most pronounced. These are usually communal, 
and, more specifically, often ethnic. Conflict over access to 
resources therefore erupts along ethnic lines and engulfs the whole 
of society. This culminates at the top of the social hierarchy in 
the struggle for power. In a situation of scarce resources the main 
economic resource is power. Various elites therefore struggle for 
power, but not on the basis of class, as the class structure is ill- 
defined. They are at best class fragments of an amorphous "class 
agglomeration". The result is what I have called "intra-class" 
conflict, and I have laid great stress on this throughout this thesis. 
Even if ethnic conflict subsides this struggle at the head of the 
social hierarchy continues, and thus ethnic conflict gives place to 
intra-class conflict. 
In discussing intra-class conflict I have also laid great stress 
on the role in this of the bourgeoisie, or "middle class". This is 
broken up into a number of fragments whose mutual rivalry is based 
on occupational differentiation. The groups involved are the 
professional element of the middle class, the business element of 
the middle class, and the military and bureaucracy (the leaderships 
of which are also largely middle-class). The working class and 
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the land-owners which stand outside each end of this broad 
middle-class agglomeration, might both be drawn into the struggle, 
but intra-class conflict is primarily between the four middle- 
class groups just mentioned. 
Of these four middle-class fragments I have laid the greatest 
stress on the professional component. It is in fact the weakest 
but it is for this reason that it is so important. It lacks the 
economic base of the business class and the power base of the 
functionary groups. It therefore seeks power through democracy, 
through an expansion of politics. This struggle is reflected 
directly in the occupational structures of the professional 
middle class. I have given journalism as an example. During 
a period of ethnic conflict the press is likely to be straight- 
forwardly partisan, but during intra-class conflict the press is 
likely to be involved in a much more complex way. All the 
middle-class fragments described above compete to turn the press 
in the direction they require. Central to this struggle is 
the professional middle class which provides the journalists who 
man the workings of the press. I have described in detail this 
group's struggle to make the press the instrument not of government, 
not simply of vested business interests, nor in any significant 
way of the masses, but of the professional middle class. 
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APPENDIX ONE: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRESS (METHODS) 
All samples were of 15 issues, selected at regular intervals 
from periods of either a year, 6 months, or, in particular cases, 
the climax of an election campaign. Measurements were of the 
length of individual items (in inches) multiplied by their width. 
Except in a few minor instances the width of news columns was 
standard throughout each newspaper; where columns were wider or 
narrower than this estimates of total area were made in terms of 
the standard width. In all cases where the results were given 
as percentages these were pecentages of total editorial space, 
i. e. total space after the subtraction of advertisements. 
The categories themselves are fairly straight-forward (e. g. 
politics, economics, crime, etc. ), but not always mutually exclusive. 
Where there was some overlap I categorised the item according to 
what appeared to be its primary significance. Thus political crime 
(e. g. violence in election campaigns) was catalogued under politics. 
In one case there was deliberate overlap, that of government 
coverage. Clearly, including government as one category amongst 
others would not make much sense, as government is involved in all 
spheres. Thus, all material classified under various headings, 
such as economics, foreign affairs, etc., which was related to 
government, were also catalogued separately under 'government', 
figures for this being given separately. 
Classification according to underlying themes is a more 
difficult operation than the initial break-down into standard 
categories. It must be stressed that such classifications inevitably 
suffer from a certain amount of vagueness and arbitrary judgement. 
"Few researchers in the content analysis tradition now argue that 
quantification procedures 'guarantee' objectivity. "' I like the 
rigour and discipline supplied by quantification but in the use of 
this and in the selection of categories I have aimed at insight 
rather than objectivity per se. The largest problems occur in 
those categories which seem to demand some subjective judgement. 
The major examples of this were the classification to do with 
nationalism and sub-nationalism (material ranging from tribalism 
to calls for unity), and the division of material according to 
1 Curran (1976), p. 5 
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whether it is favourable, neutral or unfavourable to the subjects 
or sources of the material. In the former case I to some extent 
mitigated the problem by accepting the ambivalence of such material 
into the classification. Thus, the intermediate category 'unity- 
regionalism' implicitly included the possibility that some material 
apparently calling for unity might at the same time add to the 
ethnic tension. The classification of material at either side 
of this pivotal category was much more straightforward. I further 
tried to get over the problem of vagueness of categorisation through 
flexibility. In all, I used five categories to cover the nationalism/ 
sub-nationalism area. Below are given some examples of classification 
under these categories, all from Nigeria. 
Tribalism 
"Immediately the unsuspecting Yorubas gave them the support, 
the Ibos would come out in their true wolf-Is clothing devouring 
the Yorubas and getting every good thing for themselves". 
(Report of political speech in Daily Sketch, 2.12.64) 
Discussion of Regions 
"All the Eastern Minister of Information and Welfare has done 
is to reveal the foolhardiness and planlessness of the NCNC 
Government of the East". 
(Article praising the Action Group government of the Western 
Region after this region became the first to acquire television, 
Daily Service, 9.11.59) 
Unity-Regionalism 
"Once more, we deprecate the attempt of any political party 
to seek the annihilation of any tribe in the Republic". 
(Editorial, Nigerian Outlook, 27.11.64) 
Unity 
"Your article about the Ibo occupants of our region is almost 
unbelievable. I do not agree with all the views you expressed 
therein. Temperamental traits of a few individuals should not be 
extended to all.... Moreover, this is a time when even the empty 
wind can stir up feelings". 
(Letter in Nigerian Citizen, 2.12.64) 
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Independence 
"A wicked plan aimed at the destruction of the native controlled 
newspapers throughout British West Africa by economic competition 
on the one hand, and the dissemination of British imperialist 
propaganda in the interests of foreign big business on the other 
hand... ". 
(Article written when the U. K. 's Daily Mirror was beginning 
to establish papers in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, West 
African Pilot, 21.9.50) 
Decisions as to what constitutes favourable, neutral or unfavourable 
coverage are yet more difficult. Such distinctions were applied 
mostly to the analysis of political parties and of government. I 
tried to get round the difficulties by using definitions of favourability 
which required as little subjective judgement as possible. I defined 
'favourable' coverage of parties as that which they would be bound 
to want published - e. g. a statement of their views - and unfavourable 
coverage as anything critical of the party. The remaining material 
- purely routine announcements etc. - was labelled neutral. Favourable 
coverage of government was defined differently. While a party cannot 
necessarily expect its statements to receive press coverage, a 
government in general can. Its statements etc. can be seen as 
routine affairs. Only when coverage of government contained overt 
praise did I label it as favourable. Examples of government and party 
coverage are given below, all from Pakistani papers. (Neutral party 
coverage is excluded as this was not of great significance). 
a) Parties 
Favourable 
"Emphasising his 'people's'conviction to save the people of 
Bangladesh from ravages of nature as of their fellow men we must 
attain full regional autonomy on the basis of 6-point and 11-point 
formulas', Shaikh Mujib said". 
(Report on a statement by the Awami League Leader in 1970 
election campaign, Dawn 25.11.70) 
Unfavourable 
"The statement that the Awami League boss made at his Press 
Conference in Dacca the other day showed no knowledge, let alone 
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appreciation, of the fact that in Lahore alone well over 100 
relief centres were in operation". 
(Political comment, Pakistan Times, 30.11.70) 
b) Government 
Favourable 
"The popularity of television is yet another proof of the 
far-sightedness of President Ayub, who is anxious that Pakistan 
should achieve in as short a time as possible what it has taken 
advanced Western countries centuries to achieve". 
(Article in Morning News, 26.9.68) 
Neutral 
"President Mohammed Ayub Khan yesterday said that awakening 
of the masses in a developing country like ours was possible 
if all the media of information were put to maximum use.... He 
said television was a necessity for awakening the people, making 
them aware of their problems and pointing to their solution". 
(Article in same issue of Morning News) 
Unfavourable 
"A wave of indignation and resentment at the Central Government's 
unwarranted action against Dawn and Evening Star swept all over the 
country as the news reached the farthest corners of the two wings 
of Pakistan". 
(Article in Dawn, 18.11.53) 
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APPENDIX TWO: FIELD RESEARCH IN PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH 
My field research in Pakistan and Bangladesh was undertaken 
in the last quarter of 1979. I submitted a questionnaire (given 
in this appendix) to a sample of journalists in both countries 
(taken from the major papers of Karachi, Lahore and Dacca, and 
from the news agencies), interviewed the editors of a large 
number of papers and other people involved in the media. I 
did not undertake equivalent research in Nigeria for several 
reasons: i) the content of the Nigerian newspapers was straight- 
forward; being so patently partisan it needed little explaining. 
The Pakistani press, by contrast, is a complicated mixture of 
partisanship, and government and market-orientation; ii) Pakistan 
has a professional body of journalists with long traditions -a 
journalistic background that the Nigerian press lacks; iii) much 
more has been written on journalism in Nigeria than in Pakistan; 
iv) journalism changed far more in Nigeria after the civil war 
than did journalism in Pakistan after the civil war; the press 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh was not substantially affected. 
Interviewing journalists in Nigeria would have thrown much less 
light on the pre-civil war press, which was the main subject of 
my analysis in both countries. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. When did you join your newspaper? 
What position did you hold on joining? 
What position do you hold now? 
2. What other newspapers have your worked 
on? Please list, giving rough dates. 
3. What other full-time jobs besides journalism 
have you had? Please list, giving rough dates. 
4. In what year were you born? 
Where were you born? 
a) Town or Village 
b) Province 
5. At what institution did you finish your full-time 
education? 
a) Name 
b) Place 
6. What is your father's occupation (or last 
occupation if retired)? 
7. Why did you become a journalist? Please discuss in a few words. 
8. Have you ever been to Europe or the U. S. A.? 
a) Yes (please tick) 
b) No 
If yes, how many times? 
Have you studied in Europe or the U. S. A.? 
a) Yes (please tick) 
b) No 
9. If you were born (or lived) outside Pakistan/ Bangladesh, 
when did you come to Pakistan/Bangladesh? 
10. Please name any foreign newspapers you read fairly regularly. 
11. If you read any Western newspaper, please state what you think 
are the good points and the bad points in Western journalism. 
Good Points Bad Points 
12. Do you think the English-language papers of your country are 
a) too Westernised 
b) not enough like Western 
newspapers 
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13. Please estimate the percentage of your working hours 
you spend reporting on (% working hours) 
a) Local affairs (of any 
town or areas) 
b) National affairs 
14. Which towns (or areas) do you in general report most on? 
Please list in order of time spent. 
15. What percentage of the time which you spend on local affairs 
(again, of any towns or areas) do you spend reporting on 
the area in which you live? 
If a number of your close relatives live in a different town 
or area from you, please state the percentage of the time 
which you spend on local affairs that you spend reporting 
on the area in which they live 
16. What do you think a journalist should try to do in his 
reporting? (please tick one) 
a) Report the facts exactly as they are? 
OR b) Discuss the facts? 
17. In some countries the major political parties are associated 
with newspapers in which they can express their views. In 
some other countries the newspapers tend to report the parties 
equally. It can be argued that both systems enable the 
public to read a variety of political views. Which system 
do you prefer? (please tick one) 
a) Each paper expressing a 
different party view 
OR b) Each paper expressing 
several party views. 
18. Which of the following do you think are the most influential 
papers in your country? (please tick one) 
a) the Pakistani-language/Bengali papers 
OR b) the English-language papers 
Please state in a few words the reasons for your choice. 
19. How much editorial alteration (for reasons of space, style 
or suitability) are your reports in general subject to? 
a) a great deal (please tick one) 
b) quite a lot 
c) not very much 
d) none at all 
20. Where do you prefer to read criticism of national policies (please tick one) 
a) in the actual text of a newspaper 
report on the policy? 
b) in the newspaper's editorial column? 
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21. The following is a possible list of 6 goals often mentioned 
in relation to new countries. Please number these goals in 
order of the importance you think they should have, writing 1 
by the most important down to 6 by the least important. 
Political stability 
Rapid industrialisation 
Rural development 
Freedom of the individual 
Greater economic equality 
Democratic political participation. 
22. Do you think that certain sectors of Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
society are too much influenced by Western culture? (please tick) 
a) Yes 
b) No 
23. Have you ever performed Hajj? (please tick) 
a) Yes. 
b) No 
Do you regularly observe Ramazan? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
24. How much do you read the Friday newspaper articles 
on religion? (please tick one) 
a) Hardly at all 
b) To a moderate extent 
c) Thoroughly 
25. Do you think that newspapers, when discussing Islam, should 
concentrate more on (please tick one) 
a) the traditions and past 
glory of Islam? 
b) the interpretation of Islam 
in the light of social change? 
26. Which do you think has in the past been most responsible 
for the problems of your country? (please tick one) 
a) Political instability in Pakistan/Bangladesh 
b) Western interference 
c) Non-Western interference 
d) Economic inequality in Pakistan/Bangladesh 
27. How well do you think the political parties of Pakistan/Bangladesh 
reflect the full range of public attitudes in Pakistan/Bangladesh? (please tick one) 
a) Very well 
b) Moderately well 
c) Not well. 
28. Do you think industry in Pakistan/Bangladesh should be 
(please tick) 
a) Mostly under public ownership? 
OR b) Mostly under private ownership? 
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29. Finally, would you please describe below in as many words 
as you wish, what you believe the press could realistically 
help to achieve in a developing country. 
